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Abstract 
 
 
This work discusses the contribution of the philosopher Daya Krishna (1924-2007) to the realm 
of intercultural dialogues. A leading figure of academic Indian philosophy, Daya Krishna left 
an immense and eclectic, yet mainly unexplored, corpus. Firstly, I offer one approach to his 
diverse philosophy by focusing on his philosophical project as a whole. His project attempts to 
unveil the presuppositions of thinking, which can only be effectuated in dialoguing across 
philosophical traditions founded on different presuppositions.  
Applying his project to the realm of intercultural dialogues, I begin by questioning the limits 
encountered by recent intercultural theories aiming at deconstructing Eurocentrism and 
establishing a global philosophical dialogue while responding to their postmodern European 
heritages. As a counterpoint, I introduce the challenges of Anglophone Indian philosophers in 
India, facing an uprooting from their own traditions. They feel this uprooting as cultural 
subjection, deprived of their own philosophical past.  
Within this context, Daya Krishna connected isolated communities of thinkers by organizing 
multilingual dialogues (called ‘saṃvāda’) between traditional paṇḍits, ulama and Anglophone 
philosophers. I reconstruct some of these experiments, thereby emphasizing methodological 
insights gained from this dialogical practice and the process of their organization. However, 
this intensive dialogical practice contrasts with the lack of a theory of dialogue in Daya 
Krishna’s philosophy. Therefore, I analyze what unveiling presuppositions means, and how it 
can contribute to the question of philosophical creativity in intercultural dialogues. I locate the 
source of this creativity in the challenge of accepting epistemological uncertainty in the latter. 
This uncertainty is further explored in the dissatisfaction felt in the gap between the ideality of 
philosophical apprehension and its realization, as well as in the illusion of I-centricity. These, 
however, are not obstacles for intercultural dialogues. They rather constitute the human 
predicament through which the specific creativity of intercultural dialogues originates – in the 
fragility of differences being explored conjointly.   
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Diese Arbeit bespricht den Beitrag des Philosophen Daya Krishna (1924-2007) für den Bereich 
interkultureller Dialoge. Als eine maßgebliche Person akademischer indischer Philosophie 
hinterließ Daya Krishna ein umfangreiches und vielseitiges, jedoch hauptsächlich unentdecktes 
Werk. Zuerst biete ich einen Zugang zu seiner diversen Philosophie an, indem ich mich auf sein 
philosophisches Projekt als ganzes fokussiere. Sein Projekt versucht, die Voraussetzungen des 
Denkens sichtbar zu machen, was nur mittels Dialogen über philosophische Traditionen mit 
verschiedenen Voraussetzungen hinweg durchgeführt werden kann. 
In Anwendung seines Projekts auf den Bereich interkultureller Dialoge stelle ich erst einige 
Grenzen heraus, an welche aktuelle interkulturelle Theorien stoßen, die in Reaktion auf ihr 
postmodernes europäisches Erbe den Eurozentrismus zu dekonstruieren und einen globalen 
philosophischen Dialog zu etablieren versuchen. Als Kontrapunkt dazu stelle ich die 
Herausforderungen englischsprachiger indischer Philosophen in Indien vor, welche einer 
Entwurzelung ihrer eigenen Traditionen ausgesetzt sind. Ihrer eigenen philosophischen 
Vergangenheit beraubt, erfahren sie diese Entwurzelung als eine kulturelle Unterwerfung. 
In diesem Kontext verband Daya Krishna isolierte Gemeinschaften von Denkern, indem er 
mehrsprachige Dialoge (‚saṃvāda’ genannt) zwischen traditionellen paṇḍits, ulama und 
englischsprachigen Philosophen organisierte. Ich rekonstruiere einige dieser Experimente und 
betone dabei die methodologischen Einsichten, die von dieser dialogischen Praxis und dem 
Prozess der Organisation der Experimente gewonnen werden können. Diese intensive 
dialogische Tätigkeit kontrastiert jedoch mit dem Fehlen einer Theorie des Dialoges in Daya 
Krishnas Philosophie. Deswegen analysiere ich, was das Sichtbarmachen von Voraussetzungen 
bedeutet und wie es zu der Frage philosophischer Kreativität in interkulturellen Dialogen 
beitragen kann. Den Ursprung dieser Kreativität lokalisiere ich in der Herausforderung des 
Akzeptierens epistemologischer Ungewissheit in solchen Dialogen. Diese Ungewissheit wird 
ferner untersucht in der gefühlten Unzufriedenheit aufgrund einer Kluft zwischen der Idealität 
philosophischer Auffassung und deren Realisierung, sowie in der Illusion einer Ich-
Zentriertheit. Diese Aspekte sollen jedoch nicht als Hemmnisse interkultureller Dialoge 
verstanden werden. Sie konstituieren vieleher das menschliche Dilemma, durch welches die 
spezifische Kreativität interkultureller Dialoge entsteht – in der Brüchigkeit von Unterschieden, 
die gemeinsam erkundet werden. 
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“The tension and the conflict between a human civilization transcending all 
civilizations and existing civilizations is, however, not exactly as new as may appear 
at first sight, especially in the contemporary context. All civilizations in the past have 
not only extended their frontiers but have also come into active contact and interaction 
with other civilizations not only through war, trade, and conquest, but also through 
what may be called, a genuine desire to understand and assimilate the other’s project, 
vision, and values. This aspect of the interaction between civilizations has generally 
been underplayed because of the habitual historians’ understandable fascination with 
the formation and dissolution of centres of political power and, more recently, those 
of wealth and riches which, in classical Indian thought on the subject, were clubbed 
together under a single puruṣārtha entitled artha. But, however underplayed by 
historians, there has been a fascination with the ‘other’ not only for its strange and 
exotic character which lies at the root of most recent anthropological studies, but also 
because the ‘other’ represents another possibility, another puruṣārtha of an 
individual’s own being which has not been explored or developed in his own 
civilization. The story of Chinese travelers in search of Buddhism epitomized so 
graphically in the life of Huien Tsang cannot, for example, be understood in any other 
way. However, the story of persons travelling in search of knowledge is as old as of 
those who have ventured out in quest of profit and plunder. If we remember the 
difficulties in travelling at that time and those involved in learning a foreign language 
and mastering it to such a degree as to be able to translate it into their own language, 
it is possible to begin to appreciate the impulse in at least some members of a 
civilization to understand the puruṣārtha of another and make them available to his 
own people. If it is further remembered that it was through the activities of these 
persons that such a large mass of literature was not only transported over thousands 
of miles but also preserved, translated, and received in course of time by millions of 
people of other civilizations who gradually tried to relate the projects and insights of 
their own civilization to them, it is possible to begin to realize that the dialogue 
between civilizations and the attempt of people belonging to one to transcend their 
own ‘parochiality’ has also been a perennial feature in the past of all civilizations.”1 
 
  
                                                 
1 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, PHISPC Monograph 
Series on History of Philosophy, Science, and Culture in India 8 (New Delhi: Project of History of Indian Science, 
Philosophy, and Culture - Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2005), 201–2. 
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Preface  
 
Daya Krishna was born in Meerut (near Delhi) in 1924 and graduated from the University of 
Delhi with a PhD thesis written under the supervision of N. V. Banerjee, examined by G. Ryle 
(Oxford University), H. H. Price (Oxford University) and S. K. Maitra (University of Calcutta), 
published with minor changes in 1955 as The Nature of Philosophy. This early work already 
contains a programmatic agenda for Daya Krishna’s further philosophical developments. It 
originates from the awareness that, although philosophy is claimed to be the organon for 
Knowledge based on Reason (rather than opinions) and leading to Truth, one only finds 
disagreements among philosophical theories, and philosophers furthermore do not seem to be 
able to ‘rationally’ convince each other in arguing against each other. To avoid plain 
indifference or unintelligibility, Daya Krishna ventures into exposing the unquestioned 
presuppositions of philosophy from which the ‘illusions’ of finality, unity and absoluteness of 
Truth, Reason, Knowledge, Freedom, Reality and Value originate. In my reading, it is this 
approach of ‘unveiling’ the presuppositions of thinking in general and of philosophy in 
particular that orientates his writings from this beginning until his posthumous work Towards 
a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions (2012). The task is multifarious with 
numerous implications in the different realms of thinking, and in consequence, Daya Krishna’s 
publications are thematically eclectic. He considered the transcendental presuppositions of 
consciousness, their perceptual and biological structures, their cultural, political, sociological 
and economical organizations in terms of central-peripheral powers, their logical expressions 
and the epistemological consequences of subjectivity for knowledge, as well as the ‘myths’ of 
Indian philosophy in view of their historical presuppositions. For that purpose, Daya Krishna 
delved into various traditions of Buddhist and Brahmanical classical Indian philosophies as well 
as the analytical and continental traditions of the so-called Western philosophies. He travelled 
freely and widely between traditions, texts and disciplines, with the persisting idea of exposing 
the unasked and the givenness of any way of ordering, structuring and thinking philosophical 
problems.  
Such a project cannot be realized alone, for one’s own presuppositions are far too deeply rooted 
to be overcome. Daya Krishna was not only aware of this limitation, but furthermore convinced 
that it could be a beneficial potentiality to enter in dialogue with participants sharing different 
sets of presuppositions. He thus continuously organized and participated in dialogical 
experiments, in particular during his career as a professor at the University of Rajasthan (Jaipur), 
with traditional paṇḍits (later also with Muslim Ulama) in bilingual or trilingual dialogues 
(which he referred to as saṃvāda) for reinterpreting and thinking together philosophy creatively. 
He furthermore was for two decades the editor of the Journal of the Indian Council of 
Philosophical Research, the form of which he also modified to allow more questions, answers 
and discussions. Finally, he wrote and edited more than 20 books and 200 articles: among these, 
a large part was dialogically conceived as responses to his interlocutors, another part was edited 
to promote receptions of neglected Indian philosophers and foster cross-cultural discussions, 
and yet another part was also consciously written in Hindi as a battle against the hegemony of 
English. In view of his impressive contributions and of his commitment to public ‘academic’ 
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(broadly understood) dialogues, Daya Krishna appears today as a leading figure and one of the 
most creative writers of Indian academic philosophy of the 20th century.  
The first reason for a study on Daya Krishna’s philosophy is obvious: a decade after his death, 
with an incredible amount of work left behind him on an amazing range of topics, the 
philosophy of Daya Krishna should become available to philosophers. This denomination 
includes scholars of Indian philosophy/ies but also scholars who do not associate with the 
cultural and geographical adjective ‘India’, outside the field of South Asian Studies (and its 
relatives, such as Indology, Religious Studies, etc.), inside and outside India. To this last world 
in particular, Daya Krishna is still unknown, and this work first hopes to introduce his dialogical 
philosophy. In so doing, the questions pursued here, although emerging from India and 
committed to the specificities of the context in which they arouse, are not limited to a historical 
perspective of a ‘regional’ philosophy. I want to question intercultural dialogues as such, 
starting with his dialogical experiments and philosophy. 
Devoting an intercultural analysis to Daya Krishna’s work is not insignificant. It grounds the 
enquiry in contemporary Indian philosophy with the challenges and difficulties that its context 
brings: the intermingling and division between classical and contemporary philosophies in 
India, the postcolonial stakes organizing this division, and the global context impacting its 
development. Such an enquiry thus implies to look simultaneously and reciprocally in two 
directions. On the one hand, it requires considering what an analysis which originates in 
philosophies from Indian academics could bring to intercultural theories elaborated in Europe 
or America. This further leads to question how the specificities of the postcolonial Indian 
academics meet or differ from ‘world philosophies’ elaborated in the ‘West’, i.e. to recognize 
specific developments among the world philosophies themselves. On the other hand, it also 
requires considering the influence of the ‘Western’ (including the reductions in the use and 
understanding of this term) reception of the contemporary philosophical developments of 
Anglophone Indian academics.  
Taken together, the difficulties of these relations illustrate how the Western/Indian debate is 
relevant today only when it is understood as a binary entity. The meaning of both the ‘West’ 
and ‘India’ can be only grasped in the mutual but unequal relation of the two terms. This 
inequality, however, renders the relation as necessary as it is reductive and unbalanced: for the 
Western influence is unavoidable, while it seems that even highly sophisticated world 
philosophies, cross-cultural or intercultural theories can be developed without involving their 
Anglophone Indian counterparts. Consequently, this work tackles on political questions 
relevant to the postcolonial structures Daya Krishna’s project was shaped in, in Indian academia 
and in connection with different movements fostering similar objectives - however, in very 
different ways. The contributions of Indian academia that originated following the colonial 
encounter and the transformations of Indian academics should not be underestimated, for they 
offer tremendous resources of postcolonial reflection on the terms on which intercultural 
dialogues, understanding, encounters and cross-cultural analyses can foster philosophical 
creativity today. Inspired by the specificities of the colonial Indian context, but also by the 
influences of their philosophical heritages and continuities for interrogating contemporary 
situations, Indian academia and contemporary philosophies offer highly relevant questions and 
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answers to the fields of ‘intercultural philosophy’ seen in a ‘global perspective’. Thus, Daya 
Krishna’s philosophy and his dialogical experiments firstly help us questioning, from another 
perspective and traditions, what intercultural dialogues could bring to intercultural theories, and 
in particular, how do intercultural dialogues foster creativity and novelty in philosophy.  
Furthermore, to specifically analyze the intercultural creativity involved in Daya Krishna’s 
experiments and philosophy among contemporary intercultural theories, implies not only to 
consider the Anglophone Indian academic context and its difficult relation to the Western 
counterpart that it addresses, but also the originality of Daya Krishna himself. What is Daya 
Krishna’s contribution among his peers, and what is the singularity of his position? Daya 
Krishna is a man of this between ‘classical’ and ‘contemporary’, ‘Indian’ and ‘Western’. He 
has been accused of being an outsider of the field of classical Indian philosophy/ies, because 
his interest in Indian philosophy/ies would have supposedly come late. Some scholars therefore 
suggested to divide his work into a first, middfle and late phase. There are indeed differences 
in the style of writings as well as in the influences on his work, which should be a hopeful 
insight for any philosopher, namely the possibility of developing her/his thought further. But 
Daya Krishna is also a philosopher who, trained in Western Anglophone philosophy in India, 
and also in Sanskrit, interested in learning, listening and bringing visibility to the diversity of 
Indian philosophies, tried to bring different (rather isolated) communities of philosophies 
together. He could bring them together while fostering contemporary thinking with these 
traditions at the University of Rajasthan in Jaipur. His philosophy therefore reflects the ‘living’, 
‘classical’ Sanskrit community, includes Hindi speakers and, to a lesser extent, Urdu speakers. 
It also reflects the living English-speaking contemporary community, itself divided between 
‘Western’ sources and contemporary Indian philosophy inherited from a postcolonial fusion 
between indigenous traditions and external receptions, with the impossible clear-cut of these 
antagonistic heritages.  
In this sense, Daya Krishna is both an insider and an outsider. Living and teaching in Indian 
academia, born as a Hindu, he does belong to Anglophone postcolonial academia and to the 
Hindi sphere of philosophy. But he is equally an outsider of the same Hindu philosophical 
world, of which he refused much orthodoxies, of the Islamic philosophical world, of the 
Buddhist philosophical world, and also, in his own way, of the English-world, of which he 
refused the hegemony. Of course, he is related to these traditions in different ways and degrees, 
being more closely associated to some than others. Like many instances of today’s world, 
whether it is due to colonization in or of one’s country or migrations to another, Daya Krishna 
is a mediator and an in-between figure. He is committed to the traditions of Sanskrit 
philosophies to which he feels no personal allegiance but a responsibility to reattribute to them 
a scholarly place of debate of which they have been deprived, however implying a critical view 
of their heritage. He is equally committed to the plurality and complexity of India’s intellectual 
traditions. He is finally, also trained and inclined to the ‘Western’, primary analytical, methods, 
sources and traditions, of which the Indian intellectuals also have a legitimate claim and 
heritage. Thus, he is a traveling mediator of different worlds.  
In so doing, Daya Krishna is both an illustration of his time, of the problems and concepts of 
his own contemporary Indian philosophical context, and an innovative thinker. Unlike others, 
xvi 
 
however, he was mostly committed to two things: first, to actually engage with scholars who 
were for their part, grounded in a single training and heritage. Secondly, to dissociate these 
traditions from blind loyalty to any heritage, and to consider them instead as creative sources 
for today’s thinking.  
Saṃvādas, as he referred to, were the philosophical and open dialogues organized across 
traditions and disciplines. Beyond the experiments that were carried under this name, I argue in 
the present work that saṃvāda underlies Daya Krishna’s philosophical life, his philosophical 
collective projects, and grounds most of his work. It is in the reconstruction of implicit or 
explicit dialogues with his colleagues that one grasps the origins and developments of his 
critical appreciation of Indian philosophy/ies, and the basic assumptions and intuitions of his 
own work. However, he did not write any monograph on the problem of dialogue or saṃvāda, 
and very little of his philosophical work is explicitly, systematically and theoretically reflecting 
on dialogue itself. The topic is therefore somehow always there, underlying, as the origin, the 
cause, the motivation of his whole work, without being there, as a topic reflected upon. In the 
diversity of his writings and the forms the experiments took, how to proceed to define and 
qualify what saṃvāda exactly means? And what exactly is dialoguing for someone who wrote 
so little explicitly on the topic? Can we, without losing the diversity of his insights, provide a 
meaningful continuity in Daya Krishna’s thinking if we articulate it around this concept? In 
Daya Krishna’s reception, saṃvāda takes more and more importance, but it is still true that 
there is no monograph reconstructing Daya Krishna’s philosophy of dialogue. This thesis is 
simply an endeavor to fill this lack.  
This work thus does not respond to a specific claim made by Daya Krishna on dialogue or 
interculturality. The objective rather lies in answering these questions by unveiling what I see 
as the persistent attempt in his multifarious writings, which I hypothesize to be a commitment 
to saṃvāda even when it is not named or theorized upon. I aim at elucidating what saṃvāda, in 
the diversity of its experiments and the absence of theoretical elaboration, could mean. I 
therefore engage less in the analysis of a particular school (Indian or Western), a position or the 
historical reconstruction of a classical concept, which could (also) be found in Daya Krishna’s 
writings, than with what I see as Daya Krishna’s philosophical project. While it could seem in 
consequence that there is no ‘Daya Krishnian concept’, or domain of expertise, this work argues 
that it is the method, or the path chosen by Daya Krishna that makes his contribution to the 
topic of intercultural dialogues original. I will show how this way is a practice of saṃvāda by 
combining theoretical research to unveil presuppositions that result in intercultural dialogues if 
used creatively, whereas presuppositions impede any dialogue when they remain unquestioned 
and become dogmatic assertions.  
Thus, the present work follows two objectives: firstly, the one of highlighting what I see as one 
consistent project in spite of, or better, thanks to, Daya Krishna’s various philosophical 
directions and engagements. Secondly, I will highlight what this project could bring those of us 
who argue for intercultural, cross-cultural, comparative projects, in particular for the role of 
dialogues therein. I begin with an analysis of forms of communication located first of all in 
Franco-German thought (chapter 1), before turning to some critiques based on intercultural and 
cross-cultural projects established on the heritage of these European positions (chapter 0). As 
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an answer to these critiques, I first reconstruct Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda experiments (chapters 
2 and 3), and then ground these experiments in the larger framework of his philosophical 
writings (chapters 4 to 7). I focus in particular on presuppositions (5), dissatisfactions (6) and 
illusions (7), which, I argue, enable to articulate a plurality that is confronted in dialogues and 
thereby constitute the points of tension from where intercultural creativity arises. This last 
theoretical part includes some of Daya Krishna’s interlocutors and Indian philosophers of the 
second half of the twentieth century (and most of the time, them only).  
There is no need to hide the fact that the organization and development analyzed in the 
following pages is highly personal. The resources of intercultural philosophy and cross-cultural 
philosophies from the Western hemisphere are used before all as a conceptual framework and 
counter-point to engage and frame the debate with contemporary Indian philosophy, and even 
more, to see how the distinct answers from the latter can help us delineate some limits of already 
established theories. The history of ideas on the postcolonial Indian academia that is provided 
in section 2.2.1 aims to elucidate Daya Krishna’s context of saṃvāda. Thus, neither the 
introductions nor the intellectual descriptions surrounding the dialogical experiments are 
exhaustive (which would in itself be an independent work, or even several). They present 
instead an intelligible context and a set of questions to address Daya Krishna’s dialogical 
practice and theory.  
Regarding the chapter 3 in which I describe the saṃvāda experiments, the problems are 
however quite different. They do not originate from the vastness of the sources among which 
one must choose in order to intelligibly articulate an idea, but rather from the lack of availability 
of the resources. Much of the material on which the reconstruction of the saṃvāda experiments 
is based has been assembled during research stays in India to create a usable corpus of data 
beyond the two published experiments. It includes unpublished letters provided by the Daya 
Krishna Archive (Jaipur/Tel-Aviv) and a series of interviews and meetings with participants of 
these seminars and dialogues, along with out of print essays and documents. But even collecting 
and processing these resources implies having to ‘make one’s way’ in a field that is as little 
researched and accessible as contemporary Anglophone Indian philosophy (whether this is first 
of all a defined ‘field’ itself is an open question). In this sense, the following work delineates a 
possible path in need of further developments and the saṃvāda experiments are described here 
as a possible way to engage further in intercultural dialogues.  
The last theoretical part faces both problems, namely the difficulties of accessibility of 
contemporary Indian philosophies and the vastness of possible interlocutors with whom Daya 
Krishna engaged in his philosophical writings. The integration of interlocutors and the 
construction of a line of thinking in his philosophy among the tremendous amount of material 
that he explicitly or implicitly used is my own bricolage. It required a selection of topics and 
authors depending on my own abilities (to collect, process and frame materials that for the most 
part are difficult to access) and judgment (to integrate what seemed relevant to establish a 
philosophical background for dialogue in Daya Krishna’s philosophy). There is no doubt that 
many other paths and interlocutors are possible. This also forms the raison d’être of each 
philosophical dialogue, which I define later in this work as unique and infinite in abstracto, but 
de facto limited to its participants.  
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Thus, rather than exhaustivity, one of the objectives I had set for myself was to suggest one 
comprehensive way to approach such a diverse literature, the one of Daya Krishna in particular, 
in dialogue with contemporaries from the Indian academia of the second half of the twentieth 
century. That this field is in need of comprehensive recollection, reconstruction and visibility, 
is evident to anyone who has tried to come to grip with this literature, in particular outside India. 
The choice to favor contemporary Indian interlocutors in the third part of this thesis has been 
grounded first in view of trying to at least partially reconstruct an immediate ‘circle’ in which 
Daya Krishna’s philosophy matured. Secondly, it illustrates certain common concerns and 
interests to a postcolonial generation of Indian academia. Thirdly, because neither the particular 
authors nor the more general concerns have been until now been much analyzed or made 
available (to the Western reader in particular, but also to a large extent to Indian readers), it is 
also motivated by a concern of providing reception to texts and ideas of some participants of a 
cosmopolitan and philosophically rich generation of Indian philosophy/ies. Their thoughts are 
not limited to the time and contexts that enabled their emergence and formulations, but still 
constitute a resource for creative thinking to engage with.  
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1. Introductions:  
 
“‘Dialogue’ is more problematic. (…) There is no alternative to speaking and listening to one 
another, but we must not be naive about it. What is the language in which Indians today speak 
about themselves and their tradition? Do they still speak for the tradition? How does this 
tradition itself speak to me? What is my ability to listen? How can I understand the tradition 
on the one hand, and the broken identity of its modern representatives on the other? Do I 
understand myself in the process? Could it be that understanding itself is not just a European, 
but a Eurocentric notion? With all these questions in mind, I still have to listen and to speak to 
the other. Whatever the problems with ‘dialogue’ and ‘understanding’ may be - these are 
channels that have to be kept open.”1 
  
                                                 
1 Wilhelm Halbfass, ‘Research and Reflection: Responses to my Respondents. II. Cross-Cultural Encounter and 
Dialogue’ in Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, eds., Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its 
Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, 1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), 142. 
2 
 
1.1. Thematic Introduction: Forms of communication 
 
‘Dialogue between cultures and/or civilizations’, ‘dialogue with oneself’, ‘dialogue as 
mediation between I and You’, ‘interreligious dialogue’, ‘dialogism’, logic of dialogue: the use 
of the term ‘dialogue’ is now widely implanted across disciplines and practices. Scattered in 
many domains, from technical studies of communication to ethics, in the areas of politics and 
diplomacy, in sociology, linguistics, cultural studies and anthropology up to philosophical 
conferences, the topic seems to reach saturation point. Especially as it often takes for granted 
an alleged common idea of a dialogue, which presupposes that from politicians to participants 
of interreligious dialogue, everyone would share the same ‘intuitive’ representation, and maybe 
the same praxis of ‘dialoguing’. Even more confusing, the concept of dialogue seems more and 
more to acquire a moral pressure: ‘the necessity of dialoguing’, the ‘urgency of a dialogue’. 
Dialoguing turns out to be an imperative of our century, which contributes to make ‘dialogue’ 
a suspicious concept, which would be used for ideological purposes. This suspicion, which 
arises from the feeling of an insistent moral obligation to a vaguely defined concept (which 
could thereby include different and opposed ideas) is furthermore strengthened by the gap 
between the saturation of the uses of the term dialogue and the lack of argumentation and 
philosophical research on the concept itself. In other words: everyone hears about the necessity 
of dialogue, however very few attempt to theorize, define and determine modalities as well as 
conditions for establishing and thinking different forms of dialogue. What is exactly this 
dialogue that we urgently need? Or rather: what exactly do we need to set off dialoguing? There 
is therefore a gap between a feeling of saturation of the use of the term – which makes the idea 
hackneyed – and a lack of examination of what it actually means in different contexts – which 
makes its theorization and the philosophy of dialogue neglected.  
Another gap, as relevant today as the wide spreading vs. deeper examination of the concept, 
concerns the difference between a theoretical necessity and a lack of practice. While the 
‘necessity of dialoguing’ is generally accepted as an idea, the praxis, i.e. dialoguing itself, is 
rather seldom. Speaking about how urgently we need to establish intercultural dialogues is not 
in itself dialoguing, only harping on about dialogue. More exactly: while the ideal of a global 
dialogue is almost universally (supposedly) aimed at, its praxis is severely contrasted and 
marked by several failures: failures at a political level between different nations, failures at 
negotiations for peace and independence, failures between different layers and communities of 
a society, between different domains of research, and within philosophy, even sometimes 
between scholars of a same field in a common conference. Does this imply that dialogue is not 
a viable model of communication? Does it point at constitutive defects of ‘dialogue’ itself and 
concludes to an ‘impossibility of dialoguing’? Is ‘dialogue’ at the end only an ‘empty’ label to 
be used by those who want to add some ethical shape to their ideas – and should we therefore 
jettison the concept in philosophy? Besides, at a philosophical level of thinking, B. Waldenfels 
notices that, 
“When I philosophically engage myself in my fellow human beings, I think of them and I speak 
with them only in passing, but I reflect primarily on them and I speak about them. However, it 
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all depends on how I do it. For, providing that the Others are not originally simply the ‘what 
about’ of my reflection, the risk of objectification runs to distort what was meant.”2 
Waldenfels acknowledges that such a procedure of abstraction inherently belongs to the very 
nature of the philosophical exercise so that dialogue on the one hand and reflection on dialogue 
on the other hand as a concept and phenomenon, must be clearly distinguished.  This act of 
distinction in the abstraction is a condition to remain philosophical. However, it is necessary to 
philosophize in such a way that we bring the undefined experiences into a language that gives 
them meanings. This means to make sense with these experiences, rather than project a meaning 
detached of all experiences. I would add here that dialogue, since it is intersubjectively 
dependent, belongs to a kind of experience in which thinking about (something) and with 
(someone) cannot be distinguished in the process, which makes the praxis of dialogue so 
necessary to the conception of dialogue – since the praxis corrects, modifies and transforms 
what we thought dialogue was, could reach and develop. This makes the failures of dialogue 
even more uncomfortable. Does that mean that the theory is also distorted?   
On the contrary, this very mistrust and suspicion are reason to analyze these gaps and their 
grounds. They first emerge on the subsumption of distinct forms of communication under a 
common denomination. Is it always the case that when two persons or a group of persons are 
speaking with each other, they are dialoguing? Of course not. Are all political, diplomatic, 
academic meetings dialogues? Definitely not. So what can we call a dialogue, and how to 
delimit it? Under the label ‘dialogue’ are often entailed or used indifferently the following forms 
of communication: discourse, debate, conversation, and even perhaps the idea of a conference 
and unilateral speech. The following paragraphs suggest primary distinctions and exemplified 
differences between these communicative models, which suggest a preliminary frame for this 
investigation concerned with philosophical dialogues between intellectual traditions.  
 
1.1.1. Lectures, Conferences, Interviews: Unilateral Communicative Forms 
 
That a ‘real dialogue’ cannot be confused with a session of question and answer after a lecture 
appears evident. It is so, firstly because the speaking time is unequally distributed between a 
single speaker and her/his audience and this repartition is prefixed according to established 
conventions.3  It is so, secondly and mostly, because the format of questions and answers is 
organized around the idea that the speaker ‘has’ the answer: she or he is supposed to deliver a 
certain amount of (pre-acquired) informative knowledge, which remains unquestioned, already 
established, articulated and fixed.  This informative knowledge is systematically self-organized 
                                                 
2 My translation. Original text: „Wenn ich mich philosophisch mit meinen Mitmenschen befasse, so denke ich an 
sie und spreche ich mit ihnen nur beiläufig, primär denke ich über sie nach und spreche ich über sie. Doch es 
kommt alles darauf an, wie ich es tue; denn sofern die Andern nicht ursprünglich bloßes Worüber meines 
Nachdenkens und Besprechens sind, läuft die Vergegenständlichung Gefahr, das Gemeinte zu verfälschen.“ 
Bernhard Waldenfels, Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs: sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in Anschluss an 
Edmund Husserl, Phaenomenologica 41 (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1971), 1. 
3 Francis Jacques, L’espace Logique de l’interlocution: Dialogiques II, 1re éd, Philosophie d’aujourd’hui (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1985), 118. 
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as theses, the hermeneutic context of which, relying on a certain position and methodical 
formation, remains presupposed and unquestioned. This communicative structure also implies 
a definite hierarchy and the authority of the invited speaker. It can be understood as the 
‘classroom model’ of communication, such as the one operating between a teacher and her/his 
students, where the knowledge-asymmetry is presumed. 4  Furthermore, this basic unequal 
situation is exacerbated by an immutable academic structure, such that it looks like a “ritual” 
where roles are distributed according to one’s rank within the whole of the academics – 
something criticized for example by Daniel Hornuff in an article of the German Newspaper Die 
Zeit: 
“On this background, it becomes evident that the classical structure of a conference is based 
on this correlation between knowledge and power. The knowledge of those who are well-
established, successful and highly decorated appears like the intellectual vanishing point: best 
known are the conferences, in which the participants develop the grotesque ambition to quote 
the keynote-speaker in a more extravagant and penetrating manner than all others. These 
meetings degenerate into pseudo religious rituals, during which more will be blindly repeated 
than freely thought, and during which in particular young academics learn to have to grasp the 
gesture of obeisance. That is how the power of knowledge starts to become a pattern. (…) Such 
a format of conference inhumes critique, because the structural conditions to practice it are 
missing.5” 
While such a structure is in itself dubious, what is even more questionable than its mere 
possibility is its invariable frequency and the inviolability of its format: conferences almost 
automatically adopt this ‘classroom model’, even among pairs, even if they share the same area 
of competence, with the same ‘experience’ or academic qualification. This type of 
communication precisely avoids any type of dialogical confrontation and collective thinking. It 
keeps reproducing patterns, hierarchies and ranks, power distributions, already established 
theses, etc. In short, despite the acclaimed ‘necessity of dialoguing’, academics seem to be 
fundamentally structured on an anti-dialogical communication model. 
A sub-group for this communicative form could include the ‘interview’: both types share the 
same asymmetry in assigning speaking-time and supposed knowledge. Indeed, the 
                                                 
4 This knowledge-asymmetry problem is not only delimited to lectures and conferences, although this format is 
structurally configured according to this asymmetry. This syndrome is however also a basic problem for 
dialoguing, as criticized by Daya Krishna as the “guru-śiṣya paramparā”, the “master-disciple syndrome”, which 
prevents creativity out of fearful respect for the authority Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of 
Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
28. The concrete difficulty that this conception brings about for Daya Krishna’s dialogical experiments are 
presented in 2.2.2. The theoretical problems concerning the hindrance of dialoguing due to the unquestioned 
authority of a tradition passed on to disciples are analyzed in 6.2. 
5 My translation. Original text: „Vor diesem Hintergrund wird ersichtlich, dass die klassische Struktur einer 
Tagung auf der Korrelation von Wissen und Macht aufbaut. Das Wissen der Etablierten, Arrivierten und 
Hochdekorierten erscheint als intellektueller Fluchtpunkt: Allseits bekannt die Tagungen, an denen Teilnehmende 
den grotesken Ehrgeiz entwickeln, den Keynote-Sprecher ausschweifender und penetranter als alle anderen zu 
zitieren. Solche Treffen verkommen zu pseudoreligiösen Ritualen, an denen mehr nachgebetet wird als frei gedacht 
und an denen vor allem der wissenschaftliche Nachwuchs lernt, zu Huldigungsgesten greifen zu müssen. So 
beginnt sich die Macht des Wissens zu habitualisieren. (…) Ein solches Tagungsformat beerdigt die Kritik, weil 
die strukturellen Voraussetzungen fehlen, diese zu praktizieren.“ Daniel Hornuff, “Schafft Die Vorträge Ab!,” DIE 
ZEIT, September 22, 2016, Nr. 40/2016 edition, http://www.zeit.de/2016/40/tagung-vortraege-forscher-
professoren-rituale.. 
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interviewer’s interventions simply aim at inciting the interviewee’s speech, dividing the roles 
of the participants – either questioner, or answerer. However, in this asymmetrical pattern, a 
certain one-sided or mono-intentional dialogical exploration can take place, because, unlike in 
the case of the lecture, the knowledge of the interviewee is not ‘ready-made’, ready to be 
delivered. The interview consists in exploring one perspective by the play of questioning the 
interviewee. While the communication is constructed such as to favor one (the interviewee) 
perspective, a common exploration of this perspective is configured.  
The interview aims ‘only’ at an introspective understanding of the interviewees, but from a 
common exploration of one perspective. A certain ‘self-explanation’ originates from the 
external perspective of the interviewer projected on the interviewee. This forces oneself to think 
anew and to present differently one’s own theories and discourse. In other words: within the 
restrictive format of a unilateral exploration, a self-explanatory process of introspection through 
the other takes places. An excellent example of this phenomenon can be found in the published 
interview of the French philosopher and Member of the French Academy, Michel Serres, 
conducted by Bruno Latour (Serres, 1992). The original title expresses at its best this procedure: 
Éclaircissements, i.e. ‘clarifications’, the process of illuminating, or literally render something 
clear.6 The self-clarification is provoked by the reflection of the other’s understanding on 
oneself, which brings oneself, in the process of self-explanation and answering, to think oneself 
or one’s philosophy anew in order to present it differently to the other. ‘Reflect’ in this sense 
covers its two meanings: the self-activity of thinking carefully (to reflect on something), and 
the reflection sent back to oneself, something being emitted and directed back to oneself by 
something external (the light being reflected by a mirror, for example, or in this case, one’s own 
theories being reflected by the other). The reflection operates so to say by the mirror of 
otherness, what is triggered by the act of being interviewed, which means in Serres’ case 
encountering the other’s perspective and understanding of oneself, which brings a new self-
understanding and, thereby, some “éclaircissements”, clarifications. This phenomenon of 
clarification will characterize the concept of dialogue too, with the difference that the self-
clarification in the latter concerns different participants and should therefore be a reciprocal 
enterprise. 
What one notices throughout Latour’s long interviews is Serres’ initial resistance towards all 
forms of academic debates and discussions. He recognizes himself to be solitary and isolated 
throughout his career, deeply marked by the violent context of the twentieth century, including 
                                                 
6
 The translation of this book does not convey this meaning. In English, see Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, 
Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time (University of Michigan Press, 1995). Although the objective is 
stated by Bruno Latour at the very beginning: “Bruno Latour: There is a Michel Serres mystery. You are very well 
known and yet very unknown. Your fellow philosophers scarcely read you. Michel Serres: Do you think so? BL: 
Even though your books are technically on philosophy. MS: I hope so. BL: This is where I’d like some 
clarifications (éclaircissements, in French). Your books aren’t obscure, but the way to approach them is hidden.” 
Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Eclaircissement: Cinq Entretiens Avec Bruno Latour (Bourin, 1992), 9. Serres 
and Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 1. 
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the world of academics, and scared by the oppressing stature of influent intellectuals, such as 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s.7 
“Don’t you think you’re wasting your time when you engage in such a polemic? Since war is 
the most common thing in the world, it causes the indefinite repetition of the same gestures 
and the same ideas. Neither debate nor criticism makes any advances, except of the social 
chessboard and in the conquest of power. By what strange aberration where they believed to 
be fruitful, since they kill? What makes for advancement in philosophy, and also in science, is 
inventing concepts, and this invention always takes place in solitude, independence and 
freedom – indeed, in silence. We have a surfeit of colloquia these days; what comes out of 
them? Collective repetitions. On the other hand, we are cruelly deprived of convents and quiet 
cells and the taciturn rules of the cenobites and anchorites. Debates bring pressure to bear, 
which always tends to confirm accepted ideas. It exacerbates them, vitrifies them, constructs 
and closes off lobbying groups. At the very most it sometimes chisels out clarifications, but it 
never makes discoveries. But unless philosophy is devoted to commentary, it ridicules 
retracing existing concepts. Discussions conserves; invention requires rapid intuition and being 
as light as weightlessness.” 8 
Debate defined as sterile, reproduction of violence and imbalance of power that prevents 
original thinking: Serres’ statement is indeed irrevocable. 9  However, throughout the 
interview10, his appreciation of this act of clarification above mentioned changes, nonetheless 
with little esteem, in particular regarding his feelings towards discourses and debates. The 
clarification (or the repetition at its worst) of the dialogue is not simply opposed to discovery 
(according to Serres) of the solitary work, but a creative ‘illuminating’ dimension can emerge 
from the clarification process, and thereby enables self-discoveries. Thus, Serres’ view slowly 
changes in this direction after several long interviews. Coming back on his initial statements 
and his own ‘journey’ in philosophy, he states later on: 
“Basically, when you have no available model, when you’re wandering in the desert, you don’t 
always see things clearly. The constant presence of a scientific community, of ongoing debate, 
peer pressure – things we talked about earlier, so lacking for me – all these contribute 
powerfully to clarifying what you say. Solitude often accompanies difficulty, explains it. When 
                                                 
7
  See the section on “The Futility of Discussion”, in English. Serres and Latour, Conversations on Science, 
Culture, and Time, 35–42., in French Serres and Latour, Eclaircissement: Cinq Entretiens Avec Bruno Latour, 55–
66. 
8  Serres and Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 37. Original, Serres and Latour, 
Eclaircissement: Cinq Entretiens Avec Bruno Latour, 58–59. 
9“BL: This negative experience of discussions, do you hold to it? MS: Why get into discussions of determinism 
and chaos, when the same things have been said, by the same factions, in nearly every generation? No, debate is 
not productive. (…) Polemic never invents anything, because nothing is older, anthropologically, than war. The 
opposite notion has become conventional wisdom in the Anglo-Saxon world, which today holds sway. It is because 
it holds sway that this method is propagated. That’s always the strategy of victors. Reread Plato: Socrates always 
imposes the methodology by which he always wins. Dialectics is the logic of the masters. It’s necessary first of all 
to impose, in a manner defying discussions the methodology for discussion.” Ibid., p.38 (English); pp.60-61 
(French) 
10 Although the term ‘interview’ in English normally implies a professional context (examination of a candidate), 
I prefer the term to ‘conversation’ (used in the translation) or ‘discussion’, which in the present work specify other 
pluridirectional forms of communication. In the original text, ‘entretien’ rather means interview, even if it refers 
here to scholarly meetings among peers. 
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two people are together, as we are today, debate already begins to clarify things. So, you see, 
I’m beginning to evolve, on the question of discussion.”11 
Finally at the end of five long interviews, he even finds a kind of cure in the communicative 
process that took place between him and Latour, correcting his earlier impressions:12 
“Let me say again that you have convinced me, in part, on the question of debate. The entire 
question of evil is to a certain extent projected into it. So, then, what is the enemy? Often a 
collection of partners that I have myself produced and with whom I am conditionally and 
continually obliged to contract. The kind of debate that you are right in praising allows for a 
series of local contracts, represented here by segments of questions and answers. Whereas the 
kind of debate that frightens me produces a war that continually flares up more and more 
violently, going from local skirmishes to moral advance-guard and resguard battles. Thanks 
for curing me of my formidable naïveté.”13 
In so doing, Serres ‘discovers’ in the practice that there are different types communication, 
which create different experiences, dialogical and anti-dialogical. Does this however mean – 
following Serres’ last comment - that dialogue is an irenic model? This idea will be dismissed 
in the practice conducted by Daya Krishna (2.1.1), if the dispute is rationally oriented towards 
the object of thinking and detached from the speaker, namely if the polemic engages the content 
rather than the person (see 5.2 and 5.3). However, although interviews are limited by a one-
sided perspective, the transformative dialogical experience is here already described. 
 
1.1.2. Debates 
 
A ‘debate’ introduces two or more participants, who unlike in an interview, multilaterally enter 
in communication on a subject matter. The arguments and theses of the speaker meet different 
arguments by another speaker. While the teacher/student, master/disciple, 
interviewer/interviewee distinction vanishes, what persists are the pre-established ‘positions’ 
and ‘theses’ of the participants. A debate therefore resembles the successive presentation and 
confrontation of ‘theses’ defining various ‘positions’. ‘Thesis’ in this context means an 
assertion composed by a ‘rational’ sequence of arguments that converge to establish a position, 
which excludes on explainable grounds other incompatible theses and arguments, and is 
defended against other established theses. The ensemble of theses defines one’s position on a 
particular subject. It summarizes, designates, maintains, holds and roots the theses so that it 
becomes possible to map different theses on a common ground. Within the intellectual space, 
it draws positions on theoretical maps to orientate oneself and the different participants. In so 
doing, positions settle the debate in a certain reproduction and continuity of the theses: even 
contradictory positions from the opponent are located on the same map. Hostile or friendly 
neighbors, they are both integrated in the same space with different internal locations – and the 
                                                 
11 Ibid., pp. 75-76 (English); p.114 (French) 
12 See also, ibid., p.164 (English); p.237 (French) 
13  Serres and Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 196. In French, Serres and Latour, 
Eclaircissement: Cinq Entretiens Avec Bruno Latour, 282. 
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hostile neighbors presuppose the same framework of understanding to challenge one with 
counter-arguments. A ‘counter’-argument is established ‘against’ something, which 
presupposes the understanding and the knowledge of the initial ‘argument’.14 Both parts are 
necessarily connected, even if their relation implies an opposition. Belonging to the same map 
formed by a common rational framework has the following consequences, described by Georg 
Stenger15: 
“For a common ground of understanding and thinking, it could be postulated that in order to 
be composed in an entelechial or heuristic manner, or as a regulative idea, ‘theses’ are 
important, insofar as they fulfill the conditions that are associated with the dispute of the 
discussion. This means that theses do not argue about the ground but on the ground. The 
argumentation consists in the fact that one competitively argues with and against the other. 
Discussions are competitive argumentation, and its winner is the one who can be designated 
as the one who has the best arguments. The one who has the best arguments is the one who 
comes the closest to the ground on which the battle occurred. But who decides that? This can 
be of course decided only by the ground itself, which however does not appear and is therefore 
quasi replaced by the arguments.”16 
                                                 
14 See the importance of pūrvapakṣa (counter-argument) in classical Indian dialectics and more importantly the 
contemporary reinterpretation of it by Daya Krishna in 5.1, who makes of pūrvapakṣa an essential component of 
his dialogical experiments and of his philosophical writing. See also Elisa Freschi, Elise Coquereau, and Muzaffar 
Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” Culture and 
Dialogue 5, no. 2 (2017): 173–209, https://doi.org/10.1163/24683949-12340032. 
15 Stenger introduces a classification that distinguishes between discussion (Diskussion), dialogue (Dialog) and 
conversation (Gespräch). Although I use here some of the distinctive elements and characteristics as described by 
Stenger, I do not follow his classification, for the following reasons: the first is terminological. The usual English 
translations of these terms have different connotations, and using the corresponding terms could thereby lead to 
confusion. The characteristics of Diskussion (discussion) resembles rather the (English) ‘debate’, and 
‘conversation’ in English is generally understood as ‘Unterhaltung’, as any kind of talk and exchange between 
different persons. I thus prefer keeping the concept of dialogue to describe the ‘highest’ form of communication 
that Stenger names Gespräch (conversation). Secondly, the motivations of my classification have a different 
background. Stenger’s introduction of the concept Gespräch denounces the the limits of hermeneutics (i.e. the 
limits of the question of understanding itself) in distinction with dialogue (Dialog) retrieved from the hermeneutic 
tradition. Stenger suggests instead a ‘deeper’ ‘hermetics’ that constitutes the background of his concept of 
Gespräch – which Stenger, inspired by Heinrich Rombach, defends against hermeneutics. Gespräch is not 
fundamentally understood in difference to Dialog (whereas Dialog and Diskussion are categorically opposed) but 
rather as a further realization of Dialog. Or, in his words, Dialog understood as a “intended conversation” 
(“intendierte Gespräche”). In the present work, I rather turn to Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda, a conception which I 
believe, does not correspond exactly neither to hermeneutics nor to hermetics, or at least is constituted by a 
different conceptual background, for which this classification cannot be strictly applied. Georg Stenger, 
“Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Diskussion–Dialog–Gespräch,” in Philosophie Aus Interkultureller Sicht / 
Philosophy from an Intercultural Perspective, ed. Notker Schneider et al. (Amsterdam / Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997), 
300. See also the related chapter (2.1.3 ‘Diskussion – Dialog – Gespräch’) of his book, Georg Stenger, Philosophie 
Der Interkulturalität: Erfahrung Und Welten ; Eine Phänomenologische Studie, Originalausg (Freiburg: Alber, 
2006), 927–46. See also Heinrich Rombach, Drachenkampf. Der Philosophische Hintergrund Der Blutigen 
Bürgerkriege Und Die Brennenden Zeitfragen. (Freiburg: Rombach, 1996), 117–49. 
16 My translation. Original text: „Für einen gemeinsamen Verstehens- und Denkboden, mag er nun vorausgesetzt, 
entelechial, heuristisch oder auch regulative-ideell verfaßt sein, werden "Thesen" wichtig, insofern diese die 
Voraussetzung erfüllen, welche mit einem Diskussionsstreit verbunden sind. D. h., Thesen streiten nicht um den 
Boden, sondern auf ihm, und der Streit besteht darin, daß man mit- und gegeneinander um die Wette streitet. 
Diskussionen sind Wettstreite, als dessen Gewinner sich derjenige bezeichnen darf, der die besseren Argumente 
hat. Die besseren Argumente hat derjenige, der dem Boden, auf dem gefochten wird, am nächsten kommt. Nur, 
wer entscheidet dies? Dies kann natürlich nur der Boden selber, der allerdings wiederum nicht selber in 
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This entails some consequences. While engaged in a debate, it is impossible to question the 
structure of the debate itself, as it presupposes the same framework of understanding, the same 
understanding of reason, the same procedure of presenting arguments, the same dialectic 
tradition, etc. It shapes a common frame within which internal differences can be scrutinized. 
On the contrary, meta-reflection on the ways to think, formulate and answer these questions, 
and self-critical analyzes of the structure itself are not rendered possible by the model. It can 
therefore not analyze its limits, nor some problems that haven’t been thought because of some 
unreflected presuppositions. As a model, it is reproducing a certain way of communicating in 
which different questions can be similarly treated.17 These characteristics describe a certain 
closure inherent to the position one holds – one can certainly change his or her ‘position’, but 
having a position implies having chosen and decided between alternatives, it is itself a closing 
attitude.18 This defines the difficulties of a ‘debate’ for Daya Krishna: 
 “The frustration with interminable discussion that leads nowhere and results only in a 
perpetual reiteration of ‘known’ alternatives, arises generally when the participants instead of 
‘trying’ to think, begin propounding what they believe, in invoking the ‘authorities’ of the past 
or even the present, thus changing the ‘discussion’ into a ‘debate’ between those who have 
settled ‘positions’ of their own which they are not prepared to ‘think’ about any further. They 
have reached the end of their journey, journey in the realm of thought, and they have no ‘use’ 
for ‘thinking’ any further.”19  
A famous example of the debate-configuration could be the Paris encounter of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s with Jacques Derrida, which was organized and perceived as one between 
‘hermeneutic’ and ‘poststructuralism’. This debate, which to a large extent was regarded as 
having ‘failed’, as a “non-event”20 in Derrida’s words, was however proven quite fertile in an 
indirect way. The missed-encounter between Derrida and Gadamer might have had however 
dialogical consequences, either deferred and posthumous,21 or relocated, i.e. for the reception 
                                                 
Erscheinung tritt und deshalb gleichsam von den Argumenten vertreten wird.” Stenger, “Interkulturelle 
Kommunikation. Diskussion–Dialog–Gespräch,” 291–92. 
17 „Disputationes are so to say internal quarrels about particular single questions, which can be conducted through 
the controverse, which however can never concern the whole of the framework of understanding.” My translation. 
Original text: „Disputationes sind sozusagen interne Dispute über bestimmte Einzelfragen, die darin durchaus 
kontrovers geführt werden können, die aber niemals das Ganze des Verständigungsrahmens betreffen.“ Stenger, 
291.  
18 See how Daya Krishna, Kalidas Bhattacharyya and J. N. Chubb, aware of the difficulties of the philosophical 
debates of their times, as well as of the classical dialectic models, criticize this point in 5.2 and 5.3, and how they 
develop in consequence the concept of ‘alternative’ to overcome this issue. 
19 Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge” (Manuscript, n.d.), 
6.  
20 As reported by N. Oxenhandler: “"I have the impression nothing really happened. (…) I could develop a position 
in response to Gadamer, but that would take a great effort and it is not what I want to do now." (Jacques Derrida 
in a private conversation, Hanover, NH July 8, 1987)” In Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, eds., 
Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental 
Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 268. 
21 Such is Jean Grondin’s theory in his following paper: “For Derrida, the interruption of the living dialogue with 
Gadamer could allow a real dialogue to begin. Derrida wrote somewhere that it’s when conversation stops that 
dialogue begins. In this respect, one can remember the reservation that Derrida marked, in the second question that 
he addressed to Gadamer in 1981, about the idea of a ‘living’ dialogue. This idea appeared to him as “one of the 
most problematical”, much to Gadamer’s dismay. Evertyhing happens as if the dialogue had something testamental 
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and followers, students and colleagues of the philosophers,22 especially English-speaking.23 
Although the details and the grounds of this debate do not concern us right now, some elements 
are worth noticing for a theory of philosophical communication. The encounter presupposed 
the meeting of two determined ‘positions’ having common references (Heidegger, Nietzsche) 
and foundational questions (understanding, dialogue, language), being familiar with each 
other’s work (Gadamer articulated what he supposed would distinguish his position from 
Derrida’s), from which however different interpretations of the same concepts opposed them, 
one embedding the ‘hermeneutic’ answer, the other the ‘deconstruction’. What was attempted 
in the debate was thus never to ‘modify’ or ‘transform’ their different ‘positions’, but (at least 
for Gadamer) to explore the internal differences of their interpretations of common presupposed 
grounds and common presupposed references. Such an analysis would have characterized the 
encounter as a ‘successful’ debate. However, that did not happen, and degenerated in a parallel 
presentation of positions and thesis without real confrontation. The elliptic questions did not 
touch upon the main concern but on marginal problems, they were formulated in an alienating 
way for Gadamer. Derrida’s questions were not really directed to the other, but rather to himself, 
and he rather considered his own answers as ‘eligible’ and accepted answers. And so the 
communication was summarized from both sides as follows: 
                                                 
for him, just like, in his view, all instances of speech (parole) and of writing: they are a legacy that survives their 
author and that the friend should then carry in him.” My translation.  
Original text: “Pour Derrida, l’interruption du dialogue vivant avec Gadamer permettrait au réel dialogue de 
commencer. Derrida écrit quelque part que c’est lorsque la conversation s’arrête que le dialogue commence. À cet 
égard, on peut se souvenir des réserves que Derrida marquait, dans la deuxième question qu’il adressait à Gadamer 
en 1981, au sujet de l’idée d’un dialogue « vivant ». Cette idée lui paraissait « des plus problématiques », au grand 
désarroi de Gadamer. Tout se passe comme si le dialogue avait pour lui quelque chose de testamentaire, comme 
l’est à ses yeux toute parole et toute écriture : elle est un legs qui survit à son auteur et que l’ami doit alors porter 
en lui.” Jean Grondin, “Le dialogue toujours différé de Derrida et Gadamer,” Les Temps Modernes, no. 669–670 
(2012): 357–75. (P.14-15)  
22 Grondin partially bases his analysis on the particularly eulogistic posthumous writing by Derrida for Gadamer, 
which shows the differed and relocated ‘uninterrupted’ dialogue between Derrida and Gadamer, according to the 
former: “I was convinced that someone like Gadamer deserved never to die, because we needed such an absolute 
witness, who actively or as observant participated into all philosophical debates of the century. I admit something 
else, which may seem to be an alibi: I thought that his immortality could allow us to postpone, almost indefinitely, 
the moment of a real “confrontation” (Auseinandersetzung), as we did for so long. This discussion to which 
common friends in the United States and in Europe would always prompt us. Some complained about it; some 
reproached me never to have entered this open dialogue that Gadamer had inaugurated in April 1981 at the Goethe 
Institute in Paris, to which I seemed to evade. I am inclined to believe that they were not wrong.” My translation.  
Original text: “J’étais convaincu que quelqu’un comme Gadamer méritait de ne jamais mourir, parce que nous 
avions besoin d’un tel témoin absolu, qui a participé activement ou comme observateur à tous les débats 
philosophiques du siècle. J’avoue aussi autre chose, qui pourra apparaître comme un alibi : je pensais que son 
immortalité nous permettait de reporter presque indéfiniment le moment d’une réelle « confrontation », comme 
nous l’avons fait si longtemps. Cette discussion à laquelle des amis communs aux Etats-Unis et en Europe nous 
incitaient toujours. Certains s’en plaignaient ; certains me reprochaient de ne jamais être vraiment entré dans ce 
dialogue ouvert que Gadamer avait inauguré en avril 1981 à l’Institut Goethe de Paris et auquel j’ai semblé me 
soustraire. Je suis disposé à croire qu’ils n’avaient pas tort.” Jacques Derrida, “Comme il avait raison!,” Contre-
jour : Cahiers littéraires, no. 9 (2006): 88. In German, Jacques Derrida, “Wie Recht Er Hatte! Mein Cicerone 
Hans-Georg Gadamer,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 23, 2002. 
23 The translations of all the texts of the encounter, along with their philosophical commentaries, interpretations 
and treatment into English contributed substantially to the reception of this missed-encounter in Anglophone 
literature. See Michelfelder and Palmer, Dialogue and Deconstruction. 
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“Derrida: During the lecture and ensuing discussion yesterday evening, I began to ask myself 
if anything was taking place here other than improbable debates, counter-questioning, and 
inquiries into unfindable objects of thought-to recall some of the formulations we heard. I am 
still asking myself this question.  
(…) Gadamer: Mr. Derrida's questions prove irrefutably that my remarks on text and 
interpretation, to the extent they had Derrida's well-known position in mind, did not accomplish 
their objective. I am finding it difficult to understand these questions that have been addressed 
to me. But I will make an effort, as anyone would do who wants to understand another person 
or be understood by the other.”24 
Gadamer and Derrida’s encounter illustrates a third alternative to Serres’ distinction in debates: 
neither “local contracts” formed by questions and answers, nor a destructive “war”, it rather 
constitutes a “conversation that never happened”, a sequence of “settled positions” of a thinking 
journey, in Daya Krishna’s words, which do not meet but are parallelly presented.25 It shows 
the difficulties of articulating creative “counter-positions” engaging into the other 
argumentation, and the difficulty of modifying one’s own position, which forms the core of 
Daya Krishna’s entreprise (5.1). It also raises the problem of debating and communicating on 
the same base, or located on the same intellectual maps, along with the correlated issue: what 
happens when we want to transcend this map? Even more urgently: what happens in the case 
of philosophical dialogues across traditions when there is no common map available? This hints 
to dialogue, which in our analysis breaks the common referential and conceptual context. But 
before this definition is introduced, another communicative alternative must be distinguished: 
discourse and discussion.  
 
1.1.3. Discourse – Discussion 
 
The term ‘discussion’ is more equivocal than the former ‘debate’, because it indicates another 
dimension to the communicative components. While in a ‘debate’, we focus on the internal 
argumentative composition (position, counter-position), an external element is taken in 
consideration in discussion and discourse, namely the society in which the discourse occurs. 
Society appears as an agent having an effect on the discourse and the discussion. Two authors 
can be seen as complementary for analyzing the different effects of society and the public 
dimension on discourse: Habermas and Foucault, to which I will limit myself here to introduce 
the distinction of discourse to other forms of communication.  
Habermas and Foucault already quite differ in the meanings and connotations attributed to the 
term ‘discourse’. This polysemy originates first from the linguistic differences: ‘discours’ (Fr.) 
covers first the German ‘Rede’, i.e. the idea of an organized speech, that stands closely 
associated with the art of rhetoric, i.e. what can be said and how it can be said in public. Only 
secondarily can it be associated with discussion, in which different art and forms of discours 
                                                 
24 Michelfelder and Palmer, 52–53. 
25  Richard J. Bernstein, “The Conversation That Never Happened (Gadamer/Derrida),” The Review of 
Metaphysics, 2008, 577–603. 
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are organized with each other in the society. This explains Michel Foucault’s26 insistence on the 
conditions of emergence of a speech rather than on the emergence of a common rationality from 
speeches, which is Habermas’ argumentation.27 The ‘common’ for Foucault would rather refer 
to the processes in which a society unconsciously forms the discourse we can hold in public, 
what we can say and how we can say it. Foucault insists on the social embodiment of speakers 
in a surrounding community, within which implicit “rules of exclusion” 28  operate. Quite 
differently, in German, ‘Diskurs’ implies a high level of formalization of communication with 
different participants examining a definite topic in the public sphere.  This connotation incites 
Jürgen Habermas29 to delimit the formal possibilities and conditions of communication for it to 
occur and to be ethically developed in the public sphere. The mutual history of reception of 
theories on discourse being furthermore quite complex, since the authors appear often ‘known’ 
on the other side of the Rhine without really satisfying the expectation of the other audience,30 
it explains why theories on discourse and discussion usually follow one of these alternatives.31  
Leaving apart the historical study of these relationships, what could we draw from their 
philosophies to define the idea of a discourse and discussion? If we do not renounce to think 
the idea of discourse in spite of these differences, we can interpret Foucault and Habermas as 
highlighting two sides of the intrusion of the public into the discussion: Habermas provides us 
with a formal approach underlining the possible conditions for an ethical discussion, to which 
Foucault would answer with a ‘critical’ approach, pointing at the obstacles and the difficulties 
of the public into the discussion, what the ideal discourse would implicitly bring about as soon 
as it is incarnated in a certain society. This critical side probably explains that postcolonial 
authors such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who try to throw light on the condition of access 
to discourse by subalterns and minorities, and the controlled and limited production of discourse 
by a dominant elitist part of society, rather based their theories on Foucault. In the philosophical 
dialogues between different scholastic traditions that we are concerned about, this aspect is 
metaphilosophically relevant in a postcolonial perspective. It implies that the integration of 
                                                 
26 Michel Foucault, L’ordre Du Discours (Paris, Gallimard, 1971); Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses: une 
archéologie des sciences humaines, Collection Tel 166 (Paris: Gallimard, 2010). 
27 “I am supposing that in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and 
redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope 
with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality.” Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge & the Discourse on Language (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1982), 216; Foucault, L’ordre Du 
Discours, 10–11. 
28 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language, 216. 
29 Jürgen Habermas, Moralbewußtsein Und Kommunikatives Handeln, vol. 422 (Suhrkamp Frankfurt am Main, 
1983); Jürgen Habermas, Erläuterungen Zur Diskursethik, vol. 975 (Suhrkamp Frankfurt, 1991). 
30 Deleuze’s comments on the inutility of discussion illustrates the French disagreement to Habermas: “Nor does 
philosophy find any final refuge in communication, which only works under the sway of opinions in order to create 
“consensus” and not concepts. The idea of a Western democratic conversation between friends has never produced 
a single concept. The idea comes, perhaps, from the Greeks, but they distrusted it so much, and subjected it to such 
harsh treatment, that the concept was more like the ironical soliloquy bird that surveyed [survolait] the battlefield 
of destroyed rival opinions (the drunken guests at the banquet).” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is 
Philosophy?, European Perspectives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 6. In original: Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, Qu’est-Ce Que La Philosophie? (Minuit, 2013), 12. 
31 Probably the semantic differences left unclear to the readers how Foucault and Habermas could use the same 
terms, while their meanings and connotations in the original language differ, which explains why the commentators 
usually chose one author to define discourse and discussion. That is also one argument for Stenger to dismiss 
Foucault in his analysis (based on a German understanding of these terms). Stenger, “Interkulturelle 
Kommunikation. Diskussion–Dialog–Gespräch,” 309–10. 
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speakers is delimited by external factors. It also determines how the speakers address each 
other: the monopoly of a specific language in a discourse, the monopoly of a certain scholastic 
vocabulary and argumentative methods, the validation or refusal of certain tropes and logics, 
etc. The acute problem of the monopoly of the ‘West’ in postcolonial Indian philosophy, which 
influenced Daya Krishna’s project, is related to these delimitations of the discourse (see 2.2.1), 
and the argument for including a plurality of standpoints in dialogue is also a reaction to this 
monopoly (see 5.2.2). So described, discourse seems to be contaminated by an externality, 
either by the society that constructs its limits or by the community of speakers looking for 
agreement and validity of the theses in the discourse. Discussion is thus either directed to an 
exteriority in the sense of what it produces on the public (an influence, ideally ethical, on the 
community), or conditioned by an exteriority, i.e. how the community proceeds to the 
discussion. This characteristic emphasizes a distinction from debate qualified as the exchange 
of arguments between a number of positions for a study of internal differences. Discussions 
bring about the question of the public influence and determination of communication, which 
distinguish them from dialogue that opens communication to another dimension of the intimate, 
i.e. to the interiority of the person.  
This exteriority of discussion seems to induce a ‘cumulative’ communicative model: 
participants are several individuals with their own arguments and propositions who aim, via 
mutual evaluation, to reach a common point (agreement, understanding, definitions). In other 
words, discussion is the sum of different structured speeches who, in their connection, 
correction, evaluation, aim at a consensus. In Habermas’ words: 
“I call interactions communicative when the participants coordinate their plans of action 
consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the 
intersubjective recognition of validity claims.”32 
A sum of different coordinated participations, even if they can reach norms and agreement, is 
not a dialogue, since it does not engage one fully but rather one’s public opinion with others on 
a chosen topic. In Francis Jacques’ words, “a conception of discourse remains non dialogical 
as long as sentences are hold to be results of the symbolic activity of a separate speaker.”33 
Characterized by the division between public and private spheres, discussion can only be 
composed by my public intention, the part of my being that is oriented to the public, and 
distinguished from others. My assertions are the products of my expressive capacity in 
encountering others, i.e. a way to regulate intersubjective relations in a particular society (from 
which follow the ethical implications). Of course, the questions regarding which kind of 
societies (and the consequences of their plurality for the expressions and apparitions in the 
public) and which kind of rationalities are left open, subsumed by Habermas under ideal 
conditions that presumably would be valid everywhere, and even mostly untouched by 
Foucault’s sociological critiques.  
                                                 
32 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Repr (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 58. 
33 My translation. Original text: “Une conception du discours demeure non dialogique aussi longtemps que les 
phrases sont tenues pour les résultats de l’activité symbolique d’un locuteur séparé.” Francis Jacques, L’espace 
Logique de l’Interlocution : Dialogiques II, 1re éd, Philosophie D’aujourd’hui (Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France, 1985), 77. 
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This implication to the public, in difference with the personal implication of a dialogue, explains 
probably why Daya Krishna distinguishes discussion and dialogue on the basis of the number 
of participants, as a practical implication of this conceptual distinction:  
“If only two persons are involved and they ‘share’ a long part with ‘knowledge’ of the field 
they are covering about, it may turn into a ‘dialogue’ which generally is supposed to be only 
between two persons. But if there are more than two, though not too many, it has to take the 
form of a ‘discussion’, where different minds make new points suggesting different 
possibilities and carrying the discussion in different direction.”34 
The number of participants make for Daya Krishna an important difference, and he relates 
‘dialogue’ (possibility also on the ground of a wrong etymological conception, opposing 
monologue and dialogue, and dialogue and ‘multilogue’)35 to a ‘dual’ form, in particular ‘I’ and 
‘Thou’36, while discussion is declined in plural. A numeral difference does not seem enough to 
me to ground the conceptual distinction between the two concepts (see also 5.2), but it does 
point at an important element that I would rather correlate to the distinction between public and 
private, or more exactly, between subjects and persons. Indeed, I consider that dialogue and 
discussion can both happen with two participants and with more, but, while discussion is 
composed by the addition of (separate) subjects, dialogue engages first persons in relation, an 
indivisible ‘we’. But is ‘we’ not the addition of several ‘I’? From the perspective of 
communication, ‘we’ cannot be reduced to a grammatical plural of ‘I’, it points at a different 
function and relation between the ‘I’. N. V. Banerjee defines ‘we’ as follows: 
“But what is this ‘we’? It is not only not ‘I’ nor ‘others’ nor even ‘I and other’, but cannot also 
be a person or persons. Yet, if it is not anything concrete, it is an ultimate datum and as such, 
is not, like the pure ‘I’ or the mere ‘others’, an abstraction either. It must have a definite 
                                                 
34 Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 4. 
35 It seems that Francis Jacques would have agreed with Daya Krishna: “Dialegesthai originally means to converse. 
However, even if the prefix dia does not signify “two”, when the number of speakers exceeds two, it is most of 
the time better to speak of conversation rather than dialogue. It is a communication with several voices, which 
designates another mode, besides not less significant, of Being together”. My translation. However, where both 
would disagree is the fact that Daya Krishna considers precisely this Being together, and in fact Thinking together, 
as the highest mode of philosophizing, whereas Francis Jacques, maybe more traditionally, limits himself with the 
relation of two persons only, in which case he can send back the conversation to compose another category – left 
apart. Original text: “Dialegesthai, c'est primitivement converser. Pourtant, même si le préfixe dia ne signifie pas 
“deux”, quand le nombre des interlocuteurs dépasse deux, mieux vaut la plupart du temps parler de conversation 
que de dialogue. C'est une communication à plusieurs voix, qui désigne un autre mode, d'ailleurs non moins 
significatif, de l'être ensemble.” Jacques, L’espace Logique de l’interlocution, 117. 
36 In January 1992, while Maurice Friedman was invited in the Indira Gandhi National Centre for Arts (New Delhi) 
to deliver lectures on Martin Buber, a dialogue on ‘dialogue’ was successively organized between him and the 
participants and audience of his lectures. During this dialogue, Daya Krishna seems to come back and analyze his 
own long-lived dialogical practice. He then raised again the difference between a dialogue between only two 
participants, in particular in buberian context, and a dialogue between more participants (multilogue), also he there 
did not distinguish it from discussion: “Is a dialogue possible in a very large group? Is the limitation of the group’s 
membership a necessary condition for a fruitful dialogue? What is the distinction between the dialogue between 
the so-called I and Thou, that is between two persons, and a multilogue where the conversation or whatever takes 
place is between not-too-large a group but not confine merely to two persons?” Daya Krishna, in Maurice S. 
Friedman, S. C. Malik, and Pat Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi 
National Centre for Arts : D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd, 1995), 181.  
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function to perform; and its function cannot be anything but to define. But what else can it be 
given to it to define except the realm of the personal?” 37 
‘We’ as ‘I with others’ implies the realm of the personal, which for N. V. Banerjee is correlated 
to ‘meaning’, which is different from epistemic knowledge and from the aggregate ‘I and 
others’. His conception of the realm of the personal, and in particular the role of dialogue to 
realize how others are constitutive of the ‘I’, constitutes the topic of the last chapter in relation 
with Daya Krishna’s philosophy (7.3). Limiting aside the former epistemological aspect for 
now, N. V. Banerjee’s distinction can be here useful to delimit the spheres of discussion and 
dialogue as follows. Discussions are configurations of ‘I and others’ who externally agree on 
the norms and positions upon which the discussion takes place. The arguments might differ and 
the positions might oppose the participants, but the meaning entailed in their arguments is 
independently formed by each participant. The discussions thus assume, for the purpose of 
communication, a certain consensus on the framework and understanding of the concepts that 
are discussed. Dialogue, on the contrary, proceeds in ‘I with others’, i.e. in the common creation 
of meaning in the realm of the personal. It is in the dialogue itself that the framework and the 
understanding necessary for the concepts to be intelligible and meaningful are questioned, and 
‘dialogued’ upon.  In so doing, both forms can be used in plural but one correlates ‘I and others’ 
in a society where norms for discussion are already established (as subjects) while the other 
joins ‘I with others’ in the realm of the personal.  
 
1.1.4. Dialogue 
 
Before examining dialogues in Daya Krishna’s experiments and philosophy, I want to suggest 
a first preliminary and general approach based on the commonalities of some literature from 
the French, German and English speaking academic spheres. I want to underline some shared 
basic features in philosophical description of the phenomenon of dialogue, in distinction from 
the above communicative forms.  
a) First, dialogue – in contrary to other communicative forms – emphases reciprocity. What 
does reciprocity mean? It characterizes the interpersonal relation that takes place between you, 
me and the other participants. Interpersonal, as the relation engages us all as persons (in 
distinction to discussion); reciprocal in the sense that it requires a non-hierarchical (in 
distinction to the classroom model) relation that leaves room to bilateral communication (in 
distinction to interviews, lectures, etc.). Every participant can participate on the same 
                                                 
37 N. V. Banerjee was Daya Krishna’s professor and supervisor at Delhi University. Daya Krishna refers to him 
eulogistically in Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy. A New Approach, 1st ed, Studies in Indian Tradition Series, 
no. 7 (Delhi, India: Sri Satguru Publications, 1997), 211–13; Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy 
from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western (New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations; Motilal 
Banarsidass, 2001), 302–5. He also published an extended review of Banerjee’s book Knowledge, Reason and 
Human Autonomy in Margaret Chatterjee, The Philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee (New Delhi: Indian Council 
of Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1990), 190–211. It is thereby clear that he was familiar with 
his philosophy, which influences his own thought on the non-egoistic construction of knowledge, his criticism of 
solipsism and his argument for the necessity of conceiving knowledge as intersubjectively constructed. Nikunja 
Vihari Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons (Birkenhead: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), 29. 
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conditions, no matter their academic positions or what is evaluated as their possible knowledge. 
This interpersonal reciprocal relation in dialogue is best described by Martin Buber, in the 
description of the shift from the I-It relation to the I-Thou, where the subject/object dichotomy 
vanishes to grasp the relation beyond this binary rupture. In describing a tree for example, I can 
very well consider the tree as an object with qualities, as a picture in terms of its colors, as 
movement in terms of the way the air makes it move, or how it slowly grows, as a species in 
terms of scientific classification, I can abstract from its existence laws and numbers, but, 
“It can, however, also come about, if I have both will and grace, that in considering the tree I 
become bound up in relation to it. The tree is now no longer It. I have been seized by the power 
of exclusiveness. (…) To effect this it is not necessary for me to give up any of the ways in 
which I consider the tree. There is nothing from which I would have to turn my eyes away in 
order to see, and no knowledge that I would have to forget. Rather is everything, picture and 
movement, species and type, law and number, indivisibly united in this event. (…) Let no 
attempt be made to sap the strength from the meaning of the relation: relation is mutual 
[Gegenseitigkeit]. (…) I encounter no soul or dryad of the tree, but the tree itself.”38 
 
Buber’s I-Thou relation describes a mode of apprehension beyond the subject-object duality in 
which the Thou is perceived as an indivisible whole in relation to me, designating my existence 
as being possible strictly with other persons and elements. As well formulated by Francis 
Jacques, “the person needs to be in a relation with the other (you and her/him) to become herself 
or himself.”39 It does not mean that I cannot be at all without the reciprocal relation, or that I 
cannot be alone for a moment, but in this case I would come back to an I-It perception. In the 
time in which I am in a dialogical relation, I depend on the mutuality of this relation with the 
others. In the context of dialogues, it points at the importance of the other for the constitution 
of my own self, not as differentiation from others (I being a not-others, others being not-I) or 
as a limitation to otherness (the others being the limit of myself40) but as relation (I being ‘I-
with-others’, others being also ‘I-with-others’) whose ontological consequences will be 
developed in chapter 7 in Daya Krishna and N. V. Banerjee’s account. This implies a strong 
thesis, namely that a reciprocal relation cannot function on the basis of the distinction between 
the self and the Other, the same and the other, the alter and the idem, the I and non-I and all 
similar kinds of distinction (which are exclusion of the other in the non-I sphere). And that 
would be true even in the mode of recognition of the Other, even with the intention of reaching 
to him, in addressing him from my (distinguished) own to his (outside) self. In Francis Jacques’ 
words again:  
                                                 
38 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Einburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937), 6–7. Original text: 
Martin Buber, Ich und du, ed. Bernhard Casper, Nachdr., Universal-Bibliothek 9342 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2011), 7–
8. 
39 My translation. Original text: “La personne a besoin d'être en relation avec l'autre (toi et lui) pour devenir elle-
même.” Jacques, L’espace Logique de l’interlocution, 49. 
40 I use limit (Grenze) and limitation here in their distinction to border, following Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph 
Weber’s definition: “A border, literally, is a line, often conventional seldom natural, that separates two regions of 
space. Borders connect what is separated and separate what is connected. In principle, borders can be crossed. (…) 
Were there borders that we could not cross at all, they had to be of a sort that does not connect what is separated; 
they had to be limits. With limits, unable to get a hold of the other side, we are left with nothing much to separate 
from and connect to.” Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, eds., Comparative Philosophy without Borders 
(London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 1. 
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“It is assumed that dialogism is characterized by putting forward the double recognition of the 
other in me and of me in the other. The intention is laudable. But this alterity in chiasmus, in 
spite of its appearance as an existentialist paradox, is way too weak to serve as the interlocutive 
relation that it besides presupposes. It introduces at the most an alteration and something like 
a hypothesis of the Self by the Other where the subject accepts to expose herself even if she 
gets changed in her very existence. According to the poet Hugo von Hofmannstahl: “Each 
encounter dislocates and recomposes us.” In truth, we do not speak alone, not even to someone, 
but with him. If we look for the foundation of a human relation in a permanent determination 
of the self by the other, synchronic and miraculously unified in a reciprocal relation, we do not 
only pursue the implausible, we reverse the natural order of concepts.”41 
A double recognition of oneself in the other and the other in oneself, or a simple recognition of 
the other (as different from me) is insufficient to define a dialogue. We do not speak as a 
singular constituted entity to someone but with him (participating in my constitution and 
thereby in my thoughts, speech or parole, etc.). This encounter happens prior to the recognition, 
so that the modification operates before I can attribute his own space to the other and before I 
myself formulate my ‘own’ argument or thesis, detached of any traces of the other. Indeed, the 
same argument will be presented differently in front of different listeners: I do not explain 
Heidegger in the same way to Heidegger’s experts (reading the original texts in German and 
familiar with Western and German philosophy) as to paṇḍits42, master in Nyāya logic, speaking 
Sanskrit and used to a different set of concepts and references. And I do not think in the same 
way in front of them. I do not interact in the same way, I do not address myself in the same 
way, and probably my arguments, my language, my attitude, and at the end myself, will differ 
accordingly. A dialogue already implies an encounter with the whole of the person and an 
engagement from whole to whole rather than a divisive contribution in some particular 
linguistic proposition (see 4.1 and 7), some theses and arguments that would be transferrable 
from one audience to the other. This aspect is crucial for intercultural dialogues and underlines 
Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda project presented in chapter 2. 
                                                 
41 My translation. Original text: “On croit caractériser le dialogisme en faisant valoir la double reconnaissance de 
l'autre en soi et de soi en l'autre. L'intention est louable. Mais cette altérité en chiasme, malgré son allure de 
paradoxe existentialiste, est beaucoup trop faible pour tenir lieu de la relation interlocutive que d'ailleurs elle 
présuppose. Elle introduit tout au plus une altération et comme une hypothèse du Même par l'Autre où le sujet 
accepte de s'exposer quitte à en être modifié dans son existence même. Selon les mots du poète Hugo von 
Hofmannstahl : “Chaque rencontre nous disloque et nous recompose.” En vérité, on ne parle pas seul, ni même à 
quelqu'un, mais avec lui. A chercher le fondement d'une relation humaine dans une détermination permanente de 
chacun par l'autre, synchrone et miraculeusement unifiée en un rapport réciproque, on ne poursuit pas seulement 
l'invraisemblable, on renverse l'ordre naturel des concepts.” Jacques, L’espace Logique de l’interlocution, 132. 
42 A definition of paṇḍits in the Indian academic context by M. P. Rege: “When one talks about Indian philosophers 
one has in mind western-trained Indian philosophers. But there has been in India a countrywide community of 
philosophers, who worked within the Indian tradition and were engaged in formulating, criticizing and 
reformulating philosophical theories through the medium of Sanskrit. This is the community of pandits or śāstris. 
But they were never counted as philosophers. The role which western-trained Indian philosophers in their scheme 
of things had assigned to them was that of repositories of the knowledge of traditional thought. That is to say they 
were regarded as scholars and not as philosophers.” Daya Krishna et al., eds., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two 
Philosophical Traditions (Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 
1991), xxi. In the different quotes that will be used in this work, paṇḍit is also written as pandit or pundit according 
to the transliteration style.  
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b) Reciprocity implies also the idea of a continuous movement between me and you(s). What 
is this continuous movement constituted of, how does it work, what does it bring? These 
questions are essential to dialogues and will lead the second part of this work (II.) focusing on 
‘creativity’, as the dynamic creative movement of dialogue (Chapter 4 to 7). But as a work 
hypothesis, I would like to highlight here already that reciprocity, understood as a continuous 
movement between participants inherent to dialoguing itself, enables another constant feature 
of dialogue in the literature: the idea of the ‘togetherness of a between’, of an interrelation 
between participants that implies them both, of an activity created together: a “thinking 
togetherness” for Daya Krishna, a Zwischen, Ko-aktivität (co-activity), ‘Kon’-kreativität (con-
creativity) for intercultural phenomenologists such as Waldenfels, Stenger and Weidtmann43, 
or in general a codimensionality contained in the dialogical (implied in the sam- of saṃvāda, 
2.1) 
“By putting ourselves in the position of actual contact with each other, an absolute I-centricity 
is not restricted due to a decentration that I have to execute myself, rather I find myself in the 
first place in a polycentric ordered field, in a “pole-system”. The others are there in their co-
presence, they participate in a co-activity [mittätig in einer Koaktivität], where they don’t arise 
by themselves from my thesis, where the commonalities do not arise by themselves from my 
synthesis. What becomes visible is the realm of between [Zwischenreich] of the inter-
subjectivity, of the dia-logue, of the With-each other. It raises the question, how this domain 
of the middle unifies, which forms this unity takes, which depth and amplitude it reaches.”44 
This between is to be understood in its greatest importance. Although we tend to understand 
communication as “bringing together messages between human beings”,45 the “between” seems 
                                                 
43 Weidtmann grounds “interculturality” in the “between” itself (Zwischen) and defines followingly cultures 
according to their mutual movements and transformations in-between: “The concept of interculturality refers to 
that ‘between’ of cultures, which appears in the encounter and in the exchange of cultures. Cultures are understood 
as intercultural fundamentally from this between, which lies beyond the cultures and therefore orientates them 
beyond themselves. The between, which separates cultures, is itself nothing different than relating to (Bezogensein) 
each other. In so doing, the between indicates that cultures are separated through nothing. They are the same, 
namely the respective other culture, but each in their own way.” My translation. Original text: “Der Begriff der 
Interkulturalität bezieht sich auf jenes ‘Zwischen’ von Kulturen, das in der Begegnung und im Austausch der 
Kulturen sichtbar wird. Interkulturell werden die Kulturen grundsätzlich von diesem Zwischen her verstanden, das 
jenseits der Kulturen liegt und diese deshalb zu einer Orientierung über ihr Eigenes hinaus bewegt. (…) Das 
Zwischen, das die Kulturen trennt, ist selbst nichts anderes als ihr Bezogensein aufeinander. Damit macht gerade 
das Zwischen darauf aufmerksam, dass die Kulturen durch nichts getrennt sind. Sie sind dasselbe, nämlich die 
jeweils andere Kultur, dies aber auf ihre je eigene Weise.” Niels Weidtmann, Interkulturelle Philosophie: 
Aufgaben - Dimensionen - Wege, UTB Philosophie 3666 (Tübingen: A. Francke Verlag, 2016), 39–42. 
44 My translation. Original text: “Indem wir uns hineinversetzen in den aktuellen Umgang miteinander, wird nicht 
eine absolute Ichzentrierung beschränkt durch eine von mir selbst zu leistende Dezentrierung, vielmehr finde ich 
mich von vorherein vor in einem polyzentrisch geordneten Feld, in einem ,,Polsystem“. Die Andern sind mit da in 
einer Kompräsenz, sie sind mittätig in einer Koaktivität, wobei sie selbst nicht allein aus meiner Thesis, die 
Gemeinsamkeiten nicht allein aus meiner Synthesis hervorgehen. Was so in den Blick rückt, ist das Zwischenreich 
der Inter-subjektivität, des Dia-logs, des Mit-einander. Es stellt sich die Frage, wie dieser Mittelbereich sich eint, 
welche Gestalten die Einheit annimmt, welche Tiefe und Weite sich erreicht.” Waldenfels, Das Zwischenreich des 
Dialogs, 134. 
45 “We call communication in general any process of bringing together messages between human beings, whatever 
the degree of uniformity of the code that is used, which applies to words and discourses in interlocutive contexts, 
to the type of situation and the number of participants. The term communicability designates then a condition of 
possibility for the interaction and the understanding of meaning.” My translation. Original text: “On appellera 
communication en général tout processus de mise en commun des messages entre êtres humains, quels que soient 
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to be here considered simply as a repartition of the intended meaning, intended messages from 
the speaker to the listener. ‘Between’ points at a plurality of interlocutors from and towards 
which messages are communicated, transmitted, and divided. It seems to indicate an exchange 
of messages from A ‘to’ B, and when A ‘and’ B are ‘together’, i.e., located in the same space 
and conversing with one another. Now in dialogue, ‘to’ and ‘and’ becomes the interrelation of 
between: the intention of the exchange remains, but one realizes that it is not about repartition 
of pre-ordered and pre-intended meaning exchanging piece of knowledge. Meanings and 
knowledge rather emerge from the place of between itself. The communication creates a place 
for meaning to emerge between participants, who, unlike in discussion and debates, are not 
individually contributing by critically analyzing their own positions or by adding to the sum of 
pre-existing knowledge, but who ‘together’ create positions, knowledge and meanings between 
themselves. In Francis Jacques’ words: 
“It is plainly impossible to join two soliloquies in a dialogue, like two mingled threads, or 
conversely, to fracture a speech [parole] duly exchanged as two halves of the meaning. Before 
I started to hear the other, I have sent him messages. Better, I have met him, i.e. I have entered 
in a relation with him, creating conditions of transcontextuality. There is no way to distinguish 
what comes from the one and what comes from the other. There is only one solution: to take 
them both at a time. This is the principle of non-separability of linguistic actions. Non-
autonomy of discourses seems to be a condition of dialogue.”46 
This implies that the dichotomies between speaker and listener, or position and counter-position 
cannot be maintained, as it was the case for a lecture, a debate and a discussion. It also means 
that we take some distance to the idea of the other thought from myself, thought as the limits 
of myself, as the non-I. This in-between as the proper location of dialogue has a great relevance 
for interculturality, since it constitutes both its greatest challenge, i.e. permitting a relation that 
opens a ‘between’ in the encounter, the necessity of overcoming the dichotomy of 
difference/unity, and the idea of an unreachable direct access to the other, to the limits of my 
understanding alone.  
c) Thirdly, a dialogue also implies a detachment in engagement, or with Daya Krishna, a 
“detached intellect” (niḥsaṅga buddhi) which creates a togetherness of thinking: 
“(…) they want to engage in what we would call the activity of a thinking togetherness. What 
does this togetherness mean? (…) What is needed is a new concept; that is a dialogue 
presupposes I am detached from what I am saying. That it is not I and Thou – both I and Thou 
should vanish to some extent. I must have a detached intellect – the concept of a detached 
intellect. That is an intellect that functions freely without committing itself necessarily to what 
                                                 
le degré d’uniformité du code utilisé, qui s’applique aux mots et aux discours en contexte interlocutif, le type de 
situation et le nombre de participants. Le terme de communicabilité désigne alors une condition de possibilité de 
l’interaction et de la compréhension du sens.” Jacques, L’espace Logique de l’interlocution, 14. 
46 My translation. Original text: “Il est manifestement impossible de joindre deux soliloques en un dialogue comme 
deux fils qu'on mêle ou, à l'inverse, de fracturer une parole dûment échangée en deux moitiés de sens. Avant que 
je n'aie commencé à entendre l'autre, je lui ai envoyé des messages. Mieux, je l'ai rencontré, i.e. je suis entré en 
relation avec lui, créant des conditions de transcontextualité. Pas moyen de dissocier ce qui vient de l'un et ce qui 
vient de l'autre. Une seule solution : les prendre tous les deux à la fois. C'est le principe de non-séparabilité des 
actions linguistiques. La non-autonomie des discours semble bien être une condition du dialogue.” Jacques, 78–
79. 
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it is saying. It is not because I am saying it, and therefore I have to hold it. It is a sort of 
postulational activity that is, for the moment, what I think to be meaningful and true. And that 
you also are a detached intellectual function and also you see a potentiality and a possibility.”47 
What he notices is that even once we break with the dichotomy I-It on the subject/object mode 
and even in the exclusiveness of the encounter, ‘I and Thou’ remain separated by the relational 
activity – what Ramchandra Gandhi criticizes in Martin Buber while publishing his Advaitic 
answer, I am Thou.48 While leaving the ontological debate aside on what can compose the 
relation, Daya Krishna points at a togetherness, which could be understood as a togetherness of 
the dialogue itself, of what is said in the dialogue. This, I believe, is neither a coming back to a 
distinction subject/object, nor an objectivistic account going back to a thinking as a thing 
detached from us, nor the disappearance of the person as such: I am the one thinking, I am the 
one speaking while being convinced that what I think is meaningful, and I do so as being wholly 
engaged as a person in the dialogue. But in so doing, I am not allowing my person to be attached 
to what I think is meaningful, but, in a kind of dispossession of my thoughts as being mine, I 
engage them in the dialogue, as if they would belong to the dialogue itself. Resuming the 
impressions of her academic meetings with Daya Krishna, Bettina Bäumer recalls this 
intellectual detachment49 and its relevance in dialogue: 
“He [Daya Krishna] was aware that dialogue is not a facile undertaking, because each side is 
so much identified with their own ideas and positions. Therefore he repeatedly said: ‘but we 
should try.’ Dialogue is only possible if we try to ‘become the other, to be the other, to think 
from the viewpoint of the other, to identify with the other. Is it possible?’ he asked. ‘Let us 
try’, was his challenge. He also gave a key, ‘The heart of the Indian civilization is the search 
for de-identification – de-identification with the body, with the mind, with the intellect, with 
thought… and the challenge of all civilizations is to de-identifiy with the past, with their 
concepts…’ This was a clear reference to the basic ideal of all Indian spiritual-philosophical 
systems of arriving at a state of thought-free awareness, of nirvikalpa, where alone reality is 
perceived in its own light. What he hinted at was a state of inner freedom.”50 
Daya Krishna sees this intellectual detachment as a way to engage in worldly dialogues with 
others, from which his inner freedom originates. It designates also a capacity to let myself 
follow the course of the dialogue, free of belonging to any given tradition and being able to 
                                                 
47 Daya Krishna, in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 181. 
48 Ramchandra Gandhi, I Am Thou: Meditation on the Truth of India, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Academy of Fine Arts 
and Literature, 2011). 
49 She gives elsewhere further details on her account of de-identification: “One of the greatest obstacles in creating 
a true understanding and harmony with other traditions is the sense of ‘identity’ - not the innermost spiritual 
identity to which we all aspire - our divine nature, our Buddha-nature, or whatever we may call it -, but an identity 
consisting of labels, walls, concepts, social identification with a group, a caste, a community, a region, a language, 
a religion. If the aim of religion is to liberate its followers; this liberation has to go along with a de-identification, 
breaking down of walls and limitations, based not on Divine revelation or enlightenment, but on narrow ego 
centred human identifications. De-identification does not mean loss of connection with a tradition, but, as in the 
title of our meeting, an opening of our windows and our hearts, which makes us capable of, not only meeting the 
others, but accepting other ways, other revelations, other experiences, which will ultimately enrich our own.” 
Bettina Bäumer, “Interreligious Dialogue,” in Windows on Dialogue, ed. A. Bongiovanni et al. (Delhi: Indian 
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2012), 65. 
50 Bettina Bäumer, in Shail Mayaram, ed., Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj: Dialogical Meditations on Daya 
Krishna and Ramchandra Gandhi (New Delhi: SAGE, 2014), 36–37. 
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argue beyond my position (see the epistemological relevance of this idea in 5, its relevance for 
freedom from any tradition in 6.2.3 and for engaging with others in 7).  
Does this dispossession imply that my words are not bound by anything, and that all speech is 
allowed, included for example injurious and aggressive speech? If there is no immediate ethics 
preventing any content (and for Daya Krishna, dialogues can emerge only without prevention 
of any thought), the detachment from the person reduces considerably the possibility of such 
speech, since such speech reach at the person rather than the topics or the philosophical ideas 
that is being discussed. In so doing, one could imagine a dialogue in which one could defend a 
thesis that is motivated by racist prejudices or theses (and engage in a dialogue with participants 
that have different opinions) but one could not attack the persons in the dialogue related to their 
cultural origins, nor held personally injurious behaviors or comments.51 One can easily see the 
difficulty of conceiving such an idea once it is embedded in the practice: the borderline between 
attacking the person or his or her ideas vanishes more often than not, even among scholars. The 
borders are, although theoretically very clear and understandable, rather blurred in practice and 
seem to quickly explode in the emotional impulse that one can with difficulty repress in the 
given situation. The same is the case for the ‘togetherness’ and ‘thinking together’ emerging 
from the dialogue itself (the co-dimensionality).Theoretically described, it is the dialogue as 
such that leads its participants rather than individual contributions which give us a sum of 
separate information. In practice, it is more difficult to observe, and impossible to ‘guarantee’. 
I do not imply that it can never arise, that nobody can witness such experiences or that we do 
not have any account of such. Indeed, Daya Krishna provides us with concrete dialogical 
experiments and material of concrete dialogues (chapter 3), and also for this reason, his 
engagement with dialogical experiments in his life greatly contributes to show his relevance in 
theories of dialogue. But beyond this exception, it sounds as if it is difficult to believe that these 
‘high standards’ and ‘perfect’ realization can be reached. And, except of Daya Krishna, 
examples of successful dialogical experiments following the principles defended by these 
authors, are relatively rare to be found in the context of philosophical dialogues between 
traditions in academia.  
Rather than denying the ideal dimension contained in dialogues (and the problems regarding 
their realization), or rather than ‘lowering’ our expectations of the dialogical, let us presuppose 
a perfectibility in dialogues, i.e. a potentiality for self-improvement. In this sense, the ideality 
contained in dialogue functions as a model for actual dialogues, providing them with an ideal 
framework that can be used as a self-critical tool (and vice versa). If actual dialogues are 
necessary witnesses and corrections of the theoretical foundation, the ideality contained in the 
theory can act as an orientating paradigm to practice, correct and reflect on the actual dialogue 
– something that I claim, grounded Daya Krishna’s dialogical experiments. The consequences 
that can be drawn from such a dynamic will be developed in chapter 6 and the concrete ways 
in which Daya Krishna grounded this relation are described in chapter 2. Thus, although Daya 
Krishna refused projecting a normative dimension to dialogue, which restricts its scope (and 
                                                 
51 See Ali’s reinterpretation of classical Indian dialectic to suggest concrete inclusion and tolerance among the 
interreligious confliectual diversity of the contemporary Indian society. Muzaffar Ali, “Indian Philosophy and 
Ethics: Dialogical Method as a Fresh Possibility,” Sophia 57, no. 3 (September 2018): 451–54, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0673-6. 
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further raises the problem of ‘who’ produces the norms), dialogue is connected to the question 
of values conceived in relation to pūrvapakṣa. Values are in this sense not what frames a 
dialogue in terms of rules of conduct, but they are conceived as orientation of the dialogue, i.e. 
that towards which we seek together, this ideality that ‘ought to be’: this constitutes the topic 
of chapter 6. 
d) The following characteristics are all derived from this condition of reciprocity. The next one 
regards one dialogical form in which reciprocity is concretized: the confrontation in dialogue. 
Confrontations are necessary parts of dialogue, for the obvious reason that in a complete 
agreement between all participants, no dialogue (no debate and no discussion either) could take 
place, because speech would be superfluous - everything would be understood in the same way, 
would share the same intuitions and would be expressed in synonyms. Consensus is neither the 
aim nor the result nor any ultimate state of dialogue.52 Now, whether a full agreement between 
human beings could happen is already in itself questionable, so we most probably always 
contemplate either partial, strong or even radical disagreements on a question, on a topic, and/or 
on a method. However, confrontation seems prima facie quite anti-dialogical, mostly due to 
image like Serres’ above, pictures of ‘wars’ like debates, destructive and unproductive fights 
where the aim is just about demolishing the other’s argument (if not the other itself). Or in a 
milder picture, confrontation seems to be more depending on rhetorics and persuasion to win 
the other than ‘truth-related’ in the classical models of sophistry in the Greeks and vitaṇḍā 
(eristic wrangle)53 in the Nyāya framework.  
So, how can we admit confrontation as a necessary dialogical method or tool? The difference 
between the fallacious or destructive type (destructive both in the sense that it is an attack to 
the person, and a rhetoric that blocks and destroys the communication itself) and what I want 
to underline here comes back to the description of reciprocity, and emphasizes again 1) the 
importance of the detached intellect and 2) the dispossession of the position. In dialogues 
confrontation is without use of force and under the acceptance of the other who contributes to 
the confrontation, which makes dialogue non-irenic but also non-destructive. In so doing, the 
questions are raised on the arguments and not on the person and for the sake of the dialogue 
                                                 
52 In distinction to forms such as negotiation (in business, diplomacy and politics, etc.), where the negotiators are 
expected to reach a consensus, a ‘deal’, an agreement, etc. See Jacques, L’espace Logique de l’interlocution, 125.; 
in distinction also to Habermas’ discussion in the public sphere, in which the consensus validates the participation 
of all in the rational process of discussion.  
53 On the term vitaṇḍā: Gerhard Oberhammer, Ernst Prets, and Joachim Prandstetter, eds., Terminologie der frühen 
philosophischen Scholastik in Indien: ein Begriffswörterbuch zur altindischen Dialektik, Erkenntnislehre und 
Methodologie. Bd. 3: Pra - H, Denkschriften / Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-
Historische Klasse 343 (Wien: Verl. der Österr. Akad. der Wiss, 2006), 138–41. On the context of vitaṇḍā (esp. 
around the Nyāya-Sūtra): Gautama and Pakṣilasvāmin, Le Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Akṣapāda, le Nyāya-Bhāṣya 
d’Akṣapāda Pakṣilasvāmin: l’art de conduire la pensée en Inde ancienne = Savātsyāyanabhāṣyaṃ 
Gautamīyanyāyasūtram, trans. Michel Angot, Collection Indika 2 (Paris: Éditions Les Belles Lettres, 2009), 68–
128. On the different types of debates in the Nyāya and Caraka-saṃhitā: Ernst Prets, “Theories of Debate, Proof 
and Counter-Proof in the Early Indian Dialectical Tradition,” in Essays in India Philosophy, Religion & Literature, 
ed. Piotr Balcerowicz and Marek Mejor (Delhi: Motila Banarsidass, 2002), pp.435-448. 
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itself rather than for any victory. This has more the character of a “play”54 between different 
positions hold and defended but detached from my person and subject to modification.55  
e) One last common aspect of dialogue, which rather implicitly underlies the earlier 
characteristics of a dialogue and its conceptions by the aforementioned authors, could be thus 
critically formulated by my reader: is not such a dialogue something completely ideal and can 
we even pretend to actualize or practice dialogues so understood? Indeed, a kind of virtuous 
ideal seems to arise at different places. First, a kind of hierarchy seems to be admitted among 
the forms of communication, which puts dialogue at the summit regarding its ethical and 
valuational realization. Only some kinds of virtuous communication are recognized as 
dialogical, those which do not use force nor pressure (such as blackmailing, threats, etc.), which 
do not aim at protecting the interests or the domination of one group (whether economical, 
diplomatic, etc.), which do not have to reach a consensus or any pre-established utility (such as 
an agreement, a deal, etc.): in summary, as Francis Jacques writes, “the interlocutive space of 
dialogue aims at evading the field of forces. Rather than a public or social space, it is a logico-
pragmatic space. That is why its relation to force is completely different. The man of dialogue 
is more mindful of confrontation than of conflict. If he claims a thesis through and through, it 
is always under the accepted control of, and even solicited by the other.”56 Devoid of personal 
or social interest and of any utility pressure, dialogue is delimited in the social sphere. The space 
of its occurrence is thereby restricted, which justifies Daya Krishna’s experiment to the specific 
case of philosophical dialogues between intellectual traditions. Dialogues are within the 
scholastic and academic framework not devoid of politico-socio problems and questions. The 
challenge they present for the contemporary intercultural debate is highlighted in (1.2.1) and 
the specific postcolonial challenges they raise is analyzed in (2.2.1). As a response to these 
specific difficulties and to address a limited scope of issues, Daya Krishna isolated the 
dialogical process to the academic context. He developed a logico-intellectual sphere of 
reasoning preventing in the dialogue animosity and disputes between religious, social and 
cultural communities. In that sense, although Daya Krishna’s dialogues between philosophical 
traditions engage with different religious communities, they do it from a scholastic or academic 
perspective rather than from a religious one. This entails a strong limit: participants dialogue 
on religious traditions but without religious feelings. Bettina Bäumer57 contemplates the limits 
of intellectual and logical approaches to other spheres of consciousness, or rather the limits that 
                                                 
54 See Daya Krishna’s comment during the Bhakti dialogue (see also 5.2.1 where this quote is further explained): 
“I shed my ego to the extent I participate in this universal reason in the game of knowledge. In the game of 
knowledge when we enter into a dialogue, I do not remain Daya Krishna, you are not just Kriplani and he is not 
just this particular, specific human individual. But we get out of our individual prejudices, biases and try to reach 
an objective universality, which can be mutually corrected and jointly explored.” Daya Krishna, Mukund Lath, 
and Francine E. Krishna, eds., Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion: Philosophical Explorations in the Indian 
Bhakti Tradition (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 2000), 64–65. 
55 See Daya Krishna’s approach, defending vitaṇḍā rather than vāda committed to a pre-identified idea of truth in 
2.1.1 and Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on 
Counterposition and Dialogue,” 175–76. 
56 My translation. Original text: “L'espace interlocutif du dialogue se veut soustrait au champ des forces. Plutôt 
qu'un espace public ou social, c'est un espace logico-pragmatique. De là que son rapport à la force soit totalement 
différent. L'homme de dialogue est plus soucieux de confrontation que d'affrontement. S'il soutient une thèse 
jusqu'au bout, c'est toujours sous le contrôle accepté, et même sollicité, de l'autre.” Jacques, L’espace Logique de 
l’interlocution, 124. 
57 Personnal communication with Bettina Bäumer, Abhinavagupta Research Library, Varanasi (23/01/2017). 
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it implies in terms of participation (see the analysis of the dialogue referred to here regarding 
the different seekings pursued by different participants in 6.3). While some dialogues engaged 
with participants following different religious practices, devotion or ‘religious’ attachment 
(such as the bhakti dialogue with Shrivatsa Goswami) could succeed in exploring the 
intellectual dimensions of these traditions when the participants could accord the intellectual 
with the spiritual (see 3.3.2), other dialogues encountered difficulties due to the limitations of 
the perspective in which the dialogue was conceived. In Srinagar (Kashmir), Daya Krishna’s 
approach was insufficient to grasp the complexity of the multi-layered dimensions of the 
spiritual approach of paṇḍit Lakshman Joo, which signals the problems of intrareligious 
dialogues with ‘believers’. Thus, as described by Bäumer, 
“the seminar was an exploration of Kashmir Śaivism, a relatively new discovery for Indian 
philosophers. Dayaji discovered it for himself, and was also viewing it critically. It was more 
the fact of meeting and discussing the issues involved, than a real contribution to the research 
on Kashmir Śaivism. In a sense historic, the meeting with the last and powerful representative 
of the living tradition, Swami Lakshman Joo, at the Guptaganga Hall in Ishbar, near his Ishvar 
Ashram, did not result in a satisfying dialogue, because the levels were too different: the merely 
intellectual approach of the scholars and the lived experience of the master.”58 
In particular, following Panikkar’s59 distinction between the inter- and the intra- religious, Daya 
Krishna’s dialogues are “dialectical dialogues”, dialogues that meet on the ‘arena of doctrines 
and opinions’. In this sense, his entreprise of gathering “experts or representatives of different 
belief-systems or artistic sensitivities” remain at the interreligious level in view of exclusion of 
the religious dimension of man in the process. For Panikkar, the intrareligious dialogue (that he 
practices and demands, as well as Bäumer) is a “religious act” that includes the whole religious 
personality of its participants. And thus, the insufficiency of the inclusion is felt for some 
participants, as soon as ‘believing’ becomes a necessity for understanding, as Shail Mayaram 
also remembers: 
                                                 
58 Bettina Bäumer, “‘Falling in Love with a Civilization’: A Tribute to Daya Krishna, the Thinker,” in Philosophy 
as Saṃvāda and Svarāj: Dialogical Meditations on Daya Krishna and Ramchandra Gandhi, ed. Shail Mayaram 
(New Delhi: SAGE, 2014), 35. 
59 The distinction between inter- and intra-religious dialogues, and a broad introduction into Panikkar’s conception 
of dialogue can be summarized as follows: “When we limit our field to human relationships, we see that the other 
is not just a producer of ideas with which we agree more or less, or just a bearer of affinities that make possible a 
number of transactions; it is neither a mere (other) subject nor a mere (other) object. It is a person who is not my 
ego, and yet it belongs to my Self. This is what makes communication and communion possible. This awareness 
is the dawn of the ‘dialogical dialogue’. The thou emerges as different from the non-I. When this encounter touches 
the depths of our intimate beliefs, when it reaches the ultimate questions of the meaning of life, in whatever sense, 
we have the ‘religious dialogical dialogue’. Oftentimes this dialogue does not go beyond doctrinal levels or 
emotional projections. This is the ‘interreligious dialogue’, which is generally carried on by experts or 
representatives of different belief-systems or artistic sensitivities. When the dialogue catches hold of our entire 
person and removes our many masks, because something stirs within us, we begin the ‘intrareligious dialogue’. 
This is the internal dialogue triggered by the thou who is not in-different to the I. (…) In brief, the intrareligious 
dialogue is itself a religious act-an act that neither unifies nor stifles but re-links us (in all directions). It takes place 
in the core of our being in our quest for salvific truth-in whatever sense we may understand these too-loaded words. 
(…) The search becomes an authentic prayer, a prayer open in all directions.” Raimon Panikkar, The Intrareligious 
Dialogue, Rev. ed (New York, N.Y: Paulist Press, 1999), xvi–xvii. 
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“I remember the meeting of the scholar’s group including Daya Krishna, Ram Chandra 
Dwivedi, Arindam Chakrabarti and Mukund Lath with Laxman Joo, then celebrated as one of 
the greatest living exponents of the school of philosophy that is popularly known as Kashmir 
Śaivism. Laxman Joo responded to their questions with complete silence; his emphasis on the 
sadhana pakṣa of that school disappointed the scholars. After their departure, he asked Bettina 
Bäumer, ‘Yeh nāstik kaun the?60’ (personal communication, 14 January 2010)61 
It is thus not the case that spirituality or belief were excluded from the realm of dialogue. Rather, 
it is as a sceptic of any (spiritual or not) tradition that Daya Krishna participated in these 
dialogues. I believe that difference of perspective of Daya Krishna’s experiments to the 
interreligious dialogue is necessary, since it defines his dialogues as “dialogues between 
philosophical traditions” (including traditions of religious origins), or intellectual dialogues 
between representatives of different (religious) traditions (see the Bhakti dialogue in 3.3.2). 
These dialogues, although protesting against the exclusion of (religious) traditions in the 
academic spheres (see 2.2.1), did not aim at bringing a religious practice or communication 
between different faiths.  
 
1.1.5. Definitions versus Dynamics 
 
To summarize the characteristics of each form of communication, I distinguish lectures, 
conferences, interviews, debate, discussion and dialogue in terms of the function the subjects 
hold in each of them. In the first three forms, lecturer and public or interviewer/interviewee are 
clearly opposed vis-à-vis knowledge and authority. The subject is perceived as the one who 
knows and brings his knowledge to the public, who at the most can raise a question in return. 
The inequality in expertise, time allotted to speak and authority is accepted. However, even if 
limited, the question can ask for clarification and provoke an ‘éclaircissement’, a self-
illumination, in Serres’ sense. It is mostly against such forms, which presuppose an expert 
facing listeners that Daya Krishna conceived his saṃvāda project, whereas he implied 
clarification as a function operating in dialogue. In the debate, the subject and the listener 
become participants arguing on a given topic. The emphasis on the topic debated tends to 
presuppose a certain homogenous background on which one stands to present thesis and 
antithesis. This homogeneity renders the model difficulty usable in intercultural context. This 
limitation is not formulated directly by Daya Krishna vis-à-vis debate, but his saṃvāda project 
between different philosophical traditions addresses this difficulty. What remains from this 
model for him is the importance of the categories of position and counter-positions 
(pūrvapakṣa) (see 5.2), however closer to the Sanskrit model of dialectics introduced in (2.1.1). 
With the idea of discourse, the exteriority implied in the idea of public or the audience is taken 
into consideration, which is of great relevance in postcolonial Anglophone Indian academics 
(see 2.2.1). While debate implied an emphasis on the topic and an agonistic constellation as 
‘participant 1 versus participant 2 on the topic X’, discourse is more of a summative model. In 
                                                 
60 Mayaram translates: ‘Who were these non-believers?’. ‘Na-āstik’ literally means ‘non-believers’, which as 
Daniel Raveh remarked to me, should be rather translated as ‘sceptics’. While the first can be indeed interpreted 
as a criticism, the second is read as a compliment to philosophers, in particular by Daya Krishna. 
61 Mayaram, Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj, xxiii. 
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a summative model, it is rather the participation of 1 and 2 together that contributes to the sum 
of knowledge on a topic in a certain public context. Concerning dialogue, the characteristics 
that are emphasized for Daya Krishna’s project are the detached intellect and the confrontation, 
derived from the emphasis on the topic rather than the person, and on the creative outcome of 
the dialogue rather than on the addition of theses; the reciprocity and essentiality between 
persons (see 7.3), unlike in the three first forms; the idea of a ‘between’ inserted between 
participants as a locus for creativity, which shifts the perspective from a cumulative to a holistic 
model.  
In such a description of the forms of communication, what already appears are the following: 
first, my work is restricted to a delimited type of communication, namely philosophical 
dialogues between traditions. The consequences and difficulties of dialogue to be applied to 
intercultural context can already be perceived: the plurality of – not only different positions or 
different philosophical doctrines – but of different ways of philosophizing, different forms of 
rationality, and with it, of understanding in such context, of being able to communicate, in 
particular of questioning, of being able to think together beyond definite positions.  
Furthermore, one caution should be formulated. It seems easy to delimit these categories in a 
formal manner and to attribute them perfectly distinguished characteristics. It is also possible 
to classify and order them, to show the increasing problems of debate and discussion for 
intercultural applications, the gradual insertion of the importance of the other in these models 
and the space left for meeting the other in these different communicational paradigms. These 
characteristics and distinctions, however, only serve an explanatory purpose. In contrasting 
these models, I wanted to highlight different dimensions implied in communicative forms: the 
distribution of knowledge and inclusion of an authority (in lectures and interviews), the 
insertion of the public in discourse in difference to the emphasis on the intimacy of a ‘between’ 
persons in dialogue, the confrontation and formation of positions on the same conceptual map 
in debate. By a formal introduction into different forms of communication it is possible to start 
unveiling the multi-layered problems that they imply, notably by emphasizing their differences. 
However, the borders between these different forms are in practice not possible to trace. In the 
facts and in the practice, what the examples tried to show, it is difficult to sharply decide 
between one or the other category, in the case of an encounter: a debate can turn into a dialogue, 
a discussion into a debate, an interview into a dialogue, etc. It is not possible to decipher 
beforehand whether a question and answer session will be dialogical, or whether a disagreement 
in a debate will enable questioning the ‘conceptual map’ in which it was taking place. T  
“But if a discussion can degenerate into a debate, a ‘debate’ can result in the resuscitation of 
discussion once more. The challenge to one’s firmly-held belief by consent and compelling 
counter arguments and counter-evidence compels once to ‘think’ afresh and find ‘new’ 
arguments or evidence, or to expose the weakness in the other’s arguments or the evidence, or 
give an alternative interpretation of the latter to show that it is more in consonance with one’s 
own position.”62 
The happening of a dialogue can also turn into a posteriori exegetic commentary that removes 
the ‘dialogical’ character of the event in the process of explanation, with Stenger’s example: 
                                                 
62 Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 6–7. 
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“Notwithstanding, this ‘Socratic dialogue’ became a ‘Platonic dialogue’, which was followed 
by further ‘discussion’ and ‘discourse’. This means also that the unique experience of thinking 
quasi subsides and henceforth serves as sediment and presuppositions of thinking.”63 And vice 
versa, as the exegetic tradition of a text can create dialogues in exchanging questions and 
thoughts on different interpretations and the meaning of texts, what constitutes the aim of Daya 
Krishna’s collective investigation in India’s Intellectual Traditions: Attempts at Conceptual 
Reconstructions 64, where participants questioned together the texts. The distinctions operated 
are not to be taken as literal borders between forms of a communication where one form exactly 
qualifies one encounter, but unveils characteristics essential to dialogue by contrast to other 
forms of communication. These characteristics are explored by Daya Krishna in his dialogical 
experiments. The experiments and Daya Krishna’s philosophy demonstrate in particular the 
entanglement of all these dimensions, for which reason I define ‘dialogue as multifaceted 
whole’ in chapter 4.1. In chapters 4 to 7 I argue furthermore that it is from the dynamics of this 
entanglement that the dialogical creativity originates. 
  
                                                 
63 My translation. Original text: “Gleichwohl ist aus diesem “sokratischen Gespräch” ein “platonischer Dialog” 
geworden, dem im weiteren “Diskussionen” und “Diskurse” folgten. D.h. auch, dass die einmal gemachte 
Erfahrung des Denkens gleichsam absinkt und fortan als Sediment und Denkvoraussetzung dient.” Stenger, 
Philosophie Der Interkulturalität, 301. 
64 Daya Krishna, ed., India’s Intellectual Traditions: Attempts at Conceptual Reconstructions (New Delhi : Delhi: 
Indian Council of Philosophical Research : Motilal Banarsidass, 1987). 
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1.2. Genealogical Introduction: Intercultural Dialogue – Emergence and Difficulties of the 
Field(S) 
1.2.1. The Illusions of a “Global Dialogue”: Intercultural Studies, their Audiences and 
their Limits. 
 
After a thematic specification and after having characterized ‘dialogue’ among different forms 
of communication, I want to determine what the ‘intercultural’ of ‘intercultural dialogue’ 
implies. This encompasses clarifying the stands of the contemporary philosophical research 
related to interculturality to justify my choice of thinking intercultural dialogues with the 
philosophy of Daya Krishna among the intercultural field, where he is not usually received. 
This intercultural field being itself composed of different cross-cultural 65  approaches and 
researches, I define and delimit first some approaches that have already been established. In 
articulating these different approaches, I then attempt in this introduction to locate restrictions 
of different established cross-cultural movements and show the absences left on the margins on 
these research, absences which I try to remedy with a contribution from the side of 
contemporary Indian philosophy.  
To analyze the interculturality in the different philosophical fields, I believe that one requires 
less a thematic approach – to define interculturality as such – than a genealogical one in a 
Foucauldian sense,66 i.e. to inquire on the factors that enacted cross-cultural studies and to 
delimit the forms and contexts in which they take place. Cross-cultural studies in philosophy, 
in spite of the manifoldness of their apparitions in different parts of the worlds, all responded 
to the Euro-Americano centrism of philosophy and to the postcolonial affection of philosophies. 
In that sense, cross-cultural studies are positioned as critical responses with demands and claims 
enacting the construction of theories. 67  This responsive position qualifying cross-cultural 
studies entails however an unresolved problem, the consequences of which are highlighted in 
                                                 
65  I distinguish in this section between Intercultural Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy and Postcolonial 
Theories (which are defined below). I use the term ‘cross-cultural studies’ to designate these three approaches 
together when I integrate them in the same field, considering the fact that in spite of their differences, these 
approaches all focus on crossing different philosophical traditions and are by definition concerned with this 
problem (to which they answer differently) 
66  Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, La Généalogie, l’histoire,” in Hommage à Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1971), 145–72; Foucault, Les mots et les choses. 
67 For example in intercultural philosophy: “Questions of philosophy - questions concerning the fundamental 
structures of reality, the knowledgeability, the validity of norms - have to be discussed in such a way that a solution 
is not propagated unless a polylogue between as many traditions as possible has taken place. This presupposes the 
relativity of concepts and methods, and it implies a non-centristic view to the history of human thinking. At the 
very beginning there can be formulated a negative rule: never accept a philosophical thesis from authors of a 
single cultural tradition to be well founded.” Franz Martin Wimmer, “Is Intercultural Philosophy a New Branch 
or a New Orientation in Philosophy?” (1996), 15, 
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/franz.martin.wimmer/intpheng95.pdf. See also Hamid Reza Yousefi and Ram Adhar 
Mall, Grundpositionen der interkulturellen Philosophie, Interkulturelle Bibliothek 1 (Nordhausen, Thür: Bautz, 
2005), 126–29; Ram Adhar Mall, Intercultural Philosophy, Philosophy and the Global Context (Lanham, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 19–32.126-129; 19-32; in postcolonial Indian philosophy, the same problem 
concerns the negative definition of svarāj which is taking more and more importance in postcolonial Indian 
political philosophy. See R. Prasad remarks on K. C. Bhattacharyya’s use of the term in Krishnachandra 
Bhattacharyya, “Svaraj in Ideas,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly. Special Number. Svaraj in Ideas XI, No. 4 
(December 1984): 486. See also below 2.2.1. 
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the next two sections: a negative self-understanding. By a negative self-understanding, I mean 
a negative definition of one’s grounds and principles characterized by what they are not, what 
they fight against, what they criticize, what should be attained, rather than what one is. If 
standing against someone constitutes an efficient starting point for new claims and recognition, 
the insufficiency of a ‘positive’ formulation of the foundation of a concept can be a crucial 
defect. The problem is that any fight needs not only an opponent to defeat, but also, and for so 
doing, a ground on which to stand, so as to avoid the foundation to collapse in the fight itself. 
The relevance of cross-cultural studies consists in their ability to ground the critical response in 
a positive definition. The terms of these definitions remain problematic, on the one hand 
concerning the audience they implicitly address, and thereby the unspecificity of the ‘global 
dialogue’ they institute, and on the other hand concerning their remaining European foundations 
in mostly French and German philosophies (1.2.2). 
Historically, ‘cross-culturality’, ‘interculturality’ and related concepts such as “world 
philosophy” or “transculturality”68 are systematically investigated in academics circa from the 
1980’s on69, with the basic idea of providing access and reception to non-Western literatures, 
connecting and thereby ordering concepts and philosophies originating from different traditions. 
‘Non-Western’ designates in this context philosophies that do not belong to the mainstream 
corpus that has been canonized in Western Europe, in North America and further applied in 
former European colonies. Such a necessity of diversity of sources and cosmopolitan authors 
in academics respond to the current globalized world. The globalization and the proximity 
enabled by the new configuration of space and by technology increased the exchanges between 
scholars in the world. Demands were formulated for integrating a diversity of participants as 
well as the texts that formed their conceptual background into what is believed to be a global 
dialogue70, the possibility of engaging with philosophers from all around the world. While 
‘globalization’ became a central concept in academics, this belief into a ‘global dialogue’ has 
                                                 
68 See on “Transkulturalität” and “multiculturalism”, the definitions of Wolfgang Welsch and Rajeev Bhargava 
respectively in Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, Gita Dharampal, and Minou Bernadette Friele, eds., Die 
Interkulturalitätsdebatte: Leit- und Streitbegriffe - Intercultural discourse: key and contested concepts, (Freiburg: 
Verlag Karl Alber, 2012), 146–64. See one interpretation (in favor of the term ‘intercultural’ philosophy) of the 
distinction between transculturality, interculturality and multiculturality by Weidtmann in Weidtmann, 
Interkulturelle Philosophie, 23–49. Also in favor of interculturality, see Mall, Intercultural Philosophy, 36. Since 
these distinctions are made by authors sharing the same conceptual framework, namely German intercultural 
philosophy, responding to each other, I do not find it relevant for the present explanation that rather operates 
between the different fields of ‘cultural’ philosophies. 
69 German publications flourished from 1980 on, such as Mall’s, Kimmerle’s and Wimmer’s work; in English, 
Mehta’s India and the West is also published in 1985, such as the beginnings of postcolonial publications by 
Edward Saïd (1978 for Orientalism) and Spivak and Homi Bhabha at the beginning of the 90ties (except for 
forerunners such as Franz Fanon in French literature, as early as 1952). 
70 J. L. Mehta warns us of the dangers of a world civilization and the necessity of instituting a dialogue between 
civilizations today where each independent seems to be in a crisis, related to the others in the idea of a ‘planetary 
culture’ which seems to conduct all individual civilizations to their loss; the threatening of the global or planetary 
to the dialogue is the illusion of a homogeneous (Western prevalent) culture: “The one peril threatening man today 
comes neither from the plurality of cultures nor from the diversity of religious traditions but from what, following 
Heidegger, has been called world-civilization above, the destiny of homelessness in which men all over the world 
are caught today. (…) A new way of thinking, meditative, recollective, originative, can have a glimpse into these 
dark depths and it alone can do so, once it abandons the naivete of the rationalistic faith in a ‘cunning of reason’ 
operating behind the outward history of man and governing it” Jarava Lal Mehta, Philosophy and Religion: Essays 
in Interpretation (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2004), 45. 
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not been much investigated. Or rather, the ‘illusion’ (to speak in Daya Krishna’s term, see 7) 
and the problems connected to this belief have not been much exposed.  
The idea of a global dialogue rests on the awareness of a plurality of philosophies rooted in 
different traditions. The problems of their commensurability, of the possibility of hermeneutic 
exegesis of foreign traditions, of radical or gradual differences between them, the possibility of 
reaching a common understanding to bridge them, and the creativity and newness of the 
interspace constitute core questions relating the various cross-cultural studies. In a nutshell, the 
question of how to relate philosophies between traditions frames the background on which 
different approaches of cross-cultural studies meet, as well as one of the first impetus for their 
establishment. However, if an awareness of a need for ‘global dialogue’ has emerged, the 
heterogeneity of its methodologies, the borders that it erects,71 and the relative incomplete 
realization of global dialogues in practice, has not been much considered. In other words: while  
scholars agree that research ought to be global and interconnected, interculturality remains 
absorbed in a singular academics (usually Western prevalent). I want to illustrate this point with 
the example of the integration of Anglophone Indian academic philosophy. Indeed, both 
postcolonial theories applied to the Indian situation, as well as comparative philosophies 
between classical Indian philosophies and Western philosophies are by now rather 
acknowledged in the so-called ‘global academic discourse’, even if the proportion between 
Western and Indian philosophies remains highly imbalanced in the syllabi, teachings and 
research. All cross-cultural theories agree and stand for integrating Indian philosophies in the 
philosophical curriculum and enact comparative approach with Indian traditions in philosophies. 
The relevance of Indian philosophies (as philosophy ‘proper’) is slowly acknowledged, even if 
the modes of reception remain incomplete and perfectible, and Indian studies are ‘on the way’ 
to be better integrated to philosophy. However, it is quite striking that despite such an 
“intercultural turn”72, philosophy produced in India in the twentieth century remains largely 
unknown, even in the case of Anglophone Indian philosophy, whose exclusion cannot rest on 
the unavailability or inaccuracy of translations. Postcolonial philosophers outside India even 
chose for a large part to base their research on contemporary sociological or anthropological 
data in India rather than on contemporary Indian philosophies. They combine these sociological 
or anthropological analyzes with philosophical principles and methods that are often inspired 
by Derridian or Foucaldian concepts. This creates a fusion in which Anglophone Indian 
philosophies are for the most part not included.73 Why is it the case that despite of cross-cultural 
                                                 
71 See my critique of a ‘philosophy without border’ in the following book review: Elise Coquereau, “’From 
Comparative Philosophy to Fusion Philosophy’, Ed. Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, Comparative 
Philosophy Without Borders, London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2016, 246 Pp.” Journal of World 
Philosophies, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 152–154. 
72 Stenger, Philosophie Der Interkulturalität, 45. 
73 This gap between an active development of contemporary sociological and anthropological research in India 
compared to what is felt as a difficulty for Indian philosophies to be creative and contemporary was one of the 
motivations for the Jaipur experiments conducted by Daya Krishna: “Veena Das in the Introduction to her well-
known work entitled Structure and Cognition has argued for the articulation of both the manifest and the implicit 
conceptual structures embedded in the texts and the use of them for the understanding of Indian social reality. But 
as her interest was limited, she confined herself to two texts only, and even within them only to those concepts 
which seemed to serve her limited purpose. Brahmanhood, householdership, kingship and asceticism are not 
usually the type of concepts which a cognitive enterprise deals with. And in case it does accept them for conceptual 
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movements and even within cross-cultural theories such a fragmented reception and a 
compartmented participation is still operating, and why is it the case that such exclusions remain 
unnoticed? Which kind of illusions does the idea of a global dialogue generate, which makes 
us believe in the possibility of a global participation while disregarding these absents?74 Why 
is it so that the participation into the global dialogue is not global but locally distributed?  
My work contributes to fill this lacuna, and suggests an analysis of the situation of the 
contemporary philosopher Daya Krishna located in the composite contemporary Indian 
academic world and his response to the problems of intercultural dialogues. To investigate the 
difficulties of the ‘intercultural dialogues’ today, which are not limited to a conceptual 
definition of ‘intercultural’ and ‘dialogue’ themselves but also by the questions of its access, 
repartition and composition,  and to justify the necessity of taking seriously unreceived fields 
of philosophy such as the contemporary Anglophone Indian academic production, I 
contemplate suggesting some conditions and limits of the global discourse in cross-cultural 
studies. I hypothesize that cross-cultural research’s scopes also exercise a selection in the 
reception of philosophers and text, despite claiming creating a global and diverse dialogue, and 
that a reflective awareness of the margins of this field is necessary for an inclusive development, 
not only in the theoretical conceptions, but also in terms of resources and literature. In the next 
pages, I therefore distinguish between three fields that analyze different aspects of the 
phenomenon of interculturality to show where they operate, which kind of literature they 
consider and which methodologies they use, in order to ascertain their centers and peripheries.  
I define in general ‘cross-cultural studies’ as research on the specific questions generated by 
the emergence of cultural otherness in a globalized world and conceptual reflections on forms 
of cultural relations, along with critical analyses of any form of ethnocentrism. This minimal 
definition is explored in (at least) three different ways by what is called ‘intercultural 
philosophy’, ‘comparative philosophy’ and ‘postcolonial studies’. ‘Intercultural philosophy’ is 
understood as a set of theories and models for thinking the encounter of cultures and questions 
related to cultural Otherness in a globalized world. It has been established from 1980 on in the 
German-speaking world75 as an internal philosophical development with the central idea of 
                                                 
purposes, it would perhaps have to understand them at a more abstract level in functional terms. Yet, whatever 
may be one’s dissatisfaction with the particular concepts chosen for articulation and the interrelationships worked 
within them, there can be little doubt that the move is in the right direction. (…) These are not the only works [J. 
P. S. Uberoi, Veena Das, Sudhir Kakar] which give evidence of a search analogous to ours. The search ‘for a 
sociology of India’ and the debate around it is well known. The latest, perhaps, in the article by T. N. Madan in 
the book Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer (…). The work of Ashish Nandy, Claude Alvarez and Dharm 
Pal tries to do the same thing, though in a different direction. (…) But the attempt that we are trying to make and 
which is only faintly reflected in this work is in many ways significantly different from all these in that it seeks a 
conceptual articulation of the intellectual tradition in different fields of knowledge in order to use it creatively for 
extending, deepening and enhancing knowledge in these domains.” (emphasis added) Daya Krishna, India’s 
Intellectual Traditions, xii–xiii. 
74 This question comes close to Raghuramaraju’s investigation on the “classical presences that are absent in the 
modern times”. However,  I deviate the debate from the Indian academic milieu to the contemporary philosophical 
movements developing intercultural or comparative philosophies, which paradoxically still, while standing for the 
“classical” presences, leave modern participants absents. A. Raghuramaraju, Enduring Colonialism: Classical 
Presences and Modern Absences in Indian Philosophy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1. 
75 See for example the by now classical texts by Heinz Kimmerle, Interkulturelle Philosophie zur Einführung, Zur 
Einführung 266 (Hamburg: Junius, 2002); Ram Adhar Mall, Philosophie Im Vergleich Der Kulturen: 
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‘interculturalizing’ philosophy itself, rather than appending a subdiscipline to it. Covering quite 
a wide range of topics, the focus in intercultural philosophy concerns the internal modifications 
brought by the plurality and hybridity of cultures to philosophy itself, and the question of the 
contacts themselves instead of the separate investigations of different traditions.76 In so doing, 
the research consists into reinvestigating, revising and correcting the mono-European narrative 
of philosophy. Authors for example re-explore the European traditions from an ‘intercultural 
perspective’, i.e. an intercultural reading of European authors to denounce their limits and see 
how one could develop their conceptual tools to make them conceptually contribute to thinking 
the encounter of cultures. For example, studies on Gadamer on the one hand criticize the 
problematic represented by the encirclement within one’s own horizon and the closure of one’s 
tradition, and on the other hand rework concepts such as ‘fusion of horizons’ 
(Horizontverschmelzung) to think intercultural understanding77. The objective is to enlarge and 
widen the horizons and perspectives of philosophy and to reflect on the new contemporary 
phenomena occurring, such as cultural otherness, globalization, international human rights, or 
even methodologically trans-, inter- and multiculturality in the legacy of the philosophical 
discourse. As a textual approach based on philosophical traditions and heritages, intercultural 
philosophy aims at developing a conceptual apparatus to think cultural otherness and 
interculturality.  
Running parallelly and originating earlier,78 ‘comparative philosophy’ offers a close but distinct 
perspective on the subject matter. First, there is a tendency to consider comparative philosophy, 
by now rather Anglophone, as a ‘global philosophy’, to be developed and established 
homogenously in academics in the world, which would however lead to multiple and sometimes 
contradictory definitions and methodologies used in different times and places. For example, 
                                                 
Interkulturelle Philosophie, Eine Neue Orientierung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesesellschaft, 1995); 
Rombach, Drachenkampf. Der Philosophische Hintergrund Der Blutigen Bürgerkriege Und Die Brennenden 
Zeitfragen.; Stenger, Philosophie Der Interkulturalität; Weidtmann, Interkulturelle Philosophie; Yousefi and 
Mall, Grundpositionen der interkulturellen Philosophie; Rolf Elberfeld, Phänomenologie Der Zeit Im 
Buddhismus: Methoden Interkulturellen Philosophierens, Philosophie Interkulturell, Bd. 1 (Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2004); Franz Martin Wimmer, Interkulturelle Philosophie: eine Einführung, 
UTB für Wissenschaft Philosophie 2470 (Wien: WUV, 2004). 
76 See this paradigmatic definition by Stenger: ““Interkulturelle Philosophie“ geht nicht darin auf, sich mit anderen 
Kulturen zu beschäftigen und deren Philosophie(n) zu eruieren – wenngleich diese Ansinnen in Geltung bleiben –
, sie scheint mir ihre Sprengkraft darin zu haben, daß sie zu einer wirklichen Herausforderung der Philosophie 
insgesamt avanciert. Die Philosophie wird nicht nur aus externen Gründen interkulturell werden müssen, sie wird 
sich aus internen philosophischen Gründen interkulturalisieren.” Original text. My translation: “Intercultural 
philosophy is not exhausted by the occupation with other cultures and by eliciting their philosophy/ies, although 
these requests remain valid. To me it seems that intercultural philosophy finds its blasting force in advancing to a 
true challenge of philosophy in general. Philosophy will not have to become intercultural only for external reasons, 
but it will interculturalise itself out of internal philosophical reasons.” Stenger, Philosophie Der Interkulturalität, 
14. 
77 For instance, Ram Adhar Mall, Hans-Georg Gadamers Hermeneutik Interkulturell Gelesen, Interkulturelle 
Bibliothek, Bd. 19 (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2005). 
78  The first East-West Philosophers’ Conference took place at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa in 1939 
(organized by Charles A. Moore, Wing-tsit Chan and Gregg Sinclair), which is regarded as a milestone in the 
establishment of comparative philosophy. For a history of ideas around the East-West conferences and their  
conceptions of comparative philosophy, see Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, Geeta Ramana, and James Maffie,  
“Introducing Confluence: A Thematic Essay,” Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies 1 (2014): 7–63. 
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Paul Masson-Oursel,79 who is believed to have been the earliest to explicitly use the term 
“comparative philosophy”80 in the West, considered it as a condition to reach positivism, as a 
follower of Auguste Comte. He elaborated the concept of analogical cultural “proportions”. 
This means for example that the relation between Socrates and Greek philosophy is analogically 
comparable to the relation between Confucius and Chinese philosophy. This positivist study is 
quite different from the recent one asserted by Chakrabarti and Weber:  
“The imperative is to re-interpret Indian, Chinese, or Japanese philosophy in terms of 
(oppositionally or positively) Western philosophical ideas as much as contributing back into 
English-language philosophy by bringing in elements of Asian or African or Hawaiian 
philosophy.”81 
Initially comparing was tantamount to objectively highlighting the differences and 
resemblances between two fixed entities retrieved from their different traditions, possibly in 
order to show the equality of both or the missing parts of one82. This idea is slowly fading for 
a dynamic approach where all traditions equally contribute to philosophical thinking itself, 
which constitute also Daya Krishna’s approach. In responding Ben-Ami Scharfstein’s 
Introduction in progress of his work entitled A Comparative History of World Philosophy. From 
the Upanishads to Kant, Halbfass suggests even a ‘dialogic comparative’ model that could be 
pursued (I have no indication affirming that he lastly would have written one of this type), 
which he describes as follows: 
“If I were to write a similar work of ‘dialogic comparison’, it would perhaps include some 
imaginary dialogues between representatives of the three traditions, for instance, between 
Śaṅkara and Descartes on the foundations of knowledge (i.e., the Veda and the Cogito), 
Aristotle and Nāgārjuna on arguments, debate, and the ‘two truths’, or even such modern 
figures as the Neo-Vedantin Vivekananda and the Indologist Paul Hacker on the role of the 
person in ethics and the possibility of ‘Practical Vedānta’. I might also try to correlate some of 
the guiding patterns and underling premises of Indian philosophy and culture, such as the 
                                                 
79 It is interesting to make a small detour here to P. Masson-Oursel who was the first to explicitly use the term 
“comparative philosophy” in 1923. Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical 
Understanding (Albany: SUNY, 1988), 420. 
As a follower of A. Comte, he believed that the main condition to reach this state of positivity was to be obtained 
through comparison. He chose the analogy as a main method to practice it. For Masson-Oursel, the comparison 
cannot operate directly between two authors or systems since of course, as they are culturally different, their 
context, history and content have to be distinguished and cannot be immediately brought together. One needs a 
comparative tool to conduct a parallel between cultures. More precisely, a parallel cannot be drawn directly 
between cultures, one has rather to grasp the proportion in each cultural system. Only the proportion can be 
compared interculturally. To say it differently: analogy is defined as a mathematical proportion that enables the 
comparison, as the equality of two relations, and Masson-Oursel writes to illustrate: “A is to B as Y is to Z”. 
Between A and Y, or between B and Z can be as many and as broad differences as one can see, since what we 
compare is only the relation between A and B and between Y and Z, which has to be comparable. In this way, we 
do not come up against the problem of the encounter, or the reduction to the same, or the inadequacy, the gap 
between cultures. Each culture keeps its own intelligibility in its singular structure, which distinguishes it from the 
Other (on the side of difference). However, the analogy (the similarity of the respective internal relations) enables 
to relate the different particular structures (on the side of identity). 
80 Halbfass, 420. Halbfass attributes the introduction of the term to Indian authors, in particular to the Bengali B. 
N. Seal in 1899. Halbfass, 422. Needless to say, the reception of the term in the West, including by Indologists, is 
probably more the result of the use of the term by Masson-Oursel. 
81 Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders, 20. 
82 See the historical account of Halbfass, Halbfass, India and Europe, 419–33. 
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dichotomy of action and inaction (pravṛtti and nivṛtti), the doctrine of karma and rebirth, and 
the scheme of the four goals of life (puruṣārtha) with issues of contemporary philosophical 
and public debate.”83 
Such approaches testify of the evolution of the discipline. It is now about elaborating a cross-
cultural philosophical questioning or “fusion philosophy” 84 , which also shows that it 
progressively comes closer to ‘Intercultural Philosophy’, even if the latter contains meta-
philosophical and methodological perspectives that might vary. These gradual transformations 
in comparative philosophy, which proceeds from the struggles for the acknowledgment of non-
Western traditions in Western academics, from the postcolonial investigations in the newly 
independent states and the critical analyzes of Western traditions by non-Western nations, are 
explained by certain ‘phases’ or ‘stage’ 85  in its development. “Roughly summarized, 
Charkrabarti and Weeber outline these phases as follows: the first stage consists in finding 
equivalents in non-Western philosophies that would anticipate Western philosophies; the 
second stage attempts to contrast these philosophies; the third stage aims at reinterpreting 
Western philosophies by using contribution of non-Western theories (and vice versa)”86. These 
originally pedagogical, and sometimes nationalistic approaches for the recognition of all 
                                                 
83  Wilhelm Halbfass, “Research and Reflection: Responses to My Respondents. III. Issues of Comparative 
Philosophy,” in Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural 
Studies, ed. Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, 1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), 302. 
84 Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders. 
85 In order to distinguish different layers in comparative philosophy, M. Kirloskar-Steinbach, Geeta Ramana and 
J. Maffie differentiate between three stages in their thematic introduction to their journal Confluence, which are 
close from Chakrabarti and Weber. The first one reveals “sincere attempts were made to make the “East” 
understandable to the “West””, such as B. K. Matilal’s work on introducing Nyāya philosophy into analytical 
philosophy. Their pedagogical and exegetical individual efforts into creating a space for non-Western philosophy 
into the Western framework aimed in a second phase at a certain systematization of comparative philosophy, 
“where one strives to work out a common space for comparisons. The bounds of this space are clearly framed by 
moral commitments which underline the equal positionality of the participants involved; in some contexts a 
heightened hermeneutical awareness leads thinkers to mark out an area in which cross-cultural philosophizing can 
meaningfully take place.” Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ramana, and Maffie, “Confluence,” 9–10. This could include 
intercultural philosophy as defined above in the approach it aims to take. However, except of the systematic 
enlargement that would distinguish it from the first phase, I believe that the individual philosophers in the first 
stage also aimed at an equality of the participants and imagined a meaningful way of comparing, if not supported 
by their institution or affiliation. Finally, the authors considered a third stage where the philosophers “work out 
the socio-political ramifications of the insights developed in the preceding stages”. Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ramana, 
and Maffie, 10. This would be rendered possible by a further step of internalization of the awareness of equality 
presupposed for any comparative philosophy. One major problem in this view remains that it highly presupposes 
to be the evolution of comparative philosophy in Western institutions, with the struggles for including non-Western 
philosophies in syllabi and the establishment of the postcolonial studies. I suspect that it does not consider other 
attitudes, such as the nationalist ethos described above by Bhagat Oinam in their scheme, nor the internal relation 
between Sanskrit and English teaching described in Sharad Deshpande, ed., Philosophy in Colonial India (New 
York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015), 1–20. It seems therefore that different comparative philosophies 
exist, notably those developed in American and English institutions by, in the present case, Indian scholars, and 
those described by Deshpande of Indian scholars who remained in Indian institutions. Kirloskar-Steinbach, 
Ramana, and Maffie, “Confluence.”  
86 Coquereau, “’From Comparative Philosophy to Fusion Philosophy’, Ed. Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, 
Comparative Philosophy Without Borders, London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2016, 246 Pp.,” 152. 
See Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders, 20–22. 
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philosophies ‘as’ philosophy 87 , slowly took into consideration and affirmed the context-
dependency of philosophies to explore the differences between philosophical systems.  
Despite various stages in the development of comparative philosophy, and the span in the 
meanings attributed to the concept in different occurrences, the general idea that justifies their 
common use remains to establish a pluricultural philosophy, but in a different way than 
Intercultural Philosophy. While the latter rather takes as a subject the very phenomenon of 
interculturality (question of cultural otherness, understanding of the other, elaboration of a 
dialogue), comparative philosophy retains the classical philosophical subjects while modifying 
the approach. The fields of logic and philosophy of mind have been notably widely investigated 
by comparative philosophy88 considering for instance the concept of perception between Indian 
Nyāya tradition and analytical tradition such as Frege and Wittgenstein.89 The idea is not to 
study what happens in the encounter between different traditions and cultures, which kind of 
experience it creates, nor how it modifies the presupposition of one’s understanding, but rather 
to benefit from more information and concepts to creatively investigate a specific topic. 
Weidtmann notices in this regard that rather than the investigation on the conditions to create a 
common space for dialogue, comparative philosophy considers in priority the “extension of our 
knowledge”, our own and the other’s knowledge. This academic interest must lead us to “extract” 
ourselves as much as possible from our own traditions and to constitute an objective 
methodology which forms the preconditions for comparing two objects.90 The criticism and the 
                                                 
87 Halbfass qualifies this first period as follows: “”Comparative philosophy,” if it is possible at all, is still in a 
nascent stage, and it requires much critical reflection and hermeneutic awareness. Western partners in the 
comparative enterprise and the East-West “dialogue” have to be aware of their historical background and of some 
long-standing biases in the European approach to non-European traditions - as well as of an inherent bias and one-
sidedness in the “comparative” approach as such: They have to recognize that their allegedly neutral, purely 
theoretical and cultural developments, and that the very openness of comparative, cross-cultural “research” is 
conditioned by an implicit European parochialism, by one peculiar, almost idiosyncratic manner of understanding 
reality. On the other hand, Indians in many cases still have to find the necessary freedom for a kind of comparison 
which is not primarily apologetics and cultural self-defense against the Western challenge, which does not amount 
to hastily reinterpreting or readjusting their own traditional concepts and ways of thinking, and which at the same 
time does not simply extrapolate and perpetuate the traditional schemes of inclusivism by subordinating all other 
world views to Advaita Vedānta.” Halbfass, India and Europe, 433. 
88 Beyond the considerable number of references in Indian philosophy (principally Nyāya and Buddhism) in 
analytical style and analysis, one can see the following resources for comparative analytical studies: Chakrabarti 
and Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders; Bimal Krishna Matilal and Jaysankar Lal Shaw, Analytical 
Philosophy in Comparative Perspective: Exploratory Essays in Current Theories and Classical Indian Theories 
of Meaning and Reference (Dordrecht - Boston - Lancaster: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985); Gerald James 
Larson and Eliot Deutsch, eds., Interpreting across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy (Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass Publ, 1989); Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Explorations in Philosophy: Essays by J. N. Mohanty. 
Indian Philosophy., ed. Bina Gupta, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
89  For instance, Jaysankar Lal Shaw, The Collected Writings of Jaysankar Lal Shaw: Indian Analytic and 
Anglophone Philosophy (London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 
2016); Jonardon Ganeri, Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy, 
Oxford Philosophical Monographs (Oxford : Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 
1999); Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, ed., Word and Sentence, Two Perspectives: Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein (New 
Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 2009).  
90  “Der komparativen Philosophie geht es anders als etwa dem dialogischen Ansatz nicht primär um 
Verständigung, anders als dem Polylog nicht darum, Stimmen anderer Kulturen zu Wort kommen zu lassen, und 
anders als den universalistischen Ansätzen nicht um die Verteidigung einer einheitlichen Grundlage aller Kulturen. 
Es geht ihr schlicht um die Vergrößerung unseres Wissens sowohl von der eigenen wie von anderen 
philosophischen Traditionen. Und das nicht zu dem Zweck, den eigenen, zu einem guten Teil durch die eigene 
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discussions within comparative philosophy concerns therefore rather the objectivity and the 
scientificity of its conditions: the question of a tertium comparationis91, of the very possibility 
of cultural neutrality92 in comparing. To some extent, the distinction between comparative and 
intercultural theories echoes the distinction between analytical and continental philosophies 
respectively, which quite interestingly shows how these “cross-cultural philosophies” runs on 
from specific (Western) traditions. 
Quite differently, postcolonial theories,93  mostly strongly pluridisciplinary and political in 
character, are grounded on the one hand on the analysis of the influences and legacy of the 
different forms of colonization on their subjects, as well as on social analysis of the environment 
of the latter’s and the inequalities produced by the colonial residues. Rather than the philosophy 
itself, it considers the politics underlying the production and repartition of philosophy, and 
knowledge in general. Influenced by methods such as Foucauldian genealogy and Derridian 
postmodernist deconstruction between power and knowledge (the problem of their foundations 
is analyzed in the next section), postcolonial theories extended such analysis to the colonial 
phenomenon. Their investigations include questions regarding unequal access to the discourse, 
politics of translation, the constitution of one’s own identity in a postcolonial world, the 
criticism of the Western social idea of modernity, etc. Although recent French philosophy 
largely set up their reflection, it is less an internal philosophical approach working within and 
for the philosophical legacy and corpus, than the elaboration of socio-political analyzes 
highlighting (hidden) dominating forces that exercises their power on the production of any 
theory and philosophy that is at stake. Philosophy constitutes a tool and an instrument rather 
than a locus or an end. In that sense and for philosophers, postcolonial theories constitute a 
metatheory useful to bring awareness to the conditions of philosophizing and the political 
elaboration of theories, which can be associated with the former two approaches as cross-
cultural developments of philosophical theories. In her famous text “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, 
                                                 
kulturelle Tradition geprägten Horizont zu erweitern und so die eigene “Weltansicht” (W.v. Humboldt) zu 
verändern, sondern aus wissenschaftlichem Interesse. Die komparative Philosophie wirft deshalb einen möglichst 
objektiven Blick sowohl auf die fremde als auch auf die eigene Philosophie, die mit der fremden verglichen wird.” 
Weidtmann, Interkulturelle Philosophie, 68. See for another criticism from the side of intercultural philosophy 
Stenger, Philosophie der Interkulturalität, 937–46. 
91 Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders, 6. 
92 See the postcolonial reading of comparative philosophy by Rada Ivekovic, “Now, the problems which are 
already more than evident reveal how difficult it is to juxtapose, let alone compare, two worlds and two traditions. 
The very act of comparison is not a neutral operation. Neutral comparison does not exist. It is forced to draw on a 
terminology and an intellectual context. In the case we are considering, these are occidental. And they make 
capital, to use a Derridean term (see Derrida 1992), for occidental thought. Theoretically, the terminology and 
intellectual context would, for an oriental subject, be oriental. But we can say nothing about this. We lack any 
means of verifying the relationship of the other to the other. Comparison also opens the question of temporality 
and the consecutive: is the comparison occurring in one and the same time? In consecutive times?” Rada Ivekovic, 
“Coincidences of Comparison,” trans. Penelope Deutscher, Hypatia 15, no. 4 (2000): 227–28, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/hyp.2000.0060; Rada Ivekovic, Orients, Critique de La Raison Postmoderne: Essais, Le 
Diwan Occidental/Oriental (Paris: N. Blandin, 1992), 28. 
93  Considered as the forerunners, Aimé Césaire in his “Dicours sur le colonialism”, 
https://archive.org/details/DiscoursSurLeColonialisme, Franz Fanon and Edward Saïd distilled at different places 
of the world the first concepts and structural criticisms on colonialism. Regarding postcolonial philosophy in 
relation with Indian colonization, the works of Gayatri Spivak, Dispesh Chakrabarti, Homi K. Bhabha, Ashish 
Nand, Sudhir Kakar and P. Chatterjee are by now considered classical.  
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Spivak, continuing Said’s critique, denounces the (in)ability for French intellectuals to uproot 
themselves from their tradition: a tradition of white colonizer and exploiter, which, even when 
fighting, determines their thinking in the intellectual environment in which they take their 
inspirations and references, but also to the world to which they have been exposed: 
“Edward W. Said’s critique of power in Foucault as a captivating and mystifying category that 
allows him ‘to obliterate the role of classes, the role of economics, the role of insurgency and 
rebellion’, is most pertinent here. I add to Said’s analysis the notion of the surreptitious subject 
of power and desire marked by the transparency of the intellectual. Curiously enough, Paul 
Bove faults Said for emphasizing the importance of the intellectual, whereas ‘Foucault’s 
project essentially is a challenge to the leading role of both hegemonic and oppositional 
intellectuals’. I have suggested that this ‘challenge’ is deceptive precisely because it ignores 
what Said emphasizes - the critic’s institutional responsibility. This S/subject, curiously sewn 
together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international 
division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of 
Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only 
that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of 
that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in 
the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual 
ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary - not 
only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law.”94 
In so doing, postcolonial studies have further denunced the Eurocentric level, not only 
constituting of the texts themselves, which earlier were either ignorant, indifferent or clearly 
exclusive, such as Heidegger’s or Husserl’s famous remarks on the Europeanization of the earth 
and the European philosophy as only possible philosophy. These studies showed that not only 
the textual traditions but also the subjects themselves in their colonial constitution and in the 
hidden political forces and powers influencing their works and grounding their intuitions, 
constitute Eurocentric barriers, not only on historiographical terms but also in terms of our 
identities. However, although postcolonial studies influenced contemporary Indian philosophy, 
and brought awareness for comparative and intercultural studies on the conditions of writings 
and composing philosophy, it specifically did not answer the problems of connecting classical 
Indian philosophies with Western philosophies, nor the conditions for creating philosophical 
dialogues between these traditions, and thereby could not provide the space for receiving 
Anglophone Indian academic philosophy. This case raises furthermore the problem of 
integration of philosophies which are not specifically political, but nevertheless affected by the 
political consequences of colonization, into the fields of postcolonial studies. Since the topics 
of Anglophone Indian philosophies are not necessarily political, and furthermore written in 
English, it becomes complex to integrate them into an anti-hegemonic discourse. The 
postcolonial demands in this case relate to the equal right to engage in philosophical discourse, 
for instance on epistemological topics, from different traditions and standpoints. This means 
that the postcolonial reflections constitute the frame in which one philosophizes rather than a 
philosophical topic itself.  
                                                 
94 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, by Cary 
Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (University of Illinois Press, 1988), 280. 
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For these reasons, while postcolonial studies have immensely contributed to cross-cultural 
analyzes of international power structures and of conceptualization of the colonial predicament 
per se, the lack of integration of specificity of local traditions and local movements in the 
globalization of philosophy itself remains a problem. How to keep the specificities of localities 
while aiming at an international scope? How to integrate the locality of non-Western 
movements and academics while denouncing the globality of colonialism? I agree with Yoav 
Di-Capua’s statement (in an article entitled “Arab Existentialism: An Invisible Chapter in the 
Intellectual History of Decolonization”, pointing at the same kind of exclusion I am outlining 
in the Indian context) in his evaluation of postcolonial studies on that matter:  
“Indeed, even postcolonial studies, a field that has made a point of studying the ‘decolonization 
of the mind,’ has done little to rehabilitate local thought and its global context. While it offers 
an important corrective to Eurocentric scholarship on empire as well as a critique of the 
practices of the nation-state, the realities of colonized peoples are almost always projected 
against the essentialized epistemology of colonial Europe, with the ultimate goal of 
investigating the persistence of “colonial discourse.” (…) While postcolonial studies provide 
us with invaluable insights and a critical emancipation of marginal historical subjects, it has 
done little to date by way of presenting a systematic and comprehensive account of how people 
put their thoughts together.”95 
What do these distinctions between Intercultural, Comparative and Postcolonial methodologies 
imply for thinking intercultural dialogues? There are two levels in my analysis for thinking 
dialogues that I will combine with a study on Daya Krishna. The first concerns what cross-
cultural studies advocate, i.e. a dialogical praxis engaging participants from different 
intellectual traditions, aiming at reaching global dialogue. Whether these participants are 
considered from their postcolonial political implications, their contribution to a cross-cultural 
knowledge (from a comparative perspective) or in the constitution of dialogue itself, the 
integration of different traditions at a global scale is claimed by these different movements. 
However, the locality of the movements they stand for is not represented enough. This global 
dialogue is in its composition already restricted by the limits of these three approaches, which 
can only accommodate ‘global’ participants when they fit into these limited frameworks. These 
three fields of cross-cultural studies are by now widely received and grounded and seem to 
answer to the challenge of ‘world philosophy’ and of a global discourse. However, in reaching 
this global reception, they rather integrated the participants and the different philosophical 
traditions under the rules of writing of Western academics. They did not much influence the 
very standards of academic thinking and writing. In that sense, they rather contribute to the 
already established syllabi in appending to already existing categories a global dimension, for 
instance in completing a ‘Logic’ course by an Indian perspective, without questioning the very 
categorization at play in distinguishing a Logic course from a Metaphysics course. The 
compartmentalization did not undergo further modifications, and furthermore, non-Western 
traditions did not contribute rethinking the compartments: Sanskrit compartments have, for 
example, never influenced English philosophical divisions.96 M. P. Rege, in the introduction of 
                                                 
95 Yoav Di-Capua, “Arab Existentialism: An Invisible Chapter in the Intellectual History of Decolonization,” The 
American Historical Review 117, no. 4 (October 1, 2012): 1063, https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/117.4.1061. 
96 Elise Coquereau-Saouma, “Politics of Addressing, Problems of Reception: To Whom Are Anglophone Indian 
Philosophers Speaking?,” Sophia 57, no. 3 (September 2018): 493, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0674-5. 
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the first published dialogue organized with Daya Krishna, writes, as an incentive for saṃvāda 
between philosophical traditions, that: 
“The Indian doctrine is significant to the extent that it raised or touched upon or foreshadowed 
conceptual issues with which the ongoing philosophical debates in the West is concerned, and 
in tackling them deployed modes of arguments which were similar to those used by western 
thinkers, leading to parallel epistemological or ontological conclusions. It is the western 
philosophical tradition which yields the yardstick by which to measure the relevance or 
importance of Indian thought. The cognitive and practical concerns of western philosophy are 
taken as central or natural and Indian thought has to prove its worth by establishing that 
somehow its speculations and conclusions had a direct or at least indirect bearing on them.”97 
Comparative philosophy according to him did not contribute in breaking this modus operandi, 
nor in overcoming the opposition East/West to which the saṃvāda experiments also respond, 
by exploring internal differences and relations in Indian philosophies. On the contrary, 
comparative philosophy in most of its practice for Rege adapted to this yardstick and 
contributed to give similarity and soft differences to enrich the Western framework in 
answering the philosophical trends of the West: “Nyāya and realism, Mimamsa and 
hermeneutics and so forth”, Advaita responding to Absolute Idealism and later on Nyāya 
responding to the anglo-analytical logic98. In so doing, some great absents have been left at the 
margins of cross-cultural studies. Indian authors who are not part of Western institutions, who 
do not share their intellectual references nor the same topics, who write in vernacular languages 
or who write in English outside these established movements, are excluded from the ‘world’ 
reception and the ‘global dialogue’, such as a vast part of contemporary Indian philosophy. The 
works of Daya Krishna, Ramchandra Gandhi, Rajendra Prasad, K. Bagchi, D. P. 
Chattopadhyaya, R. Balasubramanian, R. Sundara Rajan, N. V. Banerjee, and many others, are 
completely unknown outside India (and probably partially also in India), although they were all 
also trained in Western philosophy, often engaging further with classical Indian philosophies 
in different languages, or conceptualizing further the relation between contemporary Indian 
philosophers and Western philosophies. Thus, in different words and applying this idea to 
another side of Indian philosophies, Coseru describes how cross-cultural philosophies are 
merged within the ‘global’ philosophical scene as follows:  
“A sort of open-ended and non-committal thinking across traditions has taken root among 
practicioners of what some now call ‘fusion philosophy’, others ‘cross-cultural philosophy’, 
but what might be best described as ‘cosmopolitan philosophy’. This idea is neither new nor 
particularly revolutionary. When Dignāga (c. fifth to sixth century) embarks on his synthesis 
of the prevalent epistemological, grammatical, and psychological theories of his day and 
Vācaspati Miśra (tenth century) authors his empathetic and influential commentaries on 
Advaita Vedānta, Nyāya, and Saṃkhya-Yoga texts, they do so as members of a Sanskrit 
cosmpopolis. That cosmopolis endures today among traditionally trained scholars in India and 
the Indian diaspora. But it functions within, and relative to, an all-encompassing and 
universalizing cosmopolis that we now call the global West. Doing Indian philosophy today 
                                                 
97 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xviii. 
98 Daya Krishna et al., xix. 
 
40 
 
means operating within a larger horizon whose cardinal points of reference are no longer 
geographical but for the most part conceptual and institutional.”99 
This situation shows the importance of a correlated basic fact that has not been highlighted 
enough in this context: the importance of the audience one is addressing to.100 We always write 
for someone and we always speak to someone. There is an audience aimed at, even if it is a 
virtual or invisible one, with a set of common presupposed references, a certain style and 
rhetorical codes, some a priori common understanding, a shared horizon, namely an enunciative 
context determining where we speak from (our context) and to whom we speak (addressee), 
which in return determines how we speak to the one we address (rhetorics). The belief in the 
possibility of a globalized audience is caused by internet and the wide-spread usage of 
English101, common means of communication and a common linguistic tool, both enabling the 
global participation. However, the reader remains fractioned into different schools, academic 
research groups and models of learning, which partially determine the sources we use, the texts 
we read, the appreciation and the use we make of these texts, as well as our own reception, may 
it be by opponents, colleagues or students. Furthermore, the reception of academic writing is 
also culturally and socially determined, which partially explains the difference in reception 
originating from India and Europe or America, or more nuanced the difference in reception of 
well-known Universities and smaller ones, even within the same country. To believe in a 
globalized audience entails therefore the risk of a) remaining in one’s own academic and 
cultural world while believing to address one’s writing to the global world; b) to presuppose 
that academic participation, reception and distribution is global, or in other words, that all 
scholars can freely communicate with all scholars; c) not to realize that these limits create the 
illusion of believing in an equality and sometimes even in a homogeneity of readers. In so 
doing, a reflection on the audience of cross-cultural studies should not be underestimated: who 
are we speaking to in intercultural, comparative and postcolonial studies?  
A large majority of authors in cross-cultural studies address in priority a Western audience 
looking for reinterpretation of its own traditions or for enlarging the tank of resources and 
materials of Western research. Bhagat Oinam comments on this persisting framework of 
Western reference:  
“At times, Indian contemporary philosophers raise questions within and about philosophy in a 
Western context, and, to an implied reader who is also Western. It may also happen that the 
same question is raised and addressed to the native scholars. When Sri Aurobindo wrote The 
Foundations of Indian Culture (1997/1998), his first audience were the native populations. It 
                                                 
99 Christian Coseru and Purusottama Bilimoria, “Interpretations or Interventions? Indian Philosophy in the Global 
Cosmopolis,” in Routledge History of Indian Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2018), 8–9. 
100 The following paragraphs develop the relevance of the audience and the address in setting a platform for global 
dialogues. I developed in another article the relevance and the problems of the audience and the address in the 
Anglophone Indian academic scene in questioning the difficulty of the reception of this field and hypothesizing 
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101  Eric Schwitzgebel estimates that only 3% of articles published in the most prestigious English-language 
philosophy journals refer to works that are not originally written in English today. The only other source languages 
that he found are ancient Greek, Latin, German, French and Italian.  
See https://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2016/09/how-often-do-mainstream-anglophone.html (visited on 16. 01. 
2019). I thank Elisa Freschi for making me aware of this article. 
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was with a view to generate nationalist feeling that such a text was written. When 
Raghuramaraju writes on classical Indian philosophy or contemporary Indian philosophy, his 
audience, too, is primarily Indian. But the two are not the same, as the latter under no 
circumstances is faced with the challenge to generate the feeling of nationalism. On the other 
hand, the writings of B. K. Matilal or Ganeri (2001) show that their audience is the West. They 
locate themselves within the philosophical framework of Western philosophy, within which 
Indian philosophical narratives are brought in as an exception! This is quite obviously clear 
when Ganeri in his book Identity as Reasoned Choice (2012) brings Indian theories in the 
larger framework of democratic discourses in the West. Though both the trends use Western 
philosophy as a yardstick, in the former it is the use of Western philosophical methodology 
that serves as the tool for conceptual articulation, whereas in the latter it is the use of Western 
philosophical framework as the larger discourse, wherein Indian narrative serves as the 
content. Indian philosophy seems to get a secondary place in both. This is the plight of the 
post-colonial intellectual enquiry where colonial rule continues to covertly haunt through 
collective memory. The West continues to remain the point of reference even for engaging in 
Indian philosophy!”102 
The critical point that I want to raise here does not concern the variety itself of audiences, nor 
even the prevalence of the Western audience (which is criticized by Oinam), but what one could, 
using Daya Krishna’s terminology, call an ‘illusion’ (see 7) of the audience when we believe 
addressing a global audience (writing in English on an open-access platform on non-Western 
philosophies). Authors addressing a Western audience, either hermeneutically in teaching 
Indian philosophy in America or politically in bringing awareness to a global world in Europe, 
are certainly in their rights, and their work are important contributions that began changing the 
academic scenes. A certain ‘illusion’ however occurs if these authors would believe that they 
initiate a global dialogue when they engage with non-Western philosophies in the West, or if 
their audience would believe in cross-cultural approaches when exclusively reading what is 
only addressed to them. For instance, while Spivak challenges a Western audience in 
deconstructing postcolonial power-relations, and incite her audience to rethink itself as 
intellectuals today, it would be overhasty to conclude that she represents the ‘Indian’ voice and 
that a global dialogue is reached in her writings (which in the case of the quote given above, 
rest on a critical reading of Foucault and Derrida). The larger paradox of this framework is the 
fact that as soon as the subaltern reaches a voice, she is not representing the subaltern: thus, the 
access of a part of the minority to the global academic does not erase the problems of other 
minorities that continue to exist parallely. The provocation and demands for recognition in front 
of a Western audience does not immediately imply an engagement with non-Western (in this 
case Indian) philosophies. Such differences in the addressed audience explain the gap between 
postcolonial studies abroad and contemporary philosophy in India. Such scholars abroad 
answered Euro-American prejudices against Indian philosophy or Indian identities in being 
located in a determined enunciative context from where they could address a Western audience, 
in defining themselves abroad. Their creative debates certainly enhanced great debates and new 
philosophical categories, but it did not lead to a global dialogue.  
This situation justifies why I confront an approach based on another context, working with the 
difficulties of the Indian academic environment. Engaging the situation of cross-cultural studies 
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justifies my choice for introducing another context into it, and working with Daya Krishna’s 
objectives, conceptual background and philosophy, although he remained distanced to 
comparative philosophy and postcolonial studies. 103  Articulating the limits of the models 
already established in cross-cultural studies to relate to the contemporary Indian context (with 
its own difficulties and stakes) enable a different perspective on dialogue to emerge. It is 
consequently not about favoring the contemporary Indian situation, which also copes with 
difficult issues that will be at stake in the next chapters (2.1.2 and 2.2) nor to present the Indian 
academics or classical Indian philosophies as a more favorable terrain for dialogues. This is 
what Amartya Sen for example attempts to do in elaborating the figure of a ‘native’ 
“argumentative Indian” 104  by selecting positive interreligious or intercultural figures 
throughout Indian history. What I rather aim at is to point at the differences of contexts and the 
differences of the difficulties that enacted intercultural dialogues, which highlights differences 
in the conceptions of intercultural dialogues themselves. After the limits of the horizon of the 
global dialogue in cross-cultural studies, i.e. the interplay between the different cross-cultural 
studies and their constitutions of peripheries, I want to analyze some ‘vertical’ limits in the 
constitution of cross-cultural studies, namely how they relate to their historical foundations, 
which are of European nature. 
 
1.2.2. Paradox of Cross-cultural Studies: is Anti-Eurocentrism a ‘Self-critical’ 
Eurocentrism?  
 
As a second correlated problem, I now turn more specifically to the foundations of cross-
cultural analysis described above, which are grounded in the criticism of Eurocentrism. 
Postcolonial and subaltern studies such as the ones of Gayatri Spivak, have been strongly 
influenced by studies of political organization and power distribution in the discourse from 
Foucault105 as well as the ‘dominating’ positions of Deleuze and Derrida. The postcolonial 
move originates from the insufficiency of these French theorists to pluralize their philosophies, 
to go beyond their own location (historical and cultural) when considering the play of power 
and politics in the access to speech, and finally, their impossibility to contemplate an Other that 
would be other than the “other of Europe”, i.e. an Other that would escape the binary logic of 
the idem/alter to reach an otherness that cannot be taken back to the same.  
Derrida’s case is symptomatic and relevant, since he is a figure and a reference for a large part 
of postcolonial and intercultural philosophy working with the concept of “différance”. L’Autre 
Cap (the Other Heading), for instance, pleads for a strong defense of hospitality, a defense of 
Europe and of a ‘beyond’ Europe, an openness of the borders. However, this manifesto for 
‘Others’ is grounded in itself, i.e. does not imply any other philosophy nor culture, is not 
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addressed to them, and does not consider any non-Western references. 106 This becomes 
problematic in his dialogue with Mustapha Chérif, where both speakers emphasized sharing an 
Algerian connivance. In Derrida’s colonial context of his childhood, this is tantamount to going 
back to an ‘elsewhere’ that he cannot access. Rather than Algeria itself or the presence of 
another culture, Algeria means the unreachable, whose access is forbidden by colonialism – and 
consequently in Derrida’s speech, the criticism of brutality of colonization.  
“The cultural heritage I received from Algeria is something that probably inspired my 
philosophical work (…). Everything that has interested me for a long time, regarding writing, 
the trace, the deconstruction of Western metaphysics—which, despite what has been said, I 
have never identified as something homogeneous or defined in the singular (I have so often 
explicitly said the contrary)—all of that had to have come out of a reference to an elsewhere 
whose place and language were unknown or forbidden to me.”107 
An “elsewhere whose place and language were unknown or forbidden to me” defines the 
conception of alienness which emerges in such literature. Derrida’s philosophy and his answers 
in the dialogue show rather the radical ruptures imposed by colonization: the access to the Other 
was impossible, and only a posteriori criticism of oneself seems to be possible to bridge 
between the one and the Other. Derrida seems to be symptomatic in recognizing the presence 
of Others that make him analyze the limits of oneself without being able to reach these.108 But 
is a criticism of oneself sufficient to integrate Others and configure intercultural dialogues? 
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Which kind of place does that leave to Others to configure a dialogical model or to answer to 
the still delimited self?  
In Derrida’s text, it seems that the Other is used to confirm one’s own thesis or to insinuate 
himself as example to reinforce one’s thesis. The Other seems to prove that Derrida’s self-
criticism is true. Does this not constitute a vicious circle, of looking for Others while remaining 
self-critical? And thus, Ivekovic comments:  
“Here is the whole problem. This intuition or oriental inspiration puts the Orient back to its 
traditional place for us, while seeming to rehabilitate it. The unsaid Orient to which we give 
shape. As if Western philosophy could suck by magic the strength of the foreign referents that 
it assimilates in making codes out of them. We feed ourselves of this other thought without 
giving back its due, apart from the name we adopted. This is the very gesture of a 
monologue.”109 
This undertaking of a ‘self-critical eurocentrism’ still forces the Others to address their 
concepts, philosophies and formulate their traditions to the West. But, if the beginnings and the 
foundation of cross-cultural studies ‘had to’ start from calling into question the Western 
monopoly from the inside, and if this gesture of self-criticism was necessary in the first place 
to render the encounter necessary with the Other, can it remain sufficient to define 
‘interculturality’ today? Can self-critical Eurocentrism help overcome Eurocentrism? Rada 
Ivekovic presents to my view the most eloquent criticism on the persistence of Western models 
in thinking Otherness and the application of Western methodologies: 
“That is the movement of all philosophers of difference and/or postmodern: the different [the 
Other], the oriental, are ‘rehabilitated’ but keep their traditional pictures. This is what I 
question, because I still see in it the figure of the philosopher, of the dominating reason, of the 
western subject who (dis)poses the values, who configures a world around himself. The 
‘rehabilitation’ is then mostly utilitarian. Indeed, the oriental (or feminine) model taken up for 
the interests of western philosophy does not change the relations of power. (…) The answer of 
Derrida, as well as of Sloterdijk, of Lyotard, etc., and to a lesser extent, of Serres, leave beyond 
the horizon of the difference-problem the question about how the Other (the Orient) would 
answer to it, and in particular about what he would have to say (about/from) himself.”110 
Ivekovic’s critique is addressed to French philosophers, postmodern thinkers and thinker of the 
difference (Lyotard, Serres, Derrida), who have questioned the Eurocentrism and are precursors 
                                                 
109 My translation. Original text: “Là est tout le problème. Car cette intuition ou inspiration orientale remet l’Orient 
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and influence of many cross-cultural philosophers. Extending slightly her critique to the field 
of cross-cultural studies, is the self-humility sufficient to establish a dialogue when the 
methodology itself is left untouched and when we reproduce the asymmetrical conditions of 
dialogue, even if we are now aware of our own limitations?  
My description certainly does not do justice to the scope of the available literature on the topic. 
It nevertheless attempts to sketch one pertaining problem these authors are dealing with, namely 
the legacy of German and French philosophies, which conditioned the development of these 
fields. These cross-cultural studies were enforced by the necessity of countering the limits of 
their predecessors, either denouncing Eurocentric assumptions or the lack of consideration of 
the cultural specificities in their philosophies of dialogues. It was consequently necessary to 
derive ‘other’ concepts of the Other in intercultural applications from these classical 
philosophies. This also applies to intercultural studies, which had to face the problem of 
redefining the position of the Other as a critique of the non-specificity of Otherness in 20th 
century European philosophy. However, the specification that responded to this insufficiency 
also remains itself based on the correction and revision of 20th century European philosophy, 
which retains the monopoly of the conceptual background and reference. I call this gesture a 
‘self-critical Eurocentrism’, which retains the mono-culturality and the centrality of the self-
effectuated critique, as described by Ivekovic. This question, I think, although more acute in 
postcolonial studies, should be faced by all cross-cultural studies. Not only the question of the 
Otherness in its Otherness, but also to interrogate how we conceive this question. Studies on 
Intersubjectivity for example first from Husserl111  and then from Merleau-Ponty112  do not 
directly include intercultural situations but can be applied to intercultural dialogues in further 
developments of the concept, such as analyzed by Waldenfels.113 The problem of the non-
specificity of the Other in 20th century German and French philosophies enacted intercultural 
theories to investigate the variations of the concept of Otherness if considered from cultural 
perspectives114. The Other was in 20th century philosophies grounded as an abstract entity, as 
                                                 
111 Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlaß ; erster Teil: 1905 - 1920, 
ed. Iso Kern, Photomech. Repr., Gesammelte Werke 13 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1973); Edmund Husserl, Zur 
Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlaß ; zweiter Teil: 1921 - 1928, ed. Iso Kern, 
Photomech. Repr., Gesammelte Werke 14 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1973); Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie Der 
Intersubjektivität: Texte Aus Dem Nachlaß ; Dritter Teil: 1929 - 1935, ed. Iso Kern, Photomech. Repr., 
Gesammelte Werke 15 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1973). 
112 See in particular the chapters “Autrui et le monde humain” and “La liberté” in La phénoménologie de la 
perception. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Tel 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), 398-
422;496-520. 
113 Waldenfels, Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs. 
114 See again Ivekovic’s critical contrast: “The ‘theoretical West’ envisages such a possibility [to acknowledge the 
cultural dissymmetry or arbitrariness of its universalistic claim] only when compared to the Other. But the concept 
of the Other, indispensable in this process, is itself a Western construct and obsession. It is not that the Indians do 
not have the expression or the concept of the Other. They do, and it is anya, and also dvaita. However, in the 
European tradition the concept of the Other is linked to the metaphysics of the subject, or agent, which is clearly 
not an Indian preoccupation in philosophy. The idea of the Other is heavily exploited in different wakes of 
philosophy in the West, as the flip-side of the subject, and especially so in the various post-modern and the like 
‘philosophies of the difference.’ The Other understood in this sense would rather be something to be overcome in 
the main currents of the Indian orthodox tradition or of Buddhism, since it would be considered a possible source, 
or result, of illusion or of apparent multiplicity. But this is certainly not a concept of the Other that could contribute, 
as in the European version, to the globalization of one dominant point of view. On the contrary, one has the feeling 
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non-I or as a universal Other: the idea of an independent Other outside myself and different 
from my own limits has become necessary. It also took seriously the problem of 
commensurability and relation in intercultural contexts.  
In particular, one of the major contributions of intercultural phenomenology, has been to 
distinguish between two types of otherness. More exactly, it gave full significance to this 
distinction in intercultural contexts. Authors such as B. Waldenfels and G. Stenger thus 
distinguish between der Andere (other) and der Fremde (alien).115 One of the main difference 
between the two concerns their relation to the I. Indeed, der Andere, the other, is understood in 
relation to me, the Other as we find it in 20th century European phenomenology, the Other such 
as Lévinas’ or Buber’s, i.e. the Thou in distinction to the I. He/she is the ‘other’ face of myself, 
what I am not, what I do not understand, what I cannot reach. Beyond the personal level, the 
‘other’ operates also between cultures such as in the dichotomies ‘East and West’, ‘Europe and 
the Orient’. The Orient is nothing else than the ‘other of Europe’, i.e. limited to what Europe is 
not. The other, being an ‘alter’ (etymologically, the other of two), enables only a binary relation: 
the one and the other. We think that there is a difference only by contrast to ourselves, by 
delimitation. The alien, for Waldenfels, is understood in the sense of inclusion and exclusion: 
“what is alien does not simply appear different, rather it arises from elsewhere. The sphere of 
alienness is separated from my sphere of ownness by a threshold.”116 While the sphere of 
otherness is a relative sphere to me, the sphere of alienness is a sphere originating elsewhere. 
The other can be understood only in reference to me and my horizon, although he runs the risk 
of disappearing in my understanding, since he then becomes integrated to the own once 
understood. Nevertheless, a transformation of myself is implied by the other. This 
transformation of myself and this transformation of my understanding and my ways of 
understanding, in the binary context of the Other (the other in reference to the own), can be 
seen as a first preliminary step towards the Other: enlarging my horizon, opening and 
                                                 
that avoiding it, avoiding or overcoming the split subject/object in the Brahmanical tradition or pursuing the advaya 
in Buddhism, is a willing effort to prevent any such globalization. This is an example of what I called a ‘choice of 
civilization.’ Furthermore, the subject and its Other bear testimony to the Western ontological concern, weak if 
not absent in the case of India.” Rada Ivekovic, “The Politics of Comparative Philosophy,” in Beyond Orientalism: 
The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, ed. Eli Franco and Karin 
Preisendanz, 1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), 223–24. 
115 Waldenfels’ distinction is present throughout his work. For the present paper and for an English definition, we 
can use the following one today: “And this brings us to the second great division, namely, between one’s own and 
the other’s. More precisely, we must distinguish one’s own (Eigenes) from the familiar (Eigenartiges) and the 
other (Fremdes) from the alien or heterogeneous (Fremdartiges). The other would include unknown and 
unavailable contents of experience and spheres of experience, so to speak uncharted spots within one’s own world, 
indeterminacies for which determining rules exist, and empty places that can be filled by a suitable continuation 
of experience. The heterogeneous, on the contrary, would be something that shatters the existing structures of 
experience and orders of experience, that is, something unknown in a heightened sense and for which our ordering 
grids are inadequate. An example of the other would be lack of knowledge within our own language; an example 
of the alien or heterogeneous would be an unknown foreign language. The heterogeneous can occur in various 
forms: at the same stage, in the guise of forms of life, cultures, and languages of similar development; at an earlier 
stage, such as one’s own childhood and, collectively, in so-called primitive forms of life, all the way to animal 
prior forms; or finally, as a deviancy, as in the case of anomalies and diseases.” Bernhard Waldenfels, Order in 
the Twilight, Series in Continental Thought 24 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), 76. 
116 Bernhard Waldenfels, The Question of the Other: The Tang Chun-I Lecture for 2004 (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2007), 7. 
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relativizing my position, trying to understand the other behind me and bringing him in my 
understanding.  
On the contrary and to escape the problems of this binarity, the alien (der Fremde) provokes us 
beyond the limits of understanding, where our rational framework is not sufficient to find an 
agreement within the same horizon, the same borders. It calls for an encounter and an 
experience, which finds its incarnation in a dialogue (Gespräch) in its authentic and demanding 
form.  
“It seems that the alien thing resp. the alien person can neither be simply received nor 
understood. They seem to fundamentally elude every access, which does not have to 
immediately be an appropriation. A preliminary attempt to answer would maybe consist in (…) 
entering in a dialogical configuration and in the event of a discussion, wherein a coming closer 
does not exclude the alien, but lets the infinite detraction of the alien “be”, and actually 
estimates it.”117 
It is therefore in the dialogue that one can find access to the alienness, but an access that is not 
directly directed from me to him. The alienness appears in the dialogue, not in order to be 
domesticated, nor to be brought into a common frame, but to bring forth an encounter, a 
confrontation, a surplus that could not arise otherwise.  
But more important for the moment, and rather meta-philosophically, the alien (der Fremde) 
which should englobe intercultural experiences and allow an intercultural (universal?) 
experience, is, from the genealogy of its conception, grounded in the limits of the classical 
concept of Otherness. Stenger partially acknowledges this point, without admitting its European 
foundation – or at least the possibility of its non-universal ground: “With the experience of the 
Other in his otherness comes a first irritation in the centuries-old traditions of thinking, whereby 
all otherness is just the Other of Oneself, analogous to the fundamental relation in which all 
diversity is and has to be reduced to unity.”118 Intercultural philosophy answered to this problem 
by reinvestigating specific manifestations of otherness in intercultural contexts and the 
phenomenon of cultural otherness in general. The methodological problem however, although 
apparently present for example within hermeneutic intercultural research, has not led to a 
calling into question of classical methodology. It rather called for enlarging the classical 
foundation to further applications and illustrations. But is it sufficient, on the one hand to escape 
Eurocentrism and on the other hand to engage in a dialogue with the Other? 
Furthermore, in refusing the mode of ‘alterity’ that presupposes the binary reciprocal definition 
of the I and its alter (ego), the definition attempts to escape defining the Other by the I in 
                                                 
117 My translation. Original text: “Es scheint so, daß das Fremde resp. der Fremde weder einfach aufgenommen 
noch verstanden werden können. Ja sie scheinen sich jedem Zugriff, der gar nicht sogleich eine Aneignung sein 
muß, von Grund auf zu entziehen. (…) Ein vorläufiger Versuch einer Antwort bestünde vielleicht darin, (…) daß 
man in eine Gesprächskonstellation und ein Auseinandersetzungsgeschehen eintritt, worin ein sich Näherkommen 
das Fremde gerade nicht ausschließt, sondern dieses unendlich Entzogene der Fremdheit “sein” läßt, ja geradezu 
schätzt.” Ibid., p. 371. 
118 “Mit der Erfahrung des Anderen in seiner Andersheit kommt eine erste Irritation in die Jahrhunderte alten 
Denktraditionen, wonach alle Andersheit nur das Andere des Selben ist, analog jenem Grundverhältnis, in dem 
alle Vielheit auf Einheit zurückgeführt wird und auch werden muß.” Ibid., p. 340. 
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considering her/him as an ‘alien’ (in Waldenfels’ definition above described). He/she is not 
anymore understood as ‘non-I’ in the duality of the I and Thou, but as ‘beyond the I’, as what I 
cannot grasp. However, in doing so, he/she is left untouched as the ultimate excluding category, 
as ‘exo-topos’ and remains a formal unspecified category. This also leads to a certain 
homogeneity presupposed in such concepts of alienness. The alien is an ‘extra-ordinary’ 
phenomenon119, beyond any categorical order and ‘hermetic’120, beyond any understanding. A 
problem however follows, namely to consider alienness itself to be one unified concept. It is a 
‘beyond’, the ungraspable category121. Within this ‘beyond’, one can distinguish a plurality of 
cultures, but they will all be characterized by what is ungraspable for the Other. To say it 
differently: regardless of the origin of the alien, his or her characteristic as an alien is to be 
‘beyond’ the own, defined by this difference or this gap (écart122) between the own and the 
alien. In remaining Other and yet powerful colonizer instituting a hierarchy, European 
philosophies have set the configuration of thinking and dialoguing in their own scheme. Even 
when willing to engage, are we able to do it without reducing the other to our own 
representation?  
Is it however not naïve from my part to believe that we could simply ‘leave’ Eurocentrism and 
accede another point of view than ourselves, grounded in European thoughts and context? Are 
we maybe not condemned to move circularly in qualifying different phases of (persisting) 
Eurocentrisms? Halbfass and Ivekovic present clearly distinguished alternatives on the topic. 
For Halbfass, Eurocentrism, including what I call ‘self-critical’ Eurocentrism, is an unescapable 
fact, as much as the Europeanization of the Earth, the denial of which constitutes a self-illusion: 
““Is it really possible to move briskly from Eurocentrism to anti- Eurocentrism (and from logos 
to anti-logos?” [ibid., p.50 question raised by Fred Dallmayr]. Our answer to this question has 
to be clear and simple: No. The various recent forms of ‘anti-Eurocentrism’ cannot lead us 
beyond the Eurocentric constellation of our modern world. Instead, they may prevent us from 
facing the problem, or perhaps even reinforce it. We cannot simply replace ‘Eurocentrism’ (or 
‘logocentrism’) with its opposite. There is no room for such ‘opposites.’ Any discourse of 
rejection is inevitably futile as long as it is unable to face the extent to which it is permeated 
by what it rejects. Modern ‘Eurocentrism’ which coincides with the ‘Europeanization of the 
earth,’ is, of course, no longer a particular kind of ethnocentrism, which would coexist with or 
might be replaced by other ‘centrisms,’ or culturally and geographically bound views of the 
world. In the universality of its cognitive claims, it suppresses and anticipates its own rejections 
and opposites. For the time being, we have no choice but to accept the historical predicament 
of Europeanization, and to try to understand it from within, patiently, ready to ask questions 
                                                 
119 Waldenfels, The Question of the Other, 12–13; Bernhard Waldenfels, Etudes pour une phénoménologie de 
l’étranger (Paris: Van Dieren, 2009), 17. 
120 Rombach, Drachenkampf. Der Philosophische Hintergrund Der Blutigen Bürgerkriege Und Die Brennenden 
Zeitfragen.; Heinrich Rombach, Die Welt Als Lebendige Struktur: Probleme Und Lösungen Der Strukturontologie, 
1. Aufl, Rombach Wissenschaft, Bd. 5 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2003), 22–24. 
121 Waldenfels, Etudes pour une phénoménologie de l’étranger, 12–14. 
122 François Jullien, L’écart et l’entre: Leçon Inaugurale de la Chaire sur l’altérité, 8 Décembre 2011, Débats 
(Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2012). 
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without expecting immediate answers. Trying to discard or replace it would be an act of self-
deception.” 123 
When Halbfass mentions the futility of the rejection, insofar as it is already conditioned by its 
own rejection, he means, I believe, what I outlined with the idea of Eurocentrism turning into a 
self-critical Eurocentrism. Simple critiques and negations certainly cannot erase Eurocentrism 
in the deeper layers of its conditioning our thoughts. Does it mean however that we are left 
speechless, having no right to speak, or in Halbfass’ alternative, left to “accept the historical 
predicament of Europeanization, and to try to understand it from within?”  
On this point, I believe that Ivekovic’s ‘answer’ to Halbfass internal acceptance of Eurocentrism 
- Ivekovic first wrote her essay on Halbfass to which the latter answers, her explanation does 
not constitute a direct answer - raises relevant questions. In so doing, she also interrogates the 
very ability of dialoguing between these traditions if the prism of Eurocentrism is maintained 
in spite of our efforts: 
“India, the Orient, is the Other we have given ourselves, as Halbfass puts it. By which words 
should one call this Other to a dialogue, a dialogue that has no status in its tradition? And why 
should one do it? Isn't dialogue also a Western setting? How is it possible not to pressure the 
Other with violence while proposing the dialogue? This is a problem of the politics of 
discourse. The problem of reception of which one clue resides at the side of the Other is 
invisible and unsolvable from ‘this side.’ We would have to de-center ourselves. Identity is 
caught up in a paradox. It is the impossible position between ‘I’ or ‘we’ and the ‘Other,’ never 
accountable. How could one break with the arrogance of one's own cultural identity without 
necessarily renouncing it - when this arrogance seems to be constitutive of it? Jacques Derrida 
would confirm the paradox here: we must be true within treason itself (Derrida 1991). But is 
it sufficient to take note of the de facto asymmetry in order to be exonerated? Instead of giving 
some space for the Other to speak, space that will remain empty, shouldn't we try to go one 
step further and listen to the Other, to that other language, and try to understand it? That would 
produce a world of multiple co-subjects. However, it would be uncontrollable. Why should 
Europe, the West, always be that inexhaustible source of universality? How could one insure 
collaboration between multiple subjects? In order to come to this sort of advaita from the 
Western position we certainly have to start by doing what Wilhelm Halbfass does when he lets 
the Other speak. The most radical moves in these matters seem to be the moderate ones.”124  
Breaking with the arrogance of one’s identity corresponds to breaking with Eurocentrism, the 
impossibility of which seems to lie in the constitutive relation to one’s own identity. However, 
does it excuse Halbfass’ resigned comment on remaining internally aware of Eurocentrism? “Is 
it sufficient to take note of the de facto asymmetry in order to be exonerated”? I understand this 
relevant critique in concrete intercultural applications:  Is it justified to systematically ground 
intercultural philosophy on philosophical methodologies that have no reference outside 
European contexts? Can we simply integrate the Other in such a context, and does he/she not 
become rather intercultural illustration than actors? 
                                                 
123 Wilhelm Halbfass, “Research and Reflection: Responses to My Respondents. II. Cross-Cultural Encounter and 
Dialogue.,” in Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural 
Studies, ed. Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, 1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), 149. 
124 Ivekovic, “The Politics of Comparative Philosophy,” 232–33. 
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1.2.3. Contemporary Indian philosophy Interculturally Defined: Outline of the 
Content.  
 
To analyze intercultural dialogues, I believe that using examples from non-Western literature 
is not sufficient, but that the theories themselves should originate from different sources, in my 
case, an Indian philosopher trained in Western philosophy (and initiated to Sanskrit) who 
himself engaged with different traditions of Indian philosophies. Before turning to a detailed 
description of these dialogical experiments, I wish to elucidate the somewhat unusual 
background of the following chapters. Chapter 2 reconstitutes the context of the dialogical 
experiments and answers to the questions “What does saṃvāda mean, how did the saṃvāda 
project come to existence and why was it conceived?”. The next chapter 3 describes the forms 
of the dialogical in the different experiments organized and the methodology that underlies 
them, and responds to the “how”, namely “how did they happen and what are the dialogues 
themselves?”.  
These two chapters, which both consider the concrete proceeding of the dialogues, demand a 
longer comment, on the one hand to measure the specificity of the context they describe, and 
on the other hand to notify the reader of the personal reconstruction that I effectuate. Indeed, 
the following description has been reassembled from diverse sources, partially published, 
partially unpublished and/or informal interviews, which I have conducted during my research. 
This concerns first the information about the dialogical experiments themselves, which have 
not all been published, and the material around their organization or their assessment, but to a 
certain extent also the conceptual narrative of the colonial time. Indeed, only one encompassing 
history of colonial Indian philosophy has been until now written, by Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. 
Garfield,125 which concerns the generation preceeding Daya Krishna’s and thereby does not 
include the intellectual history of these dialogical experiments. This means that, in the field of 
colonial and post-colonial Indian philosophy, in English-speaking academia in India and in 
other Hindu and Muslim education systems, there are no “ready-made” resources126, neither 
regarding the collection of data nor their evaluation and interpretation, and not even a contextual 
historical narrative surrounding them. This simple fact has important consequences: these 
concepts and authors are not part of our familiar conceptual environment and cannot be 
immediately used in an argumentation.127 As Raghuramaraju comments, the resources have 
first to be recollected and identified, analyzed and connected to their peers, namely the 
discourse in which they occurred must be reconstructed. This process provides the text with an 
                                                 
125 Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield, Minds without Fear: Philosophy in the Indian Renaissance (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2017). 
126 A. Raghuramaraju, “Bending Deleuze and Guattari for India: Re-Examining the Relation Between Art and 
Politics in Europe and India,” Sophia 57, no. 3 (September 2018): 476, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0684-
3. 
127 “There is a variance, an unevenness, between these two [Euro-American philosophy and Indian writers]. I am 
sensitive to this and wish to tread carefully so as not to accentuate the difference or unevenness. Unlike in the 
Euro-American world, in India, academic resources are not available readymade, one has to get them ready for 
use. This is a long procedure, and it requires different levels, stages, and methods of preparation. Firstly, the 
resources have to be identified and their descriptions have to be drawn up. One, then, needs to find out if there are 
existing interpretations available on them, and write about these realities, practices, or ideas in a new idiom. Only 
then, these can be used in academic discussions.” Raghuramaraju, 476. 
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intellectual context, so as to create a discourse where the concepts can be meaningful and used 
appropriately. It is worthwhile to notice that this procedure of recollecting, identifying and 
analyzing the resources, which is invisible once the text is written and not recognized in the 
philosophical field, partially explains the lack of research on these fields, and in general in non-
Western resources. The imbalance between the ‘ready-made’ handbooks and easily available 
resources on Western philosophy and their absence concerning non-Western, in my case here, 
post-colonial Indian philosophy, makes the development of the latter from scratch strenuous.  
These chapters try in consequence to create a coherent image of saṃvāda in its own context, in 
order to make the concept “usable”. Raghuramaraju explains the risk in overstepping these steps 
when he writes about the danger of comparing “uneven” authors, when there is a “disproportion 
in the availability of the scholarship on these thinkers”128. He writes that “directly using the 
resources from India can expose these scholars from India to vulnerabilities and render them 
less enduring - to be considered esoteric at most, attracting more of curiosity than academic 
credibility, despite themes and ideas from India gaining visibility at the global level.”129 I want 
to draw attention to this precaution, which I find methodologically significative in a study in 
intercultural philosophy, and which justifies my detailed exploration “around” the idea of 
saṃvāda. With Raghuramaraju, I have to warn against the danger of uprooting authors to a 
global context, which also implies, for unfamiliar readers, using these authors without 
introducing the discourse in which they occurred. It is indeed easy to dismiss a theory when our 
philosophical approach is monocultural, or in more moderate cases, too inclined to analogical 
thinking, akin the ‘like’-argumentation claim, i.e. ‘the non-Western concept X actually 
resembles the Western concept I know Y, ergo there is nothing new about it, and I do not need 
any non-Western philosophy’. Without elucidating the singularity of a context from which a 
new concept emerges, one risks missing the creativity of non-Western philosophers (even if 
chronologically, it also often happens that the non-Western philosopher suggested the ‘similar’ 
concept prior to the Western one). Conceptual analogy, if sometimes a useful pedagogical 
device, can easily erase the originality and the specificity of non-Western philosophers who 
find themselves, from the simple unevenness of the corpus, immediately in a situation of 
conceptual inequality: in front of the masses of documentation on European author X, a single 
text of a non-Western text preserved in the library (without any external references, intellectual 
context or other texts available), naturally seems less elaborated, precise, or complex. In other 
words and to illustrate my point: in order not to understand Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda as a mere 
late (intercultural) copy or variation of Plato’s dialogue, or to avoid simply ‘picking’ the 
concept ‘saṃvāda’ and add it as an ‘exotic example’ to a Western theory of dialogues, or 
pūrvapakṣa as an equivalent to counter-position, their specific narrative must be reconstructed 
‘from scratch’, from a very reconstruction of sources to the specificities of the intellectual 
context in which he was rooted.  
In this regard, the next chapter reconstructs the project that led to the dialogues: first, in 
recollecting and gathering Daya Krishna’s comments at different places, unpublished thoughts 
on dialogue and in his comments in the introductions to different saṃvādas, from which I draw 
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a first definition of the concept as used by him and its different implications (2.1). Then, I 
investigate the etymological meaning of saṃvāda and the use in the classical scholastic Sanskrit 
traditions (2.1.1): I thereby connect it with the classical dialogical traditions to underline the 
originality of Daya Krishna’s reinterpration, who implied paṇḍits, as those who directly inherit 
the classical traditions, but only in order to be contemporary actors of the philosophical 
traditions (2.1.2). The divide between the idée reçue of paṇḍits as those who preserve the texts 
and Daya Krishna’s implication of them as thinkers questions the perception of the 
philosophical ‘tradition’ in India. This antinomy between historical and philosophical approach 
brought an intellectual divide in the different philosophical communities in India. It is from this 
perspective that saṃvāda becomes not only a philological, historical and hermeneutic device of 
importance, but also a postcolonial project (2.2.1). This motivation for reacting to a more 
inclusive philosophy has also a more personal aspect of engagement, in particular from his 
experience as a professor and the friendship involved in the experiments, which leads me to 
suggest some predecessors who have inspired and contributed to the creation of the experiments 
(2.2.2) and (2.2.3) 
The following chapter articulates the different forms, which I consider by extension to be part 
of the saṃvāda project (since the name was only given to the multilingual dialogues organized 
between different philosophical communities), including the weekly seminars of Jaipur (3.1), 
the editing work of the Journal of Indian Council for Philosophical Research (3.2), the saṃvāda 
experiments themselves (3.3), and the dialogues organized between contemporary Anglophone 
philosophers (3.4). Besides the historical motivation of reconstructing a corpus with the 
material I could recollect, but also of making available excerpts from unpublished letters and 
documents used for the preparation of the experiments, and the experience of participants, I 
pursue also another objective in this chapter 3. I investigate the cross-cultural attempts and the 
methodology developed in the practice of the different dialogues, that gradually integrated 
different philosophical traditions in the Anglophone academics, and also the preparation and 
thoughts on how to make academics in India more diverse, and followingly, more creative and 
relevant today. These methodological analyses from the practice form the ground on which I 
then turn to theorize the concept of saṃvāda itself.  
In the second part of this work entitled ‘Saṃvāda in Theory’, I investigate Daya Krishna’s wide-
ranging philosophy in order to think ‘dialogue’ in connection with the practical experiments 
that he conducted. Dialogues can be seen from two angles in Daya Krishna’s philosophy: as a 
topic and as a method. As a topic, it implies thinking what dialogues across philosophical 
traditions could mean with his philosophy. As mentioned in the Preface, and further 
investigated in 3.5, there is no monograph and only few articles dealing explicitly with the 
subject of dialogue in his immense corpus. Therefore, we need to articulate different core 
concepts in his philosophy and investigate in which sense they can contribute to the topic. As a 
method, however, Daya Krishna’s own writings are often dialogical in the sense that they imply 
interlocutors, and often also his listeners, as part of a philosophical dialogue in his texts. For 
this reason, the next part includes some interlocutors, mostly his immediate predecessors and 
contemporaries with whom he also engaged in real life, or those who influenced him greatly. 
In the different chapters, I relate his thoughts to those of Krishachandra and Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya, J. N. Chubb, Margaret Chatterjee, G. C. Pande, S. S. Barlingay and N. V. 
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Banerjee, who I believe, are helpful to integrate Daya Krishna’s ‘counter-positions’ into a larger 
philosophical framework to which he is responding.  
In chapter 4, I emphasize on thinking dialogue as a ‘multifaceted whole’ by outlining the 
different inseparable dimensions that are implied in it. Thus, refusing to limit the analysis of 
dialogues across traditions to the question of translations between languages or conceptual 
frameworks, I focus here on all the philosophical interlocking that it raises. Saṃvāda indeed 
necessarily implies rhetoric and, in a larger perspective, epistemology. The questions of what 
is fallacious or not, what can be said or not, how it can be presented, as well as the question of 
the kind of truth that we want to reach in a dialogue, belong to a certain extent to these realms. 
However, in Daya Krishna’s perspective, these questions imply to think anew what we think is 
true and false, which kind of authority is exercised and what is its legitimacy, which kind of 
persons are there and how they see themselves in relation to others, how knowledge is 
inextricable from its intersubjective constitution, and how we are ‘moving’ towards a certain 
idea of truth, i.e. what is this force pushing us together towards something which we seek. 
Knowledges take here a plural and wider sense: they are defined as constituted on the one hand 
by elaborated resources from various traditions (in the sense of śāstric knowledge, bodies of 
fixed treatises), put in tension with knowledge-as-seeking (as puruṣārthas), this movement 
towards what we want to know, or what ought to be realized. Within these two poles, I first 
suggest to see dialogue as a tool (śilpa) that activates this tension between the different 
resources and the seeking for ‘more’. In this sense, dialogue is a tool for what Daya Krishna 
calls ‘the art of the conceptual’ as what can liberate critical and creative thinking in distinction 
to the fixed ‘thoughts’ of the acquired resources from all traditions.  
The next chapters further develop the different dimensions implied in chapter 4. Chapter 5 
investigates epistemological presuppositions by focusing on a device to which Daya Krishna 
gives great relevance in his philosophy: pūrvapakṣa or counter-position. I first contemplate the 
advantage of counter-positions to unveil presuppositions of thinking, since counter-positions in 
this sense (ideally) require taking into consideration the other’s position to the best of one’s 
capacity before presenting alternatives. It thus enables a certain detachment from one’s position 
and a sense of plurality of different standpoints (5.2). Continuing with J. N. Chubb’s and 
Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s respective concepts of epistemological introspection, which the 
former conceives of as witnessing the origins of thought, and the super-philosophic attitude of 
contemplating a plurality of contradictory and absolute philosophies, I interpret with Daya 
Krishna their insights as an epistemology of dialogue (5.3). Such an account requires a thinking 
of knowledges in the plural, alternating and aware of their own presuppositions, which is 
revealed by counter-positions in dialogue. To explain that knowledges can be seen in the plural 
implies to consider that theories, although different and even contradictory with each other, can 
be seen as equally valid from a super-philosophic point of view. This signifies to regard them 
as an alternation or exploration of different standpoints. That these standpoints exist in the first 
place, and that they lead to contradictory unfolding requires to take into consideration concepts 
such as significance and meaning. This means that knowledge is not only the result of premises, 
but that these premises are developed according to some criteria leading the knowledge toward 
a certain direction. These criteria and directions fall outside of the epistemological realm.  
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I investigated these directions and criteria from the perspective of values in chapter 6, retrieved 
in particular from the structure of puruṣārthas. First I analyzed the difficulties that taking in 
consideration values for dialogue entail, in particular the difficulty of critically discussing 
values and the hierarchy of particular value-contents between traditions (6.1). In that sense, 
values are presented as a content of the dialogue. I then further considered how values influence 
dialogue itself, namely as what defines attitudes in the dialogue (6.2). With Daya Krishna, I 
regard participants of dialogues as ‘seekers of knowledge’ (jijñāsu), thereby introducing a 
valuational modality to the concept of dialogue. This leads me in particular to consider the role 
of ignorance and the tension between ‘not knowing yet’ and ‘yet wanting to know’. This tension 
between what ‘ought to be’ and what ‘is’, or more exactly what ‘is not yet’ is correlative to 
Daya Krishna’s interpretation of puruṣārthas and values. After investigating the influence of 
values on participants, I finally articulate values from the perspective of dialogue itself, namely 
as the tension between the conceptual apprehension of the idea(l) of dialogue and concrete 
realizations of dialogical experiments (6.3). The gap between the two appears from the 
dissatisfactions that reality brings about with regard to our ideal apprehensions. Rather than 
concluding with a radical distinction between theory and practice, I contemplated the 
advantage, with Daya Krishna, to locate the dynamic of dialogues in this tension, as the freedom 
to continue, which ‘moves’ the dialogue forward. 
While dissatisfactions can be felt, and thus revisions can be implemented for the next dialogue, 
and while epistemological presuppositions can be unveiled from another standpoint, chapter 7 
analyzes difficulties - regarded as further creative tensions - which cannot be detected from an 
external point of view. These concern illusions of consciousness, distinguished by Daya 
Krishna into two categories, structural and transcendental. Structural illusions in particular 
reveal the difficulty of unveiling the givenness of what appears similarly to all who share the 
same structure (biological, conceptual, historico-cultural). This points at the limits of our human 
condition itself (7.1). I focus on one limit in particular, which is of crucial relevance for 
dialogue: ‘I-centricity’. This points at the impossibility of conceiving the other as I-
consciousness, having the same sense of absoluteness as our ‘I’ has for us (7.3). Limiting the 
other to an ‘object of my consciousness’, namely as a position or an argument, raises the 
problem of our ontological relation to others in dialogue. This relation is further complicated 
by the fact that seeing others as ‘objects’ of my consciousness is also configurated by politico-
cultural forces. Since I associate my ‘I’ with certain identities (being ‘Indian’ for instance), the 
identity of my ‘I’ is also related to other structures. While I feel my ‘I’ as an absolute centre for 
me around which ‘others’ gravitate, the cultural centres and peripheries might entail different 
constitutions. This raises further the problem of ‘others’ as ‘objects’ to be studied from my own 
centre. In postcolonial Indian philosophies and for intercultural discourses in general, the 
intermingling of these identities in the I and others, but even more my understanding of ‘others’ 
as ‘objects’ about which I think (and not with whom) raises central difficulties for dialoguing. 
With N. V. Banerjee in particular, I investigated the foundation of an ‘I with others = We’. This, 
I believe, is crucial to avoid a conception of dialogue as a sum of separated contributions (‘I 
and others’) instead of a constitutive relation from where (from the ‘we’) creativity arises. I 
hypothesized with Daya Krishna - and his contemporaries - that to become aware of this 
essentiality to others is a demand originating from within consciousness (7.2). With Daya 
55 
 
Krishna, however, resisting any a priori constitution, this demand is to be realized in mutual 
actions with others, namely in dialogues. In the movement of withdrawing within my ‘I’ and 
engaging ‘out’ with others lies my realization of being with others. For Daya Krishna, this 
dynamic is furthermore an expression of my freedom, a freedom which is neither (only) 
impeded by others, because of which my absoluteness is limited, nor absolutely detached from 
the world, as a transcendental escape. It is precisely a freedom to enter in dialogue with others, 
which my consciousness demands from within, but which meets with the concrete limitations 
of my intersubjective possibilities.  
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Part I: Saṃvāda in practice 
2. Saṃvāda Project: Definition and Genesis of Daya Krishna’s Dialogical 
Experiments.  
 
“There still remain a very large number of questions that demand answers. (…) It is hoped that 
others will take up the endeavor from where we have left it. We wish them luck and hope that 
they will have learnt something from the achievements and deficiencies of this volume, which 
attempted the writing of a new type of history. How professional historians will respond to this 
effort is difficult to say. But new departures are generally not welcome and intellectuals, as a 
class, happen to be ‘conservative’ as anyone else. Perhaps I was ‘saved’ from the usual 
traditions of history writing as I was never trained as a historian and, even in the field of 
philosophy, I have been an ‘outsider’ as I have not belonged to any ‘school’, whether modern 
or traditional. I have been, if anything, a ‘thinker’ at large for whom the activity of ‘thinking’ 
has always been more important than the products of that activity and hence, have always 
questioned the obvious, so easily accepted by most.”130 
  
                                                 
130 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 
15–16. 
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2.1. What is Saṃvāda? 
2.1.1. Sam-vāda, “Collective Discussion”: from the Nyāya-sūtra to Daya Krishna 
 
The term saṃvāda in the present context refers to the scholastic dialectic traditions of Sanskrit 
literature,131 and to the dialogical form of philosophizing in classical India.132 The term, usually 
translated as dialogue, or more precisely ‘collective discussion’ is composed of sam- (‘with’, 
comparable to the Latin prefix cum in con-versation) and vāda, ‘discussion’, ‘debate’133 . 
However, (saṃ)vāda does not refer to any kind of debate or discussion, but to discussion among 
pairs in the Nyāya-sūtra, which corresponds to Caraka’s non-agonal form of scholastic 
debate134. In this literature135, distinctions are made between three types of verbal confrontations: 
vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Vāda136 aims at establishing the truth, and requires in the Nyāya-sūtra 
(I.2.1137) the exposition of positions and counter-positions, refutes contradictions, and “consists 
in the establishment of their respective thesis and the refutation of the counter-thesis based upon 
the means of knowledge and reasoning (pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambha)” 138 . Jalpa (NS. 
                                                 
131 It could be useful to explore here the differences with European classical scholasticism, in particular to notice 
how modern European philosophers reacted to their tradition in difference to their Indian counterparts. From a 
historical study one could locate the roots of different practices and emphases by confronting both classical 
traditions. I chose here to limit myself to a general introduction of the classical Indian rhetoric from the more 
specific point of view of Daya Krishna’s reinterpretation.  
132 For vādas taking place at the court with kings and between philosophical schools, see the Introduction of 
Gautama and Pakṣilasvāmin, Le Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Akṣapāda, le Nyāya-Bhāṣya d’Akṣapāda Pakṣilasv 
āmin, 15–242; Johannes Bronkhorst, “Modes of Debate and Refutation of Adversaries in Classical and Medieval 
India: A Preliminary Investigation,” Antiquorum Philosophia 1, no. 1 (2007): 1000–1012; Brian Black and Laurie 
L. Patton, eds., Dialogue in Early South Asian Religions: Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain Traditions, Dialogues in South 
Asian Traditions: Religion, Philosophy, Literature, and History (Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT, 
USA: Ashgate, 2015). (in particular Nicholson’s contribution, pp.151-169). In the Buddhist tradition, for instance 
Jonardon Ganeri, “Argumentation, Dialogue and the Kathāvatthu,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 29, no. 4 (2001): 
485–93.  
133 Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition 
and Dialogue,” 174. 
134 „“Gemeinschaftliche Unterredung“. In den Nyāyasūtren bezeichnet der Terminus die Unterredung unter 
Gleichgesinnten und entspricht somit dem bei Caraka gelehrten Begriff der nicht-agonalen Form der 
wissenschaftlichen Debatte.“ Oberhammer, Prets, and Prandstetter, Terminologie der frühen philosophischen 
Scholastik in Indien, 203–4.My translation: “’Common Interlocution’. In the Nyāyasūtras, this term signifies the 
interlocution among like-minded persons. It thus corresponds to the concept of the non-agonal form of scientific 
debate as taught in the Caraka.” 
135 The difference between these two references is summarized here: “Both manuals [Caraka-saṃhitā and Nyāya-
sūtra] discuss the question of debate in general (vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā) with the difference that vāda in the Nyāya-
sūtras is understood as the friendly form of debate, and disputation (jalpa) and eristic wrangle (vitaṇḍā) are the 
hostile forms, wheareas in the Caraka-saṃhitā disputation and eristic wrangle are subdivisions of vāda (…). This 
means that in the Caraka-saṃhitā, vāda is only the hostile variety of debate.” Prets, “Theories of Debate, Proof 
and Counter-Proof in the Early Indian Dialectical Tradition,” 440–41. 
136 Bimal Krishna Matilal, “Debate and Dialectic in Ancient India,” in Philosophical Essays. Professor Anantalal 
Thakur Felicitation Volume, ed. Ramaranjan Mukherji (Kolkata: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1987), 56–57; Gerhard 
Oberhammer, “Ein Beitrag Zu Den Vāda-Traditionen Indiens,” Wiener Zeitschrift Für die Kunde Süd- Und Ost-
Asiens, no. 7 (1963): 63–103. 
137 Gautama and Pakṣilasvāmin, Le Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Akṣapāda, le Nyāya-Bhāṣya d’Akṣapāda Pakṣilasv 
āmin, 341–43. 
138 Ernst Prets, “Futile and False Rejoinders, Sophistical Arguments and Early Indian Logic,” Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 29, no. 5 (2001): 545. 
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I.2.2139) occurs between rival parties who aim at winning the debate. While the development of 
the dispute (jalpa) resembles the dialogue (vāda), the means are different: tricks and sophistical 
strategies140 are as much part of the game as the rational content of the argumentation. Finally, 
vitaṇḍā (NS. I.2.3141) also implies the idea of victory, this time however for the bare sake of it, 
without establishing any position of its own, nor aiming at establishing the truth. As Elisa 
Freschi notices, Daya Krishna’s choice of using the term saṃvāda “clearly points at his 
positioning himself within those who search for truth and not for a victory in debate”142, and I 
would add, also clearly locates the project as a contemporary reinterpretaton of the Sanskrit 
dialectic tradition. She continues in highlighting the relevance of the addition of the prefix ‘sam-
’, which, although it has precedents and evokes the rhetoric tradition, is not usually found in 
combination with vāda: this addition clearly emphasizes the mutuality in Daya Krishna’s use 
of the term. She adds: 
“Although vāda is in Nyāya truth-oriented, it also retains a competitive aspect. Daya Krishna 
removed this in favour of an open-ended and non-competitive discussion. This removal does 
not amount to an irenic ideal, since the critical engagement with other ideas makes Daya 
Krishna often ready to dismiss what he deems to be prejudices or closedness in other authors.  
(…) Moreover, Daya Krishna even displays a preference for the hostile confrontation modelled 
after the vitaṇḍā when he writes:  
“It should be noted that jalpa is defined in terms of chala [‘fraud’, EF] and jāti [‘futile 
rejoinder’, EF] and hence consists of them (see sūtra 1.2.2). Thus, really speaking, there are 
only vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā as jalpa consists of chala and jāti. This reveals that ultimately the 
act of reasoning in its psychological aspect consists only of honesty and dishonesty in 
reasoning. Both vāda and vitaṇḍā are honest, even though the latter is not generally considered 
as such. But, the person who engages in vitaṇḍā is perhaps even more honest than the one who 
engages in vāda, because he openly declares that he has not yet found the truth or does not 
have any settled siddhānta [‘conclusive opinion’, EF] of his own, but that he sees the defects 
in what someone else is claiming to be truth or proclaiming as a siddhānta. However, in this 
sense of vitaṇḍā one who argues that reasoning can not establish any siddhānta at all or, in 
other words, can not find the truth or is a completee skeptic can not be considered a 
vaitaṇḍic.”143 
This implies that Daya Krishna is well aware of the fact that vāda entails an a priori assumption 
– which he calls “final and ultimate absoluteness of the knowledge” – namely, that of the 
possibility of establishing a definite truth. In this sense, vitaṇḍā implies more openness.”144 
                                                 
139 Gautama and Pakṣilasvāmin, Le Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Akṣapāda, le Nyāya-Bhāṣya d’Akṣapāda Pakṣilasv 
āmin, 343; Matilal, “Debate and Dialectic in Ancient India,” 57–58. 
140 See the elaborated study on these device by Prets, who also prevent us from the ‘negative’ understanding in the 
translation as quibble, tricks and sophisms, since these device are in the NS valid means of refutation. Prets, “Futile 
and False Rejoinders, Sophistical Arguments and Early Indian Logic.” 
141 Gautama and Pakṣilasvāmin, Le Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Akṣapāda, le Nyāya-Bhāṣya d’Akṣapāda Pakṣilasv 
āmin, 345–46; Matilal, “Debate and Dialectic in Ancient India,” 58–64. 
142 Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition 
and Dialogue,” 175. 
143 Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras: A New Commentary on an Old Text, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, 
no. 287 (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2004), 25–26. 
144 Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition 
and Dialogue,” 175–76. 
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Freschi argues that Daya Krishna chose the term vitaṇḍā over vāda for not risking a skeptical 
(and maybe relativistic) account and for not encouraging an “easy rhetorical victory”. Daya 
Krishna could not concede the honest argumentation for the sake of the rhetorics, although he 
could also not accept an irenic model. J. L. Mehta, who himself has been engaged in 
phenomenological and hermeneutic analyzes of Indian philosophy and confronted to the 
dialogical problem in his career abroad, comments on his own experience. He underlines the 
necessity of a certain confrontational attitude in dialoguing for not risking mutual 
congratulating or politeness.  
“Whether one takes it in the ancient Greek spirit of agon and eristikos or in the Indian sense of 
shastrartha, there is an element of mutual grappling and fight in such dialogues, without which 
they easily turn into a mere exchange of courtesies. In order to be fruitful the dialogue must be 
conceived also as a mutual challenging, a calling out to the other to come out into the open, 
and it needs being conducted as a ‘liebende Kampf’, to use Karl Jaspers striking phrase.”145 
I believe that Daya Krishna would subscribe to this idea of a ‘loving fight’ to avoid 
superficiality of courtesies. Nevertheless, in spite of his inclination to a confrontational model, 
it is most probable that he could not consider it a viable model due to the rhetorical aspect and 
that he also could not favor a dialogical model that did not consider seriously counter-positions 
in its procedure.  
Daya Krishna remained consciously closer to vāda, although in a vitaṇḍic move of not self-
proclaiming a given truth. This commitment to vāda, its implication of the objective and 
scholastic truth as well as the importance of the dialectic in classical Indian traditions per se, 
can partially explain why Daya Krishna relied on dialogue as a logical instrument apt to 
philosophize. Indeed, in the European traditions, dialogues as proper philosophy reached its 
apogee with Socrates and Plato, and although the advent of Modernity still provides some 
examples (with Descartes or Hume) or even if we find contemporary sporadic examples, it 
remained a genre at the margins, which has difficulties to be integrated to the ‘proper’ scientific 
expectations of modern philosophy.146  Treatises largely replace and expulse philosophical 
dialogues, which are not felt as enough reliable or systematic. Saṃvāda, on the other hand, is 
not felt in opposition to, but as a component of śāstras (treatises) as a logical method of tending 
towards truth since the classical developments of Indian philosophies. It is in rational debates 
with counter-positions that the arguments are sharpened. While rhetoric is seen as suspicious in 
modern European philosophy, in particular as the instrument of sophistry, the elaboration of 
complex rhetorical rules in India circumvents this difficulty without jettisoning the necessity of 
confrontation for logical argumentations. Thus, saṃvāda does not carry the skeptic connotation 
vis à vis scientific and philosophical standards of knowledge implied by modern European 
philosophy. On the contrary, it contributes to knowledge through a precise and systematic 
collaborative investigation to erase mistakes, obscurities and approximations. The logical 
                                                 
145 Mehta, Philosophy and Religion, 68. 
146 A contemporary expression of skepticism towards the possibility of dialoguing in philosophy is illustrated by 
Slavoj Žižek in his “Philosophy is not a dialogue” Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, and Peter Engelmann, Philosophy 
in the Present, English ed (Cambridge ; Malden, Mass: Polity, 2009), 49–72. 
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connotation implied in the term may also justify Daya Krishna’s preference over the English 
equivalent, bearing of a more literary and disregarded philosophical importance.  
The technical Sanskrit term saṃvāda clearly and self-consciously articulates the project 
undertaken by Daya Krishna, both in its relation to the tradition, and in the etymological 
composition. With his projects however, the term takes a new signification. In Daya Krishna’s 
dialogical project, saṃvāda was first the name attributed to M. P. Rege’s and his first 
institutionalized and published multilingual dialogue, a philosophical encounter between 
Nyayāyikas, trained in Sanskrit Indian philosophy, and English-speaking philosophers trained 
in Indian academics. The dialogue (see 3.3) created a philosophical platform to collectively 
engage different intellectual traditions on a common topic, in this case Russell and the concept 
of proposition, which could benefit from both expertise and perspectives.  
Beyond this explicit denomination as saṃvāda and the saṃvāda project, there are only a few 
occurrences, either to ‘dialogue’ or to ‘saṃvāda’ in Daya Krishna’s work. However, there are 
as few occurrences as there is an absolute consensus from participants of any of the dialogical 
experiments, from his colleagues, students and friends on the fact that he has been entirely 
concerned, throughout his life, with dialoguing with as many thinkers as he could. Daya 
Krishna’s epistolary legacy, his classes and seminars, but also his home opened in the afternoon 
to all seeking dialogues, as well as his dialogical way of editing the Journal of Indian Council 
for Philosophical Research are clear evidences of a constant, open and long-lasting enthusiasm 
for dialogues between philosophical traditions. One way to resolve this apparent paradox is 
simply to consider that his constant engagement either did not allow him (enough time) to come 
back to conceptually elaborate on a practice he was conducting daily (see 3.5). Another, maybe 
more plausible explanation given Daya Krishna’s capacity to write extensively, is to consider 
that he saw dialogues to consist of a practice constantly evolving according to the opportunities 
and encounters, questions and demands of the dialogues themselves, rather than a theory, which 
runs the risk of becoming systematic, automatic and presupposed. Thus, dialogue is a way to 
act-ualize philosophical theories rather than a philosophical pre-written and fixed ‘instruction 
book’. Dialogues, if conceived as a method, are meant to be used. So conceived, no theoretical 
methodology, even if independently tailored for each dialogue, can a priori guarantee success 
to the dialogue147 or uncritical endorsement.148 Critiques are on the contrary necessary to renew 
the dialogical attempts. Regardless of the reasons for the lack of conceptual analysis, Daya 
Krishna’s work leaves us with the legacy of an immense praxis – partly transcribed and 
published - contrasted with few clear and direct analyses of the topic. This span between a 
constant and lively engagement with dialogues and the paucity of an analysis of the 
phenomenon itself, is worth being explored as a possibility of thinking anew with his legacy 
the question of dialogues between different philosophical traditions. 
                                                 
147 See for example Bettina Bäumer’s experience, Bäumer, “‘Falling in Love with a Civilization’: A Tribute to 
Daya Krishna, the Thinker,” 34–40. 
148 See for example Shail Mayaram’s testimony in her fictive dialogue, Mayaram, Philosophy as Saṃvāda and 
Svarāj, 278–91. 
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Nevertheless, I could locate a philosophical analysis of saṃvāda project, which, coincidentally, 
is retrieved from a dialogue, the topic of which was itself ‘dialogue’. It shows how Daya 
Krishna took seriously the praxis of dialogue, not only illustrating his theory by artificial 
dialogues or simple examples, but theorizing dialogues in the dialogues themselves. Organized 
by Kapila Vatsyayan149, an important scholar of Indian classical arts, on 15th-16th January 1992 
at the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts in New Delhi, the dialogue took place after a 
series of lecture delivered by Maurice and Aleene Friedman on topics related to dialogue and 
Martin Buber. The dialogue started as a discussion on Maurice Friedman’s lecture on “Dialogue 
and the Human Image”. In 1992, Daya Krishna looks back at the assessments and the future of 
his undertaking. As a rather rare case of straightforward definition and analysis of his own 
project, I find it useful and worth to reproduce the full utterance pronounced during this 
dialogue, as it shows not only what saṃvāda means in Daya Krishna’s experiments, but also 
how he conceived it as a life project. This is how he introduced himself and his philosophical 
interests to the audience at the very beginning of the dialogue: 
“I’m a philosopher, and I’ve been interested for some time past in what you would call the 
activity of philosophizing, enlarging it to what we would call the activity of thinking, 
particularly as it happens in small groups. What exactly emerges out of what we could call the 
collectivity of interactive thinking. After that I have recently been experimenting on what we 
would call establishing dialogues – the living careers of traditional knowledge in different 
fields, both in the Sanskritic and Islamic traditions in this country. Now here the experiment 
has been in diverse forms, but one major experiment that has been attempted is how persons 
with the reservoir of traditional knowledge respond to contemporary intellectual issues about 
which they are not aware in the Western tradition and the Western languages. The other is to 
establish an interaction between themselves with respect to new questions which we formulate 
with respect to their own traditions, that is, traditions of knowledge as they are developed and 
the classical perspectives. The other aspect is how these interact, for example the classical 
Arabic tradition as it is represented in India, and the classical Sanskritic tradition with respect 
to a particular field of knowledge. Because they belong to two different traditions that are both 
classical, but they have not interacted among themselves. So we try to make them interact with 
each of them. One carries the experiment a little further in what we would call extending not 
merely in the fields of knowledge but what we would call a skill, like, for example, bringing 
traditional persons who deal with architecture both theoretically and practically and modern 
architecture. One also extends the experiment to what one may call a discussion on the tradition 
of commentaries because most of the classical traditions of knowledge have been presented in 
the form of commentaries on basic texts and commentaries on commentaries further, giving 
rise to a feeling that nothing new is being said. So we try to bring people from what you would 
call the tradition of commentaries in the Sanskrit tradition and the Arabic tradition and the 
Christian tradition and the Greek traditions together into a dialogue to reflect on that. That is 
how, through the form of commentaries, new things have been said. So we ask the scholar’s 
concern to tell us to take specific examples where they could find that, through a new 
commentary, something new is being said, though the form is the commentarial form, just the 
                                                 
149 This dialogue is not part of Daya Krishna’s saṃvādas, in the sense that it was not organized by him but he was 
invited to participate. According to the foreword and preface, the seminars, including the dialogue, were organized 
for the venue of Maurice and Aleene Friedman by Kapila Vatsyayan, with the help B. N. Saraswati and the 
retranscription edited by Pat Boni and S. C. Malik.  
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style of writing, intellectual thinking and tradition. We have been carrying on different kinds 
of experiments, and it will be interesting to see what sort of dialogue takes place.” 150  
The attention to the diverse directions undertaken and to the creativity that grounds this 
diversity stands out in Daya Krishna’s description. Saṃvāda, as he specifies, primarily means 
the “collectivity of interactive thinking”. It implies a process of ‘thinking’ that engages a 
‘collectivity’ in an ‘inter-relation’, i.e. multiple participants together, in a common effort of 
reflection on a topic, where ‘together’ includes all willing-participants (not necessarily in terms 
of a large number, but in terms of a diversity of intellectual traditions, whether cultural or 
scholarly in terms of a domain of expertise). This togetherness refers to the earlier definition of 
dialogue in its con-creative aspect (see 1.1.4), with the difference that it does not seem to be 
conceivable outside the dialogues themselves for Daya Krishna, unlike the phenomenological 
theories used in the definition of dialogue above (1.1.4). Daya Krishna emphasized on the 
liveliness of dialogues, as a hermeneutic attitude for reading and questioning texts151, but even 
more, whenever possible, as a ‘real encounter’ with the thinkers themselves, which provokes a 
‘shock’ of an actual meeting the Other (see also 7): the embodiment of a complex of ideas, 
conceptual structures, feelings, personality and expression which, met in its otherness in the 
encounter rather than in one’s own interpretation in reading, breaks out our own projection on 
the idea itself:152  
“The shock of a real encounter with the original is well known, but what is not so well known 
is the still greater shock that one feels when one meets the thinker himself. There is, on the one 
hand, the encounter with the person, which, in a sense, puts all that he had said or written far 
behind and seems somehow strangely irrelevant to the situation.”153  
This belief, which does not on the other hand presuppose any insufficiency of the texts but 
emphasizes on the creative act of reading, interpreting and discussing them together, grounds 
Daya Krishna’s interest for ‘real’, ‘embodied’ encounters and dialogues. Interestingly, 
Gadamer also evoked the “shock” (Anstoß154) although he does it within his hermeneutic 
research, in his account of question as generated by the experiences “when we are shocked by 
                                                 
150 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 164–65. 
151 Daniel Raveh explored with Daya Krishna’s philosophy what a ‘text as a process’ means, in particular the 
dialogical reading of a text as an active engagement with the text. Even in his monographs, Daya Krishna indeed 
does not ‘write alone’ but rather speaks to the texts that he is concerned with. In addition to this, I believe that his 
dialogues with a text were conducted along with real encounters with others, which were influencing the texts he 
was writing and the type of questions he was raising. Thus, one does not exclude the other, quite the contrary, 
which is why I include the encounter with others as a necessary inspiration and source of creation for further 
engaging in texts. See Daniel Raveh, “Text as a Process: Thinking with Daya Krishna,” Sandhān VII, no. 2 
(December 2007): 191–205. 
152 See also Arindam Chakrabarti’s comment in Arindam Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” in Contrary Thinking: 
Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 8. 
153 Daya Krishna, “Thinking versus Thought: Strategies for Conceptual Creativity,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected 
Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 28. 
154  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke: Hermeneutik: Wahrheit Und Methode.-1. Grundzüge Einer 
Philosophischen Hermeneutik. Bd. 1, vol. 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 372. 
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things that do not accord with our expectations”.155 For Lorenzo Bonoli, who reinterpreted this 
mention of Anstoß in the anthropological context, the shock becomes the moment of the 
manifestation of cultural otherness, the apparition of the cultural difference: 
 “It however appears obvious that this work of linguistic elaboration [to give an 
anthropological account of the shock] is not an epistemological neutral gesture: it implies a 
transformation, a construction of the lived experience according to lexical and conceptual tools 
that our linguistic system provides us with. It is precisely in this work of elaboration that the 
conditioning linked to our cultural belonging takes place, and that otherness is transformed, 
from “something that produces a shock” towards something that we can say and understand, 
and therefore towards something that can be integrated in our symbolic system. It follows that 
an otherness expressed in our language is already not a ‘true’ otherness anymore, insofar as it 
is already mediated and belongs straightaway to our conceptual horizon.”156 
I do not believe that the shock is limited to the cultural aspect of otherness, but it breaks out the 
common and un-reflected continuous movement of the exchange and lets appear a fissure to 
reexamine what was presupposed and accepted. The awareness and the burst of consciousness 
that emerge from this plain encounter with otherness challenge our presupposition and 
prejudices and allow a ‘fresh start’ on the same idea.  
From the development of the shock to the inter-actions characterizing dialogues, a collective 
‘thinking’ emerges, expressed and integrated by the participants with their different conceptual 
backgrounds who meet in a dialogue. The shock is fainting in the mutuality of thinking, so that 
one of Daya Krishna’s way to retain the ‘freshness’ is to consider thinking as an activity and a 
process: it cannot be achieved nor definite – it is “subject to revision and counter-revision”,157 
which is how saṃvāda progresses. In this sense, it has to be distinguished from ‘thought’ as “a 
product of the activity of thinking”:158 a thought is an achieved and particular product or result 
of thinking, which can be exposed in argumentation, systematized in philosophical works, 
which usually grounds one’s position in a dialogue. Thoughts can be exposed and explained in 
a structured framework, and publicly presented. In this sense, thoughts compose lectures and 
conferences and are exposed in debates. However, precisely where conferences and debates are 
limited to the expositions and the descriptions of these thoughts, dialogues consist in the activity 
                                                 
155 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Joel Weinsheimer, and Donald G. Marshall, Truth and Method (New York: Bloomsbury 
Publishing USA, 2004), 360. 
156 My translation. Original text: “Il apparaît toutefois évident que ce travail d’élaboration linguistique [de rendre 
compte du heurt] n’est pas un geste épistémologiquement neutre : il implique une transformation, une construction 
de l’expérience vécue en fonction des instruments lexicaux et conceptuels que notre système linguistique met à 
notre disposition. Et c’est justement dans ce travail d’élaboration qu’intervient le conditionnement lié à notre 
appartenance culturelle et que l’altérité est transformée, de “quelque chose qui produit un heurt”, en quelque chose 
de dicible et de compréhensible, et donc en quelque chose d’intégrable dans notre système symbolique. Il s’ensuit 
qu’une altérité formulée dans notre langage n’est déjà plus une “vraie” altérité, dans la mesure où elle est déjà 
médiatisée et appartient d’emblée à notre horizon conceptuel.” Lorenzo Bonoli, “La connaissance de l’altérité 
culturelle,” Le Portique. Revue de philosophie et de sciences humaines, December 21, 2007, 7, 
http://leportique.revues.org/1453. 
157 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 28. 
158 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions (New Delhi: Centre for Studies in 
Civilizations - Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2012), 21. 
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of their inter-active constitution. On the relation between thinking and dialogue, Daya Krishna 
writes in a letter to Sharad Deshpande:  
“’Thinking’ is not easy, but one can ‘start’ thinking, and if one does, the momentum builds 
‘itself’ and then one wonders how one could have lived without getting ‘fresh’ new ideas all 
the time. 
You are thinking. Keep it up, and write as it helps one to think. Also, discuss with friends, 
colleagues and even students as that too brings new ideas to one’s mind and ‘objections’ one 
had not thought before.”159 
‘An explorative activity ‘between’ the participants interested in the togetherness of thinking’, 
is consequently how I would define the practice of saṃvāda for Daya Krishna. 
 
2.1.2. Saṃvāda as a Manifesto for Creative Indian Philosophies 
 
Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda project constitutes chiefly a response to the needs of Indian 
philosophy today in India, vis-à-vis Euro-American philosophies and vis-à-vis classical Indian 
philosophies, in a postcolonial context. The difficulty of defining ‘Indian’ philosophy today - 
is it the following of classical Indian philosophy, in which case can it be only an exegetical, 
historical or repetition of earlier doctrines, or is it something else, in English, in Euro-American 
philosophical categories - in which case, is it still ‘Indian’? These bundles of postcolonial 
problems in positioning Indian philosophy today are for Daya Krishna summarized in one major 
challenge for contemporary Indian philosophies: to renew with creativity. This means avoiding 
on the one hand the historical repetition of the classical, on the other hand the imitation of the 
‘Western’, whether the categorical forms inherited from the British colonial time or the sources 
and methodologies further applied in India, mostly inspired by Anglophone academia.  With 
the following intentions, Daya Krishna developed saṃvāda as a manifesto for contemporary 
Indian philosophy: 
1) He first urges to reanimate ‘Indian philosophies’ in their plurality and interconnection. This 
implies a strong and perseverant critique of the denomination “classical Indian philosophies” 
strictly meant as historical presentations, understood as philological objects studied for the sake 
of unveiling a conceptual brilliant past. His views concur on this point with Krishna Chandra 
Bhattacharyya’s, one of the most respected and acknowledged Indian philosopher of the 
colonial period, in the denunciation of a historicizing of Indian philosophies to a certain 
inanimate classicism: 
“The historian here cannot begin his work at all unless he can live in sympathy into the details 
of an apparently outworn creed and recognise the truth in the first imperfect adumbrations of 
                                                 
159  Daya Krishna, Letter to Sharad Deshpande, 11. 05. 2014. I am thankful to Sharad Deshpande for his 
authorization to quote this extract.  
Daya Krishna left a treasure of letters, which have been by miraculously preserved and scanned by Daniel Raveh 
and Dor Miller at the Tel Aviv University. I am very much indebted them for sharing these supplementary readings 
and resources. The dating used is the one given in the manuscripts. Any obvious and unambiguous typing mistake 
is directly corrected; any equivocal typing mistake is left untouched or with further explanation.  
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it. The attitude of the mere narrator has, in the case of the historian of philosophy, to be 
exchanged as far as possible, for that of the sympathetic interpreter. There is the danger, no 
doubt, of too easily reading one's philosophic creed into the history, but the opposite danger is 
more serious still. It is the danger of taking the philosophic type studied as a historic curiosity 
rather than a recipe for the human soul, and of seeking to explain the curiosity by natural causes 
instead of seriously examining its merits as philosophy. This unfortunately is sometimes the 
defect of Western expositions of Eastern philosophy and religion.”160 
In Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s context, this criticism is directly addressed to colonial 
Indology, associated to George Thibaut in this Studies in Vedāntism 161  in their scientific 
application of classification and linguistic operations developed in philology, an approach 
devoted to ‘past’ cultures. The symmetry brought the same consequences to classical Indian 
philosophies, including the assumption of them being fixed in a distant past. For sure, the 
saṃvāda challenges such an approach when arguments from classical Indian philosophies 
answer modern questions. Daya Krishna’s objective certainly differ from Krishna Chandra 
Bhattacharyya, since he does not aim at recognizing the ‘truth’ of Advaita Vedānta, implied in 
the above quote, but rather contributes in questioning this truth (see the critique addressed by 
Daya Krishna to K. C. Bhattacharyya in 5 and 7.2). However, like K. C. Bhattacharyya, Daya 
Krishna argues with the idea of approaching Indian philosophies as “living-fabrics”162 from the 
point of view of a “sympathetic interpreter”. Sympathetic interpreter does not contradict 
philosophical critique in Daya Krishna’s view. He rather encourages vivid critiques in the 
philosophical responses and comments, however after having read other philosophies as a 
sympathetic interpreter, granting them the right to be philosophical and the ability to contribute 
to philosophical knowledge and rational discussions. While concluding his Developments in 
Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards, Daya Krishna comes back to the problem 
of historiography, and explicitly describes his ‘principles of interpretation’ in close affinity with 
K. C. Bhattacharyya’s: 
“As for the principles of interpretations we have not adopted any ‘new’ ones except that we 
have been ‘open’ to any and every sign which even faintly suggested that something new and 
significant was being said by the thinker concerned, or that the extant text contained in it the 
possibility of a new direction of thought which was only half-explicit in it. This, of course, 
meant that we not only kept our own intellectual preferences aside but ‘suspended’ even our 
own considered judgements regarding what was right or wrong in the matter and let the ‘text’ 
take hold of us as if we ourselves were ‘recreating’ it from within or being led by it in directions 
which we had not thought of before. 
A ‘real’ encounter with texts, is thus, not just a reconstruction of past thought but rather 
stepping into a living stream where the though currents of the past, both visible and invisible, 
                                                 
160 Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, “Studies in Vedāntism,” in Studies in Philosophy, ed. Gopinath Bhattacharyya 
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 1–90. The Introduction to the Studies in Vedāntism is the only one of the 
volume that was written by K. C. Bhattacharyya himself.  
161  See also Jonardon Ganeri’s comment: Jonardon Ganeri, “Freedom in Thinking: The Immersive 
Cosmopolitanism of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya,” The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy, 2016, 15–16, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199314621.013.48. 
162  Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, ed. Gopinath Bhattacharyya (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1983), 6. 
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carry one into the future as they gently ‘force’ one to move in directions one had not dreamt of 
before. The encounter with ‘history’ is, thus, not a movement into the past as has generally 
been thought but rather a movement into the future because one has stepped into the living 
currents that flow from the past and have sufficient vitality and force in the present to carry 
one onwards into the future. At least, this is what we have ‘experienced’ and the sensitive 
reader will find on every page the marks of this living encounter leaving an exciting challenge 
to carry on the dimly-seen possibility and develop it into directions which are only faintly 
indicated there.”163 
The first paragraph further explicates his notion of ‘detached intellect’ (mentioned in 1.1.4) and 
the second paragraph illustrates the objective of saṃvāda, i.e. how stepping in traditions which 
we see as living can propel us into the future, into directions which we could not have else 
imagined. Saṃvāda is therefore understood against the historicizing practice of Bhattacharyya’s 
generation of Indologists, which left traces on the whole study of Sanskrit, not only in Europe 
where the philological parallel to Greek and Latin remained, but also in India:  
“The psyche of even the traditional scholar was transformed and he saw his task as somehow 
consisting mainly of editing and publishing classical Sanskrit texts by collating different 
manuscripts and producing standard editions in consonance with the standards set by the West 
and/or in translating these texts and making them available to the Western-trained intellectual 
who did not have sufficient command of Sanskrit or hardly knew it all.”164 
This change of attitude in seeing Sanskrit philosophies as historical objects that had to be 
preserved in being edited and translated created the idea that it had been lost or forgotten and 
successively rediscovered, both by foreign Indology scholars and modern Indian scholars 
writing in English. If Sanskrit philosophies were ‘re-discovered’, it implied a historical rupture, 
a certain ‘death’, becoming ‘classical’ language and knowledge, “where it [classical 
knowledge] has become primarily an ‘object’ of understanding and scholarship, having little to 
do with the active life of the intellect as it is lived and pursued in modern times.”165 
A last visible difference between K. C. Bhattacharyya’s and Daya Krishna’s views implies a 
reciprocity duty: in Daya Krishna’s postcolonial time, the critique of inanimate historization is 
still addressed to Indian studies developed in Western institutions,166 and in general to the blind 
parallelism of historiographies of India and Western cultures (and the evaluation of the former 
by the latter).167 Moreover, it also addresses paṇḍits themselves when they refuse to engage 
                                                 
163 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 
343. 
164 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 192. 
165 Daya Krishna, 193. 
166 “The interests of western Indological studies combined with the search for a spiritual self-identity in the face 
of overwhelming western superiority in all fields of knowledge seems to have led to the creation of a certain picture 
of India’s philosophical past, which has become fixed in the minds of successive generations both in India and 
abroad, through innumerable text books which render it almost impossible to question the picture or to build 
another one.” Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy. A Counter Perspective, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 
310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006), vii. 
167 “Some of these difficulties [to delineate the Indian philosophical entreprise over more than two and a half 
millenia of its recorded history] arise from the fact that the very entreprise of writing the story of Indian philosophy 
has been undertaken under the inspiration of the way the histories of Western philosophy have been written and 
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with academic scholars, lacking interests to be themselves “sympathetic interpreters” of other 
philosophies, and all subsequent form of “blind” 168  orthodoxy. 169  Lamenting the lack of 
response to his writings, Daya Krishna witnesses the difficulty in making people think anew: 
 “Yet, what is perhaps still more amazing is the fact that the evidence amassed in these articles 
has failed to make the slightest dent in the assertions of those who have had the occasion to 
know a little closely of their contents. (…) Occasionally, there have been some responses, even 
attempts at rebuttal, but generally of the most perfunctory kind. In a recent seminar devoted to 
a discussion of my thought, five papers were presented on what I have written on Indian 
philosophy. But, except for the paper by Prof. J. N. Mohanty, no one even tried to come to 
grips with the central conclusions of my papers or the arguments and the evidence presented 
therein. Karl H. Potter is the only exception, but his response to my detailed critique of the 
reply he made earlier is so tangential that one begins to wonder if any serious discussion can 
be held about issues in Indian philosophy with scholars in the field.  
The response of traditional pandits has been no different, though as many of them do not know 
English, they can hardly be blamed for not doing so. But even when a shorter version of the 
article entitled ‘The Vedic Corpus: Some Questions’ was presented in Sanskrit to a gathering 
of the most outstanding Mīmāṃsā scholars at Tirupati, not a single person said anything. Some 
of the most eminent Nyāya pandits failed to see any problems posed by the text of the 
Nyāyasūtroddhāra or by the fact that some of the sutras have not only variant readings, but 
contradictory ones in different versions of the text as given by different authorities.”170 
If the idea defended here by Daya Krishna and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya seems self-
evident, the fact is that ninety years after the former’s introduction to Studies in Vedāntism, the 
methodology used to approach classical Indian philosophies remains largely untouched, the 
prejudices of its belonging to the past are still holding, and the contact between these different 
spheres remains scarce. This shows the necessity to formulate the issues clearly and develop 
alternative dialogical frameworks.  
The question is therefore how to contemporize the conception of classical Indian philosophies, 
and how to renew our philosophical approaches towards them. This frames the saṃvāda project, 
or in Daya Krishna’s preface to the first published saṃvāda (Rege experiment), “to think of 
ways and means of revitalizing the Indian philosophical tradition”. 171  This interrogation 
encompasses different implications. Concretely, it entails including and putting back the 
learned and ‘traditional’ scholars (paṇḍits, ulama, etc.) at the centre of the dialogues to question 
and discuss contemporary issues.172 For Daya Krishna and M. P. Rege, this is necessary for the 
                                                 
the contrast which most Western writers have drawn between the tradition of philosophy in the West and 
supposedly analogous traditions in other countries and civilizations.” Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 104. 
168 Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2001), 4. 
169 For example: “’Orthodoxy’ reigns in respect of almost every field of Indian philosophy. Even such a simple 
query as ‘Nyāya- Realist or Idealist? offended the ‘orthodox’ to rush and ‘save’ the citadel of Indian philosophy. 
Similarly, the question regarding the ‘presence’ of Vedānta in the first millennium A.D. was treated as if the holy 
waters of the Ganges were being polluted, or the ‘unquestionable’ questioned.” Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras, 
9. 
170 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006, p.viii-ix. 
171 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xii. 
172 “Also, if classical Indian philosophical thought was really vibrant and alive at one time and had the strength in 
it, even in contemporary times, to respond critically and creatively to philosophical issues in contemporary 
philosophy then why should it not be capable of independent growth and development on its own, even in modern 
times? Anything that is alive must be capable of modification, growth and development along new lines - a 
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future of Indian philosophy for the following reasons: regarded by Western-trained scholars, 
paṇḍits are seen simply as those who conserve and preserve the Sanskrit cultural patrimony. 
This includes an implicit exclusion from the philosophical discourse, since it means that 
Sanskrit philosophy is ‘dead’ in the same sense as Latin and Greek philosophies, namely further 
explained but not lively developed by philosophers belonging to these traditions. It becomes a 
source of historical interest. This perspective projected by those who already stepped outside 
the Sanskrit traditions is for Daya Krishna and M. P. Rege wrong and must be addressed.173 
Secondly, the shift of medium in doing Indian philosophy from Sanskrit to English “affects the 
message”: 
“The basic terms in which he [a western-trained scholar] articulates his understanding of Indian 
doctrines inevitably remain western, terms which have originated and crystallized in the course 
of the development of the western philosophical tradition and the broader cognitive tradition, 
in the debates and controversies, discoveries and criticism which propelled it. (…) The act of 
transfer carries with an implicit criterion of evaluation.”174 
This postcolonial affection of philosophy, the incapacity of relating to traditions in the 
languages and cultural forms in which they were prior to colonization, cannot be denied in 
India. However, for Daya Krishna paṇḍits play a determining role for the future of philosophy 
since they were less affected or differently influenced by these new media and instructions. 
Thus, even if the forms and contents of their philosophizing has changed, these changes 
happened often parallelly to the ones of English-speaking academia of which they remained 
(willingly or not) outsiders. Rather than excluding them to the pre-modern sphere, the inner 
hybrid creativity of postcolonial India originates from a dialogue with them. Finally, their 
methods of doing philosophy is for Daya Krishna of particular interest, namely the saṃvāda 
itself, the rhetorical tradition into which they are trained. Paṇḍits therefore possess for Daya 
Krishna the ability to be thinkers and philosophers today (neglected as such), the resources to 
be creative, able to rearticulate counterpositions of postcolonial India from the traditions, and 
master another method for philosophizing: saṃvāda. It is in those qualities that Daya Krishna 
tried to involve them in a dialogue with Western-trained Indian philosophers. This, however, 
faces different obstacles, both to locate paṇḍits who are not part of the academic system, in 
breaking prejudices and indifference from both sides, in rendering dialogues at least bilingual 
and in formulating questions and hypotheses in languages that are understandable to both sides. 
The art of saṃvāda consists in bringing enough closeness for communication in these two 
separated world.  
It first implies a recognition from the side of Indian academics from where these scholars have 
been excluded, or from where they chose to withdraw, and to “take them seriously”. What does 
                                                 
situation that can only be realised if the scholars who are deeply immersed in the traditional philosophy in the 
traditional way begin to look at it in a new way. And this can happen only if they begin to ask new questions, 
articulate their own dissatisfactions with the traditional philosophy as they apprehend it and suggest their own 
improvements in respect of the deficiencies they find in the traditional formulation of the problems or of their 
solutions.” Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” in 
Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. Philosophie Asiatique/Asian Philosophy, ed. Guttorm Fløistad, vol. 7 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 72. 
173 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xviii. 
174 Daya Krishna et al., xviii. 
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that mean precisely? To credit them with the certainty that they are able to answer, as 
representative of their traditions, contemporary and cross-cultural philosophical questions 
(rather than exegetically or historically repeating their positions) in the language they choose 
to express themselves. Even more: that they are able to answer more creatively in entering in 
dialogue with their western-trained counterparts than the latter alone, using a different set of 
apparatus to the already available analyses responding to modernity. In Garfield’s words, 
“taking seriously the standpoint and hermeneutic method of one’s interlocutor as well as his/her 
ideas themselves, and taking seriously one’s own tradition not as a lens through which to view 
another’s, but also as specimen under one’s colleague’s lens at particular moments in the 
dialectic”175, is the condition of “possibility of conversation”. As such, it grounds the possibility 
for enlarging the “scholarly community”, he reports, as well as the “range of texts and resources 
on which it can draw”, which again is a condition for “a greater philosophical depth and rate of 
progress”. In other terms, it determines the future possibility of fusion of horizons for Garfield.  
Contemporizing Indian philosophies signifies for Daya Krishna challenging received “pictures” 
for alternative “narratives”176: while a “picture once built is difficult to dismantle”177, in other 
words, static and strongly printed in our conceptions, “alternative narratives” have the potential 
to present more complex, variegated and interrelational developments of concepts.178 One of 
                                                 
175  Jay L. Garfield, “Western Idealism Through Indian Eyes: A Cittamatra Reading of Berkeley, Kant and 
Schopenhauer,” in Postcolonial Philosophy of Religion, ed. Puruṣottama Bilimoria and Andrew B. Irvine 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 135. 
176 In general concerning the consequences of created ‘pictures’ in history, see Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any 
Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations; Daya Krishna, Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia (Shimla : 
Los Angeles: Indian Institute of Advanced Study ; SAGE, 2012); Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian 
Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western. (in particular the conclusion of the latter). 
Daya Krishna investigates before all the consequences of unconsciously constructing a certain picture of a period, 
which, although based on evidences, does not question the principles of interpretation and selection on which the 
picture is created. This leads, within philosophy, to simplification and fixation of some received ideas, which are 
denounced by Daya Krishna as ‘myth’. See Daya Krishna, “Three Myths about Indian Philosophy,” in Indian 
Philosophy. A Counter Perspective, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru 
Publications, 2006), 18–37; Daya Krishna, “Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy,” in Indian Philosophy. A 
Counter Perspective, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006), 
38–65; Daya Krishna, “Indian Philosophy and Mokṣa: Revisiting an Old Controversy,” in Indian Philosophy. A 
Counter Perspective, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006), 
66–102. (see 6.1 for the same issue regarding puruṣārtha, the hierarchy of which raises problems concerning the 
fixity of such pictures).  
177 Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, 5. 
178 Federico Squarcini further comments on the relation between the staticity of the narrative and the isolation of 
the tradition as follows: “The South Asian intellectual panorama has been portrayed for centuries as a consistent 
and impervious monolith, easily framed – according to this received opinion – by a few epitomizing effigies, such 
as the so-called Indian mysticism (twin of the ‘Asian irrationalism’), the static tradition of India and its perennial 
philosophy (which nicely matches its ‘soteriological wisdom’), all invariably understood as universally fitting 
notions. This common view gained significant ground after the beginning of the eighteenth century, although some 
of its roots can be traced back to the endeavour of leading figures in South Asian thought, even prior to 
colonization, to establish a unified ‘cultural’ canon. Having proved itself to be an effective apologetic and 
propagandistic tool, it has continued its career until today in the context of the activism of representatives of so-
called Neo-Hinduism. It found fertile ground because it has been reinforced by some classical models of approach 
to South Asian thought which have been classified by Amartya Sen into “magisterial, exoticist [and] curatorial”. 
(…) No matter how we may perceive it, there is no doubt that this static representation of the intellectual world of 
South Asia is to be held responsible for the growing isolation of the different philosophical traditions and the 
fracture in their dialogue, as well as for the increasing refusal on the part of philosophers to build an environment 
of shared beliefs and to welcome the variegated realities of world-wide philosophical practice.” Federico 
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the relevant challenges for saṃvāda concerns the picture of Indian philosophy as consisting of 
isolated and stagnating Indian schools. 179  This preconceived idea predominating the 
understanding of classical Indian philosophies delimits classical Indian philosophies into 
orthodox and heterodox schools, which seem to be systematized in separated units, presenting 
substantialized philosophies. This reading of ‘Indian philosophy’ reduced the subject matter to 
a somewhat simplistic view, categorizing classical Indian philosophy in a systematic manner 
between orthodox and heterodox schools, divided into six orthodox schools and a few heterodox 
such as Jain, Buddhist, Cārvāka180. The frozenness of such classification, and in general the 
denunciation of received ideas of (Indian) philosophies have constituted the central target of 
Daya Krishna’s philosophy. In a famous article entitled ‘Three Myths About Indian 
Philosophy’181, he tackles the misconceptions (that he calls ‘myth’) of Indian philosophy being 
‘spiritual’, the authority of the Vedas (and the following division between ‘orthodox’ and 
‘heterodox’ schools with regard to the acceptance or rejection of the former), and the fixed 
division into ‘schools’. About the latter, he states that  
“There is no such thing as final, frozen positions which the term ‘school’, in the context of 
Indian philosophy, usually connotes. If ‘schools’ change, develop, differentiate and divide, 
then they are never closed, finished or final with respect to what they are trying to say. There 
could, then, be no fixed, body of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Saṁkhya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Buddhist, 
Jain or Cārvāka positions except in a minimal sense. These would, on the other hand, rather be 
styles of thought which are developed by successive thinkers, and not fully exemplified by 
any.”182 
Thus, he laments the fact that “however, the traditional presentation of the schools of Indian 
philosophy is hardly ever along these lines. They are treated as something finished and final”183. 
The solution lies for him in denouncing these myths in order to allow for a “new or fresh 
look”184 at Indian philosophy. The realization of this fresh look takes shape in the dialogical 
project that Daya Krishna undertook with traditional Indian philosophers, when the “dead, 
mummified picture of Indian philosophy (…) [comes] alive only when it is seen to be a living 
stream of thinkers who have grappled with difficult problems that are, philosophically, as alive 
today as they were in the ancient past.”185, which constitutes his conclusive remarks on the 
topic, as well as the leitmotif motivating his dialogical project. This classification that Daya 
Krishna criticizes excludes any consideration regarding the development of these schools on a 
long-time period, the individual contribution made by remarkable philosophers deviating from 
the tradition, or defining newly the tradition, as well as the interconnection between them all in 
                                                 
Squarcini, “Indian and Europe: At the Dawn of a New Hermeneutic Era”, in Karin Preisendanz, ed., Expanding 
and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm 
Halbfass, Denkschriften / Österreichische Akademie Der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse ; 
Beiträge Zur Kultur- Und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, 351. Bd. Nr. 53 (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences 
Press, 2007), 3. 
179 Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, 5–6. 
180  Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, Reunderstanding Indian Philosophy: Some Glimpses (New Delhi: D.K. 
Printworld, 1998), 15–18. 
181 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006, 18–37. 
182 Daya Krishna, 33. 
183 Daya Krishna, 34. 
184 Daya Krishna, 36. 
185 Daya Krishna, 36. 
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the form of debates. This form of philosophizing, namely of constituting philosophical 
traditions in debates, defining evolutions and positions, captures the attention of Daya Krishna. 
It does so for its lively conceptual form but also for the sophisticated rationality and rhetoric 
devices developed in such debates, against the religious prejudices applied to Indian 
philosophies. As he summarized the refinement of philosophical debates: 
“The great debate between the Buddhists and the Nayāyikas, starting from Dignāga in the fifth 
century C.E. and ending sometime around eleventh century C.E. is evidence of this 
[sophisticated debates]. (…) After the disappearance of the Buddhists from the Indian scene, 
there was the great debate between the Advaitin and the non-Advaitin whose last great 
representatives were Vyasatirtha on the side of the latter and Madhusudan Saraswati, on the 
side of the former. Along with this were the radical and revolutionary developments in Nyāya 
after Gangeśa from the twelfth century which lasted until the seventeenth century, a period of 
almost 500 years in which there were at least thirty-six thinkers whose names are known and 
who, by their works, contributed to the development and refinement of logical thought in 
Indian development that set new norms for intellectual precision such that no study remained 
unaffected by it.”186 
The renewal of Daya Krishna is also a coming back to the form of classical debates into the 
contemporary set, and the expression saṃvāda in his project should be understood as an attempt 
to explore the forgotten creativity and dynamism of Indian philosophies to be engaged again 
today. For this creativity and dynamism to arise again, rather than focusing on belonging to a 
certain school and asserting the position of a given school against another, saṃvāda appears as 
a powerful instrument. In this sense, it means a dialogue between philosophers, influenced by 
certain traditions but nevertheless able to generate individual insights and to detach themselves 
from a sense of belonging to their particular tradition, This is one concrete sense for 
understanding the creativity and dynamism of knowledge that is philosophically investigated 
in chapters 4 to 7 as the outcome of dialogues. 
2) This renewal therefore signifies to connect different traditions with each other. On the other 
hand, it does not suggest excluding any foreign philosophy. American philosophers participated 
closely in the dialogues, and a majority of Indian philosophers in Indian academics are de facto 
steeped in American and European philosophies, from the very beginning of their education 
(including Daya Krishna). Conceived as a reaction against their monopoly, the saṃvāda project 
calls for reviving the plurality of philosophies in India from different cultural, religious and 
historical origins. Saṃvāda consist therefore in connecting traditions and exploring concepts 
and topics from different perspectives, which excludes a philosophical practice in different 
languages (Daya Krishna was also a frequent Hindi writing philosopher). From a ‘pluri-
traditional’ approach, one also “moves a little bit further” to a pluri-disciplinary one: Daya 
Krishna also tried to articulate traditional theoretical knowledge, such as architecture as he 
mentions above, with contemporary practical form, i.e. not only scholars in aesthetics, but also 
professionals in these fields (architects). These attempts, however variegated they could be, 
pursue the same objective of diversification of the exploration:   
                                                 
186 Daya Krishna, “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected 
Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 62. 
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“But, normally within a cognitive culture even different disciplines share a certain way at 
looking at things or certain ways of asking questions or seeing something as problematic. It is, 
therefore, only when one undertakes a conceptual journey to another cognitive culture that one 
really encounters a different world – a world which, because of its different conceptual 
framework, appears to be no cognitive world at all. It can only be seen as something bizarre, 
something superstitious, something that one need not waste one’s time upon. In the arts, one 
has already learned or is slowly learning the perverse parochiality of such an attitude. In 
religion, one is growing towards an awareness where one may accept, even provisionally, the 
meaningfulness of other religions, at least for them if not for oneself. But as far as cognitive 
entreprise is concerned, the very idea that there may be different cognitive traditions seems 
perverse to most of its practitioners today. And this, in spite of current fashions in model-
building on the one hand and what goes under the name of sociology of knowledge, on the 
other.”187 
Daya Krishna conceived saṃvāda as conceptual journeys that could be accomplished only with 
travel companions from different ‘countries’ and it is under the metaphor of traveling that one 
can grasp the nature of the project: tentative, explorative and questioning. Like in travel 
literature, one can observe a transformation from perceiving the other from one’s perspective 
to slowly and gradually entering into the Other’s world and fuse with him. The tension between 
the differences seen from one’s own perspectives - which allows for questioning the difference 
between what is known and what appears as new and different - and the transformation of one’s 
own in the encounter is perceivable in Daya Krishna’s own journey through the dialogues.  
Surely, Daya Krishna is not the only one to argue for the relevance of Indian philosophies 
(classical, modern and contemporary) in philosophy in general as resources able to contribute 
to thinking by bringing distinct perspectives that enrich the global conversation. B. K. Matilal’s, 
pioneer of comparative philosophy between Indian and Western (before all Nyāya and 
analytical philosophy), argued earlier for the creativity of cross-cultural philosophy, as 
Mohanty reminds us of:  
“Matilal would insist that in spite of the similarities he was so good at bringing out, Indian 
philosophers did not ask many of the questions which Western philosophers asked, and vice 
versa. If we keep all such possibilities of questioning in mind, then “the study of Indian 
philosophy is not simply necessary from a cross-cultural point of view, or from the viewpoint 
of understanding the ‘Indian Mind’ (if there is such a thing), but that it is most urgently needed 
for increasing creativity and comprehensiveness in the philosophic endeavours of modern 
professional philosophers.” 188  In other words, Indian philosophy could contribute to the 
formation of a global philosophy, not in the sense of a philosophical theory acceptable to all 
(for that would not be philosophical), not in the sense of a common project to which all 
different traditions can contribute, but as a common discourse in which they can participate - 
in other words, a conversation of [hu]mankind (not a conversation of the West or the East by 
itself).”189 
                                                 
187 Daya Krishna, “Thinking vs. Thought : Strategies for Conceptual Creativity,” in Thinking Across Cultures: The 
Third International Conference on Thinking, ed. Donald M. Topping, Doris C. Crowell, and Victor N. Kobayashi 
(New York: Routledge, 1989), 203. 
188  Mohanty is here himself commenting on Matilal’s own stance, expressed here: Bimal Krishna Matilal, 
Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 13. 
189 J. N. Mohanty and Purusottama Bilimoria, eds., Relativism, Suffering, and beyond: Essays in Memory of Bimal 
K. Matilal (Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 9. 
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Such a definition of a conversation contributing to clarifying philosophical issues in a creative 
way and raising new questions that are made possible by the cross-cultural analyses themselves, 
beyond the Eastern-Western dichotomy, would qualify the ideal of Daya Krishna’s project. In 
general, what connects these different “experiments” is the interconnection between apparently 
universal questions and variegated cultural perspectives and answers, and the assumption that 
only their collective contributions can create novelty in philosophy. In a way, Lévinas’ analysis 
on Buber also epitomizes Daya Krishna’s enterprise applied to a different culture – substitute 
Buber for Daya Krishna, Judaism/Jewish for Indian, and maybe the Council Fathers for Euro-
American philosophers and philosophers in India trained solely in these Western traditions:  
“Buber approached post-Christian Judaism as a lively civilization of an admirable maturity, 
and he established it as a fully-fledged partner to the symposium of the Occident. Because 
through the Jewish civilization, he was speaking only about universal questions. (…) And that 
is no doubt the indelible mark left by Buber’s passage, who reminded the Council Fathers (…), 
that this antique wisdom learned the modern languages and is ready, if one is willing to, for 
dialogue.”190 
Whether Daya Krishna would agree on the “antiquity” of the wisdom is unsure, or maybe at the 
condition that the modern languages also get translated into the antique categories, for a mutual 
exploration and enlightenment-clarification (éclaircissements in Serres’ words) of different 
traditions. One thing however distinguishes both ‘dialogists’: Daya Krishna, having engaged 
with philosophies who have a certain spiritual, if not religious origin, remained a strong secular 
philosopher, which motivates also his project. He chose to communicate with any representative 
of any spiritual movement and to philosophically explore their traditions without their faith, 
thereby without asking them to withdraw from it, but as a questioner.  
Convinced of the potential creativity of the togetherness in thinking and of the potential 
creativity of traditional philosophers in answering contemporary questions, Daya Krishna’s 
saṃvāda project is in its outline grounded in a critique of historicizing Indian philosophies 
(thereby rendering them unactual) and the classification into separated and fixed schools. In 
emphasizing the interrelation and contemporariness via a classical dialectical tool of debates, 
saṃvāda responds to the difficulties of Indian philosophies in academia during his time, in 
particular to the separation between different philosophical traditions and their lack of 
communication.  
 
  
                                                 
190  My translation. Original text: “Buber aborda le judaïsme post-chrétien comme civilisation vivante d’une 
maturité admirable et l’installa comme partenaire à part entière au symposium de l’Occident. Car à travers la 
civilisation juive, il ne parlait que de questions universelles. (…) Et c’est sans doute la marque indélébile laissée 
par le passage de Buber qui rappela aux pères conciliaires (…) que cette antique sagesse a appris les langues 
modernes et est prête, si on le veut, au dialogue.” Emmanuel Lévinas, Hors sujet (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1997), 17. 
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2.2. Origins and Motivations of the Saṃvāda Project 
 
After a first conceptual outline of what saṃvāda means for Daya Krishna and what the saṃvāda 
experiments were challenging, I now turn to a contextual exploration of this project. While the 
idea retains the initial spirit of debates in Sanskrit traditions, its practice answers contemporary 
postcolonial stakes and the needs of Indian academics today. What does this concretely entail, 
how is this “contemporariness” manifested in the experiments? I will examine three levels: the 
intellectual environment that prompted the organization of dialogues, the lived-relation between 
Daya Krishna and the saṃvāda, and his inspirations by immediate precursors. 
 
2.2.1. Saṃvāda as a Reaction. Being Located in an Intellectual Context. Between Over-
Presence’ (of the West) and Absence (of India)  
2.2.1.1. The Cosmopolitan “Renaissance” and the Anguish of its Experience 
 
Daya Krishna was aware of the context of writing – political191, sociological192 and historical193 
– and, while tending to explore transcontextual concepts and universal questions, he located 
creativity in the variation of interpretations, answers and ways of questioning in different 
traditions. This is what he saw as novelty - not ex nihilo but as a conscious investigation of 
philosophical alternatives and creative questions emerging from such a confrontation. In so 
doing, he was not only influenced and reacting to a certain situation, but very consciously 
exploring its possibilities and questioning its limits. Among what shapes the impetus for 
saṃvāda are the vivid difficulties of contextualizing Indian ‘philosophies’ at a postcolonial time, 
and the wide disagreement of conceptual contents presupposed under this denomination. The 
problem can be summarized in the distressing and recurring questions raised by the 
philosophers of these times: what is ‘Indian’ philosophy and who is an ‘Indian’ philosopher? 
This debate focused first on the definition of Indian philosophy (vis-à-vis the West), and 
secondly (vis-à-vis India) on the authenticity of Indian philosophy, namely ‘what is ‘Indian’ in 
                                                 
191 Although Daya Krishna has been throughout his life interested into political aspects of philosophy, political 
writings are mostly part of his earlier writings. Daya Krishna, Planning, Power and Welfare (New Delhi: The 
Office for Asian Affairs, Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1959); Daya Krishna, “Political Thought in the US,” 
Quest 78 (October 1972): 35-40.; Daya Krishna, Political Development: A Critical Perspective. (Bombay - 
Calcutta - Madras: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
192 Idem. Society, in particular Indian society plays a role in the constitution of his philosophy throughout his 
career, but sociological writings are rather part of his early works. Daya Krishna, Considerations towards a Theory 
of Social Change (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965); Daya Krishna, Social Philosophy: Past and Future (Shimla: Indian 
Institute of Advanced Study, 1973); Daya Krishna, The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze 
over Three Decades (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1989). 
193 On the contrary, although history is related to society and politics and present in his early works, it is rather in 
the later period, under the forms of historiography, critique of antiquarian historicism and studies in the histories 
of Indian philosophy, that Daya Krishna contributes the most to history, as philosophy of history and history of 
philosophy. Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations; Daya 
Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, History 
of Science, Philosophy, and Culture in Indian Civilization, pt. 1 (New Delhi: Project of History of Indian Science, 
Philosophy, and Culture : Centre for Studies in Civilizations : Distributed by Motilal Banarsidass, 2002). 
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(contemporary) Indian philosophy and in philosophy made in India’ 194 . Furthermore, this 
debate appears to me as the counter-part of the debate on Otherness and Eurocentrism raised in 
the earlier section, namely counter-perspective from the colonized perspective, responding to 
‘Otherness’ by ‘Alienation’ and Eurocentrism by the monopoly of Western Indian academics. 
It is thus rhetorically fair to address critique of this context in response to the critiques 
elaborated above.  
 
These two questions regarding the identity of Indian philosophy and the Indianness of Indian 
philosophers are insolvable and yet sustained interrogations. They cover a further web of 
subsequent questions: how to articulate the pluralities of Indian philosophies in the Western 
classifications, how to compare and contrast Indian philosophies with Western philosophies 
(while retaining the internal diversities of both)? Is there something fundamentally ‘Indian’ in 
Indian philosophies? In a postcolonial world, who is still an ‘Indian philosopher’, and what can 
that even mean in such a context? On the other hand, could all philosophers in Indian academics 
not be ‘Indian’? What does it actually presuppose to be an ‘Indian philosopher’? Which identity 
concept is included in this attribute?195 And if J. N. Mohanty is right when he states that 
“One who is asking “What is Indian philosophy? What is ‘Indian’ about it?” has already 
situated himself outside of that tradition which we call ‘Indian’. None of the philosopher who 
shaped that tradition, and with those writings we are acquainted, ever asked such a question. 
They lived and thought within that tradition, which today we are, by the very questions we are 
asking, thematizing. In that very act of thematizing, a rupture has taken place.”196 
then which kind of rupture has taken place, and which consequences did it bring for 
philosophical thinking in India? If we concede that when asking ‘what is Indian philosophy?’, 
we are already located outside this tradition, then how to define this ‘tradition’ of asking ‘what 
                                                 
194 At a general level, these concerns are not limited to India but constitute what connect postcolonial studies 
(conceived broadly). In an introduction written for the UNESCO on ‘Teaching and research in philosophy: Asia 
and the Pacific’, Daya Krishna relates the different country reports (including Australia, Bangladesh, China, India, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Turkey, the USSR Central Asia and Viet Nam) from the perspective of these persisting questions. He 
writes: “The diversity of groupings on the basis of these different criteria underlines the difficulties that are bound 
to be encountered in any serious consideration of the situation of philosophy in these countries and suggests the 
need for sensitivity to the different identities of the countries from which these reports have been received. It 
should be noted, however, that the differences relate mostly to the past of these countries. As far as the present is 
concerned, they share a common situation that derives from the world situation in which each of them exists at the 
present time. All of these countries face, in a sense, the same dilemma: what to do with their past which makes 
them what they are and gives them a distinctive identity of their own and yet with which they cannot remain 
satisfied for the simple reason that if they have to live in the modern world, they have to come to terms with 
contemporary standards, determined primarily by what goes on in Europe or the United States in these domains.” 
Daya Krishna, “Overview of Country Reports,” in Teaching and Research in Philosophy: Asia and the Pacific 
(Paris: UNESCO, 1986), 3–4. 
195 See in this regard: S. S. Rama Rao Pappu and R. Puligandla, eds., Indian Philosophy: Past and Future, 1st ed 
(Delhi: Motila Banarsidass, 1982); N. K. Devaraja, Indian Philosophy Today (Delhi ; Bombay: The MacMillan 
Company of India, 1975); Deshpande, Philosophy in Colonial India; Barlingay, Reunderstanding Indian 
Philosophy; Bina Gupta, “The Contemporary Indian Situation,” in Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic 
Perspectives, ed. Eliot Deutsch and Ronald Bontekoe (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 531–41; 
Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ramana, and Maffie, “Confluence”; Karl Potter, “Are All Indian Philosophers Indian 
Philosophers?,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research II, no. 2 (1985): 145–49. 
196 J. N. Mohanty, “Indian Philosophy between Tradition and Modernity,” in Indian Philosophy: Past and Future, 
ed. S. S. Rama Rao Pappu and R. Puligandla (Delhi: Motila Banarsidass, 1982), 233. 
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is Indian philosophy’ in India (since this question characterizes a large part of post-
independence philosophy in India)? If it does not belong to the Indian tradition anymore, then 
where does it belong to? Considering the fact that ‘India’ as a concept (including its 
geographical borders but also its idea as cultural identity) arises with its independence, the idea 
of Indian philosophies can only come along with paradoxes. On the one hand, its definition 
seems to constitute an inescapable postcolonial necessity, i.e. to give an essence to such a 
sudden identity. On the other hand, it follows out of this conceptual rupture that as postcolonial 
identities, the idea of Indian philosophies is not fit to integrate the representations of ‘classical’ 
Indian philosophies which fall out of such representations. Consequently, how would this ‘new’ 
tradition relate to ‘The’ Indian tradition? What is first of all ‘that tradition which we call 
‘Indian’’? And lastly, are not these questions turning into an infinite regress, and if they are, 
then how to overcome it?  
 
I believe that Daya Krishna suggests tentative responses to these questions in taking in 
consideration the three following aspects, which form the ground of the saṃvāda project: a) the 
monopoly of the ‘West’ of Indian academics, as described above, manifested in the Indian 
scholars’ “blindness” for the philosophical production and recognition in the West (usually 
limited to its Anglophone parts); b) parallelly, an exclusion of traditional scholars (non-
Anglophone) from Indian academics, leading to a gap between them and the first group, trained 
in Western philosophy in English. It is to be noted that this exclusion can be voluntary, 
originating from these scholars themselves. c) the question of identity of contemporary Indian 
philosophy, along with the search for a ‘contemporary’ Indian philosophy with the ‘classical’ 
heritage, which is the formal formulation of a lack of connection between a) and b), the modern 
English-speaking and the traditional Sanskrit-speaking scholars. 
 
What this set of questions expresses for an Indian intellectual is the oppressing attraction of a 
somewhat undefined ‘West’ constructed as a center and reference around which he has to locate 
himself (as a periphery). The hierarchical gravitational structure is emphasized in philosophy. 
As highlighted by Daya Krishna in the same article, the case is quite different for the Arts and 
religion, where the recognition of plural cultural traditions is less a problem, or in general in 
domains that do not approach the “rationality” and “scientific” paradigm, this one being 
predominantly Eurocentric. It is thus not the case that cosmopolistanism and hybridity are not 
valued at all, or that cross-culturality is never seen as creative.197 However, in the fields in 
which the criteria of evaluation are accepted to be those of the ‘West’, such as philosophy, the 
integration of other criteria raises much more difficulties. On the other hand, as Daya Krishna 
suggests, in other fields where Indians consider themselves to be the ‘center’ (due to the “frozen 
pictures” above mentioned in 2.1.2) such as spirituality, the same hierarchy operates in 
                                                 
197 “Only in the cognitive domain can a strict claim be made for objectivity and universality. In the field of arts 
and spirituality, diversity is the heart of the matter. Plurality is not merely encouraged but valued. A person who 
repeats what the master did is no artist at all. And even in the realm of philosophy if one only repeats what the 
masters did or the great thinkers said, one is no philosopher. (…) Now, if we see the cognitive enterprises in this 
way, there can be no such things as fixed centres for all times.” Daya Krishna, “Encounters between Civilizations: 
The Question of the Centre and the Periphery,” Quest, no. 125 (1997): 268. 
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reverse198 . This hierarchy creates an evaluative structure where references are universally 
classified, so that 
“no western intellectual ever feels ‘embarrassed’ about not ‘knowing’ about any thinker, any 
intellectual of the non-western world, however great he may be [like K. C. Bhattacharya]; 
while on the other hand, people in the non-western world are always ‘embarrassed’ if someone 
points out their ignorance of a second-rate thinker of the western world. This is because we 
have accepted the notion of a centre and the periphery in our souls, in our minds.”199 
Philosophy in India was during the colonial period intensively exposed to an international 
dimension, and thus the problem cannot be how to proceed interculturally or transculturally, 
how to develop hybridity nor how to reach cultural otherness, which are the predominating 
concerns in intercultural European philosophy (see 0). In this perspective, Indian philosophies 
seem already equipped,200 and yet, Indian philosophers became even more anxious about this 
interculturality than their European counterparts. This anxiety persists until today and is 
commonly symptomatized in the English-medium monopoly, which became the epitome of the 
alien interpenetration of indigenous thinking. This alien absorption in the own, or rather the 
feeling of a loss of the own, or an ignorance of what the ‘own’ should even consist in, is 
famously described in the ‘colonial subjection’201 witnessed by K. C. Bhattacharyya in his 
speech (1929), which I believe, constitutes a turn in the history of Anglophone academic Indian 
philosophy, regarding its reception and its impact. The colonial subjection exposed there is 
defined as the inner alienation of the one who feels forced to conceptualize and think only in a 
foreign language. He further declares: 
“Our education has not so far helped us to understand ourselves, to understand the significance 
of our past, the realities of our present and our mission of the future. It has tended to drive our 
real mind into the unconscious and to replace it by a shadow mind that has no roots in our past 
and in our real present. (…) The result is that there is a confusion between the two minds and 
                                                 
198 “Supposing I ask each one of you what great, spiritual personality has been produced in West in the last four 
hundred years? Can you give me a name? You are not embarrassed about not knowing it, because you are quite 
confident that the norms and the standards for judging what a spiritual personality consists in are located in our 
own tradition. (…) Is it not amazing that India has creativity in certain fields where it does not look outside for 
recognition? Take music, for example. This is the city where Amir Khan, a great vocalist, an innovator, and a 
master died in an accident. Did we ever go to the West to discover whether Amir Khan was a great singer or not? 
Does anybody go and ask for the western recognition of Kelucharan Mahapatra, the great dancer?” Daya Krishna, 
267. 
199 Daya Krishna, 265. 
200 Following the argumentation of Bhushan and Garfield, themselves relying on Ganeri, Shulman, Alam and 
Subrahmanyam and Kinra: “In pre-British India there was no sense that Indian philosophy was ‘pure’ of foreign 
influences. The dichotomy of deśi/videśi did not structure Indian thought about philosophy in the pre-British 
period, and the predicaments that so vexed colonial Indian philosophers could hence not be framed. These 
predicaments, however, (…) erupt with considerable force in the colonial period. Why? We propose that this is 
not because of a radical first-order discontinuity between the precolonial and colonial intellectual worlds, but rather 
because of the establishment of a specific metanarrative of Indian intellectual history, one grounded in a fantasy 
of purity and authenticity co-constituted by European orientalists and Indian nationalists, each for their own 
reasons.” Bhushan and Garfield, Minds without Fear, 37. 
201 “There is cultural subjection only when one’s traditional cast of ideas and sentiments is superseded without 
comparison or competition by a new cast representing an alien culture which possesses one like a ghost. This 
subjection is slavery of the spirit.” Bhattacharyya, “Svaraj in Ideas,” 383. 
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a hopeless Babel in the world of ideas. Our thought is hybrid through and through and 
inevitably sterile. Slavery has entered into our very soul.”202 
The domination of teaching of Western philosophy in Indian Universities and the (almost) 
exclusive use of English as an academic language have been the focus of the colonial 
denunciation in academics. It constitutes a complex focus, however, because in this symptom 
are assembled different causes of the problem. First, the monopoly of English exemplifies the 
social hierarchy at stake in the academic structure in terms of normative centre-periphery 
relations that it creates. In so doing, its monopoly discriminates non-English speaking scholars. 
Daya Krishna exposes the very concrete consequences of the colonial hierarchy operated in 
Universities: 
“Thus, three different streams of education existed in the British period from the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. The first, and most visible consisted of those who were the direct 
products of the British system of education in the country. The second, consisted of those who 
were the products of the new institutions of traditional learning created by the British to 
maintain and foster traditional forms of learning and Sanskritic studies on the one hand and 
Arabic-Persian on the other. The third, consisted of those who were the products of traditional 
institutions which survived the British institutional innovations and were primarily maintained 
and fostered by non-governmental patronage in British India and by a princely patronage in 
princely India. There was a certain overlap between the last two as they taught the same kind 
of texts and courses, though there was a distinct difference in the method of teaching and the 
way in which examinations were conducted. There was also, a difference in the status of the 
persons belonging to these two streams, at least in British India, as those working in the British-
sponsored institutions had better financial support than the ones patronized by non-
governmental agencies. In fact, there was great discrimination in even the salary scales 
between the institutions of traditional learning fostered by the British and those which gave a 
western type of education in the newly-created seats of learning. This deliberate policy of 
segregation and financial discrimination in the salaries given to the teachers belonging to these 
two different types of institutions had a deep and lasting influence on the intellectual scene in 
India during the one and a half century of British influence in the field of education. The whole 
world of classical knowledge and those who pursued and practiced it became gradually 
invisible to those who came out of the new institutions modelled on the British pattern and thus 
produced an intellectual environment which was only aware of the western traditions in 
knowledge as its reference point and treated India’s traditional intellectual entreprises either as 
having had no value at all or as having been completely superseded by the developments of 
knowledge that had taken place in the West and were, therefore, completely irrelevant to the 
contemporary quest for knowledge.”203  
The postcolonial implications of Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda project become self-evident as a 
reaction to the context so described, as a rehabilitation and reintegration of the paṇḍits as 
reliable and creative sources of Sanskrit-speaking knowledge in the research and teaching 
environment; and thus, the saṃvādas “had to be bilingual”204. It is furthermore directed against 
the presumed ‘single centre’ of knowledge in the picture inherited from the colonization and 
integrated by these institutions: there are different centres and peripheries, as well as different 
                                                 
202 Bhattacharyya, 387. 
203 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 
309–10. 
204 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xxvii. 
79 
 
others and ways to relate to them. Thus, while the most visible thinkers produced by the British 
system of education adopted the Western standards as their centre, the saṃvāda project was an 
opportunity to realize that other institutions had their own standards. It reveals that Westernized 
philosophers are as much an other to Sanskrit philosophers as they are to philosophers abroad, 
and that philosophers abroad are also an other to Sanskrit philosophers. While the dialogue with 
Europe had been existing since several centuries, introducing together different interlocutors 
within India allowed to change the perspective, and consequently to relativize the idea of a 
unique centre in philosophy. 
 
Why, however, does this earlier social discrimination still pervade Indian academics today? The 
hierarchy remained not only as a social establishment, but in terms of cultural subjection in the 
common evaluation of English over Sanskrit or English over Hindi, and the idea of superiority 
instigated in the independent minds of Indian academia. The situation of the vernaculars might 
even be more preoccupying in the philosophical scene, and Daya Krishna himself did not seem 
to be able to remedy the lack of attention brought to it.205 In spite of his encouragements and 
(isolated) initiatives, Sheldon Pollock’s urgent warning remains true and also applies to Daya 
Krishna’s experiments:  
“At the time of Independence, and for some two millennia before that, India was graced by the 
presence of scholars whose historical and philological expertise made them the peer of any in 
the world. They produced editions and literary and historical studies of texts in Kannada, 
Malayalam, Tamil, and Telugu — and in Apabhramsha, Assamese, Bangla, Brajbhasha, 
Gujarati, Marathi, Oriya, Persian, Prakrit, Sanskrit, Urdu — that we still use today. In fact, in 
many cases their works have not been replaced. This is not because they are irreplaceable — 
it is in the nature of scholarship that later knowledge should supersede earlier. They have not 
been replaced because there is no one to replace them. Two generations of Indian students have 
been lost to the study of classical Indian languages and literatures, in part due to powerful 
economic forces no doubt, but in part due to sheer neglect. The situation is dire.”206 
The asymmetry between Sanskrit and vernaculars - or maybe the hegemony - in the reception 
of South Asian Studies is clear. The monopoly of English over all these languages is flagrant.  
English was both propagated as a superior language and as radically different: using it 
necessarily implied excluding oneself from one’s vernacular tradition, which could only bring 
successively contempt for those who did not join the superior modern paradigm contained in 
English. At the same time, the identity problem was also bound to arise, for English-speaking 
Indians, if radically different, were still not British, and yet remained undefined. This vague 
indeterminateness was then specified as a felt ‘inauthenticity’, namely a lack of traceable 
origins, an uncomfortable ‘in-betweenness’. Thus, the monopoly and instilled idea of 
superiority of English does not suppress all other languages, it only classifies them 
                                                 
205 Daya Krishna was committed to teaching in Hindi, as will be explained below, and did publish in this language. 
The Bhakti dialogue in its published version also contains only Hindi and English (Sanskrit portions have been 
excluded from the proceedings). There are also reports of dialogues using Urdu, an invitation letter published by 
Khawaja testifies of it Mayaram, Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj, 114–15. 
206  Sheldon Pollock, “The Real Classical Languages Debate,” The Hindu, November 27, 2008, 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/The-real-classical-languages-debate/article15349919.ece. 
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hierarchically. Intellectuals did not simply erase their vernacular, but felt Janus-faced, divided 
between multilingual every-day life and English intellectual life, which according to G. C. 
Pande, “tends stifle originality by interposing a psychological barrier between the language of 
learning and the language of every-day life.”207 Beyond the psychological ambivalence and 
alienation of evolving in two radically distinguished worlds, it also damages the creative 
potentiality of thinking, disconnecting the intellectual from a reservoir of images and 
concepts.208 G. C. Pande adds: “Concepts and images are like magical sluices through which 
the material of practical experience passes into thought and attains a new birth into an almost 
autonomous-looking world.”209  
 
This divide in the adequate linguistic spheres of life of these thinkers had another problematic 
effect: it parallelly divided Indian philosophy and Western philosophy on the same bases of 
“relevance”, “modernity”, “scientificity”, etc. Language and philosophy concorded, which 
brought another set of anxiety, following Macaulay’s Minute, found in an intellectual such as 
S. S. Barlingay:  
“In 1835, Lord Macaulay introduced a new education policy in India [the English medium] 
(…) This was the beginning of colonization (…) But it separated us (Indians) from our 
umbilical cord, from our moorings. It alienated the educated from the Indian culture. Those 
who learnt English were isolated from their past history, from their attainments. The 
philosophy of Indian origin naturally had a setback. Those who opted for English education 
could not study Indian philosophy at all.”210 
                                                 
207 Daya Krishna, V. V. John, and P. S. Sundaram, Indian Education Today: Prospects & Perspectives: Essays, in 
Honour of Mohan Sinha Mehta (Jaipur: Rajasthan University Press, 1970), 1. 
208 This disconnection originates furthermore in academia (of Indian and postcolonial societies in general) from 
the contrast made between ‘philosophy’ in the wider sense, closer to traditional forms, and philosophy in the 
narrower sense elaborated in the analytical standards of Western academia. This is another relevant conclusion 
drew by Daya Krishna in the above-mentioned UNESCO report that combines different local studies: “Another 
problem most of these countries face relates to the distinction between philosophy in the wider sense of the term 
and philosophy in the narrower sense. The distinction is made in almost every report and ambivalently oscillates 
between the two. On the one hand, one can hardly regard anything as philosophy unless it is philosophy in the 
hard-core, narrow sense of the word. On the other hand, unless it has a living relationship with what may be called 
philosophy in the common and larger sense of the word it cannot be regarded as relevant to human concerns in 
contemporary times. Philosophy in the narrow sense is primarily analytical in nature and is concerned with 
conceptual and methodological problems as well as the relationship between the argument and what it establishes. 
In the wider sense, philosophy is concerned with any general view regarding man, society and nature and their 
relationship to the whole which is vaguely discerned by man and articulated in imaginative and mythical forms. 
In this sense, it is closely related to religion on the one hand and to culture on the other. Much of the traditional 
philosophy in many of these countries is of the latter variety though in many the distinction between philosophy 
and religion was made very early in their history, particularly between philosophy in the form of theology, i.e. the 
rational substantiation and vindication of truths propounded by religion, and religion itself. (…) In fact, philosophy 
in the narrow sense presents three problems: (a) its relationship to the folk or popular culture of a country; (b) its 
relationship to religion, both in the past and the present, particularly in those countries where religion is still a 
living force—as it is in many of the countries of Asia today; and (c) its relationship to what may be called the 
contemporary problems of social transformation and change, which constitute the common historical situation of 
most of the Third World countries at the present time.” Daya Krishna, “Overview of Country Reports,” 9–10. 
209 Daya Krishna, John, and Sundaram, Indian Education Today: Prospects & Perspectives: Essays, in Honour of 
Mohan Sinha Mehta, 2. 
210 Barlingay, Reunderstanding Indian Philosophy, 6. 
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Something paradoxical (or at least it seems) emerges from the inheritors of Macaulay’s-led 
education: although the shift to the English paradigm allowed a certain creativity and the 
formation of a certain hybridity, today praised by scholars looking for ‘world-philosophy’ or 
intercultural philosophy (and so much looked for in European intercultural research), Indian 
authors provide long descriptions of the impossibility in nature for Indian philosophies to be 
creative today, due to this feeling of colonial alienation. The ‘between’ looked for by Europeans 
is felt as shallowness when one is dispossessed from one’s tradition, and the ‘radical otherness’ 
aimed at to respect the integrity of the Other (in contrary to the felt violent ‘assimilation’) 
prevents the integration and the natural modification of one’s own in the encounter with the 
Other. What we are facing in the mirroring of these cross-cultural traditions is the clash of two 
ideologies: the one who has been accused of centrism looking for reaching otherness, and the 
one who has seen himself as peripheral and felt being alienated, looking for reconnecting with 
the own. This difference creates an important shift of perspective in the respective literatures 
on intercultural dialogues, the consequences of which have however not been further elucidated. 
 
For Daya Krishna, inheritor of the latter’s paradigm, one objective consists therefore in 
‘repairing’ the asymmetrical relation between English and Sanskrit. He firmly believes in the 
abilities of Sanskrit to be able to formulate alternative - thereby, more ‘authentic’ - conceptual 
frameworks that allow for analyzing philosophy in India. Although English is, de facto, the 
lingua franca of India211, even (more) in the domain of intellectual discourse, Daya Krishna 
prefers to exclaim that “Sanskrit was, and still is, a living all-Indian language of classical and 
intellectual discourse. (…) From north and south, from east to west, people can get together 
anywhere and talk in Sanskrit.”212 This stance remains an enthusiastic hope that the project 
cannot (alone) prove, since it did not cover such an extent of the Indian philosophical scene. 
However, in spite of a certain exaggeration, what I find interesting - and symptomatic - of this 
generation of Indian thinkers is the enthusiasm itself that originates from the feeling of 
discovery. The discovery lies in the ‘something’ able to counterbalance the domination of the 
English language, although the idea of English to be counterbalanced by Indian traditions itself 
emerges in English. Interestingly, this paradox remains unsolved both in the Western academics, 
as denounced by Ivekovic earlier, as well as in the ‘Western Indian’ academics, namely Indian 
universities functioning in this language. What connects these two rhetorics seem to be the 
realization of this paradox that they however cannot solve.213  
                                                 
211 Bhushan and Garfield, Minds without Fear, 143. 
212 Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 76. This statement naturally leads to the saṃvāda project, and the institution of 
bilingual dialogues, as stated in the preface of the Pune experiment: “Few people know, in India or elsewhere, that 
Sanskrit is still the living lingua franca of traditional scholarship in India, which may be as distant from each other 
as Kashmir and Kerala or Manipur and Gujarat, is Sanskrit and Sanskrit alone.” Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a 
Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xii. 
213 This applies to Daya Krishna himself in this lecture, but before him and acknowledged by him, of much larger 
movements known as ‘Neo-Vedānta’ (and in Bengali literature at large), which illustrates this need: “It [the English 
language] was also primarily seen as providing access to a particular kind of knowledge and a system of values 
which gave a radically different foundation to both society and polity to the country. Bengal became the centre of 
this new enthusiasm as also the attempt to find some sort of a new creative civilizational response to this western 
impact so that its own civilizational and cultural identity was not completely lost. The movement of neo-Vedāntism 
has to be seen in this light and the writings from Ram Mohan Roy onwards, who was proficient both in Sanskrit 
and Persian, should be seen as an attempt to come to terms with this fascination with the West which 
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The circularity of this argumentation (counterbalancing English in English, and in so doing 
contributing to English literature) provokes a feeling of desperation, since it frames the critique 
in a certain foreign framework in trying to challenge this framework, which is not felt as very 
hopeful by the writers,214 here Kalidas Bhattacharyya: 
“In a way, thus, Indian philosophy was revived for those Indians who had been trained in 
Western learning. This revival has passed under the name of (Indian) Renaissance, though – 
few have noticed this – with the meaning of the word ‘renaissance’ turned upside down. What 
happens in genuine renaissance is that under the impact of some powerful new ideas people 
with a living tradition adjust those ideas to that tradition: normally long forgotten classical 
ideas come to be absorbed in the then current tradition. What happened, however, in India in 
those days was quite different. Forgotten by the English-educated Indians and only half-
forgotten (because only half noticed) by the vast mass of traditional Indians (who had till then 
no English education), the so-called ‘newly found’ Indian ideas could not possibly be freshly 
incorporated in an existing living tradition; for, even as unnoticed, they still informed the bulk 
of the day-to-day life of even the English-educated Indians, let alone the vast mass who had 
not that education till then. So if there was any question of adjustement, for the English-
edicated Indians, it was that of the traditionally Indian (though half forgotten) ideas with the 
English (in effect, Western) ideas that were newly acquired. Naturally, what these English-
educated Indians did was to understand and interpret the traditional Indian ideas – Indian 
philosophy, for that – in terms of ideas that were Western. This is no renaissance. If there could 
be any such really in those days, it would have rather interpreted the Western ideas in terms of 
ideas that had been traditionally Indian.”215  
Thus, within this new ‘hermeneutic circle’, a paradoxical difference emerges between the 
feeling of alienation of these authors and our a posteriori perception as world-philosophers, 
cosmopolitan,216 hybrid, intercultural, etc.; between the feeling of a substantial lack of creativity 
and our perception of a Renaissance; and therefore, between the experience as philosopher217 
and the narrative of a ‘philosophical movement’ born from this (anguished) experience.  
 
Let us come back to this linguistic dilemma in the Indian context. Another dissatisfaction 
(remaining unresolved) emerges: the gap between the felt efforts to address a world-wide 
                                                 
simultaneously aroused ambivalent feelings amongst those who came in deep contact with it.” Daya Krishna, 
Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 291. 
214 Or R. Satchidananda Murty: “There can be no one ‘modern and Indian philosophy’, nor can any single 
philosophy with an ‘independent Indian identity’ emerge. As in the past, there are now and there will be in future 
many philosophies in India. Some of them will be ‘original’, ‘independent” or ‘creative’, others dependent on or 
derivative from classical or modern Indian or non-Indian philosophies, and yet others influenced by some or all of 
these. They may have, of course, something ‘Indian’ about them, as the ātmavāda of Vedānta, the nairātmyavāda 
of Mādhyamika and the tattvopaplava of Jayarāśi had; and, as in the past, at different times one or some of them 
may be more dominant and widespread than others.” K. Satchidananda Murty, Philosophy in India: Traditions, 
Teaching, and Research (Delhi : New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass ; Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 
1985), 173. 
215 Rama Rao Pappu and Puligandla, Indian Philosophy, 172–73. 
216 Ganeri, “Freedom in Thinking: The Immersive Cosmopolitanism of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya”; Jonardon 
Ganeri, “An Institute for Cosmopolitan Philosophy in a Culturally Polycentric World” (Blueprint, 2015), 
https://www.academia.edu/8434737/Blueprint_An_Institute_for_Cosmopolitan_Philosophy_in_a_Culturally_Po
lycentric_World. 
217 Bhushan and Garfield, Minds without Fear, 10. 
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modern audience (à la Macaulay), and the silence resorting from it. Nalini Bhushan and Jay 
Garfield comment on a remark Daya Krishna would have made in an interview with them:218  
“Daya Krishna may indeed have been wrong about the state of philosophy under the Raj, but 
he gets something deeply right. He correctly characterizes the experience of Anglophone 
Indian intellectuals under colonial rule when he says in the same interview: 
. . . The deepest anguish of the Indian intellectual is that he is unrecognized in the West as an 
equal, or as an intellectual at all. Ibid. 
This failure of recognition is tragic. These philosophers wrote in a context of cultural fusion 
generated by the British colonial rule of India. They were self-consciously writing both as 
Indian intellectuals for an Indian audience and as participants in a developing global 
community constructed in part by the British Empire. They pursued Indian philosophy in a 
language and format that could render it both accessible and acceptable to the Anglophone 
world abroad. In their attempt to write and to think for both audiences they were taken seriously 
by neither.”219 
After the feeling of alienation succeeded the correlated question of integration of ‘Indian 
philosophy’ to (European220-conceived) ‘philosophy’, which was foremost addressed by Indian 
philosophers working outside India, and in general formulated vis-à-vis the non-India. On the 
other hand, for those who stayed, the problem was raised in terms of the ‘Indianness’ and the 
problem of remaining authentic while being hybrid. As an inheritor of the colonial, how to 
define oneself vis-à-vis India and the Indian traditions? In both cases, while these philosophers 
remained partially unknown in the West (Indian academic Anglophone philosophers being the 
                                                 
218 The use of the conditional in this sentence points at a certain reserve from my side regarding the context of the 
interview, in which Daya Krishna would have said that “anybody who is writing in English is not an Indian 
philosopher … What the British produced was a strange species – a stranger in his own country. The Indian mind 
and sensibility and thinking [during the colonial period] was shaped by an alien civilization.” The critique of this 
statement led Nalini Bhushan and Jay Garfield to publish their collection of texts of Indian philosophers in English 
from the 20th century, arguing that “the intellectual agency and creativity in the domain of Indian philosophy in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries belongs to Indian thinkers; they sustained the Indian philosophical 
tradition and were the creators of its modern avatar.” It remains dubious why Daya Krishna, himself an Indian 
philosopher writing in English, and defending the creativity of Indian philosophers writing in English during the 
colonial and postcolonial times (such as K. C. and K. Bhattacharyya, R. Prasad; T. V. R Murty, about whom he 
also writes), would have contradicted his own work in such a flagrant manner. The context of this statement, which 
has not been reproduced, may explain this remark, or the text that has been curtailed. Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. 
Garfield, eds., Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), xiii–xiv. 
219 Bhushan and Garfield, XIV. 
220 J. N. Mohanty’s remarks on the difference between the ‘continental’ and ‘analytical’ (in this case as heritage 
of respectively European and American traditions) recognition of Indian philosophy as philosophy is here relevant, 
since for once it specifically distinguishes between the common ‘Western’ and the ‘specific’ European: “It is 
remarkable that the analytical philosophers - who are not contaminated by Hegelian historicism or Heidegger's 
Seins Geschichte - have no problem in ascribing ‘philosophy’ to the Indian tradition. It is the ‘continental’ 
philosophers who find here something which goes against their deeply held prejudices. Quine, Strawson and 
Dummett - to name three distinguished analytical philosophers - not only have no a priori doubt (how could there 
be philosophy outside of the Western tradition?) on this matter, but have admitted (to this author) that they were 
convinced that good (and bad) philosophy knew no geographical limits. Historicism may have, in many ways, a 
liberating influence, but unless carefully thought through it may provide a subtle way of justifying one's deeply 
held prejudices.” J. N. Mohanty, “Between Indology and Indian Philosophy,” in Beyond Orientalism: The Work 
of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, ed. Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, 
1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), 167.  
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most concerned by this unacknowledgement), a certain appropriation of the Western categories 
for thinking Indian philosophies however operated ‘in spite of themselves’. This appropriation 
consisted in a vague acceptance of Indian philosophy as philosophy in selecting concepts, topics 
and schools appropriated to the Western idea of rationality, as well as contributing to it (like 
Buddhist logic or Nyāya’s adaptation to philosophy of mind). M. P. Rege describes in his very 
lucid and precise manner this scenario in the introduction of the first published saṃvāda: 
“In the prevailing circumstances western-trained Indian students of Indian philosophy quite 
naturally adopted this point of view of looking at Indian philosophy and one of the most 
thriving areas of philosophical studies in India has been that of ‘comparative philosophy’ 
which is devoted to exploring similarities between western and Indian doctrines such as Nyāya 
and realism, Mīmāṃsā and hermeneutics and so forth, and even between the views propounded 
by major western philosophers and classical Indian philosophers such as Kant and Śaṃkara, 
or Whithead and Vācaspati Miśra. In the early decades of the century when Absolute Idealism 
was the reigning philosophy in Britain and to a lesser extent in America, it was to the idealistic 
Advaita and other varieties of Vedānta that Indian commentators pointed to representative 
Indian doctrines. Later when the tide of realism and analysis swept the Anglo-Saxon 
philosophical scene, the emphasis shifted to Nyāya. Still later, when Anglo-Saxon philosophy 
came to adopt a highly sophisticated and technical idiom as a proper and necessary medium of 
philosophical discussion, it was to the sophisticated technicalities of Navya-Nyāya that Indian 
commentators turned for something to match with it.”221 
It created a new lineage in Indian philosophy, one however that had no direct contact to the 
Sanskrit medium nor to the ‘traditional’ Indian philosophers of India. Furthermore, this 
evaluation of Indian philosophy is also fostered by a certain persisting exoticism from the West, 
pressuring Indian scholars to nevertheless commit to an Indian heritage they however cannot 
master, which constitute the consequence of “Western yardstick” described by M. P. Rege. This 
yardstick implies a definition of Indian philosophy as per Western criteria that however requires 
Indian scholars to themselves validate this yardstick as the ‘authentic’ philosophers.  
In so doing, the topic of their research classified them in ‘Indian’ philosophy while the medium 
and the tradition to which they related were not directly connected to Indian traditions - they 
were also not directly connected to Western traditions. The following effect was such that while 
having failed to be noticed in the West (notably due to the West’s own discriminations and 
exclusions), the contemporary Indian philosophers failed to be considered as ‘Indian’ in their 
own academia, since they did not seem to continue the philosophical traditions as they were 
now known and acknowledged. This is what Deshpande describes as the “dual estrangement” 
of this Indian philosophy, which instead of connecting these traditions in a reciprocal critical 
dialogue on one’s tradition, isolated them from one another further: 
“The tradition either purely Indian or Western that they could claim as theirs was in fact not 
theirs. Being philosophers in the colonial era, they were exposed to the major Western 
philosophers belonging to the Greek and the European traditions and as professionals they 
were connected in some way or the other to modern educational Institutions such as universities 
and colleges. And being Indians, these philosophers were also expected to be acquainted with 
the traditional systems of classical Indian philosophy. However, what was thus expected could 
not become a defining attribute, i.e. acquaintance with classical Indian philosophy was not a 
                                                 
221 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xix. 
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sufficient condition for them to be designated as Indian philosophers. This was due to the fact 
that exposure to Indian philosophy was not integrated into the philosophy syllabus in Indian 
universities. (…)  Indian philosophy was as alien to these modern Indian philosophers as was 
Western philosophy. There was thus a dual estrangement—of the tradition from the 
intellectually inclined and of individuals from the issues and problems with which the Indian 
tradition was engaged. The history of modern Indian philosophy beginning practically from 
the first decade of 19th century could have been a history of authentic dialogue, a real exchange 
of concepts than their superficial comparison between the Western and the classical Indian 
philosophies. But it resulted only in “parallel maintaining a good distance from each other” 
(Bhattacharyya 1963: iii).”222 
Indian philosophers are bound to oscillate between intellectual implications of the Western 
definition of Indian philosophy, in which they have been trained, and the necessity to define 
themselves as distinctively ‘Indian’, because of which they have to reject their Western- 
training. In practice, it is epitomized by the monopoly use of English, the language they master, 
and a commitment (or the negation of it, a reject) to Sanskrit sources. Such a postcolonial 
allegiance to the classical (or the received idea of the ‘classical’ dimension entailed in Sanskrit) 
as a reaction to what is felt as an exclusion from the West can turn into a self-defense of the 
idea of ‘India’, with the dangerous consequence of polarizing the substantialized entities 
‘Indian’ versus ‘Western’. This in turn foments some nationalistic ideologies, which responds 
to the idea of colonial superiority imposed on them with some kind of ‘Indian’ superiority.223 
Contemporary Indian philosophy has inherited these dilemmas and challenges when it comes 
to positioning itself in the world philosophical picture, between decolonizing attempts and 
identarian quest (and sometimes even nationalist drifts), often navigating between the former 
two, like in the case of S. Radhakrishnan and K. C. Bhattacharyya. Bhagat Oinam comments 
that the “emergence of nationalist ethos cannot be understood in isolation, but in context, as an 
offshoot of colonial rule”224, pointing at the fragile border and restricted choices of post-colonial 
Indian philosophers. The other side of the same coin consists in rejecting Indian philosophy on 
the ground that it only includes classical-Sanskritist-Brahmanical elitist positions against which 
the English-speaking modernity can prevail, a position which is also not without its own 
shortcomings.225  
                                                 
222 Deshpande, Philosophy in Colonial India, 12–13. 
223 J. N. Mohanty testifies of this postcolonial confrontative reaction: “Indian philosophers educated in Western 
thought developed a myopic vision of Indian thought. They characterized it in such global terms as ‘spiritual’ and 
‘transcendental’. Our professors in Calcutta - with perhaps the exception of Rash Vihary Das and Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya - talked about Indian philosophy in edifying language. Not that they did not know the text. They 
wanted to instil in us the perception that Indian philosophy was superior to Western. One respect in which this 
superiority was explicated was by claiming that Indian philosophy was practical (i.e. aiming at the removal of pain 
and suffering, leading eventually to mokṣa) and spiritual (in a rather undefined sense of the term, and we all felt 
we knew what it was about), culminating in a mystic union with the truth. All this was contrasted with the alleged 
theoretical, intellectual, and scientific nature of Western thought. It struck me much later as strange that Husserl, 
in his Vienna lecture, drew a similar contrast, but used the alleged theoretical character of Western philosophy to 
show its superiority over the practically oriented Eastern thought. This only confirmed my suspicion that such 
contrasts must be spurious.” Mohanty and Bilimoria, Relativism, Suffering, and Beyond, 5. 
224 Oinam, “‘Philosophy in India’ or ‘Indian Philosophy,’” 461. 
225 Ananda Vajpeyi writes for instance: “But by the end of the 20th century, secular and left-wing scholars began 
to criticize the elitism—indeed the outright social inequality—associated with Sanskrit learning. Undeniably 
oppressive for some communities within India, especially non-Brahmin castes and women, but arguably 
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Daya Krishna directly inherited these internal contradictions, which are leitmotiv of his entire 
work. I see the incentive of the saṃvāda project in its particular attention to multilingual setting 
and revalorization of Indian traditions as contemporary as a clear manifestation of the dilemmas 
above explain. The Janus-faced consequence of these dilemmas may explain the apparently 
flagrant self-contradiction that Daya Krishna would be guilty of when he would have told 
Bhushan and Garfield that “anybody who is writing in English is not an Indian philosopher … 
What the British produced was a strange species – a stranger in his own country. The Indian 
mind and sensibility and thinking [during the colonial period] was shaped by an alien 
civilization.” I expressed my reserve above on the fact that Daya Krishna, Indian philosopher 
(mostly) writing in English, would deny ‘Indianness’ to Indian philosophers writing in English 
in view of his own position and his engagement with fellow Anglophone philosophers (3.4) and 
the difficulty to decipher on such a claim without context. However, if we acknowledge this 
paradox, it would exemplify the radical extent of the dilemmas faced by Anglophone Indian 
philosophers who go so far as to deny themselves ‘Indianness’ on the ground of the 
estrangement they have been facing. In this perspective, would saṃvāda represent a seeking of 
some Indianness in Indian philosophy today to re-establish an ‘authentic’ (not-alienated) 
creativity? If viewed in such a manner, does saṃvāda also not fall into the dangerous nativist 
dream of finding an ‘original’ form of philosophizing? Moreover, how would this nativism 
avoid the persisting “Western yardstick” above described, even when seeking authenticity?    
 
2.2.1.2. The Political in Dialogues and Saṃvāda as Postcolonial Response 
 
The emergence of these questions expresses the complexity of postcolonial political structures 
(and are, in this sense, not unrelated to other postcolonial societies) caught up between the two 
poles of alienation and authenticity which orientate the responses that are produced.  More 
importantly even, these postcolonial political structures influence the dialogical domain, which 
justifies their relevance in my analysis. With whom to engage, who to include in the dialogue, 
who is willing to participate, which rhetorical devices are allowed and which of them have a 
better effect, which arguments are accepted, and under which criteria? The answers to this 
second set of questions largely depends on the answer given to the first set above, in particular 
regarding the integration of participants related to a certain idea of Indianness and the 
segregation based on a certain concept of philosophy.  
 
                                                 
empowering  for Indians when seen against the backdrop of  colonialism, Sanskrit continues to oscillate between 
negative and positive meanings, like the  swastika-shaped building of the Sanskrit department at JNU.” Ananya 
Vajpeyi, “The Return of Sanskrit: How an Old Language Got Caught up in India’s New Culture Wars,” World 
Policy Journal 33, no. 3 (2016): 46, https://doi.org/10.1215/07402775-3713113. I believe that Vajpeyi in her 
article illustrates the common perception of Sanskrit in today’s Indian Universities (based on Western-training 
education such as JNU, facing political difficulties from February 2016 until today, the support of which incited 
her to write this article). However, and with regard to the much-needed support of these institutions, her views 
implicitly reduce Sanskrit itself to the recent political uses effectuated by the BJP. In her critique of the drift of 
Sanskrit used as a tool for supporting Hindutva, she also falls into the excesses of such a denunciation and the 
reduction that it implies. Her perception of Sanskrit is far away from Daya Krishna’s actual engagement with 
paṇḍits, who seems to me to present a more moderate and holistic evaluation of the language per se. Nevertheless, 
Vajpeyi’s article, in its excesses and restrictions, delineates a growing debate inside academia in India today. 
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To start with, one should keep in mind Arindam Chakrabarti’s and Ralph Weber’s general 
warning on the relation between dialogue and politics, which legitimize the inclusion of politics 
in an analysis of dialogue:  
“Every dialogue, collaborative work in hybrid styles of philosophy has had and will have an 
economics and politics. Future theoretical philosophy will theorize reflexively about that 
economics and politics also. It is said that some time back in undatable antiquity a debating 
assembly of scholars was arranged by King Janaka of Videha (modern Bihar, India). A 
thousand cows with horns wrapped in gold were to be given as a reward to the wisest of all. 
Savants and wranglers from all over the country had gathered to take part in this Philosophical 
Olympics. Before the dialogue had even started, the young arrogant Yājñyavalkya got up and 
told his two helpers, “Please take these cows to my home.” When the other brahmins raised a 
hue and cry at this outrageous appropriation, Yājñyavalka explained, tongue in cheek, of 
course, “We salute the wisest knower of Brahman, we just crave those cows.” After this ironic 
remark, for more than thirty sections of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, we get a deep metaphysical 
and phenomenological analysis of consciousness, desire and the Self, which broke the path of 
nearly all future metaphysics in India, led by this same ironic philosopher (and whose pre-
Socratic irony was no Greek influence). Every dialogue also has a politics, a negotiation and 
competition for power, at least for persuasive rhetorical impact. And in every age, every 
science and every academic discipline, specialists working within well-defined and established 
borders do have a margin of power over the open-minded, self-doubting, eclectic, many-
minded styles of thinking.”226 
Daya Krishna’s saṃvādas seem also to be motivated by a political strategy in the sense 
described here, in terms of rhetorical impact. This seems evident due to the public dimension 
that he chose to confer them in institutionalizing them via the Indian Council for Philosophical 
Research (financial and academic support), in publishing some of them and in promoting the 
outcomes in his letters227 in order to bring attention to these experiments.228 He could indeed 
have conducted the saṃvādas privately as his predecessors did (see 2.2.3). Opening, publishing, 
publicizing them had such a persuasive dimension, one of those however of the ‘open-minded’ 
and ‘eclectic’ kind described by Chakrabarti and Weber. This kind meant first to deviate from 
the usual conference model of assembling experts working in the same (narrow) field, a priori 
agreeing on the outlines, debating internal arguments and details upon a common framework, 
reading aloud their papers, following the critique made by Hornuff above in the unilateral 
‘conference’ type of communication, but also the internal limitations of the debate (see 1.1.2). 
Daya Krishna’s denunciation of the “effective apartheid between traditional and modern 
learning” and the “consequence of the apartheid on the psyche of the Indian intellectual 
today”229 is, however, not the first attempt of this kind in the history of Anglophone colonial 
                                                 
226 Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders, 229. 
227 Although published, the effort made by Daya Krishna to promote new works, to connect scholars and their 
works, to integrate Sanskrit scholars to the mainstream English-written philosophy, is visible in a number of letters. 
This attests Daya Krishna’s philosophical interest, but also of a certain engagement in enlarging the academic 
sphere of philosophizing in India to more scholars working outside Indian Universities. 
228 “It [the Indian Council of Philosophical Research] has also agreed to undertake the publication so that the 
intellectual rasa of the discussion may be tasted by a wider audience. Let the consciousness of Bhakti discover the 
intellectual element in it and enjoy the specific flavour it has.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a 
Contemporary Discussion, v. 
229 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 191. 
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and post-colonial Indian philosophies. It even almost seems that Anglophone Indian 
philosophies originate from this endeavor. Is there a difference between Daya Krishna’s 
approach and the venture of his predecessors? A main distinction concerns the method of 
answering the Western influence that persists in the postcolonial consequences of Indian 
academia, and the way to address the Western audience. While the first generation was rather 
confrontative230 in its approach of the Indian-Western comparison, trying to counterargue the 
colonial diminishing of the value of Indian philosophy by demonstrating the ‘greatness’ (i.e. 
the superiority) of Indian spirituality, their answer was thereby limited by the Western 
prejudices. Like the other side of the same coin, their responses had to symmetrically answer, 
which implied to remain within the persisting colonial logic by creating a mirroring picture of 
Western and Indian values, like Radhakrishnan.231 This kind of argumentation is analyzed by 
A. P. Rao cited in Ganeri’s analysis as a “new antinonymy of reason” as follows:  
“There is no specific name for this type of argument in the extant logical literature. Nonetheless 
it is a fallacy, and is typical of colonial intellectuals (…) To capture the formal structure of that 
argument relativising it to the present context, I mayv enture to state that it reads like: if foreign 
Plato could do it, then deśī [indigenous] Śaṃkara must have done it. Plato did it, so Śaṃkara 
did it.”232 
In so doing, the debate was already predetermined by the need to ‘answer’ a certain idea of 
Indian philosophies that was propagated in the colonial time. It could only configure pre-
determined position of a restricted debate.  Concretely expressed: to the refusal propounded by 
Western academics to recognize Indian literature as ‘’modern’ and ‘philosophical’ under the 
criteria that the presentation, format and concepts of the texts were not exactly equivalent to 
Western termini, modern Indian philosophers found themselves in an offensive restricted 
position, having themselves to distort their own heritage. They had to force the historical 
development, form and content of their texts into the Western framework, arguing thereby for 
the ‘equality’ or even the ‘superiority’ of their own traditions. The debate was necessarily 
biased due to this political imbalance and a rhetoric that was bound to fail, the one of recognition 
                                                 
230  I follow here Pawel Odyniec’s use and definition of this term in analysis of K. C. Bhattacharyya’s 
‘confrontative’ philosophy: “Thus, concerned as Bhattacharyya was with defining and highlighting those outlooks 
that he identified as ‘distinctively Indian’ and wishing to make an ‘Indian contribution in a distinctive Indian style 
to the culture and thought of the modern world’ (SI. 4), K. C. Bhattacharyya’s philosophywas ‘confrontative’ in 
that (a) it aimed to face Western and Indian philosophy with each other, (b) to clarify their fundamental notions, 
and then only (c) to give an assessment of Western stands from the standpoint of classical Indian philosophy (SI.9). 
The ‘confrontative’ feature of his comparativism lies, then, in the undeniable fact that he took sides with classical 
Indian philosophy, took it as his own culture—while he alienated modern Western philosophy, and then prioritized 
only one of the theoretically sketched outcomes that their comparison might have entailed. This is well illustrated 
in the fact that though there are plenty of philosophically interesting insights in Krishnachandra’s discussions 
concerning how certain philosophic problems were shaped and discussed in Western philosophy and concerning 
how they may be either resolved or entirely dismissed from the standpoint of classical Indian philosophy, to my 
knowledge there is no explicit exploration in the other direction.” Pawel Odyniec, “Rethinking Advaita Within the 
Colonial Predicament: The ‘Confrontative’ Philosophy of K. C. Bhattacharyya (1875–1949),” Sophia 57, no. 3 
(September 2018): 413, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0678-1. 
231 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, East And West In Religion (London: George Allen And Unwin Ltd., 1933). 
232 Ganeri, “Freedom in Thinking: The Immersive Cosmopolitanism of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya,” 4. 
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under the condition of an equivalence. Thus, this led Daya Krishna to dismiss ‘comparative 
studies’ in his evaluation of the discipline biased by this responsive need:  
““Comparative studies,” thus, meant in effect, the comparison of all other societies and cultures 
in terms of the standards provided by the Western societies and cultures, both in cognitive and 
noncognitive domains. The scholars belonging to these other societies and cultures, instead of 
looking at Western society and culture from their own perspectives, accepted the norms 
provided by Western scholars and tried to show that the achievements in various fields within 
their cultures paralleled those in the West and thus, they could not be regarded as inferior in 
any way to those that were found there. This hindered the emergence of what may be called  
‘comparative ‘comparative studies’, which might have led to a more balanced perspective in 
these fields. Further, the so-called comparative studies were primarily a search for facts or a 
reporting of data in terms of a conceptual structure already formulated in the West. The 
questions to which answers were being sought were already predetermined in the light of the 
relationship that were regarded as significant or the theories that were to be tested.”233 
The fact that European missionaries and the first indologists had their own stakes and their own 
ignorance in a field that was still unknown and only partially available to them, is a historical 
fact that could be acknowledged and criticized as the ‘first mistakes’ or ‘beginner’s mistakes’, 
what probably necessarily ground the establishment of a new field. But the persisting “blindness” 
of (Indian) scholars in unquestioningly accepting the prejudices established by others, either 
glorifying them in return and considering their simplifications as the mark of their own 
resources and the essence of their identity, or simply nourishing these interpretations 
themselves234 – even after the West has accepted a long work of critical investigation on the 
foundation of its hermeneutics – provoked Daya Krishna’s fury235, such as the related necessity 
of awaiting Western recognition as a ‘blessing’ of one’s truth, or as approving one’s act of 
dialoguing.236  
                                                 
233 Daya Krishna, “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be,” 2011, 60. 
234 Daya Krishna is eloquently provoking his audience in Shimla on the ‘fear’ of critically creating today in India: 
“Take Śankara for example. He had disciples like Padmapāda, Sureśvara, Maṇdana Miśra and others. They write 
about their teacher’s teaching, and they are not afraid—like everyone today is—to differ, to criticize and to suggest 
that the master was perhaps not quite correct in certain cases. But nowadays, people have turned strange: there is 
no utopia before us, only nostalgia. For us, the golden age is over. It is in the past. For some people it is in the time 
of the Vedas; for some people, the Upaniṣads (…). We look backwards. We want to hold on to something. We are 
afraid. We cannot see. We prefer to be blind. (…) What has happened to all these wise people around me, who 
talk about the Vedas and write about them? The Vedas are full of people we call ṛṣis, who were not afraid. It is we 
who are afraid. The Vedic canon did not close. It continued to be composed. Mantras were composed all the time. 
(…) People could write on anything. Nowadays, no one dares. While one may talk of the chandas, work on the 
alankāra, why is it that one cannot compose a mantra in a chanda and author a new sūkta? One does not even 
think of it or thinks that only the ṛṣis could do it. But why have the ṛṣis ceased? Has god forsaken everyone? Are 
we not intelligent enough? Or are we not sensitive enough?” Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 109. 
235 “Yet, whatever the justifications for this attitude [of an antiquarian spirit when looking at Indian traditions] on 
the part of western scholars, there could be none for the non-western ones. However, surprisingly enough, most 
scholars belonging to cultures other than the western one accepted this as the natural state of affairs and considered 
their own rich intellectual heritages as completely irrelevant to their cognitive enterprise, excepting, of course, the 
Greek Masters whom the western scholarship has already accepted.” Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches 
in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 71. 
236 A task for the future [to integrate Indian sources in languages other than Sanskrit], this can only be undertaken 
if the presupposition that all non-western modes of knowledge have been superseded by the current western 
thought in these fields is abandoned. This, however, can only happen when the social, political and historical roots 
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On the contrary, Daya Krishna did not bother to counterargue the old denomination of a 
Western rationality by opposing the superiority of Indian spirituality237: this bare opposition 
had proven its incapacity to dispense any vitality to Indian philosophies, and it even damaged 
the internal differences of these philosophies to correspond to these fixed ‘pictures’. This 
attitude also brought a certain tendency, for those who did not recognize themselves in the 
depiction of this ‘Indian spirituality’ that was supposed to define Indian philosophies, of leaving 
this field for Western philosophies who were for them more fit to engage in a contemporary 
world. The ‘Indian spirituality’ has been slowly left for ideological uses and simplifications of 
a nationalist type. Daya Krishna’s attempt is not new to the postcolonial ‘defense’ mechanism 
of Indian philosophies, and does not form an exception to the attitude of ‘answering’ to some 
Western prejudices.  
There is however also a certain tendency in his strategy to simply reverse this earlier emphasis 
on spirituality for its opposite, namely ‘Indian rationality’, which is best pointed out by the 
mirroring of the approach presented by German philosopher Rudolf Brandner:  
“I think that any intercultural approach to philosophy will depend on our capacity to originally 
reappropriate the own tradition; and there are quite a lot of typical modern prejudices we will 
have to cancel in order to get there. Our concerns in this direction might be quite similar and 
it might be even a common project we are working on from very different angles; it seems to 
me quite funny - in a very significant way - that while you are trying to show that Indian 
philosophy is not mokṣa-centred: and that thereby it has to be considered as ‘philosophy 
proper’ just as western philosophy, I am trying to show - by passing through Indian Philosophy 
- that Occidental Philosophy is basically mokṣa-centred and that this is exactly its constitution 
as ‘philosophy proper’.”238 
                                                 
of thought arising in the west is realized and its ‘intrinsic parochiality’ understood in terms of its own contentions 
elaborated in disciplines such as the ‘sociology of knowledge’ and the ‘paradigms of thought’ in recent times. One 
has to realize the relation between power and knowledge in order that the attitude towards non-western forms of 
knowledge may be freed from the prejudices in their own civilizations.” Daya Krishna, The Problematic and 
Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and Polity (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1996), viii–ix. 
237 “Often the tendency is to show the superiority of Indian thought and culture. This is done through a two-layered 
projection. One, that India, too, has (had) what the West has (had); and two, that India had it much earlier or much 
richer than what the West has (had). Take for instance, Sri Aurobindo’s Aspects of Indian Culture, where he shows 
that Indian culture and its philosophical worldviews are not only rich but also much older (and richer) than those 
of the West. That is how Radhakrishnan and many of his contemporaries discovered Adi Sankara as counter point 
to Bradley - much older in civilisational location in time, and much richer in philosophical rigour. Unlike Bradley, 
who was supposed to be a disguised imitator of German idealism, Sankara was shown as epitome of logical rigour 
and creative metaphysics. The idea of an unqualified monism that encompasses within its fold all multiplicity of 
human experiences, and existence of the world, is highlighted by the Indian philosopher. Adi Sankara’s Advaita 
Vedanta is shown to rescue the Indian culture and tradition from the garb of a receiving community. The projection 
is of centuries-old philosophical tradition that shows its richness when modern Europe was yet to be culturally and 
politically conceived.” Bhagat Oinam, “Philosophy in India: An Agenda for an Alternative Mode of 
Philosophising.,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XXVIII, no. 2 (2011): 78. 
238  The quote is retrieved from the section ‘Discussion and Comments’ of the JICPR with the following 
introductory note: “We are giving below a long comment from Prof. Rudolf Brandner, which he had written in a 
personal letter after reading the book entitled Indian Philosophy - A Counterperspective. We are publishing his 
comments, as his observations might be of wider interests to all those who are interested in ‘understanding’ the 
philosophical enterprises as enshrined in the two traditions of philosophizing which have come to be known by 
the names ‘Indian’ and ‘Western’. Rudolf Brandner, “Should One Try to Understand Indian Philosophy on the 
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The mirroring effect of Western philosophers looking for mokṣa for Western traditions (inspired 
by Indian traditions), while Indian philosophers inquire on non-mokṣa-centered traditions in 
Indian philosophy (to respond to the claim of Western rationality) illustrates the kind of 
reversion that is taking place. In that sense, Daya Krishna belongs to the postcolonial 
generations coping with colonial Western prejudices without being able to overcome the 
response in the terms defined by the same Western prejudices.  
I would nevertheless claim that this reversion goes further than an equivalence of the type 
‘Indian philosophies are as rational as Western philosophies’. Daya Krishna rather aims to 
alleviate the problem of a certain Western obsession observed in Indian academics, and looks 
for genuine resources in Indian traditions that could offer a novel perspective. This search for 
genuine and authentic resources remains doubtful, which might explain why participants of a 
seminar on Indian Intellectual Traditions239 could have been disturbed and excessively accused 
the attempt of looking for ‘specific Indian intellectual structures’ of being nationalist and even 
“racist”240.  Daya Krishna indeed pertains a certain dichotomy between India and the West, 
rather between Western-constructed Indian philosophies of Indian academics and the (blinding) 
perception of the West in the same Indian academics. In other words, he opposes the perception 
and the evaluation of Western and Indian philosophies by Indian academics, rather than per se. 
He appeals to revive the creativity of Indian academics by freeing thems from the subjection of 
a dreamed idea of Western academics and a stereotyped knowledge of Indian traditions. It is in 
this sense that Daya Krishna argued to look at India itself and to neglect the ‘West’ in its Indian 
academic perception, i.e. an obsessive and superior fantasized entity. This neglection was, 
however, not exclusivist, in the sense that it did not exclude integrating scholars outside of the 
traditions in question, neither to the saṃvādas, nor in his correspondence or teaching.  
Therefore, in view of this attitude, Ganeri classifies Daya Krishna, as a post-independence 
philosopher “pushing away tradition, resisting the return to one’s own tradition as a counter-
weight to colonial domination in favor of an entitlement to criticize inherited tradition and 
foreign tradition alike according to one’s own judgment”.241 He further states that 
 “Daya Krishna summarizes the new mentality when he says that “svarāj in ideas can only be 
achieved by a radical alteration in our attitude to both the traditions—the Indian and the 
Western. We have to de-identify with both and treat them only as take-off points for our own 
thinking, which should be concerned with what we consider important.” We see here key 
themes in the new mentality: the rejection of Bhattacharyya’s notion of reverence in favor of 
de-identification; the idea that the philosopher’s own sense of what is of importance is the 
fundamental norm against which to appraise cultural tradition. The post-colonial Indian 
philosopher has similarly lost any anxiety about the use of English as a language of 
communication and is not worried that its use is another modality of foreign domination; for 
English has become just a machine of communication and not a site of subjectivity.”242 
                                                 
Western Model? Fundamental Defect in Daya Krishna’s Approach to the ‘understanding’ of the Indian 
Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XVI, no. 2 (April 1999): 141. 
239 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions. 
240 Daya Krishna, ix. 
241 Ganeri, “Freedom in Thinking: The Immersive Cosmopolitanism of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya,” 6. 
242 Ganeri, 5. 
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In Daya Krishna’s case, I disagree with the loss of the anxiety caused by the use of English, the 
monopoly of which is denounced by Daya Krishna. He wrote for this reason several 
monographs and articles in Hindi (2.2.2). Furthermore, although Daya Krishna saw the 
resources of (his and others) cultural traditions critically, the saṃvāda project also constitutes 
an endeavor into diversifying the ‘philosopher’s own sense of what is of importance’ by 
bringing different cultural traditions together to evaluate these resources. ‘The philosopher’s 
own sense’ is also constituted out of humility of one’s own limit and extension to different 
philosophical communities. 
Therefore, in introducing the “Who’s who of teachers and scholars in philosophy in India”, a 
thematic and nominal yearbook listing Indian philosophers, Daya Krishna explains the 
underlying motive of the yearbook as follows: 
“The philosophical community in India has not yet become a ‘community’ in any significant 
sense of the term. (…) But whatever the causes, there can be little doubt that those who are 
aware of the lack cannot but attempt to build one. And, what better beginning can be made in 
this direction than to have a ‘Who’s Who’ of information about who is doing what and where?  
The Indian philosophical community, in fact, is divided into at least three major constellations 
and/or groups. [into English-speaking scholars, Sanskrit paṇḍits and Islamic scholars, to which 
are added those working in vernaculars, and those working in Christian theology] Each of these 
is a world unto itself and is almost ‘worlds apart’ from others, with hardly any knowledge of, 
or interaction with, the others. Even within their own ‘world’, there is hardly any all-India 
awareness. There is also, what may be called ‘differentiated growth’ or ‘islands of growth’ in 
certain centres, regions and institutions. They tend to look inward, and their attempt to establish 
some interaction with the outside academic community in their own subject is generally with 
centres or institutions abroad. Their own country is just a hinterland for them, a scheduled-
caste land of underdeveloped academia from whom they would like to escape as much, and as 
soon, as they can.”243 
Roughly formulated, for Daya Krishna, saṃvāda means to take up the challenge of this creative 
dialogue that did not happen between ‘Indian philosophies’ – those made in Sanskrit and born 
from the classical traditions, the legacy of these first English-writing generations, and further 
traditions, forgotten in most of the literature (including the above ones on colonial India), who 
still operate in India, from Islamic, Buddhist, Jain traditions. Looking at a hybridity and a 
cosmopolitanism which had all the reasons to succeed at the time of this colonial encounter 
(and in some cases, such as the Bhattacharyas’, did happen), Daya Krishna’s postcolonial 
response consists in restituting a dialogue between those who did not meet.  
The enunciative rupture between English and vernaculars/Sanskrit and the fracturation in 
micro-philosophical groups is at the origin of the parting above described, between the 
experience of anguish of Indian scholars and our interpretation of them as hybrid cosmopolitan 
actors. Daya Krishna attempted to create a community with which to engage, and with which 
to speak. The scope of such a community remained strongly limited: it would be exaggerated to 
consider that Daya Krishna did break the disinterest of the Sanskrit-speaking community or brought 
                                                 
243 Daya Krishna, Who’s Who of Teachers and Scholars in Philosophy in India (New Delhi: Indian Council of 
Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1991), v–vi. 
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deep modifications to their protective structures or educational system. He himself admits in a 
dialogue he organized in 1983:   
“In regard to the question of having a dialogue with the traditionalists we, in the Department 
of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, have had several experiments of this kind. Firstly, in 
the Department we have had an exchange of teachers between our Department and the Sanskrit 
College in Jaipur City. One of their traditional pundits has come to the Department and has 
held a long series of seminars with our colleagues and we have studied some texts with him. 
On the other hand, some of our teachers have offered to go to the Sanskrit College in the town 
to do courses in western philosophy with their students. However, that part of the exchange 
has not been so successful as they do not seem to be interested in what we have to offer.”244 
If Daya Krishna succeeded in creating a small community ready to open up for dialogues, it 
cannot be generalized to the Sanskrit philosophical world and remained an undertaking in a 
circle of acquaintances. 
This points at internal difficulties of another kind beyond the damages caused by the colonization.  
Rekindling the internal philosophical diversity of India highlights also problems independent of the 
monopoly of English and the Western influence on Indian philosophy: 
a) not-belonging to the monopolistic English-speaking philosophy does not necessarily imply other 
interactions between the different groups. Daya Krishna mentions in the dialogue on dialogue 
referred to above that even what are called ‘classical traditions’ just do not interact, and that each 
remains in its own world. Saṃvāda is therefore not only a ‘postcolonial’ attempt, but an 
intra/intercultural one for creating relations between different philosophical communities and 
remedying to the lack of internal contacts between philosophical worlds, the only condition for 
achieving creativity to him.  
b) beyond the colonizer/colonized dichotomy appear many distinguished subgroups ordered also 
by power relations and hierarchy. The Brahmanical elite has been leading the perception and 
reception of ‘Indian philosophies’ for millennia. At different places, Daya Krishna denounces the 
oblivion of the role of Buddhism in Indian philosophies245, and the biases in considering Indian 
philosophies in the prevalence of Advaita Vedānta as an elitist Brahmanical reconstruction. With 
the saṃvāda project, Daya Krishna therefore argues against the forced absence of any tradition as 
well as for reconnecting these different traditions between them.  
This becomes political again in the case of Islamic scholars, which are today neglected in Indian 
academia. Rajni Bakshi, a student of Daya Krishna, mentioned to me the emotion of Islamic 
scholars who had the feeling to be invisible, during a Workshop in 1987 in Jaipur on the “art of the 
                                                 
244 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, xxiii. 
245 “If we take all these facts together, a clear picture emerges which questions at its foundations the total picture 
that has been built of India’s philosophical tradition in the first millennium AD, stretching back to the period from 
the appearance of the Buddha. This whole period of a millennium-and-a-half is dominated by the intellectual and 
spiritual presence of Buddhism which has either been ignored or presented as a minor motif in the usual pictures 
that have been painted until now. The story has to be changed and drawn in the light of inconvertible factual 
evidence. (…) The history and philosophy of India from 500 BC to 1 000 AD has to be totally rewritten placing 
Buddhism in the centre and treating it as a chief protagonist as it not only outnumbered all other schools of 
philosophy both in quantity and quality but set the agenda to them.” Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian 
Philosophy, 21. 
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commentary” (to which Daya Krishna refers to above in the dialogue on dialogue) where Daya 
Krishna invited Islamic scholars, Nyāya paṇḍits, Samkhya paṇḍits, Western scholars, etc. This 
feeling is due to the absence of visibility of their traditons, the inexistence and public ignorance of 
their tradition246. In another communication to Shail Mayaram, she declared:  
“It was through such meetings that students like me got a glimpse of the fact that there is an 
elaborate and indigenous tradition of Islamic theology and how painfully neglected it is by the 
modern universities. I have vivid memories of an aging maulvi-saheb, almost in tears, saying: 
‘Dayājī ne hamaīṃ bulāyā, hamārī bāt sunī, varnā to hamaīṃ zindā kaun samajhtā hai [Dayaji 
called us, heard us, otherwise we are not even regarded as being alive]’ (personal 
communication, 10 April 2008).”247 
She added to me that this was the time where she herself realized the plurality of Indian traditions, 
their wide scopes and differences: when philosophy becomes philosophies.248 
 c) consequently, absences are not only exclusion but sometimes voluntarily withdrawing, what 
maybe is the most difficult challenge for dialogue itself. Integrating the paṇḍits self-willingly to the 
saṃvāda, arousing interests to them for non-Sanskristist texts and questions that are external to their 
usual perspectives on commenting their canons, bringing them at the centre of an intercultural 
dialogue and asking them to contribute to the outward Sanskrit-speaking philosophical world 
constitute a partially unresolved problem. M. P. Rege admits a certain closure emerging from the 
side of paṇḍits, in the form of the lack of interest for engaging, but also a lack of self-critique when 
viewing their philosophies:  
“If this [to conceive Indian philosophies as history of philosophy] is an unfortunate situation, 
it must be said in fairness that pandits share the responsibility for it with western-trained 
philosophers. It was understandable that till the ‘age of discovery’, the Indian philosophical 
tradition should have developed in isolation without being influenced by and without 
responding to currents of thought elsewhere because of the fact of geographical isolation. Even 
so, one must recognize that this geographical isolation was itself partly the result of the mental 
isolation into which the Brahmins had retreated owing to pride based on ignorance. They, 
perhaps, took unduly seriously the boast of the Mahābhārata that in matters of dharma, artha, 
kāma and mokṣa what is not here is not to be found elsewhere. Western philosophy of modern 
times in its creative role, fashioned new ideals of knowledge (…). By comparison, Indian 
philosophy gives the impression of moving in a closed circle. The discussions, no doubt, were 
free, but all the pūrva-pakṣas [counterposition] are given. (…) The new argument is much 
likely to be a variation of an old argument.”249 
Such remarks on a certain stagnation of the tradition and a mere repetition of already established 
thesis by paṇḍits constituted a motivation for the project, which aimed at rekindling Indian 
philosophies. The critiques were thus addressed to Anglophone philosophers vis à vis their 
understanding of the tradition (in translations) and vis à vis paṇḍits’ continuation of the tradition (in 
originals). The first were risking alienation in the change of medium and the second mere repetition 
in the isolation they voluntarily or not were facing. J. N. Mohanty comments on the latter’s loss of 
                                                 
246 Personal communication with Rajni Bakshi, Mumbai, on 18th February 2016. 
247 Mayaram, Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj, xxiii. 
248 Ibid.  
249 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xxiii. 
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creativity: “A certain way of reading, perhaps separately characterizing each lineage (as in the case 
of distinct gharāṇās of Indian music), was being preserved and transmitted, and in each case, a 
certain rhetoric was being preserved and used. By our250 times, creativity had come to an end, again 
with some rare exceptions.”251 
In consequence, Daya Krishna was on the one hand actively and cordially supported by some, such 
as Badrinath Shukla252, who were at the core of the engagement, as well as criticized and ignored 
by many others. The difficulties are many and variegated in their nature and influence on the state 
of philosophy of India, although they are related and reflect the state of postcolonial philosophy. 
The saṃvāda project can nevertheless not be understood independently of it but as an internal 
reaction to a global situation, whether seen as cosmopolitan resources or as alienation of one’s 
own heritage.  
 
2.2.2. Saṃvāda as a Way of Living: Personal Engagement and Attitude 
 
Daya Krishna is portrayed as ‘dispassionated’ when facing counterpositions, of a man of reason 
when ‘dissecting’ arguments, of the “detached intellect” in dialogue (see 1.1.4 and 5.2.1), 
calmly but steadily “thinking through”253 any reasoning, as much as ‘passionate’ for the act of 
thinking itself, loving the friendliness of the debate, valuing the opponent as a person, and 
constantly enthusiastic for philosophical dialogues. Rajni Bakshi describes him as the 
combination of these two aspects: a ‘passionate’ man for thinking with a necessary 
‘detachment’ required to take a position, and modify it and accept adversity in thinking. 
Passionate (as a person willing to engage in dialogue) and distanced (in the intellectual analysis) 
are no antonyms, quite on the contrary: the detached intellect enables a connection between the 
attitude that leads to the practice and the intellectual analysis that unfolds the theoretical 
arguments. Being personally engaged to promote this detached intellect without being self-
attached to the thing that is defended determines the way saṃvāda has been practiced by Daya 
Krishna.  
Due to the few mentions of saṃvāda in Daya Krishna’s writings and the large number of 
unpublished material, I went to question some participants, colleagues and students of Daya 
Krishna in order to recollect a larger picture of saṃvāda than the one available in the 
publications, as well as a personal picture of the man behind it. Less than the chronological 
expected dimension, what emerged the most clearly in these talks is the following: the portray 
of a man and the love felt for him, as much as his love for philosophical dialogues that he at the 
                                                 
250 Mohanty means here B. K. Matilal’s and his time, about whom he is writing the introduction of this Festschrift.  
251 “Introduction”, Mohanty and Bilimoria, Relativism, Suffering, and Beyond, 4. 
252 See the dedication of the transcript of the Pune experiment to him: “to the late Pt. Badarinath Shukla, the 
towering pandit of the older generation, this volume is dedicated. Without his inspiration, enthusiasm, affection 
and guidance little would have been achieved as he was the bridge between the old and the new, the traditional 
and the modern. He was, so to say, the modern amongst the traditional, and the traditional amongst the moderns – 
and hence the bridge-builder par excellence revered by everybody, acceptable to everybody.” Daya Krishna et al., 
Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xvi. 
253 An expression used by Rajni Bakshi during our meeting, 18.02.2016, Mumbai. 
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end embodied. The affection for the person and the friendliness of the dialogues should not be 
philosophically underestimated, for it is part of dialectic categories and a necessary ground to 
pursue collectively the ‘truth’, or, if such a term cannot be hold in our philosophical worldview 
today, an honest rational investigation of a problem. Following the definition of saṃvāda in 
classical Indian philosophy (Nyāya-sūtra and Caraka, see 2.1.1), B. K. Matilal traces the 
relevance of friendship in philosophical debates to Socrates and correlates it to Caraka in 
classical Indian dialectics254: 
“[Socrates] mentions to Meno (Meno 75 c-d): “… if my questioner were one of the clever, 
disputatious, and quarrelsome kind, I should say to him ‘You have heard my answer. If it is 
wrong, it is for you to take up the argument and refute it.’ However, when friendly people, like 
you and me, want to conserve with each other, one’s reply must be idler and more conducive 
to discussion. By that I mean that it must not only be true, but must employ terms with which 
the questioner admits he is familiar.” The debate between “friendly people” as Socrates calls 
it does not seem very different from the kind of debate which Caraka described as sandhāya 
sambhāṣa ‘debate among fellow scholars who are friends.’ And this is to be contrasted with 
what Socrates described as a debate with a disputatious person. In Caraka’s terminology, this 
is the other kind of debate which is actually a verbal fight (vigraha). Caraka broadly divides 
debates into two types. The first is held with a fellow-scholar and in a spirit of co-operation 
(sandhāya sambhāṣa255), but the second in a spirit of opposition and hostility (vigṛhya).”256 
The distinction from the hostile type of dialogue where the objective is to destroy the other 
(what occasionally happens in debate) and the counterarguments that are given in such type of 
dialogue are of a different rhetorical nature than the devices used for the second kind. This 
implies that friendliness is not a formal convention of politeness, but changes the nature and 
the constitution of the debate itself, and cannot be philosophically neglected for this reason. As 
stated in the Caraka-Saṃhitā: 
“One should have friendly discussions with persons of learning possessed of scientific 
knowledge, power of argument and counter-argument, who do not get irritated, who are 
endowed with correct knowledge, who are not jealous, who can be made to understand, who 
are competent in convincing others, who are capable of facing difficult situations and who can 
                                                 
254  See also Karin Preisendanz, “Logic, Debate and Epistemology in Anciant Indian Medical Science - an 
Investigation into the History and Historiography of Indian Philosophy,” Indian Journal of History of Science, 44, 
no. 2 (2009): 261–312; Bronkhorst, “Modes of Debate and Refutation of Adversaries in Classical and Medieval 
India: A Preliminary Investigation.”  
255  On sandhāyasambhāṣā: “”Unterredung”, “Nicht-agonale Diskussion” Der Terminus ist eine sprachliche 
Variante des bei Caraka belegten Terminus anulomasambhāṣā und bezeichnet die nicht-agonale Form der 
„Wissenschaftlichen Unterredung“ (tadvidyāsambhāṣā, vgl. auch s.v. saṃvādaḥ). „Von diesen [beiden Arten der 
wissenschaftlichen Unterredung] wird die sandhāyasambhāṣā jemandem empfohlen, der Wissen, Erkennen, die 
Fähigkeit der Rede und Gegenrede vollkommen besitzt, den man nicht zu besänftigen braucht und der mit den 
Regeln respektvollen Anstandes vertraut ist, der Fehler ertragen kann und freundlich konversiert.”  CarS [vim 
8.17] 264b, 22-32). My translation: “On sandhāyasambhāṣā: "'Interlocution', 'non-agonal discussion'. This term is 
a linguistic variation of the term anulomasambhāṣā documented in Caraka and it refers to the non-agonal way of 
'scientific interlocution' (tadvidyāsambhāṣā, cf. also s.v. saṃvādaḥ). Of these [two kinds of scientific interlocution] 
the sandhāyasambhāṣā is recommended with a person who completely possesses knowledge, intuition, the ability 
to hold a speech and to object, a person one does not need to calm down and who is familiar with the rules of 
respectful decency, who can endure mistakes and converses friendly.” Oberhammer, Prets, and Prandstetter, 
Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien, 224–25; Agniveśa and Caraka, Traité fondamental 
de la médecine ayurvédique = Caraka Saṃhitā, trans. Jean Papin (Paris: Ed. Almora, 2006), 346. 
256 Matilal, “Debate and Dialectic in Ancient India.” 
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address in a sweet tone. One should confidently discuss with such persons and put questions 
to them. When he asks anything, it should be elaborately described with confidence. One 
should not get worried under the apprehension of getting defeated. One should not rejoice by 
defeating his opponents. one should not boast of having defeated such opponents. One should 
not hold extreme views under delusion. One should not try to describe a thing which the other 
party does not know. One should try to bring round the other party with politeness and not by 
deception. One should be very careful to behave politely with his opponents.”257  
Coming back to a practical level, the friendliness should also not be underestimated concerning 
the intercultural context of such dialogues. Indeed, to initiate saṃvāda connecting different 
traditions, in a postcolonial context that made participants sensitive to the feelings of exclusion 
and alienation, requires people to trust you. Trusting you in this context refers to vāda as the 
quality enabling an honest type of dialogue seeking ‘truth’, or what one honestly hold to be true 
and demonstrates at the best of one’s rational capabilities. It therefore implies “taking each 
participant seriously” in Daya Krishna’s motto, which means listening, trying to understand and 
exposing one’s argument and counter-arguments as rationally and clearly as possible. The 
friendliness of vāda as practiced by Daya Krishna allowed him to be able to “bring people 
together”258, arising interests in different groups and communities, and persuading them to join 
the dialogue. ‘Invitations’ are not only accepted on the ground of the philosophical paper that 
will be given, but in regard to the conditions in which people will be received, including a 
friendly welcome - the assurance of a satisfiable context for communication. This attitude of 
Daya Krishna, the one of a friendly dialogue and deep friendships doubled by sincere 
expectation of the intellectual engagement from others and a strong exigence for philosophical 
reasonings (on the background of a strong belief that all scholars, independent of his tradition, 
can ‘reason’ as sharply even if with different tools or in different ways) are also the explanation 
of the success of saṃvāda in Daya Krishna’s lifetime, and his intimate connection to it. As 
Yashdev Shalya, friend and dialogical partner writes: 
“Daya Krishna occupies a space of unique distinction even amongst the very few front-rank 
thinkers in contemporary Indian philosophy. This uniqueness is defined by two qualities 
possessed by him. First, his wholly untraditional, creative approach and his natural tendency 
to probe into roots. It is because of this innate bent that Daya Krishna is able to raise ever-fresh 
and fundamental questions. Simplicity, openness and a complete freedom from arrogance are, 
in fact, ingrained in his personality itself, and are not merely functions of his philosophical 
thinking. The second characteristic is his wide-ranging vision and capacity to understand and 
think about problems related to various other disciplines.”259 
In this aspect, and although the dialogues were publicly announced and everyone welcome, 
they were mostly composed of learned scholars and friends, who came from various traditions 
                                                 
257 Agniveśa, Caraka, and Dṛḍhabala, The Carakasaṃhitā of Agniveśa : With the Ayurveda-Dipika Commentary 
of Cakrapāṇidatta: Carakasaṃhitā, ed. Yādavaśarmā Trivikrama Ācārya and Cakrapāṇidatta, trans. Ram Karan 
Sharma and Vaidya Bhagwan Dash, vol. II (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1977), 226. 
258 An expression used by R. S. Bhatnagar in our meeting. Jaipur, 24. 02. 2016. 
259 Yashdev Shalya, “Social Philosophy: Past and Future,” in The Philosophy of Daya Krishna, ed. Bhuvan 
Chandel and K. L. Sharma (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research : Distributed by Indian Book 
Centre, 1996), 192. 
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and who often disagreed with each other. Although the scope was varied, it did not reach out 
the ‘many’. If the influence of the dialogues on these friends and scholars are deeply felt, the 
wideness of this influence should also not be overestimated.260   
Saṃvāda in the form of a dialogical experiment between different philosophical traditions, in 
the name that was given to the transcription bearing this title, has grown from the teaching 
practice and the difficulties encountered while teaching by Daya Krishna. He is known to have 
kept his home door open for all seeking philosophical discussions in the afternoons.261 Neelima 
Vashishtha262 recalls how Daya Krishna was both difficult and demanding with his students, 
and at the same time always concerned and affectionate. The love to his students was going 
together with the will for developing their critical spirits and their ability to ask questions, their 
inquisitiveness, as she further mentioned. One could be tempted to either relate Daya Krishna 
to the guru-śiṣya tradition, where education is not an external contractual relation through the 
established institution delivering diplomas, but an informal relation engaging one’s person into 
one’s teaching: being in informal dialogues as an intellectual, as described by Sharad 
Deshpande: 
“What was happening as a matter of fact was a replacement of the traditional system of 
education by a new one in which the traditional guru-śiṣya paramparā (teacher-disciple 
lineage) was completely altered. In this alteration, the roles and relationship between the guru 
and śiṣya were completely changed. Teachers began to receive their monthly salaries by virtue 
of which they became professionals. Pupils began getting scholarships and stipends for being 
full-time students and prizes for their performance at regularly conducted examinations. The 
relationship between the guru and the śiṣya became incidental to the system of annual 
examinations. With these alterations, the basic structure of the traditional system which was 
based on the inseparable relation between the form and content of knowledge acquisition was 
mutilated.”263  
A relation engaging thinkers constitutes the ideal of education developed by Daya Krishna. 
Indeed, he is also known to disagree with the guru-śiṣya concept insofar as it leads to a ‘blind’ 
relation where the students (out of loyalty and respect) are bound to the position of their teacher. 
This creates a repetitive model, something also criticized in contemporary terms by K. 
Satchidananda Murty:  
“Moreover, due to the unfortunate traits of the guru-shisya tradition and the structure of our 
caste-class hierarchical society, students expect to be taught, to be ‘given’ knowledge or truth, 
and not to learn on their own and make an independent intellectual effort to acquire knowledge 
or arrive at truth; while most teachers due to these reasons do not consider students as co-
partners in the education process and do not encourage them to raise questions, entertain doubts 
and exercise their critical faculties. So, without a change in these attitudes, 
                                                 
260  Mukund Lath appeared to have reservations on the otherness contained in saṃvāda, mentioning that all 
participants were known to each other (although belonging to diverse traditions), having agreed and being willing 
to engage. The question of motivating people to participate is for him irrelevant, as it constituted of small groups 
of friends who were already convinced of the necessity of saṃvāda – the influence on people was consequently 
inexistent for him and limited to the participants of the dialogue. (Personal communication, Jaipur, 06.05.2016.) 
261 Mentionned by Rajni Bakhshi (18.02.2016, Mumbai) and Daniel Raveh. 
262 Personal communication, 26.02.2016, Jaipur.  
263 Deshpande, Philosophy in Colonial India, 14. 
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tutorials/seminars/discussions may not be very fruitful, though for training in philosophizing 
they are the best methods.”264 
In this in this context of commitments to a personal philosophical relation to his students, 
grounded in dialogues, and challenging questions in the academic description of Murty that one 
can appreciate Daya Krishna’s teachings, which appear, by contrast, of a radical different 
nature, described by Mustafa Khawaja:  
“His class was never a one-way traffic of words. It was a real saṃvāda (dialogue) in which al 
the students and scholars took an active part. Doing a class with Dayaji was like drawing a 
picture, under the watchful eye of a master artist. Unless and until one has not touched the 
canvas, or has not made any statement one is absolutely free to try his/her hand on drawing 
any pictures of his/her choice. The moment one draws a line or make a statement the logical 
implications of the act result in some sort of determination. But this determination is subject 
to one’s creativity and resourcefulness. When the implications of one’s act are pointed out, one 
may realize one’s stupidity in making the statement or drawing the line, but then it may be 
erased or modified under the guidance of the master. However the dialogue between the 
disciple and the master shall have to continue so that the contours of the picture may 
emerge.”265 
Furthermore, his attention to the linguistic muddle in contemporary Indian philosophy were 
amplified during his teaching at the Rajasthan University. As in most Indian universities, the 
legacy of the English-speaking institution does not imply an equal or universal command of the 
language in practice: the division within students, regarding their schooling (English, Hindi or 
another regional language) and background is such that not all of them can at the beginning of 
their studies articulate philosophical argumentation in English266. On the other hand, some 
professors (or students), having internalized a long training in English, may not be able to 
express themselves in regional languages or lack the faculty to translate Western philosophical 
                                                 
264 Murty notes however counter-examples found in the tradition, from where Daya Krishna takes his inspiration: 
The methods mentioned above had their counterparts in India. Upadeśa (personal teaching) and pravacana 
(lecture), encouraging questioning (paripraśna) and insisting on reflection on what is heard (manana, 
nididhyāsana), correspond to the lecture method. Dialogues such as those of Yaajñavalkya-Maitreyī and Uddālaka-
Śvetaketu and of the Buddha with others correspond to the tutorial. The different aahnikas in philosophical works 
are summaries of daily lessons. Śāstrārtha carcā (discussion of the meaning of texts) and Vāda (debate through 
presentation of a position and a counterposition on an issue), conducted in a gathering of scholars (goṣṭī, pariṣad), 
correspond to the seminar. The vigour of philosophical activity in ancient and medieval India was due to the 
simultaneous adoption of all these methods.” Murty, Philosophy in India, 186–87.  
265  Mustafa Khawaja, “The Dialogue Must Continue,” in Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj: Dialogical 
Meditations on Daya Krishna and Ramchandra Gandhi, ed. Shail Mayaram (New Delhi: SAGE, 2014), 109. 
266 Daya Krishna comments on the division between students as per their linguistic medium: “Higher Education in 
India means primarily college and university education for boys and girls after passing out of High or Higher 
Secondary schools with a minimum number of marks which entitles them to seek admission to these institutions. 
These schools are of varying standards all over the country. But the most radical and important distinction between 
them is that they can be divided into two broad classes which almost completely exclude each other. The distinction 
is based on the language used as the medium for instruction in these schools. There are some that exclusively use 
English as their medium for instruction. Others, and they form the majority, use the regional language for this 
purpose. This results in a clear division between the students who come to the colleges and the universities. They 
form almost two different castes, the one lower and the one higher, with overt and covert forms of feeling and 
behavior corresponding to their status in the inner world of the college and that of society outside.” Daya Krishna, 
John, and Sundaram, Indian Education Today: Prospects & Perspectives: Essays, in Honour of Mohan Sinha 
Mehta, 9. 
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concepts into Hindi. As for the speakers who are not native from Hindi speaking areas, they 
simply may have command of other vernacular languages or prefer to use English. The 
problems that it creates concern the philosophical communication, but also the access to 
academic resources, which are limited in vernaculars267. This situation is also regretted by an 
evaluation of philosophy in Indian Universities led the University Grants Commission Review 
Committee (published in two reports in 1966 and 1968), in which it is mentioned:  
“One increasingly big problem, though, is the pressure exerted on colleges to introduce 
instruction in Hindi or the regional languages, a problem, because of the general absence of 
books of a sufficiently high standard or in some cases absence of any books at all written on 
philosophy in these languages. Pass course teaching in philosophy suffers much on account of 
the poor linguistic equipment of the students. Dictation and memorization of notes seems to be 
the prevailing method at the moment. (…) There is a great need, therefore, for more books, 
better syllabi and better linguistically equipped students if pass course teaching is to be 
improved.”268 
It is to be noted that the situation still prevails today. The same report also mentions the “need 
for the translation of essential texts so that students do not depend on second-hands accounts”, 
along with introducing “some outstanding pundits” in the departments of philosophy and 
translation of philosophers of regional languages into English. 269  Interestingly in another 
contribution on the topic of education, Daya Krishna mentions active solutions to tackle the 
problem of translation, such as making it the responsibility of each department to prepare its 
own reading material, in suggesting translation of an article as compulsory assignment for 
Master or PhD Students, in actively publishing autonomous vernacular materials, etc. He then 
notes that preparing reading-material in regional languages constitutes a “concomitant 
prerequisite of any real change in the system of higher education of India”.270 This, he felt, 
could not be found in metropolitan Universities or Institutes, which are too deeply grounded in 
English language, not ready to question this situation. He further writes:  
“No university is worth its name and mission, which fails creativity to solve this fundamental 
problem of higher education in India. The metropolitan universities are, however, cushioned 
against the realization of the absolute necessity of what is required, as their students are largely 
drawn from families and schools where English is taught and learnt in a regular manner. (…) 
They [these students] only help to sustain the illusion of these universities that they can make 
significant contributions to the problem of higher education in India.”271 
Reversing the usual educational hierarchy into an asset for smaller or more isolated colleges, 
Daya Krishna did not limit himself to advocating ideals to be followed: himself being part of 
non-metropolitan university of Rajasthan, the linguistic needs he had to face – like any other 
professor – probably initiated the writing of his publications in Hindi. The first one Gyāna 
                                                 
267 Also in Daya Krishna, John, and Sundaram, 18–20. 
268 Report of the University Grants Commission Review Committee, “Philosophy in Indian Universities” (New 
Delhi: University Grants Commission, 1966), 19–20. 
269 Report of the University Grants Commission Review Committee, 21–22. 
270 Daya Krishna, John, and Sundaram, Indian Education Today: Prospects & Perspectives: Essays, in Honour of 
Mohan Sinha Mehta, 19. 
271 Daya Krishna, John, and Sundaram, 19. 
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Mīmāmsā, written in 1980 on epistemology, was thought in particular for his students as a high-
quality book for teaching – the lack of textbooks and teaching materials of quality in Hindi 
being deplored. The second one Bhārtīya Darśana: Eka Nayī Dṛṣṭi272 , (in Hindi) (Indian 
Philosophy: a New Approach) published much later in 2000 is still addressed to students, but 
also to scholars to continue the dialogic engagement and provoke interests to those who might 
not read English (it is close to the book with the same English title published by Daya Krishna). 
Furthermore, Daya Krishna regularly contributed to Unmilan, a journal of philosophy in Hindi, 
to provide philosophical research in vernacular.273 Asha Mukherjee274 mentions the importance 
of translation in Daya Krishna’s class, between Hindi and English, when Daya Krishna 
discovers the difficulty of communicating between an English-speaking professor for logic and 
his Hindi-speaking students. As philosophizing should be addressed to all, and allowed to all 
regardless of their languages, Daya Krishna became sensitive to the linguistic question, initially 
already as a teacher. This question came to the core of the entreprise while acknowledging the 
importance of Sanskrit-speaking (and sometimes Hindi-speaking) paṇḍits.  
However, strongly against the imposed hierarchy of a guru-śiṣya or any teacher-student 
relationship, saṃvāda cannot be only a ‘teaching tool’ for philosophical communication nor to 
replace the Western monopoly by the Sanskritist one. In conducting saṃvāda, it so happened 
that Daya Krishna was himself as much a student as a teacher – and maybe a little bit more of 
the first, and that while originally trained in Western philosophy, he became a strong 
interrogater of Sanskrit ones. In this sense, his interest in saṃvāda was strengthened by his own 
learning. While discovering Sanskrit and its contemporary liveliness, still operating in India, as 
possible national language in a country where the communication between states and 
communities can be rendered impossible,275 he himself wanted to learn more, and learn in his 
own way. Im-mediately taught by the living masters of these philosophies, for whom these 
traditions were alive and creative, in their own languages. Bettina Bäumer 276  notices the 
growing openness of Daya Krishna, for whom his philosophy, completely occidental (even if 
due to his origins a part of traditions remains), grows little by little, and for which saṃvādas 
are done and organized ‘for himself’ to learn Indian traditions: Daya Krishna learns from 
saṃvādas. The model, as mentioned by T. N. Madan277, is the one of a conversation between 
two friends, extended to a dialogue between different groups of people.  
                                                 
272 Daya Krishna, Bhārtīya Darśana: Eka Nayī Dṛṣṭi, (Jaipur ; New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2000). 
273 Mentioned by Daniel Raveh in his Encyclopedia Entry of Daya Krishna (forthcoming) 
274 Personal communication, Santiniketan, 24.01.2016.  
275 “Even Europeans, who are proud of their languages, have begun to translate their works into English. A work 
in German or French, just like a work in Italian, has no international audience unless it is translated into English. 
This is a fact, just as earlier when Sanskrit was the pan-Indian language. Imagine! Even the Buddhists and the 
Jainas had to write in Sanskrit in order not merely to be considered knowledgeable, but to pave their way to the 
central arena of discussion in the country. When did the Buddhists start writing in Sanskrit? When did the Jainas 
do so? The transition from Pali and what we call Prakrit into Sanskrit is an interesting story. Sanskrit was, and still 
is, a living all-Indian language of classical and intellectual discourse. We are not aware of it. I discovered it, and I 
try to tell my friends, ‘Look! English is one of the all-Indian languages of intellectual discourse; Sanskrit is the 
other.’ From north and south, from east to west, people can get together anywhere and talk in Sanskrit.” Daya 
Krishna, Civilizations, 75–76. 
276 Personal communication, 23.01.2017, Abhinavagupta Research Library, Varanasi.  
277 Personal communication, 15.02.2017, New Delhi. 
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While dialogue has been a philosophical form of thinking as well in Ancient Greece as in 
Ancient India, and while the idea of dialogue leading to truth has been underlying this 
conception, dialogue also strongly depends on the persons involved in it, as a lively and 
evolving activity of thinking. The rupture after his death, or the weakening of the project (we 
note the existence of dialogues of the same kind on numbers in Delhi led by Arindam 
Chakrabarti, in Delhi again between Chinese and Indian philosophers led by Bhuvan Chandel, 
etc.), but also the importance of his person in their conception (for the preparation of questions, 
for the contacts and the response to his invitations, for his relative importance in the happening 
of the dialogues themselves) imply a personal talent to bring people together. Although 
saṃvāda as a theoretical concept, and as an operating methodology cannot be restricted to Daya 
Krishna himself and deserves independent investigation, it would also be naïve to dissociate 
the person from the project, and not to consider that the saṃvāda project undertaken by 
someone else may have a quite different form than the one I am describing in this work. The 
importance of his own experience, of the biographical, must be outlined in the process. Unlike 
how it might appear, namely as a reason to dismiss the whole project due to its ‘subjective’ 
nature (depending on Daya Krishna’s personality), I see it as the manifestation of the neglected 
inherent nature of philosophy lying in subjective intuition (the presuppositions of which are 
studied in 5); secondly, I see it as the valuation of the person in philosophy, something akin to 
N. V. Banerjee’s emphasis on the “realm of the personal”, the interperonal consequences of 
which are explained in 7.3.  
 
2.2.3. Saṃvāda as Continuity of Novelty. Inspirations and Precedents 
 
Daya Krishna did not believe in novelty ex nihilo, but in reinterpretation, rearrangement of the 
concepts in contemporary contexts and connecting concepts from different traditions to re-
problematize them. With Chrakrabarti’s words (describing Daya Krishna): “the real novelty of 
philosophical thinking lies in seeing new – in the epistemic sense of hitherto unperceived – 
connections between apparently unconnected conceptual questions or muddles, rather than in 
creating new concepts.”278 It is therefore not surprising that saṃvāda itself, conceived as a 
platform for thinking anew philosophical problems, has been developed in agreement with such 
an idea of a ‘continuation with new eyes’, inspired by preceding experiments, together with 
these predecessors. S. S. Barlingay had already tried to tackle the problems of contemporary 
Indian philosophy above mentioned (postcolonial change, ‘stagnation’ and stereotypes in 
perceiving Indian philosophy) at the Indian Council for Philosophical Research, from which 
Daya Krishna received his financial and academic support for the organization of saṃvāda. In 
a mail dated 08.07.2017, Sharad Deshpande mentioned that Barlingay had organized in 1971-
1972 “a novel seminar called ‘Sequence Seminar’. The idea was to focus on some seminal 
concepts from systems of Indian Philosophy and discuss them as deeply as possible. The first 
seminar was devoted to Samkhya notions of Puruṣa and Prakriti. (…) This experiment 
continued three times in consecutive years”. He notes that the philosophers K. J. Shah, K. T. 
Pandurangi, E. R. Sreekrishna Sharma and others had attended, and that, although some notes 
                                                 
278 Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” 5. 
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were taken in order to prepare the reports, it seems difficult to locate these notes today, if they 
still exist. S. S. Barlingay himself comments on the “sequence seminars”279, his description of 
which resembles the saṃvāda experiments: 
“I look at this problem [stagnation, stereotypes and traditionalism in Indian philosophy] from 
two points of view – organizational and theoretical. In order to tackle the organizational side, 
I started for example, three philosophical journals, in English, Hindi and Marathi for creating 
a forum for those who wanted to study and write. I think this should be done all over India. 
But the main problem is rather theoretical, I thought and do think that Indian philosophy is just 
philosophy. There is nothing special about it; and so we should enter into a dialogue between 
Indian philosophers and the philosophers of the Western mode and a synthesis should be 
arrived at. This could be done at two levels. First, by arranging a dialogue between the paṇḍits 
and the Western scholars. What is living in Indian philosophy should be accepted and what is 
dead should be given up. But while doing this, we must also examine the interpretations given 
by commentators; and as far as possible we should understand the original text directly rather 
than depend on the commentaries. With this end in view, I arranged some seminars with the 
title “sequence seminars”. I am happy that ICPR is carrying on the work now under the 
leadership of Daya Krishna.”280 
What Barlingay aimed at is “philosophy, and philosophy alone”281 where the “confluence” in 
respective languages of all philosophies would be integrated to modern thought in the exercise 
of thinking: and the product of this thinking, in different languages, in different traditions and 
in their encounters, would not need to be regionalized nor to bear any particular label, but would 
define philosophy as intrinsically plural. This rejection of regionalization of philosophy, which 
has been emphasized in comparative models that highlight a concept in different regional 
traditions (India/Europe), has been recently also defended by Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph 
Weber with the idea of a “comparative philosophy without border”282. Here, the categorization 
into regional philosophies is avoided to counter the correlated exclusion or hierarchy that 
implicitly plays a role in this division, since the reference remains the Western conception of a 
concept X, to which another perspective is added – but formulated in Western context, the 
concept of “ethics” for example, even if highlighted by a Chinese perspective, remains bounded 
by a departure point understood as Western ‘ethics’. Barlingay, followed by Daya Krishna, was 
earlier already trying to balance such an asymmetry described above: 
“While discussing with Prof. Gilbert Ryle at Oxford University, the contribution of modern 
analytical philosophy, it came to my mind that long ago the grammarians of India, Naiyāyikas 
and Mīmāṃsakas have discussed the problems of language and have propounded their theories 
of language. (…) A bridge is being built now over the modern philosophical structures and the 
ancient Indian structures. But the distance still remains. Macaulay’s reforms brought about 
something which Indians had perhaps never thought of. The growth of Indian thought is stunted. 
It is still not a living discipline. The result is that everything ends in false and incorrect 
historicising. I also feel that many a time while interpreting the concepts the orientalists did 
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not take the cultural context into account and did not bring in the old Indian and the new 
thought under one canopy. This was also the case with Paṇḍits. I thought there should be a 
dialogue between the Paṇḍits and the modern philosophers. I, therefore, held a few seminars 
and arranged for some dialogues under the title ‘Sequence Seminars’ in the University of Pune. 
This was later followed by ICPR under the scheme ‘Saṃvāda’. But what is necessary is a 
renaissance in the domain of philosophy of Indian origin.”283 
Furthermore, in his introduction to the first saṃvāda experiment, Daya Krishna mentions the 
work of K. Satchidananda Murty who has held a “meeting” in Tirupati284 and suggested to open 
the experiments to the non-Sanskritist world, in particular to scholars from the Arabic 
tradition285. These experiments are reported by Ashok Vohra to have happened in the 70ties.286 
In any case, both philosophers were in close contacts pursuing the same objectives, attested by 
K. Satchidananda Murty’s work, in particular in his reflection about the state of Indian 
philosophy (which Daya Krishna commented before its publication287) in Philosophy in India, 
Traditions, Teaching, and Research.  
A major earlier dialogical experiment, in which Daya Krishna also took part, has been 
conducted by Prabodh Parikh, Michael McGhee, M. P. Rege, Ramchandra Gandhi and others. 
Entitled ‘Convivium’288, it consisted in informal philosophical discussions and meeting for 
thinking. Michael McGhee recalls it as follows: 
“But chiefly [the dissastisfaction with the state of philosophy], and in summary, it was a lack 
of connection with life — and that connection was palpable in the case of Dayaji, Ramubhai, 
and Rege. I wanted to insist that there was nothing monolithic about this ‘Westernization,’ but 
rather that there were countercurrents in the West that mirrored Indian philosophical resources 
that could be mobilized for resistance, that one had to distinguish between the 
(super)imposition of a foreign culture and the specific content of what was aggressively 
dominant in that culture, and that there was plenty of room for dialogue and a meeting of minds 
— if the right conditions could be found. This was really the founding principle of our 
Convivium series: that a small group of philosophers living together for a short ‘retreat’ and 
under the same roof would sufficiently thaw out so that they could actually talk to each other 
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and find common ground. Large-scale conferences with banks of sessions had their place, we 
thought, but conversation did not flourish in such environments.”289 
Unlike Daya Krishna’s saṃvādas, it was organized independently and self-financed, without 
academic support: the latter will be developed at a larger scale and institutionalized by M. P. 
Rege and Daya Krishna in the saṃvāda experiment (see 3.3.1). The former was organized in 
India and in U.K. during five days, once every two years in an average. In a letter, Prabodh 
Parikh sent the preparative issues for the next convivium to Daya Krishna for his philosophical 
reactions. The way the exchange takes place tells us a lot about how the convivium proceeded. 
Daya Krishna answered him as follows: 
“Nice to learn from your letter that the Convivium is still alive and that its sixth session is 
going to be held in some Buddhist Monastery in H. P. [Himachal Pradesh].  
The problem you have chosen is interesting, but perhaps one should try to understand this urge 
for getting out of subjectivity rooted in a culture and shaped by it and, at another level, formed 
by intellectual traditions to which one belongs and which is available to one in one’s language. 
I think the Convivium should start with a ‘confession’ of the difficulty one is encountering 
presently and share one’s own attempt to get out of the constraints and limitations 
unconsciously created by the culture and in intellectual tradition one is born into. But then, 
would the awareness of one’s culture and its presupposition really ‘free’ one, and even if it 
does, what shall this ‘freedom’ mean as, ultimately, freedom is what one does with it.”290 
Reflecting on our embodiment in our own culture, Daya Krishna mentions the form of 
confession, a way to personally introspect within ourselves our attachment to our own culture. 
This ‘engagement’ in the reflection is different from a debate or lecture, something on which 
McGhee comes back in his own answer to Daya Krishna’s reaction to Prabodh Parikh: 
“I think these remarks of Daya Krishna go straight to the heart of the issues that should be 
confronting us in the Convivium. I take very much to heart the things said in the second 
paragraph. As many of you already know there has always been some unease/tension about 
what the nature of our presentations should be. I have always favoured plenary sessions 
introduced by a twenty minute talk about things currently on one’s mind, but some people have 
felt more secure with a written paper and the result has sometimes been a full programme of 
talks with relatively little room for the discussion and conversation that is supposedly to be at 
the heart of our project as conviviasts, which is to bring what has been always too snatched 
and peripheral to the centre. The idea of a ‘confession’ in the wider sense of a personal account 
of one’s approach to and agenda in philosophy, delivered in the first person (as done so 
admirably last time by Syed) appeals to me greatly, and in fact would make a good collection 
of essays.”291  
This idea of a confession in the sense of a ‘personal account of one’s approach’, namely of 
one’s way to philosophize, reveals a will to unveil one’s presuppositions which emerge out of 
one’s (cultural) position. In other terms, the presuppositions of one’s thinking are embedded 
into a larger valuational context through which we think, which is unveiled by engaging in 
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dialogue. The constitution of epistemological positions out of valuational orientations revealed 
by engaging into collective thinking constitutes the topics of the theoretical part of this work 
(chapters 4 to 7). What these remarks tell us is how this reflection is grounded in a larger 
experimental framework of dialogues conducted by Daya Krishna and his colleagues. This in 
return implies that the philosophy analyzed in this second part originates and is intrinsically 
related to a ‘living together’ which describes dialogues more adequately than a ‘talking 
together’. McGhee writes elsewere, while commenting again on the convivium: 
 “What we wanted to achieve was not just a ‘talking together’ but a ‘living together’, a milieu 
in which we could share ideas and experience at leisure, in which we would not simply settle 
down uncomfortably to listen to a series of long papers crowded into an arduous and cerebral 
dat, but in which conversation would arise naturally because we were a gathering of thinkers 
curious about each others ideas, would arise over breakfast or dinner, or on long walks along 
country paths, or, best of all perhaps, in the midst of washing up in the kitchen after supper.”292 
During our meeting, Prabodh Parikh also mentioned the friendship that unites Daya Krishna 
and M. P. Rege in this venture, philosophically very close in their ideas and engaged in the idea 
of ‘thinking’ and ‘philosophizing’ rather than ‘doing philosophy’ (in the sense of history or a 
commentary as an acquired substance), but different in their style: Rege was a man of prose, 
systematic in his thoughts, especially in Indian philosophy, while Daya Krishna was ‘playful’ 
in his thinking, composed but poetic. The association of their differences and their agreements 
on the lacks of philosophy today motivated them probably to continue the experiments in the 
forms of a dialogue between Indian traditions at a larger scale to bring awareness to the scholars 
philosophizing in India today. M. P. Rege organized with Daya Krishna the first published 
experiment entitled saṃvāda, also named the Rege experiment. While I will come back on the 
experiment itself in the section below (3.3), I will just mention here the initial motivation for 
such an organization in Daya Krishna’s words in the preface, who explains why this experiment 
really started the saṃvāda process: 
“Few people know, in India or elsewhere, that Sanskrit is still the living lingua franca or 
traditional scholarship in India, that the only language in which intellectual dialogue can be 
carried on between these persons from different parts of India, which may be as distant from 
each oher as Kashmir and Kerala or Manipur and Gujarat, is Sanskrit and Sanskrit alone, as 
the only other language they know is their regional language which are as diverse as the regions 
they belong so. Unlike Latin, therefore, Sanskrit is the living language of traditional 
scholarship in contemporary India, and if one wants to enter into a dialogue with this tradition, 
one will have to do so in Sanskrit or have facilities for bilingual translation from Sanskrit into 
English and vice versa. This, though so obvious when stated, seems to have escaped the notice 
of everybody till Prof. Rege realized it and took active steps to realize the preconditions or any 
successful dialogue between the two intellectual traditions which are not only culturally and 
civilizationally far apart, but also do not share a common language through which the 
conceptual distances could be bridged.  
The Rege experiment, of which this [publication] is a record, was unique in another respect 
also. One could perhaps find its halting precursors (…). Yet, none of them had really clicked. 
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They were good while they lasted. But they did not generate that feeling of discovery, 
enthusiasm and success which the Rege seminar did in Poona. They were, so to say, abortive 
beginnings which did not leave any successful fruition. The Rege experiment, on the other 
hand, led to a series of successive activities each giving rise to another as is the way of all 
creative activity. In fact, nothing was pre-thought or pre-planned. Rather, each step showed the 
way for the next – and the next, for the next next.”293 
‘It clicked’: an expression characterizing the inseparable whole of the experience (see 4.1 on 
dialogue as a multifaceted whole) that happens in the encounter. Inseparable in the sense that it 
describes the experience itself, composed of the different participants, their individual relations, 
the conceptual topics and the reaction of the group, i.e. the individual elements of the encounter. 
However, it refers to something superseding the individuality of all these elements, expressed 
in this expression ‘it clicks’. A venture into the different individual elements can give us leads 
on the reasons why it ‘clicked’ and maybe inspirations for other similar dialogues, but it cannot 
recreate the atmosphere, the experience and the encounters of the ‘clicking’ moment. These, 
however, decide of the success of the dialogue. And yet, in the successive attempts at dialoguing 
by predecessors and contemporaries, Daya Krishna succeeded in developing a dialogical form 
that filled a lack felt by the participants of relations between different philosophical 
communities and a philosophical methodology to think creatively about philosophical problems.  
The saṃvāda project does not constitute an exception nor an unprecedented innovation, rather 
the continuous expression of a long tradition - what Daya Krishna emphasized in referring to 
the experiments with the term saṃvāda itself. He was himself neither the first nor the only one 
to have instituted successful dialogues between traditions, between languages, and between 
philosophical communities, neither the last one.  The felt division between the traditional 
philosophical communities, between those who believe in the necessity of communicating with 
the ‘mainstream’ philosophers and the Western audience, and those who recluse themselves did 
not disappear. The project remained also limited in its organizations and audience. However, 
something distinctive in Daya Krishna’s approach is the visibility that he created. Unlike his 
predecessors (but also his followers, since I cannot find a movement of that public importance 
after him), he succeeded, via a sustained effort in publishing the dialogues, in promoting new 
publications in regional languages and Sanskrit in the journal he edited, in many letters to 
students, friends, colleagues, and paṇḍits, to bring a public visibility to the saṃvāda project, 
which he hoped would become a movement. Thus, Daya Krishna tried to institutionalize regular 
direct contacts in the academic world between different philosophical traditions engaging 
together on contemporary matters. The project did not avoid the shortcomings and defects of 
its time in the postcolonial presuppositions that motivated it in terms of Indianness and identity. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the concrete limits which every practical experiment has to face (see 
6.3 on the philosophical dynamic of apprehension facing the limits of realization), the visibility 
that Daya Krishna succeeded to foster made the project wider. It contributed to transform the 
prejudices and presuppositions on classical Indian philosophy and to the ‘death’ of Indian 
philosophy tout court. It created a sense of, if not united community, at least of some scholars 
of different communities able to dialogue with each other. The variety of forms related to 
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saṃvāda and of the dialogical forms that I consider to be a part of the saṃvāda project, is a key 
to this success. It is now time to turn to these concrete experiments.  
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3. Forms of saṃvādas: Description and Inductive Methodology of Dialogues 
 
“Thus, the spirit of Pune took another turn and the experiment that Rege had launched there, 
another direction. Issues were framed and sent to possible participants. The stage was set, and 
we met for a full three days to explore the philosophical dimensions of the Bhakti tradition in 
India in the heartland of bhakti itself. At times, it almost seemed blasphemous to say the things 
we said when the eternal flute of the Divine itself called to us every moment to give up the 
vain, empty, dry world of the intellect and the greeting of the ‘Rādhe Rādhe’ which reminded 
us of the ecstasy of divine love. But admidst these enticements and allurements what sustained 
us was the unbelievably long, hard-core tradition of the ever-seeking, ever-doubting sāttvika 
quest for the ultimate Truth by the buddhi in the Indian tradition, which has never been afraid 
of raising the most formidable pūrvapakṣas against one’s own position and attempting to 
answer them.”294 
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The description of the different forms of saṃvādas that follows does not delimit the definition 
of the idea of dialogue or even of the saṃvāda project to the forms described. This would imply 
that I consider saṃvāda to consist strictly of the experiments that were published or 
communicated and to define it historically as the sum of the experiments that happened from 
the early 80ties until 2007. However, as a potential methodology and a philosophical concept, 
the description of the experiments does not delimit the possibilities for dialoguing between 
philosophical traditions in general on the account of those that did happen, nor normatively 
classify them in terms of success and limitations. The following description proceeds from the 
examples of the experiments as a starting point for inductively abstracting a possible 
methodology that is grounded on actual scenarios. I analyze the initial intuitions at the origins 
of the project, but also the conceptual developments from the practice and their relevance to 
promote visibility to different philosophical communities in the Indian academic world. The 
description encompasses the intellectual context, incentives and reconstructions, and the 
philosophical presuppositions upon which the idea of saṃvāda has taken form. I also try to give 
a coherent picture and narration of the experiments that have been organized, less in 
chronological terms than in reconstructing the conceptual venture that implicitly motivated their 
undertaking. This part consists therefore less in a historical report than in the presentation of 
different forms of dialogues and their developments. In recollecting the multiple references, 
notes, mentions, and anecdotes, I also try to offer a taste of the mass of unrecorded and 
unpublished dialogues that happened, the spirit in which they were thought and conducted, and 
a tone of Daya Krishna’s way of philosophizing. Most of these experiments were successively 
created from the previous ones, as the following of new ideas showing the paths for further 
steps and creating new dialogues, which were precedingly unplanned. The following attempts 
to give an idea of this process. As guiding-line, Daya Krishna’s ‘Plea for a New History of 
Philosophy in India’ can be used to illustrate how he conceives research to proceed: although 
published in a volume of his own article, he emphasizes there the need for collective research 
and “successive seminars” required to proceed into one’s own research. Let us also note in 
particular in the following quote his mentioning of “adopting the viewpoint or perspective of 
someone else”, what one faces in dialogue and relating to the relevance of counter-position (or 
pūrvapakṣa, further analyzed in 5): 
“The need for a new history of philosophy in India, thus, can hardly be denied. But even if the 
plea is accepted, how shall one go about implementing it? The usual method, is for some 
institution to approach an outstanding scholar to undertake the work who, in turn would ask 
other scholars to write for the volume. But as they are generally well-known specialists in the 
field, when they are invited to write upon the subject, they only summarize, repeating what 
they have already said on the subject. Few scholars are prepared to do any new research to 
write for a volume edited by someone else and hardly anyone can adopt the viewpoint or 
perspective of someone else to do the task he/she is asked to do. (…) What, then, is to be done 
to avoid such a situation? Perhaps, only a long-term plan consisting of diverse strategies at 
various levels would yield the desired result. One could start with a stock-taking of what has 
been done, spell out what needs to be done and then locate persons at various levels who could 
be involved in the thinking and execution of the project. A detailed spelling-out of interrelated 
research could be given to see that research work is done in those domains. Similarly, 
successive seminars could be planned in such a way as to explore questions that need and 
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answer on problems that need to be resolved. The idea of a long term collaborative, cumulative 
research has not happened in the Humanities though it is now a commonplace in the natural 
sciences even though it is true that disciplines in the Humanities need this particularly in the 
contexts of projects such as this. What one needs is imagination, will and commitment to 
undertake these entreprises.”295 
From my meetings with some participants, two attributes defining the saṃvāda are 
consensually evoked: the creativity emerging from the dialogical, and the capacity of these to 
bring people together. In this chapter, I also trace these characteristics from the dialogues 
themselves, i.e. from the dialogical method practiced. The definition of saṃvāda indicated 
previously (2.1), in terms of a multilingual, open and equal (by which I mean against a guru-
śiṣya parampara system) philosophical dialogue between living representatives of the 
traditions is embodied in the experiments. Daya Krishna’s conception of the idea of saṃvāda 
unequivocally coincides with its realization, so that this section parallelly illustrates, explains 
and completes the definition given previously. Read in the context of postcolonial Indian 
philosophies elicited before (2.2.1), the context and the inputs that incented the dialogues 
become clearer in analyzing the platform to integrate different Indian traditions. This chapter 
therefore surveys how the context precedingly enunciated takes form in the saṃvāda, and what 
the strategies for putting these principles into action consist in: the creativity expressed by the 
participants is the creativity felt in exploring a new method of reading and doing (Indian) 
philosophy.   
 
3.1. Jaipur Experiments 
 
The initial series that I include in the saṃvāda project are composed of seminars and workshop, 
whereby they are distinguished from the usual academic seminars in their conception and 
realization. They were conducted in Daya Krishna’s University of Rajasthan in Jaipur, and 
named retrospectively the ‘Jaipur experiments’. Diverse in their forms, topics, objectives and 
success, they constitute a ‘laboratory of dialogical experiments’, which, in the forms of ‘weekly 
or Wednesday seminars’, evidenced the intellectual vitality of the University of Rajasthan296. 
Remembered vividly by all, these seminars seem to have ceased after Daya Krishna297. But 
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rather than consecutive lectures by renowned philosophers, what demarcates them was an 
emphasis on dialoguing open to the present audience, conceived as active participants. The 
participants recall the intense liveliness and demanding philosophical thinking at these 
occasions. Shail Mayaram writes that  
“Philosophy in Jaipur became a public activity - ‘‘Wednesdays with Daya’’— where groups 
of teachers, researchers, activists, journalists, and others came together for an afternoon of 
open-ended discussion. Someone would pose a problem, and soon an intense collective 
exercise in philosophizing would follow. He had a capacity to reframe a question or concern 
and to show the possibilities that lay buried in a formulation. There were countless occasions 
when I took my own work/problem to him for discussion. I always came away enriched.”298 
Rajni Bakshi299 evokes the seminars that were organized every week on different themes to 
which all (undergraduate and postgraduate students, faculty members, etc.) were invited to take 
part while being considered with the same seriousness and treatments in return in the discussion. 
She adds that Daya Krishna himself was a “participant like the others, neither omnipresent nor 
leader, but also not invisible”. These undertakings frame the first regular preliminary form of 
the saṃvāda project (and relates it to its teachings at the University, see 2.2.2). M. R. Ventakesh 
narrates that 
“Daya Krishna considerably changed student’s perception of a noble subject and his classes or 
seminars were never for a moment dull. An entire afternoon every week, Dayaji had earmarked 
for ‘Creative Philosophizing’, when anyone could raise any issue, or present any paper which 
he thought was of philosophical interest. And then over plates of Jaipuri ‘Kachori’ [North 
Indian snacks] and steaming hot cups of Rajasthani tea, an animated discussion would 
follow.”300 
What should be noticed in this dialogical experimental laboratory is the informal spontaneity 
of the enterprise, where nothing was either recorded nor planned but organized pursuant to the 
discussions that aroused. The topics for the next dialogues, the required modifications or the 
extension of the problems to new concepts were emerging from the dialogue itself, from the 
epistolary correspondence that followed, and the dialogues also developed due to the 
coincidences and self-reflexivity of the shared moments. The dialogical experimentation 
operates when some place is left for the ‘spontaneous’ and ‘unexpected’, maximizing the 
‘krishnian-gadamerian’ shock of the encounter above described (2.1). The ‘weekly’ or 
‘Wednesday seminars’ with his students and guests – and others, since all were invited - were 
known to touch all possible topics (from Greek philosophy to Indian, continental philosophy, 
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ethics, etc.), where each class was “fresh” and “creative”, according to Khawaja 301 . He 
accordingly comments on the spontaneous, unprepared and open, yet rigorous exploration of 
concepts:  
“His [Dayaji’s] class was never a one-way traffic of words. It was a real saṃvāda (dialogue) 
in which all the students and scholars took an active part. Doing a class with Dayaji was like 
drawing a picture, under the watchful eye of a master artist. Unless and until one has not 
touched the canvas, or has not made any statement one is absolutely free to try his/her hand on 
drawing any pictures of his/her choice. The moment one draws a line or makes a statement the 
logical implications of the act result in some sort of determination. But this determination is 
subject to one’s creativity and resourcefulness. When the implications of one’s act are pointed 
out, one may realize one’s stupidity in making the statement or drawing the line, but then it 
may be erased or modified under the guidance of the master. However the dialogue between 
the disciple and the master shall have to continue so that the contours of the picture may 
emerge.”302  
The metaphor shows that freshness and creativity do not exclude, but rather require a rigorous 
logic consisting in defining one’s argument, defending it against counter-arguments exposed 
by other participants, oneself considering possible counter-arguments, and continuing the 
argumentation up to one’s abilities. Khawaja specifies that the logical flow characterized the 
class, and interconnected them, the concept that emerged being explored in the next class. He 
however notes that besides the rigorous argumentation itself, the weekly seminars, unlike the 
‘saṃvāda experiments’ (3.3) and other workshops, were not planified. On the contrary, a 
precise preparation was necessary for elaborating the questions of the saṃvāda, selecting 
participants, gaining contacts and organizing larger seminars.  
Thus, saṃvāda experiments are paradoxically grounded on a careful planning that allows the 
spontaneous dialogue, namely an intended framework upon which unintended meetings can 
take dialogical shape. In other words, a conscious work in the preparation, organization and 
realization of the setting is required. Evidences of a rigorous report stating of the different stages 
of the organization of a workshop on ‘Texts and their Interpretations’303 (Jaipur, 28th to 31th 
March 1992) was sent to the Indian Council for Philosophical Research, reproduced in full 
length for the present work in the Appendix 1304. In summary, the following steps are described:  
a) invitations for the workshops explaining the topics, sent to multiple and diverse 
institutions, encouraging thereby contacts between them.  
b) organization of a prior meeting with the participants to explain the purpose and the 
methodology of the workshop, where suggestions were taken in return to the organization 
committee. 
                                                 
301 Personal communication with Mustafa Khawaja (Delhi, 14th August 2017). 
302 Mustafa Khawaja, in Mayaram, Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj, 109. 
303 Report unpublished and undated (hypothetically from the same year as the workshop, 1992). For all the letters 
as well as for this report, I owe my gratitude again to Daniel Raveh and Dor Miller, who provided me with all the 
unpublished documents they could preserve and scan numerically.  
304
 Rajni Bakshi also mentioned another workshop on “The art of commentary” to which I referred earlier, 
gathering Ulema, Nyāya paṇḍits, Western scholars, etc., which took place in 1987 in Jaipur.   
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c) a prior experience to practice the methodology presented was organized, where 
participants were asked to send their answers to the following questions based on some of 
Plato’s texts: 
“1. What were the questions or problems to which they (the texts) would be the possible 
answers or solutions? 
2. What are the questions that you can possibly raise with respect to the passages given to you? 
3. What are the deficiencies that you find in the contentions made in the paragraphs given to 
you? 
4. In what directions could you possibly develop the thought given in the passages? 
5. How would you answer the question or solve the problem independently of the way it has 
been attempted or answered in the text given to you?” 
 
d) Daya Krishna received the answers with some queries asking for clarifications on the 
workshop, which led him to publish a “brief statement stating the nature of the experiment” 
e) the organization committee was requested to prepare the materials to be used as ‘texts’; 
they were provided to the participants when they reached the place “with the instruction that 
they should go through and do the exercise before the actual sessions started.” 
These are all preliminary steps to the workshop itself, which shows how the spontaneity of the 
encounter and the contents explored in the dialogues as well as the opportunities for its further 
development were enacted, not as formal restriction of the contents and format of a paper, but 
as a methodological stage. A dialogical setting was carefully organized so as to allow a dialogue 
to occur.  This means concretely a certain consensus, visible in the preliminary steps on the 
methodology, objectives and framework of the dialogue – even when dialogues aim at 
connecting different rationality and ways of thinking. Concretely in the case of this workshop, 
it required before all a certain understanding and agreement on the “approach” of the 
experiments, in terms of methodology and the purpose of the investigation. I could not locate 
the annexures mentioned with the details provided, sent as notes and explanation, but it is 
justified to assume in Daya Krishna’s dialogical context that these aimed at preventing 1) a bare 
historical presentation of some texts, 2) a repetition of literature theories (or other theories) on 
what is a text, 3) an exegesis of an authoritative text. The approach rather fosters a critical 
questioning on the role of texts in different fields. The methodology is also implied in the 
questions above, which clearly point at a progressive independence from the text to the thinking 
subject – from the commentary of the texts themselves to a singular answer to the questions 
themselves, and from an exegetical perspective to a critical questioning of the problems or 
concepts.  
The workshop itself was divided into a “general introduction to the new approach to the texts 
which was to be experimentally demonstrated at the workshop” and “information regarding the 
diversity of the notion of the “texts” an “interpretation”, which has emerged in recent time, 
particularly in the field of Literature, Law, Medicine and History.” This is also perceptible in 
the advice addressed for further realization, which encourages the ideal preparation of the 
participants:  
“In case such workshops are to be held in future, the preparations should be done well in 
advance so that the “texts” are sent to the participants beforehand and they be asked to work 
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on them before coming to the workshop. At the workshop the discussion could then be 
concentrated on the results of their different responses arising from the texts in the context of 
the new approach suggested to them.”  
The setting of the dialogue also implied an intense individual preparation of the materials, 
which are collectively shared and together thought about in a saṃvāda. The spontaneity is the 
result of a specific setting within which participants agreed on the kind of thinking required and 
on the approach or methodology. This does not mean that only one rationality or kind of 
thinking can be accepted, but it requires a reflection beforehand on the kinds of argumentation 
that will contribute to the dialogue. The diversity of topics and resources are even more visible 
in the Appendix 2 - Discussion on the ‘Gauhati Meeting’ in a letter addressed to Shri Kireet 
Joshi, Chairman in February 2005 of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. In this letter, 
while discussing the possibility of organizing a Gauhati meeting which seems to be rather 
organized for students, Daya Krishna gives a wide range of possible topics: classical and 
contemporary, based on original Sanskrit sources and contemporary English discussion in India 
on Kant, analytical and continental topics, etc.305 The questions that are suggested to be raised 
to the students are methodologically quite close to the ones of the seminar and show the same 
progression from an understanding of the philosophical problem to an independent critical 
assessment and further exploration of the problem. The last question further encourages to argue 
with, i.e. to engage with the author, by directly assessing one’s argument vis à vis the initial 
position.   
“(a) What is the question or the problem which the author is trying to answer or solve here? 
(b) Do you consider the answer or the solution satisfactory? If not, why not? 
(c) How would you extend the thought expressed in these pages/paragraphs further? 
(d) What would be your own answer to the question or solution of the problem concerned? 
(e) What are your grounds for thinking your solution is more satisfactory than that of the 
author?” 
                                                 
305 For instance:  
“(a) Mīmāṁsā Sūtra 2. 4. 8. and the discussion on it in Śābara-bhāṣya (Gaṅgānāth Jhā’s translation). 
(b) The discussion in Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra 1. 3. 34 to 38 and its comparison with the discussion 
on the same issue on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra 6. 1. 4. onwards in Śābara-bhāṣya (op. cit.).  
(c) The whole of the discussion on Brahma Sūtra 3. 4. 1. in Śaṅkara Bhāṣya is to be analysed and commented 
upon.(…) 
Western Philosophy 
 (b) Kant’s arguments in the Transcendental Analytic in his Table of Judgement and the Categories of 
Understanding. 
(c) “Kant’s Doctrine of the Categories, Some Questions and problems’ Daya Krishna, JICPR. Vol. XVIII No. 4. 
P. 1-11. 
(d) Interpreting Metaphysical Deduction: A Hermeneutic Response to Professor Daya Krishna’s Essay ‘Kant’s 
Doctrine of Categories: Some Questions and Problems” Binod Kumar Agarwala. JICPR Vol XIX No. 3. P/109-
154. 
(e) “Binod Kumar Agarwala’s Response to Daya Krishna’s Essay on Kant’s Categories, R. S. Bhatnagar. JICPR 
Vol. XIX No.4 P/137-147. 
 (i) The analysis of the statement “X is Good” by Moore and Stevenson.” See the Appendix 2.  
 
116 
 
This pedagogical and methodological approach also means that people who participated agreed 
with the broad lines of his ‘dialoguing with a text’. The setting was discussed beforehand and 
could naturally be questioned. However, at the time of the encounter, an overall agreement had 
been made on the objectives and approaches, which seems to be the necessary condition for 
dialogue. These conditions are for me understood in terms of the specific ‘seekings for 
knowledge’ that define the broad orientation of a particular dialogue. These concrete 
orientations here described thus form the practical counterpart to the values (puruṣārtha) as 
desires to know that are philosophically investigated in chapter 6.  
The Jaipur experiments also set up an academic engagement with paṇḍits who came to teach in 
the philosophy Department, fostering their visibility into the Western-mode of philosophical 
training.306 Daya Krishna reports:  
“We, in the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, have had several experiments 
of this hand. Firstly, in the Department we have had an exchange of teachers between our 
Department and the Sanskrit College in Jaipur City. One of their traditional pundits has come 
to the Department and has held a long series of seminars with our colleagues and we have 
studied some texts with him. On the other hand, some of our teachers have offered to go to the 
Sanskrit College in the town to do courses in western philosophy with their students. However, 
that part of the exchange has not been so successful as they do not seem to be interested in 
what we have to offer.”307 
Raghuramaraju uses these reservations expressed on the success of the project to denounce the 
initiative itself (see 3.4). To me these are rather indications of actual difficulties to engage 
between philosophical traditions. Indeed, there are real obstacles in entering the Sanskrit 
philosophical communities: locating and accessing members of a community outside the 
mainstream, and even more establishing a trust and raising interest to different contents and 
methods than the ones already mastered. This constituted a much greater challenge, which 
deserves a few comments. It is difficult to exactly record the proportion of refusal from paṇḍits 
to enter in dialogue, logically because it is difficult to record silence (in terms of those who did 
not answer), even if some comments of the type quoted above attest of a gradual, relative or 
partial success of saṃvāda in terms of penetrating Sanskrit philosophical communities. 
Conversely, these difficulties justify Daya Krishna’s insistence for an “open” dialogue and give 
us a glimpse at the efforts made to reach out paṇḍits for building the saṃvāda project.  
Besides the direct intra-cultural dialogues, and the seminars preparing them, another kind of 
dialogue happened in Jaipur (thereby often included in the Jaipur experiment’s series) in the 
early eighties. It was referred to as the ‘Interdisciplinary group’, an outcome of which has been 
                                                 
306 Daya Krishna also mentions the organisation of Summer and Winter schools in Modern Logic and Navyā-
Nyāya for traditional and modern scholars together and seminars on comparative logic following the Pune 
experiment. Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xiv. In a letter sent 
to Sharad Deshpande, M. P. Rege invited him to join the “Summer School for Pandits in Western Logic”, from 
May 25th to June 6th 1987 in Wai (Maharastra), where the Sanskrit scholars Dr. Pralhadachar and S. R. Bhat 
introduced sections on inference to western-trained philosophers. These schools seem to have met interest and 
success, but the other way was more difficult to institute. Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from 
Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 311. 
307 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, xxxiii–xxiv. 
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published in the book India’s Intellectual Traditions308 in 1987. It involved Anglophone Indian 
academics trained in different disciplines such as sociology, philosophy and arts, discussing the 
classical texts of the Indian traditions, in particular of the Nāṭyaśāstra. The difference between 
this project and the saṃvāda with paṇḍits is stated during the preliminary meeting organized to 
this dialogue, defining the objectives, methodology and goals. Daya Krishna explained that 
these meetings are intended to create a shift in perspective: “We are not trying to understand 
the classical tradition as the pundits apprehend it. We are trying to see if there is an implicit 
conceptual structure in the Indian tradition which can be brought to the surface and stated in 
modern terms.” 309  This endeavor can be regarded as a reflection on how to elaborate 
methodologies for social sciences proper to articulate Indian traditions and in interdisciplinary 
contemporary readings of classical texts, such as the Manusmṛti (in which case a relevant 
question is “what is living and what is dead in Manu”310) or the Nāṭyaśāstra.  
“It [this work] seeks a conceptual articulation of the intellectual tradition in different fields of 
knowledge in order to use it creatively for extending, deepening and enhancing knowledge in 
these domains. Thus, its primary purpose is not to understand the texts in which these 
conceptual structures are embedded, but rather to free these structures from their moorings so 
that they may become available for diverse cognitive purposes. It is true that concepts find 
their meaning in interrelationship with other concepts and in the context of their applicability 
to the fields they refer to. But both the applicability and the interrelationships go on changing 
over time in response to the cognitive needs of the thinkers and the times. (…) It [the task] is 
to discover the intellectual idiom of the past, or to vary the metaphor, to take possession of the 
intellectual patrimony which is ours by right and use it to advance the cognitive enterprise of 
mankind today.”311 
However, in the published edition, the dialogical dimension is difficult to grasp, since, although 
the group developed reflection on the approach, methodology, aims and content (recalled by 
the introduction) in meetings, the publication did not keep the dialogical form, except for the 
summary of the discussions of the preliminary meeting. The reader has to rely on the report of 
the introduction to imagine the dialogues, and otherwise use the individual contributions. This 
project also has met with some difficulties in a long run, showing a gradual disengagement from 
the participants312. 
                                                 
308 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions. 
309 Daya Krishna, xxiii–xxiv. 
310 Daya Krishna, 57. 
311 Daya Krishna, xiii–xiv. 
312 In an indirect way, these difficulties were productive as an incentive for Daya Krishna to continue his research: 
“However, the ‘Jaipur Experiment’, as Daya Krishna recalled later, aimed at critically rearticulating India’s 
Intellectual traditions, began “losing momentum sometime after 1985”, following the ‘untimely death’ of Prof. A. 
M. Ghosh, a close associate of Dayaji in his department. (…) Stating that the idea of the ‘Jaipur Experiment’ 
emerged from a lecture by Prof. S. C. Dube, sometime in 1983, Daya Krishna writing about it once said, “the 
collective thinking on the subject by the interdisciplinary group at Jaipur as well as other convergent ‘experiments’ 
initiated by Prof. M. P. Rege, resulted in the publication of ‘Samvada’. Yet, it began to lose steam after some years 
as Dayaji acknowledged. “Though occasional meetings of the group continued, we gradually began to realize that 
we could not proceed significantly beyond what had been achieved so far. I realized then that, ultimately, one 
‘individual’ effort would enable us to take any further steps towards the goal that we had set ourselves”, reflected 
Dayaji on the turn the ‘Jaipur Experiment’ had taken.” Ventakesh, A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of 
Two Indian Philosophers, 31–32. 
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“There has been so much talk of 'indigenization', and so little real attempt at doing it, that one 
wonders if those who talk are really serious about it. It reminds one very much of those who 
talk and write incessantly about 'revolution' and 'praxis' without engaging in any action to 
change things where they happen to be located. Yet, reflecting the next day on what I had said, 
I felt why should we not start the game ourselves. And so, what may be called 'The Jaipur 
Experiment' was born. Sometimes in early eighties, a meeting of persons from various 
disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities was called and, initially, the group met 
every week to keep the flame alive and the enthusiasm going. The group called itself 'The 
Interdisciplinary Group' and later met at more infrequent intervals, fortnightly or monthly. 
Since my retirement from the University, the meetings have become even more infrequent, 
though these are still held to remind ourselves of the promises that we had made and the task 
we had undertaken. Many of the early members of the group have lost interest; some even 
turned 'hostile' to the very spirit of the enterprise. One such person recently remarked to me 
that it was a 'racist enterprise'. But a 'hard core' remains and, hopefully, might attract new 
enthusiasts in the future. In fact, it was to attract such new enthusiasts that we persuaded the 
Indian Council of Philosophical Research to fund a seminar on the subject. The idea that there 
is a hard-core intellectual tradition in India, and that it is differentiated according to different 
fields of knowledge is so alien to the prevailing intellectual ethos of the country, that we did 
not even know who amongst the scholars in the social sciences and the humanities would be 
interested in the enterprise.” 313 
The project can be suspiciously scrutinized indeed considering the emphasis on a specific 
Indian intellectual tradition, what Daya Krishna calls “hard-core intellectual tradition in India”. 
It could imply a nativist or nationalist motivation of the type developed by the earlier generation 
of Indian philosophers during the colonization, who were looking for specific ‘Indian’ 
characteristics (see the problems of these conceptions in (2.2.1). If the formulation of this 
presentation remains dubious, the project put into the perspective of Daya Krishna’s work, who 
was himself dedicated to deconstruct such monolithic categorizations of philosophies, can be 
understood as a counter-perspective to the monopoly of the Western methodologies in social 
sciences. While the content of social sciences varies and includes different geographical zones 
and cultures, Daya Krishna reacted against the lack of alternative methodology to analyze the 
different cultural data, and in particular against the lack of an Indian methodology to apply to 
Indian data. Relating his approach to the work of Veena Das and Sudhir Kakar for their 
sensitivity to the implicit and the ambivalences in shifting conceptual structures when analyzing 
one’s own tradition (see 1.2.1), he emphasizes the need to conduct further research in these 
directions in different fields, in particular to analyze conceptual categories and methodologies.  
It is, I believe, in this sense that the Interdisciplinary Group was formed. In spite of the criticism, 
Daya Krishna did consider this publication as a success for his approach, as reported below. 
“The only substantive result, besides the new and radical formulation of the Nyāya position 
with regard to Atman in Pandit Badrinath Shukla’s lecture, and the publication of India’s 
Intellectual Traditions, giving a tentative preliminary account of the attempt at conceptual 
reconstructions in the field of sociology, political science, aesthetics, and law, has been the 
change of awareness and atmosphere with regard to the urgency of establishing critical and 
creative linkages with the cognitive traditions of India.”314 
                                                 
313 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, ix. 
314 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 81. 
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The ‘Jaipur Experiments’ had no definite form, and mitigated successful results, which is easily 
understandable if one considers it as a ‘raw laboratory for thinking’. Jaipur was home to the 
first ideas and experimentations in Daya Krishna’s own university. It is mostly the place where 
the topics and methodologies were tested and renewed continuously. While some 
methodologies made their proof, in particular the pedagogical methodology of critically 
revealing one’s presuppositions and elaborating creative counter-positions (see 5), others did 
not lead to a larger audience, or met with critiques, as above mentioned (see 6.3 for thinking 
these as part of a dynamic developed in the gap between ideality and reality of ideas). The idea 
was more ‘attempting’ and renewing both the methodology of looking at concepts, the audience 
and the behavior of participating, and creating a common brainstorming, a resource for situating 
and exploring new problems. Discovering connections between concepts and confronting one’s 
intuition and logic was the aim and result of the project, i.e. in other words, exploring the 
potential creativity.  
 
3.2. Editing the Journal of Indian Council for Philosophical Research 
 
The dialogical attempt of the editorship of the Journal of Indian Council for Philosophical 
Research (henceforth JICPR), which Daya Krishna edited from 1990 (Vol. VII (1)) until 2007, 
is to be found at two significant places. It is firstly visible in the setting, in the modifications of 
the structure itself of the Journal, making gradually more space to collective new columns such 
as “Notes and Queries”315 and “Discussion and Comments (1992 onwards316), and later “Focus” 
and Agenda for Research” (1997 onwards 317 ), where short notes of a philosopher were 
discussed upon through several issues by others, as an uninterrupted dialogue.  
Secondly, although unpublished, attempts at dialogical outcome can be found in the background 
of the editing process. In the epistolary exchanges for the account of the JICPR, Daya Krishna 
reveals an intense philosophical engagement in his lengthy answers to each submission for 
articles. He vividly encourages new philosophical initiatives, sends equally sharp critiques on 
the articles received, trying to provoke incentives and dialogues. He also discusses how to 
include more intra- and inter-cultural traditions and multilingual contributions in the journal 
and how to break with the mono-Western/Indian comparative framework.318 Each submission 
                                                 
315 In the publication of the collection of these columns by R. S. Bhatnagar, the introduction written by Yogesh 
Gupta dates the apparition of Notes and Queries from Vol X. (1), in Sept-Dec. 1992, with the following 
introduction by Daya Krishna: “With this issue, we are starting a new section entitled Notes and Queries in the 
JICPR. Most students of the subject have always some problems with what they read, or will like something to be 
clarified about which they are in doubt as to whether what they understand is correct or not. The section will 
provide a forum for all such queries and it is hoped that eminent scholars of the subject will help in elucidating 
and clarifying the issues so raised. Readers are invited to take advantage of this new forum in the JICPR.” Daya 
Krishna and R. S. Bhatnagar, Agenda for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy, First edition (Jaipur: UGC, 
ASIHSS Programme, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan and Literary Circle, 2013), iii. 
316 Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, v–vi. 
317 Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, iv–v. 
318 In an unpublished letter to a colleague announcing him the launching of a new Journal, dated 20.07.2007, Daya 
Krishna answers with his best wishes to the editor, mentioning also the awaiting challenges of such a task: “There 
is also the problem that most of our good people are stuck, and perhaps rightly so, with Western thought and are 
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was returned with a detailed comment on the conceptual implication of the article, its 
contemporary relevance and possible utilizations fur further explorations of the concepts. He 
addressed potential critiques on the approach taken, and refused any purely historical exposition 
or repetition of an argument already established elsewhere, asked for more clarity, not hesitating 
to suggest counterpositions or alternatives. However, admittedly, it is probable that in most of 
the cases the communication must have been abrupted, since in such a configuration of reviewer, 
what Daya Krishna must have received back is at its best a revision of the articles he returned. 
Indeed, being the editor, i.e. in this case the authority accepting or declining the submissions 
for publications, a certain asymmetry, as mentioned in the introduction in cases of lectures, 
must have been felt. In any case, only little answers to the reviews are to be found in the 
remaining piles of letters, either because they have remained with the addresser or because of a 
lack of answer. 
Coming back to the configuration of the Journal, Jay Garfield and Arindam Chakrabarty draw 
an interesting comparison in their memorial tribute to Daya Krishna, when they mention that 
“he also contributed to it in a constant flurry of short notes and questions for discussion. These 
were the philosophical precursors of today’s blogs, and inspired a great deal of philosophical 
work.”319 The image of philosophical blog illustrates both the form and the function of these 
columns: brief notes that raise attention on new or unnoticed publications, on a problem or a 
question one had currently in mind, roughly thought, like the preliminary notes one makes 
before composing it through in a book or an article. Similarly, these columns were conceived 
as a collective platform for research, first to bring one’s own research into the light, and 
moreover to collaborate on open questions or exchange on each other current research. Daya 
Krishna himself was in the front line a ‘user’ and contributor of this ‘blog’, regularly looking 
for help on his own issues (the dates of publications of his questions fit his forthcoming 
publications) and equally responding to others. In this type of correspondence, but also in all 
the other forms of the dialogical experiments, Daya Krishna himself learns, in particular in his 
study on the Indian traditions, which he entirely conceived as a collaborative enterprise - 
learning from experts and questioning what he learned.  
At this ‘unfinished’ state and therefore ‘open form’, these notes could however arouse more 
diverse reactions: not (yet) definite in a systematic argumentation and rhetoric ornament, 
                                                 
completely ignorant of what goes on in the world of philosophy elsewhere. There is also a clear division between 
those who know Indian philosophy from the Sanskrit texts and those who think and write from secondary sources 
alone. 
Still, there is room for another good Journal in India. At present there is only the Journal of Indian Council of 
Philosophical Research and the Indian Philosophical Quarterly published from Delhi and Pune respectively. Both 
these Journals are in English, though the vast public in India, including the community of students mainly want 
good material in their own language. Hindi, which is supposed to be the national language, has only two Journals, 
one from Pune and the other from Jaipur. As for Philosophy Journals in other languages, I do not think there are 
any. Or at least I do not know them. 
There is another problem which, in my opinion, needs to be urgently attended to. Most of what is called the Indian 
philosophy was written in Sanskrit, yet our Journals have hardly any place for those scholars and thinkers in 
philosophy in this country who read and write only in Sanskrit. Perhaps you should think of a Sanskrit section in 
your Journal along with the one in English and make it a bilingual one rather than in English only.”  
319 Jay Garfield and Arindam Chakrabarti, “Remembering Daya Krishna and G. C. Pande: Two Giants of Post-
Independence Indian Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West 63, no. 4 (2013): 460. 
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safeguarded by a whole of authoritative references that would prevent any intrusion, the ‘naked’ 
thought can still benefit from inputs in various directions and be connected in different networks 
of concepts and different traditions of thinking. Plus, the final writing eliminates options and 
hypotheses that were inadequate or wrong, something that remains in the stage of the blog, and 
can be a springboard for discussing alternatives, counterpositions, modifications, and suggest 
other alternatives, if discussed collectively. In this regard Khawaja320 reflected with me on the 
oral dimension of dialogues in contrast to writings that we continuously re-work and improve. 
He specified that in dialogues, unlike in writings, once something is said, it cannot be erased, 
even if it is a mistake: it has to be worked upon in the dialogue where all statements count, so 
that counterpositions and better counterarguments have to be established to draw the logical 
argumentation from the initial hypothesis. Similarly, in the blog, a wider spectrum of positions 
and counterpositions can be carved out from the collaborative research at the very level of 
hypotheses, prior to the completion or the reviews written on a finished product. This 
corresponds in a sense to the ‘advantage of being ignorant’ discussed in 6.2.1 and concretely 
explicitates Daya Krishna’s emphasis on ‘thinking’ rather than definitive ‘thought’, i.e. 
considering the potentiality of of still open-ended propositions.  
The content was consequently varied according to the authors’ interests and current works: 
some focuses and attention brought to unnoticed publications321, agendas suggesting further 
possible research worth to be undertaken322, short notes on new publications, less as a review 
than a personal assessment of their contributions with regard to one’s interests323, informal notes 
                                                 
320 Personal communication with Mustafa Khawaja (Delhi, 14.08.2017) 
321 For example, a call for further work by Daya Krishna: “Philosophical writing in India is generally assumed as 
being confined to either the English or the Sanskrit language. Normally, no one expects any significant 
philosophical activity to occur in any of the other Indian languages. However, a book published some 20 years ago 
draws the reader’s attention to the existence of philosophical writing in Indian languages. Edited by Professor V. 
M. Bedekar, the book Philosophical Writings in Fifteen Modern Indian Languages is published by Continental 
Prakashan, Vijaynagar, Pune, 1979 (p.342, Rs. 45). The information provided in this book covers the period upto 
1975 only. The contents need to be up-dated so that information regarding any work that has been done later in 
these languages is also available.”Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, Agenda for Research in Indian and Western 
Philosophy, 393–94 Vol. 2. 
322 Example at a general conceptual level (agendas are also suggested in cases of a single author): “Questions of 
morality are generally discussed in respect of actions of an individual, and not of groups or institutions or political 
entities such as nation-states. There is, of course, some sort of a value judgement on the actions of groups and 
institutions and an attempt to regulate their behavior as they function within the jurisdiction of a polity which has 
control over them. The relation between politics, however, is not usually governed in such a way as they are 
supposed to be sovereign in character. The problem of moral values and norms that should govern this relationship 
between a plurality of equally sovereign and independent states deserves exploration, particularly in the light of 
the global situation emerging today.” Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, 31. 
323 For example: “The awareness that there are diverse philosophical traditions, particularly the Western, the Indian 
and the Chinese has been haunting the philosophical consciousness for quite some time. But ‘Comparative 
Philosophy’ as it has been called, has not yet come into its own as the three great traditions in philosophy have 
generally failed to be seen in a unified perspective. The difficulty is perhaps unresolvable as each has a unique 
singularity of its own. A significant and fruitful attempt in this direction has recently been made by Professor Ben-
Ami Scharfstein in his A Comparative History of World Philosophy from the Upanishads to Kant, State University 
of New York, 1998, pp. 683. A cursory look at the title and contents of the chapters will reveal both the scope and 
the exercise that author has tried to achieve in this work.” [table of content follows]. Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, 
417–18. 
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and thoughts about a concept or a problem, etc – from Kant324 to vernacular Indian philosophy 
via Arabic and Jewish philosophy325. Daya Krishna assesses the potential of their creativity as 
follows: 
“These queries evoked a number of responses from various persons and provided some 
clarification regarding the issues that were raised. However, they themselves brought to light 
not only deep differences in the understanding of what was sought to be clarified, but also 
raised new issues which have not yet been highlighted or become the focus of further 
discussion” 326  
This ‘naked’ form of thoughts formed a tank for issues and topics, which could be further 
explored in the dialogical experiments, questions redirected to the audience who had the 
expertise to discuss them, and connecting scholars among and outside of academia who reacted 
differently on these notes. The JICPR was so to say a pre-test in its form and its process: it 
constituted a preliminary test for evaluating the potentiality of a topic or a set of questions to 
enhance a dialogue, to be responded to, prompt to incite reactions from different thinkers or 
different philosophical traditions. Posthumously, R. S. Bhatnagar proceeded into publishing 
these queries and notes, otherwise spread out through decades of the Journal, into two volumes, 
leaving the questions raised as material for further research and dialogues.327 
As expected, and as in the case of blogs, responses differed: not all issues arouse interest and/or 
answers, some others moved into long discussions with unexpected perspectives opening 
through several issues of the JICPR, which led some of them to be afterwards republished 
together in a volume entitled Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy.328 In the preface of 
this publication, Daya Krishna connects the ‘blog-type’ exchanges of these columns to the 
saṃvāda experiments: 
“The story started, as it always does, by a ‘chance’ encounter with a ‘stray’ quotation from 
Staal by Wendy O’Flaherty in her Introduction to the Volume on Karma edited by her. The 
quotation seemed to present, at least prima facie, a view of oblation in the Vedic sacrifice, or 
dravya-tyāga, which was mistaken. The obvious solution was to find from reputed Mīmāṃsā 
scholars the ‘authoritative’ view on the subject and in case it conflicted with Staal’s 
interpretation, send the same to him so that he could defend his own interpretation against 
theirs. Accordingly, Staal’s view was translated into Sanskrit, sent to Pt Pattabhiram Sastri, 
Remella Suryaprakasa Sastri, Ramanuja Tatacharya and Professor K. T. Pandurangi. They all 
cooperated in the experiment and their comments along with Professor Staal’s reply were 
published in different issues of the JICPR and are reprinted in this collection for the reader’s 
benefit. (…) Saṃvāda was the first experiment of this type, planned and executed by Professor 
M. P. Rege, who is now no more. (…) The Rege experiment which occurred at Poona had had 
slow, but lasting, effect on the ‘understanding’ of Indian philosophy in this country. The 
                                                 
324 The discussion on Kant was quite fertile and extended throughout the issues. For an example on a brief ‘work 
note’: “What is the relations between theoretical and practical reason in Kant? What is the difference in Practical 
Reason as evidenced in the prudential action on the one hand and the one displayed in Moral action?” A longer 
reply was attempted by R. K. Gupta, Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, 324–26. 
325 Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, 396–98. 
326 Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, iii–iv. 
327 Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, Agenda for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy. 
328 Daya Krishna, ed., Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Issues in Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, and Nyāya (New 
Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2004). Not all issues raised in the JICPR were published in this 
volume. 
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discussions and debate collected in this volume are a continuation of that ‘experiment’ and an 
evidence of its influence over the intervening years. An ‘invisible’ change has, however, 
occurred during this period as the focus of attention has shifted from the ‘external’ ‘reference 
point’ of Western philosophy to something that was ‘internal’ and immanent to the tradition of 
Indian philosophizing itself. The debate with the exponents of Indian philosophy in the West 
is still marginally here, but gradually the students and practitioners of Indian philosophy in 
India are discussing and rediscovering a rich field of diversity, conflict and ambiguity in the 
tradition that challenges debate, discussion and exploration resulting in a ‘new’ partnership 
between traditionally trained Pandits and modern University-trained philosophy persons in the 
country. This has already resulted in incalculable benefit to both the parties concerned, as 
Indian philosophy becomes once again, a matter of ‘living concern’ to the practicing 
‘philosophers’ in the country.”329 
In so doing, the JICPR constituted the platform of discussion which slowly and partially 
succeeded to integrate different traditions of philosophizing in India and abroad. Daya Krishna 
collaborated with the journals in regional languages, himself publishing in Hindi and trying to 
get translations of some Hindi articles, and wished to introduce a column in Sanskrit, something 
that was left unachieved until now.330 Extending the visibility of the diversity of philosophizing 
in India has been an overarching objective, something that was also reflected in the edition of 
the Who’s Who331, hoping for creating one philosophical community in India, while however 
preserving the heterogeneity of its different traditions in a dialogical engagement. 
“One of Daya Krishna’s outstanding contributions has been his long Editorship of the Journal 
of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (JICPR). And in that job, he never lost sight 
of the need for documenting the basic approach of great Indian thinkers of his time, even if 
they were not exactly his contemporaries. 
A classic case in point is the story of the late Prof. C. T. K. Chari, an outstanding and original 
thinker and an unparalleled teacher of Philosophy for nearly four decades at the Madras 
Christian College in Tambaram near Chennai. Dr. Chari, at his suburban home that he 
symbolically called ‘The Cloister’, died virtually unknown and unsung on January 4, 1993 at 
the age of 83. Even the local newspapers did not report his death then. 
But the moment Prof. Daya Krishna came to know about Dr. Chari’s death in Chennai, he 
immediately wrote a letter to me as a former student, asking whether someone could write an 
obituary piece on the legendary Dr. Chari for publication in the JICPR. Such was Dayaji’s 
concern for chronicling the lives of great Indian thinkers for posterity’s benefit.”332 
Due to its regular publication and the continuity of the work, Daya Krishna used this platform 
to answer some problems of division of philosophical communities exposed in (2.2.1) and to 
inter-connect the different micro-groups of the philosophical worlds.  
To summarize, the Jaipur experiments and the edition of the JICPR were the platforms for long-
term ‘testing’ and developing the saṃvādas. They constituted preliminary stages of the more 
formal saṃvādas. I mean formal in terms of academic support, which required a more exact 
preparation and organization. The Jaipur experiments and the JICPR offered a constant space 
                                                 
329 Daya Krishna, xiii. 
330 Mentioned by Daniel Raveh in his introduction to Daya Krishna, Civilizations, xxi.  
331 Daya Krishna, Who’s Who of Teachers and Scholars in Philosophy in India. 
332 Ventakesh, A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of Two Indian Philosophers, 34. 
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for short-term ventures in their most heteroclite forms: they engaged with interdisciplinarity, 
interculturality, tried to restructure the ‘lecture’ form of academia, and used the opportunity of 
a journal to institute dialogue in writings. Naturally, some of these forms did not hold and topics 
were left apart. Critiques were raised against some attempts such as the interdisciplinary groups, 
the letters might have often not found responses in the cases of harsh critiques emitted by Daya 
Krishna as the editor, many notes and topics suggested in the JICPR have not been taken up for 
further consideration, and probably some topics were considered irrelevant. In spite of Daya 
Krishna’s commitment to including vernaculars and Sanskrit, the JICPR remained an English-
speaking platform. However, these steps and these preliminary stages were crucial to Daya 
Krishna experiments: they were first platforms of possible encounters without further 
commitment required, in particular in the JICPR where no long-term implication nor traveling 
was necessary to participate. They created contacts and generated conceptual resources to be 
further used in personal research or collective dialogues, to which I now turn.  
 
3.3. Saṃvāda Experiments 
 
One step leading to another, the organization of the saṃvāda experiments took place, with the 
twofold objectives of connecting and dialoguing between philosophical traditions, and doing it 
so in a contemporary way. This constitutes the epitome of the challenge described above, of 
interconnecting different isolated philosophical communities in multilinguistic platforms 
allowing for thinking originating from different conceptual structures. It differs from the other 
dialogical forms here inasmuch as it directly integrated paṇḍits or ulema at the core of the 
entreprise, forming a direct dialogue between philosophical traditions on contemporary issues. 
Shail Mayaram describes them thus: 
“A series of dialogues were organized with traditional Indian scholars, the pandits. Seminars 
would always be held with plenty of breaks to let ideas seep in, and they always needed good 
food, particularly sweets, and sometimes novel venues. (…) The pattern was similar: The 
purpose was to confront traditional Indian scholars with a set of new questions, to de-fossilize 
traditional Indian Philosophy, as it were, in order to spur a new impetus to thought.” 333 
‘Confronting’ implies articulating questions from a Western perspective to be investigated by 
the classical ones, after having them translated in the relevant language. It was confrontative in 
the sense that it fostered debates, which demanded unusual questions from the perspective of 
the respondent, and necessitated thinking new argumentations in displacing one’s usual set of 
analysis. For such ‘confrontations’ to actually arise (and not to disperse into uncomfortable 
silent and diverting answers) necessitates a precise organization and pre-conditions: the first is 
to render feasible the encounter itself, materially and mentally in acknowledging the very 
possibility of contemporary Indian philosophy to exist in Sanskrit and English simultaneously, 
by paṇḍits and academic philosophers together. Before I describe the experiments individually, 
let us look at the general project that was aimed under the umbrella of the ‘saṃvāda experiment’. 
 
                                                 
333 Mayaram, “Daya Krishna,” 442. 
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The first aim of any dialogical experiment referred to as saṃvāda was to immediately confront 
philosophical traditions today. Daya Krishna mentions mutual recognition of two 
‘contemporary’ traditions by the first ‘saṃvāda’ or Pune experiment, provoking the excitement 
of such an encounter:  
“Saṃvāda was the first experiment of this type, planned and executed by Professor M. P. Rege, 
who is now no more. His death on the 28th of December, 2000 has deprived the philosophical 
world of one of the most ‘imaginative’ experimenters who brought the active practitioners of 
the two philosophical traditions, the Indian and the Western, in a dialogical situation where 
each was ‘forced’ to ‘existentially’ face the ‘living’ tradition of a different way of 
philosophizing. The Rege experiment which occurred at Poona has had slow, but lasting, effect 
on the ‘understanding’ of Indian philosophy in this country.” 334 
To begin with, the encounter “broke the ice”335  between communities, beyond the frozen 
pictures and prejudices of each other, to create an embodied presence that concretizes the 
diversity of philosophizing. In directly engaging with the traditions from the perspective of 
those for whom it is alive, it also incarnated the contemporization of classical Indian philosophy 
described in the definition of saṃvāda above (2.1).  In a letter to a paṇḍit dated from the 12. 05. 
2006, Daya Krishna writes, while working in the background on the organization: “what we 
really want to know is how a person primarily trained in Sanskrit feels about the book and 
whether he/she thinks that he/she get some idea of what another philosophical tradition has 
thought about the problem he is familiar with.” The liveliness, however, is not to be understood 
in the sense of describing, in an anthropological study, indigenous philosophical communities 
today preserved from the mainstream Indian academics, but in including them as contemporary 
actors of philosophy and dialoguing together for the purpose of creative inter-thinking. The 
liveliness therefore leads to creativity, a relation that Daya Krishna conceptualizes in the 
presentation of the objectives of the second published saṃvāda on Bhakti: 
 “If knowledge claims universality, then, in each field there are contemporary issues engaging 
the best minds of the world today; so, if the tradition has real vitality, if the carriers of 
traditional knowledge have real knowledge, then they must be able to tackle contemporary 
intellectual issues in the perspective of their own traditions of knowledge. Therefore, we 
formulate contemporary intellectual issues in Sanskrit or in Arabic, place them before classical 
scholars and ask them to respond to them. In turn, we critically respond to their responses, and 
so the dialogue goes on. We have done this until now in the field of contemporary philosophical 
problems, and current issues in linguistics.”336 
                                                 
334 Daya Krishna, Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy, xiii. 
335 “The meetings and the dialogues gradually broke the ice between the representatives of the two philosophical 
traditions in India and established a rapport between the two groups, resulting not only in a profound intellectual 
respect for each other, but also in the exhilarating discovery of philosophically exciting differences in the way 
problems were perceived, questions posed, answers attempted and solutions sought. A contrasting analysis which 
leads in a different direction and gradually builds an imposing structure of philosophical construction over 
millennia is something whose possibility one can not even conceive of if one is confined to one philosophical 
tradition alone, which one inevitably treats as the only possible tradition and hence as universally paradigmatic in 
character.” Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, 75. 
336 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 7. 
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Methodologically, it circumvents the biases implied in the status, authority and legitimacy of 
the tertium comparationis337 in comparison. Since the comparer approaches the comparanda in 
a defined aspect from his/her own limited perspective, the imbalance denounced by the implicit 
favoring (in terms of knowledge abilities if not of preference, usually Western) is here avoided. 
Secondly, saṃvāda is valuable for the space it leaves to the traditions (usually located at the 
margins) to structure their discourse as they conceive it, rather than in the terms elaborated for 
them by Anglophone philosophers trained in second-hand sources or Indologists trained in a 
foreign conceptual structure. In so doing, it also circumvents the postcolonial dilemma of 
having to answer a foreign conceptualization and/or compartmentalization, and having to 
structure one’s categories according to the expectations of the more powerful other, which is 
faced by Anglophone Indian philosophers (see 1.2.2 and 2.2.1). One critique that one could 
already anticipate in Daya Krishna’s above formulation concerns the methodology, when he 
mentions that “we formulate contemporary intellectual issues in Sanskrit or in Arabic, place 
them before classical scholars and ask them to respond to them”338. This still implies that 
Anglophone Indian philosophers position themselves as the questioners to whom paṇḍits must 
answer, even if they can reformulate the issues and/or counter-question the assumptions 
presupposed by the questions. This critique, inherent to the conception of saṃvāda, is addressed 
(with Raghuramaraju’s) in the section 3.4.  
Nevertheless, in responding to contemporary question, they are in the position of themselves 
articulating their traditions vis-à-vis these questions, which means that the contemporization is 
not imposed. This is what Daya Krishna conceives when he speaks of ‘living’ traditions. 
Methodologically, this finally circumvents the inherent risk entailed in comparative philosophy 
of substantializing philosophies. When comparative philosophy relates concepts seen from a 
historical perspective, it implies a fixity and a closure in the concepts frozen by the textual 
exegesis. It becomes therefore difficult to instigate further modifications and to dynamically 
connect these entities seen from such a perspective, which creates difficulties for cross-cultural 
dialogues. On the contrary, a living tradition means that modifications and transformations 
within the tradition still occur through multiple comparing subjects. This strategy is also 
suggested by J. L. Mehta as a necessary, although softly, ‘modernizing’ of philosophy:  
“Modernizing what goes on in any department of the arts faculty, Sanskrit, Arabic or 
Philosophy, is to take these subjects out of their confinement within ancient scholarship and to 
                                                 
337 “A specialist of contemporary ethics might be comparing early Chinese and Greek ethics while being unfamiliar 
with both and claiming a roughly equal interest in their respective ethics and their notion of honor. But, of course, 
the comparer in this case is a specialist of contemporary (let us admit with self-critical candor, Western) ethics, or, 
if no specialist, is at least familiar with ethics to some degree. From this point of view, it might be fair to say that 
each comparer sets out to compare from the standpoint of a certain “cultural tradition”. This can be phrased more 
hermeneutically or it can be fashioned as an implicit comparison so that our example would feature three rather 
than two comparanda at work (contemporary ethics, Chinese ethics, and Greek ethics), with the comparer being 
more familiar with one comparandum (contemporary ethics) than with the other other comparanda Chinese ethics 
and Greek ethics). In each way, the comparer emerges as a further variable to content with.” Chakrabarti and 
Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders, 7. 
338 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 7. 
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make them contemporary in their relevance, appropriable in the present, literally translating 
their meaningfulness from the past into the present.”339 
However, typically for Mehta, this modernization implies to go through a Western 
reinterpretation of classical Indian philosophies, namely to filter the subjects through Western 
categories of analysis:  
“A scholar of Tulasi Das, for example, may wake up to a new approach to his past, and to what 
it means to be a poet, and suddenly see that Tulasi is indeed modern and speaks to us with a 
living voice. He is more likely to succeed in this if he is not only steeped in his own literary 
and religious tradition but also has an alert eye on what is being done by literary critics and 
theorists in Western countries.”340 
This resembles and yet differs from Daya Krishna: the basic logic of enriching via knowing 
from more traditions than one’s own is nothing foreign to Daya Krishna and belongs to the 
process by which the saṃvādas are conducted. Indeed, questions from, for example, Western 
logic are posed to paṇḍits. However, Daya Krishna perceived this process in a bidirectional 
procedure: he himself profited and enjoyed the reverse process, namely to learn from the 
Sanskrit categories thinking Western problems. This reciprocity is not implied in Mehta’s 
statement, who conceived the Westernization as a necessity.341 In saṃvāda, the reciprocity is 
constituted as an objective, even if the concrete difficulties of penetrating a different 
philosophical milieu can sometimes affect the results.  
 
3.3.1. Pune Experiment.  
 
The first dialogue explicitly presented as saṃvāda, was held in Pune from July 11th to the 16th 
1983, organized by M. P. Rege (Professor, University of Pune) with close assistance by 
Francine and Daya Krishna, and published bilingually in a Sanskrit-English edition by Mukund 
Lath and Francine Krishna in 1991. It consisted in reinterpreting the concept of proposition 
from Russell, in Sanskrit and English simultaneously.342 For a dialogue to happen between 
these two worlds, however, the text, the questions had to be carefully selected and formulated. 
M. P. Rege justifies his choice in his introduction: 
“I selected Russell’s theory of the nature of proposition as presented in his Principles of 
Mathematics as the subject of the dialogue because it represents something like an attempt to 
make a new beginning in philosophical analysis by turning one’s back on what has gone on 
before. I thought that it would therefore be comparatively easier to put the theory across to 
pandits as its exposition would not demand many references to the tenets and arguments of 
earlier schools and thinkers, and the points of agreement and disagreement between them. Also 
Russell’s realistic and analytical approach has an obvious affinity with that of Nyāya and 
                                                 
339 Mehta, Philosophy and Religion, 232. 
340 Mehta, 232. 
341 The following comment of Mehta is a reaction to the Heideggerian ‘Europeanization of the Earth’: “There is 
no other way open, to us in the East, but to go along with this Europeanization and to go through it. Only through 
this voyage into the foreign and the strange can we win back our own self-hood; here as elsewhere, the way to do 
what is closest to us is the longest way back.” Quoted in Halbfass, India and Europe, 442.  
342 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xviii. 
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Mīmāṃsā. The next step was to secure the collaboration of Prof. E. R. Swaminathan, a sound 
and versatile scholar of the darśanas who was then on the faculty of Kendriya Sanskrit 
Vidyapitha at Tirupati. But for his unstinted co-operation the dialogue could not have taken 
place. We agreed that the best course for us to take would be for me to prepare a statement in 
English summarizing the main points made by Russell and formulating the philosophical 
problems raised by them. He would then translate the statement into Sanskrit for the benefit of 
those pandits who were unfamiliar with English (…) I may remark that this probably was the 
first time when a western philosophical doctrine was presented through the medium of Sanskrit 
to an audience of pandits.”343 
For an audience external to one’s tradition, the relative historically independent position of 
Russell and a certain common interest for logical questions were strategically considered a 
possible bridge between paṇḍits and analytical philosophers. This alludes to a first question for 
cross-cultural projects, namely whether it is possible to dialogue on all philosophical topics 
between traditions, and how to delimit what can be fructuous and what cannot. Indeed, what M. 
P. Rege and Daya Krishna describe in the introduction and preface (which narrate the 
background) are carefully established conditions for the setting of the dialogue, which mostly 
depended on particular reactions to the text by philosophers interested in the process344.  
They also comment on the organization of the bilingual facilities,345 complemented by the 
account given by Daya Krishna in a subsequent article, on creating a favorable setting for the 
dialogue. Of particular importance is the above stated precise choice and clear formulation of a 
topic and the effort to translate a philosophical world into a different conceptual frame. 
Secondly, Daya Krishna explains the material difficulty in locating paṇḍits, to reach out to them, 
invite and persuade them of the necessity of the dialogue346. He further emphasizes on how 
                                                 
343 Daya Krishna et al., xxv. 
344 “I had several discussions with Shri Shrinivas Shastry during which I tried to explain to him Russell’s theory 
of the nature of proposition, its philosophical context and implications, with Dr. Jha functioning both as an 
interpreter and participant. It was an extremely encouraging experience, I discovered. I must confess to my 
surprise, that the two pandits could, without much difficulty, acquire an accurate understanding of Russell’s theory 
and appreciate its philosophical significance. But pandits are professionally trained to tentatively entertain 
philosophical theories on their own terms for the purpose of working out their philosophical presuppositions and 
implications. (…) I could now make so bold as to visit personally Shri Badarinath Shastri Shukla, the doyen of 
Naiyāyikas, at Varanasi. When I explained him the idea of the dialogue I was trying to hold he entered into its 
spirit with great enthusiasm, went over the Sanskrit statement with me line by line and at the end promised his 
total co-operation in this venture. (…) Another eminent scholar-philosopher who generously put his services at 
my disposal in organizing the event was Prof. K. T. Pandurangi. He introduced me and the idea of the dialogue to 
many pandits who in addition to being masters of traditional doctrines could enter with zest into philosophical 
discussion. Prof. K. T. Pandurangi combines the advantage of having studied for many years, the darśanas in a 
pāṭhaśālā in the traditional way, as well as having a facility in English which enables him to expound lucidly and 
accurately the more subtle points in Indian doctrines.”Daya Krishna et al., xxvi–xxvii. 
345 “The dialogue had to be bilingual. This meant that scholars who could translate from Sanskrit to English and 
vice versa had an essential role to play in making it possible. As would be evident, the translations they were 
required to provide extempore were not merely translations from one language into another but also from one 
conceptual framework into another.” Daya Krishna et al., xxvii. 
346 “The traditional scholars are not only scattered far and wide in different parts of the country, sometimes even 
in remote areas not usually associated with the presence of any man learning here, but they have generally little 
occasion to meet each other in intellectual interchange. Many of them are old and retired and settled in their 
ancestral villages or in Maṭhas belonging to their own Saṃpradāya. To find their whereabouts and find funds for 
inviting them all to one place from all the four corners of India was a difficult and challenging enterprise indeed.” 
Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 74. 
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selecting the participants was relevant, both for the discussion itself and to create a trustful 
atmosphere: 
“He [M. P. Rege] was also careful in choosing the scholars from both sides for the dialogue. 
The traditional Pandits invited for the dialogue were drawn not only from various disciplines, 
such as logic, grammar, linguistics, hermeneutics (Mīmāṃsā), which would be relevant to the 
subject under discussion, but also were of such outstanding authority in their respective fields 
that the very fact that they had consented to take part in such a dialogue made the experiment 
seem worthwile to other Pandits. Prof. Rege also met many of them personally and explained 
to them the purpose of the dialogue so that they had some idea of what was intended to be 
achieved through the dialogue and were favourably inclined towards it. Besides this, he took 
care to choose those amongst traditional scholars who had a relatively open mind about 
philosophical issues and were prepared to modify their positions in the light of counter-
arguments or offer new arguments for holding to the old positions. These qualities were 
preeminently embodied in such outstanding representatives of traditional scholarship as Pandit 
Badrinath Shukla, Pandit Srinivas Shastri and Pandit Laxman Shastri Joshi who throughout 
guided the discussion for one full week during which time the dialogue was held.”347 
The western-trained scholars were also carefully invited as participants who had “a fair 
knowledge of Sanskrit”, “knew Indian philosophy” and “had a firm foundation in Western 
philosophy”. The dialogue was rather a meeting between Anglophone scholars trained in Indian 
academics in Indian philosophy, able to use Sanskrit for using original sources and reinterpreted 
into English, and Sanskrit scholars. As Mukund Lath recalled in our meeting,348 the English-
speaking audience could often understand Sanskrit and the scholars usually knew each other, 
even if they could disagree with each other’s position or work differently, in terms of method, 
sources and training. Thus, it is the combination of these different linguistic and hermeneutic 
facilities, philosophical affinity and mutual interests and respect that allowed the success of this 
first endeavor of this kind, as Daya Krishna elsewhere comments: 
 “The innovation of Professor Rege lay in that he not only provided the facility of a bilingual 
dialogue between traditional and modern scholars concerned and explaining to them the 
purpose of the dialogue. Also, he chose a subject which lay on the borderlands of contemporary 
and traditional philosophy and formulated the issues which were to be discussed in the dialogue 
in as precise a manner as possible and in a language which was well-known to traditional 
paṇḍits, that is, Sanskrit. He thus created an atmosphere where traditional scholars could feel 
free to express their ideas in their own language on issues of relevant contemporary 
philosophical concerns which engaged the minds of those who were trained in that subject in 
institutions modelled on the western pattern in India. (…) The work has been hailed as “the 
First Exercise in doing comparative philosophy, rather than in ‘talking’ about it.”349 
This teaches us that a certain familiarity between participants is necessary for dialoguing, which 
at a first glance seems to contradict the nature of my previous definition of ‘intercultural 
dialogues’ (1.1.4). Unlike debate, which imply a common framework in which arguments and 
theses are scrutinized and evaluated, I hypothesized that intercultural dialogues unsettle this 
                                                 
347 Daya Krishna, 72. 
348 Personnal communication, Jaipur (on 06.05.2016). 
349 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 
311. 
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common framework. In this disruption of the framework emerges novelty in ideas. Is familiarity 
therefore an obstacle to this disruption?  
If familiarity is a counter-argument to an intercultural theory based on ‘radical otherness’ or 
difference, it can be a resource for intercultural methods which are grounded on theories of 
overlaps350, similarity or resemblances. Using familiarity as a tool for intercultural dialogues 
does not mean to overemphasize similarities or look for identity, parallels and analogy. On the 
contrary, familiarity itself can be displaced in order to allow intercultural communication, and 
yet differences in the understanding, interpretation, formulation, and lastly, new thinking. By 
displacing familiarity, I mean shifting the familiarity that arises on the basis of a certain training 
and affiliation to a thematic familiarity, however interdisciplinary or interculturally conceived. 
In this case it means shifting from the context-related familiarity of analytic philosophers with 
the same background, to the thematic familiarity of logic-trained scholars where the Russellian 
theory of proposition is formulated in Sanskrit in a way in which it is understandable to 
Sanskrit-speaking logicians. In a way, this familiarity is positioned between the hermeneutics 
of resemblance and difference in the intercultural debate: a ground of familiarity is created 
between philosophical communities (who do not otherwise communicate) to allow differences. 
This thematic familiarity is today revendicated in the academic world at different levels, notably 
in the case of revising the usual regional separations of manuals into European philosophy / 
Indian philosophy / Chinese philosophy into reorganizing theories according to their thematic 
familiarities such as “logic” in which both Analytic and Sanskrit Nyāya sources are exposed 
together,351 for example. However, the inclusion of contemporary reinterpretation of these 
traditions in a direct encounter enables an experiential dimension’352 from which arouses the 
initial enthusiasm of the saṃvāda.  
The enthusiasm or the feeling of philosophical discovery originated from the above mentioned 
feeling of “doing comparative philosophy rather than talking about it”. This does not however 
mean that the ‘talking about it’ was absent, since the introduction and conclusion of the 
saṃvāda, but also the epistolary exchanges regarding the organization of saṃvādas, and other 
writings 353  of Daya Krishna continuously reflect on methodological problems in doing 
comparative philosophy. Nevertheless, as encouraged by the critiques, it is a unique instance of 
philosophical communities engaging in philosophical dialogues being recorded: 
“What we have here is an example of comparative philosophy being done, an instance of a 
practice often talked about but rarely undertaken. The participants in this seminar did not 
discuss whether it is possible for a Sanskritic Naiyāyika to have philosophically useful 
conversations with an anglophone Russellian; they simply went ahead and had the 
                                                 
350  Mall, Intercultural Philosophy; Mall, Philosophie Im Vergleich Der Kulturen; Yousefi and Mall, 
Grundpositionen der interkulturellen Philosophie. 
351 The pioneering work of B. K. Matilal can be considered emblematic of such attempt. 
352 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 8;27. 
353 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy”; Daya Krishna, 
“Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be,” 1989; Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking. 
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conversations. And so here, for the first time, to my knowledge, we have a record of actual 
philosophical engagement between philosophers from these very different backgrounds” 354 
This ‘doing’ surpassed the methodological descriptions, it unveiled possibilities which had only 
been abstract (‘talked about’) and which were incorporated by the participants. This arouse for 
Daya Krishna the discovery of an alive community having philosophical stances and reasoning 
that deserved to be integrated to the philosophical debates.  
“The fact that there were scores of living representatives steeped in the traditional ways of 
philosophising with whom it was almost a way of living itself came as a surprise to everyone 
who had thought that the classical traditions of Indian philosophy were dead and gone and 
hence a subject of only historical and antiquarian interest to be satisfied by rummaging among 
the dusty shelves filled with ancient texts, difficult to interpret and understand.”355 
This illustrates again and justifies the importance of the encounter in the saṃvāda project 
propounded by Daya Krishna356 (see 2.1). 
For these reasons, this saṃvāda was a successful initiator of the subsequent series. The 
enthusiasm it arose stimulated the conception and institution of saṃvāda as defined above. 
Subsequently, he claimed that “philosophical activity, at least in India, is to be a joint activity 
undertaken through some sort of a cooperative, though dialectical, interaction between the two 
traditions where each questions the other and, by questioning, forces the thought to take new 
directions.” 357  This saṃvāda then permitted the organization of further dialogues and 
encounters between these worlds, in the forms of summer schools, integration of paṇḍits in the 
University of Pune and University of Rajasthan as well as classes tought in Sanskrit.  
Four years later for example, M. P. Rege organized a “Summer School for Pandits in Western 
Logic” in Wai (Maharastra), between May 25th and June 6th, 1987. In the official invitation sent 
to Sharad Deshpande, he describes the Summer School as follows:  
“One of the programmes the School will conduct is that in which a Senior Pandit will read a 
classical Nyaya text with western-trained philosophers who may not have much knowledge of 
Sanskrit. The text will be expounded in the traditional manner, in which will [be] provide[d] 
full exegesis of philosophical and textual points. Dr. D. Prahladachar has kindly agreed to read 
‘Bhasha-Pariccheda’ – the sections on Inference and Shabda-bodha and Prof. S. R. Bhat 
‘Vyapti-Pancheka’ with Mathuranath’s commentary in this programme. We will try to arrange 
the time-table in such a way that one can attend both the classes if one wants to. A seminar on 
the philosophy of logic with special reference to inference will be held on the last four days of 
the school which will be open to all scholars participating in the school.”358 
                                                 
354 Paul J. Griffiths, “Samvāda: A Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions by Daya Krishna; M. P. Rege; 
R. C.Dwivedi; Mukund Lath.,” Philosophy East and West, January 1995. 
355 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 73. 
356 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 8;27. 
357 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 76. 
358 Invitation by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, signed by M. P. Rege and sent to Sharad Deshpande, 
dated 19. 4. 1987. I am indebted to Sharad Deshpande to share with me this historical document.  
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The preface to saṃvāda mentions other Summer and Winter schools and further dialogues, 
which derived from the enthusiasm and discovery felt in Pune. 
The dialogues created possibilities of collaborations that answer the challenges analyzed earlier 
(2.2.1). This recognition constitutes for Daya Krishna a “substantive result” that materializes in 
a “change of awareness and atmosphere with regard to the urgency of establishing critical and 
creative linkages with the cognitive traditions of India.”359 Beyond the politics, this recognition 
is urgent from a historico-philosophical point of view given the hermeneutic situation. Since 
the reading of classical Indian texts is mediated by Western concepts in Indian and Western 
academics, paṇḍits who master the original texts (the language but also the complex contexts 
and references) can create novel works relying on the traditions that are in an “unbroken 
continuity”360. Without their collaboration, “important texts would become unintelligible to 
modern students of the subject”, as Daya Krishna continues. This does not limit their role to 
solely consist of preserving the texts, but of reinterpreting them today in novel ways.  
It is beyond my expertise and the scope of this work to detail the complex logical reasonings 
effectuated in Sanskrit and in English that took place during this dialogue. However, I provide 
here a few methodological remarks on how the communication seemed to proceed, and some 
assumptions on how it may have contributed to Daya Krishna’s philosophy. Responding to the 
questions that were circulated beforehand, the dialogue proceeded to a large extent in 
establishing parallels between the Russellian terms and implications and (mostly) Nyāya 
counterparts. These parallels begin by observing in which conceptual terms the Russellian 
proposition could be ‘translated’ into Sanskrit categories. The philosophical problems 
originating from it open the way for internal discussion within Sanskrit philosophies as well as 
outlining difficulties in Russell. This process operated mainly by contradictions and further 
questions for clarifications. One example of it is given by Daya Krishna, himself translating 
Prof. Pahi’s statement: 
“The second point made by Dr. Pahi was that in Russell’s earlier position there is a distinction 
between the notion of ‘existence’ and the notion of ‘being’. While the notion of ‘existence’ 
can be relevantly rendered by the Sanskrit word ‘padārtha’ in the Naiyāyika framework, there 
is no corresponding word in Sanskrit, this was a most important point he made, there is no 
corresponding concept to that of ‘being’ which we find in early Russell. Hence if Russell’s 
thought is to be translated into the traditional Indian framework, we will have to find a 
corresponding term for the notion of ‘being’.  
Pahi: I also suggested a way. Within the Sāmkhya-Yoga ontology there is the notion of 
saviṣayakavṛtti.”361 
                                                 
359 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 81. 
360 Daya Krishna, 77. 
361 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, 30. 
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This in return questioned the choice of choosing the concept of proposition of the early Russell 
and the ambivalence within his early and later philosophies362.  
For example, the debate on what ‘entity’ means in Russell is parallelized with the distinction 
between ‘mental’ (bauddha) and ‘external’ (bāhya) categories, and proceeded into the problems 
that applying these categories would result in Russell’s understanding of entities, as in 
Pandurangi’s definition: 
“What has really to be examined is that if we think of two types of entities, bauddha and the 
real, when a word denotes a bauddha entity; but the question is: whether the intervention of a 
bauddha entity in between to convey a real entity is thought to be necessary for Russell. This 
is a point which westerners have to clarify. If all that Russell wants to say is that whatever the 
ontological status of an entity, an entity which is conveyed by a word; then that is 
understandable and it is so without prejudice to the ontological status of the entity. But it would 
seem that he wants to say that whenever a word conveys an entity which has existence in space 
and time, there is also a bauddha entity functioning as a medium, and in the case of words 
which do not stand for a real entity there is only a bauddha entity. This, however, would create 
difficulty.”363 
The developments of the Sanskrit implications of the categories applied to Russell forced both 
the Sanskrit paṇḍits to rearticulate their definitions and logical argumentation to the Russellian 
context, and the ‘Western’-trained philosophers to re-articulate Russell’s philosophy in the light 
of such answers. The origin of the creativity felt by Daya Krishna arises from exchanges of this 
type that modifies the usual ways of articulating and thinking a problem and a concept (here: 
‘entity’). There are many more examples of this kind, which altogether result in the response 
written after the saṃvāda by Badrinath Shukla, entitled in the volume in the appendix “On 
Propositions: A Naiyāyika Response to a Russellian Theory” 364 , translated by Arindam 
Chakrabarti. This response was republished in a collective work edited by Chakrabarti. The 
latter indirectly answers the opening comments by M. P. Rege in the introduction of the 
saṃvāda, who suggested to continue the collective exploration with the concept śābdabodha365 
                                                 
362 By Arindam Chakrabarti: “I think it is rather unfortunate that we have chosen Russell as the representative 
defender of the concept of proposition. For one thing, this is one of the points on which Russell is found to be 
vacillating. Even in the principles where he comes closest to holding strongly the concept of proposition he uses 
language as if he sometimes means by proposition a sentence and sometimes a state of affairs. And it is not quite 
clear what he means by it. (…) But unfortunately the mature Russell does not believe in propositions. So if we 
want to discuss Russell in the context of propositions at all, i.e., Russell as a defender of propositions, then we will 
have to discuss the Russell of the Principles. And that is the Russell who makes the distinction between being and 
existence. And if we talk of the Russell who drops the distinction between being and existence, than it will be 
difficult to see, and that would make it more interesting, how in spite of dropping this distinction, in spite of being 
of the opinion that only things that exist, be they mental or physical, are independently meant by words (…), he 
can defend the notion of proposition.” Daya Krishna et al., 31–32. 
363 Daya Krishna et al., 18. 
364 Daya Krishna et al., 191–213. 
365 Thus, M. P. Rege concludes the introduction to the written saṃvāda, coming back on the entreprise as follows: 
“It appears to me, therefore that it is in the direction of śābdabodha (knowledge gained by understanding sentences) 
that the dialogue should continue. This is an area which overlaps epistemology and ontology, as well as formal 
logic with its formalized syntax and semantics. It is thus central to philosophical inquiry and has been minutely 
explored by classical Indian thinkers. The recent movements of analytical philosophy and hermeneutics have also 
progressed in this direction. It is, perhaps, in this area that a dialogue of this kind will be most fruitful and rewarding” 
Daya Krishna et al., xxviii. 
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(knowledge gained by understanding sentences), a concept that was discussed several times in 
the dialogue. Chakrabarti expanded the project as follows: he started by questioning the 
epistemic weakness of Western philosophy that considers knowledge of words but very less, if 
ever, the knowledge from words, namely the knowledge earned by testimony. He thus describes 
the situation as follows: 
“In pooh-poohing testimony as something we cannot help depending upon because of our 
gullibility on the one hand and our epistemic laziness on the other, in ignoring the role of 
accumulated (and more or less unquestioned) tradition in the progress of scientific knowledge, 
in being reluctant to grant that when deference to the authority of the expert is in order it is 
irrational to try to observe and reason for oneself – mainstream Western epistemology has been 
arrogantly revisionary. Given such cultivated irreverence toward one’s own cultural patrimony 
of knowledge, it is not surprising that this “individualistic tradition” (an oxymoron?) should 
be unwilling to learn from an alien (=non-Western) tradition, especially when that tradition is 
by definition un-modern!”366 
Not hesitating to unveil the myth of intellectual autonomy (see also 3.5), he also counter-
balanced the “perils of trust” and the problems of interpretation of the concept śabdabodha367. 
Chakrabarti uses the resources from each tradition to counter-balance the lacunae of each. He 
circumscribed them by mutual analysis and presentation of the issues from different 
perspectives. In so doing, he acknowledged this entreprise of the saṃvāda experiment, when 
he finally states: 
“when the traditional Sanskrit-speaking scholars (who still carry on, in India, the indigenous 
lineage of philosophy of language and knowledge) were for the first time exposed to themes 
like Russell’s theory of propositions or Frege’s sense/reference distinction or the problem of 
proper-names – their creative response took the Western-style ‘philosophers’ of India by 
surprise. In this book we try to give a flavor of such responses through the papers by Shukla 
(translated from Sanskrit) and V. Bhattacharya (translated from Bengali). Thus, the second gap 
that this volume tries to bridge is between contemporary Western and classical Indian traditions 
– because luckily we can still make the latter speak to live issues through these ‘pandits’ who 
teach and write in a method untouched by any Western influence.”368 
He thus opened the debate to philosophers of language such as P. F. Strawson, John McDowell, 
Michael Dummett, who contributed next to the above mentioned classical paṇḍits and Indian 
philosophers familiar with the two areas such as B. K. Matilal and J. N. Mohanty. On the other 
hand, Chakrabarti also persevered in the Sanskrit philosophical communities, being an active 
translator and introducer of Western analytical philosophy in Sanskrit. He thereby also 
contributed to considering Sanskrit epistemology (particularly Nyāya) as an active purvāpakṣa 
of other logical traditions, able to unveil the neglected presuppositions of other traditions and 
to reformulate them.  
                                                 
366 Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical 
Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, Synthese Library 230 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994), 2, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2. 
367 Matilal and Chakrabarti, 8–9. 
368 Matilal and Chakrabarti, 15–16. 
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Finally, for Daya Krishna, this dialogue was an immersion into the Indian dialectical tradition, 
namely an occasion to practice sam-vāda as defined by the tradition. A way to describe the 
dialectical proceedings is formulated in the opening of the dialogue by Śrīnivāsa Sāstrī: 
“Russell has argued that words refer to entities that have an external existence. But our 
understanding of the matter is different. We believe that words such as ghaṭa refer to an entity 
qualified by the universal ghaṭa-hood. In other words; the word ghaṭa means something that 
exists in a form of its own (svarūpasat). Let me confess, however, that I am not sure what 
Russell means by ‘external existence”: can it really be equated with the notion of bāhyārtha 
that we have? (…) We would like to know from you, sirs [Western-trained philosophers], 
whether a word according to Russell denotes something that has an external existence, or does 
it refer to an entity existing in its own form, qualified by a universal. We have in our midst 
many eastern paṇḍits. They too will present their views. We shall then have to face the task of 
deciding what is right and what is not. We have gathered here to engage in an encounter of 
ideas. Ours will be a discussion between those who are seeking the truth. We are not aiming at 
more sophistry or winning an argument. Sītā, when she wanted to teach something to Rāma, 
never said ‘I want to teach you.’ She said ‘I want to remind you of something you know.’ I too 
would like to remind you of something you know. In expressing your views, do not try to 
impose it on others. Do not hold on to your views dogmatically; yet do not give them up if they 
can withstand the force of all the counter-arguments aimed at them. You are free to express 
any view that you think fit. But whether the view be that of a great ācārya or a renowned sage, 
you must be prepared to support it with sound arguments; since what we propose to hold here 
is an exchange of ideas, wherein views will be put to the test of reasoning.”369 
What is enunciated as the rules of the saṃvāda here, precisely embodies the definition of vāda 
given earlier from the Nyāya-sūtras and by Caraka, namely a collective (sam-) seeking of the 
truth together in analyzing the rightness and wrongness of the arguments propounded, in 
honestly and soundly defending positions and counter-positions. Śrīnivāsa Sāstrī supplements 
to the traditional rules a careful warning against dogmatism, may it originate out of allegiance 
to a tradition that one feels endangered by the question (see 6.1 on the authority of a tradition), 
or out of academic dogma (possibly also out of laziness). This usual and classical way of 
conceiving saṃvāda is carried out throughout the dialogue, even until Shukla’s answer, which 
is a successive presentation of positions and counter-positions, either from the tradition or by 
Russell. It is my hypothesis that Daya Krishna found this dialectic successful and exciting and 
got convinced of its potentiality for developing saṃvāda. He himself developed a unique 
approach (very clearly visible in his books on Indian philosophy): a fervent counter-position of 
classical philosophies via sustained argumentations. This distinguishes Daya Krishna’s 
approach from the typical carefulness of Western-trained philosophers studying classical Indian 
philosophies who have too much reverence towards it or feel bound to defend it in front of 
Western philosophies (in a position of power). His critical engagement corresponds here in 
practice to what he reinterpreted from the concept purvāpakṣa, counter-position (see chapter 5 
for the details of his reinterpretation): listening to the other’s arguments, understanding and 
learning from it respectfully while being ready to find counter-positions and alternatives if the 
arguments are to be found unconvincing.  
 
                                                 
369 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, 2–3. 
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3.3.2. Bhakti Experiment 
 
The second published saṃvāda took place from 13th to 16th Oct. 1988 at the Sri Caitanya Prema 
Samsthana (a centre for Vaishnava studies) in the holy city of Vrindavan370. Presented as a 
seminar on “the Intellectual Dimensions of Bhakti Tradition in India”, this dialogue was 
motivated by the comment of Shrivatsa Goswami371, of a historical attempt to “recast all 
knowledge”372 in the perspective of bhakti373 (devotion, attachment, feeling), to which Daya 
Krishna answered by wondering “whether there was really an intellectual dimension of the 
Bhakti tradition in India which had not been paid any attention to until now.”374 Starting from 
the idea of re-exploring the bhakti tradition, the large range of issues discussed included 
questions related to the ontological status of devotion/feeling (bhakti), the problematic relation 
between feeling and knowledge for philosophy, and, consequently, “the place of philosophical 
argument” in a feeling-centred bhakti as well as how any “socio-cultural determined pattern of 
feeling” 375  may influence bhakti. The question of the inclusion of bhakti, which can be 
interpreted as the absolute in the realm of feeling, in contemporary societies, was also raised: 
“How is the notion of impersonal obligation to institutions, ideals, norms and values 
                                                 
370 For more resources on the specificity of the bhakti tradition of Vrindavan upon which the dialogue reflects, and 
on the Shri Caitanya Prema Samsthana where the dialogue took place, see the following resources,  published in 
association with Shrivatsa Goswami.  A detailed description and study of the Catainya Prema Samsthana (Jaisingh 
Ghera), (namely a study into the bhakti world of this saṃvāda) can be found in Margaret H. Case, Seeing Krishna: 
The Religious World of a Brahman Family in Vrindaban (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). A collective 
exploration on Govindadeva, the temple visit described in the Session VI of the Bhakti dialogue, is published as 
Margaret H. Case, ed., Govindadeva: A Dialogue in Stone, Vraja Nāthadvārā Prakalpa, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Indira 
Gandhi National Centre for Arts, 1996).  
Due to the usual problems of transcription, one finds numerous variations of the scripts for ‘Vrindavan’ 
(Brindaban, etc.) and other Sanskrit names and terms used in this section. Instead of consistency (impossible due 
to the different sources I use), I chose to respect the transcriptions indicated by the authors or editors of the works 
I quote, and for myself to use the most common use in English.  
371 On the honorific title ‘Goswami’, Shri Shrivatsa humbly comments in the dialogue: “In the Vedic perspective, 
the word ‘gosvāmī’ will definitely mean something very different but which, in the spiritual dimension was not 
only eulogized but got respectability to such an extent that even the Bhaṭṭas or the Dubes thought it great to have 
the appendage ‘Gosvāmī’ to their names. The word means, one who can control the senses. But I have no pretention 
of giving myself the connotation of that respectable dimension of the meaning of ‘Gosvāmī’. Rather I will take it 
more in the other sense of ‘Gosvāmī’, the Lord of the cows, the bull who is destined to carry the burden of the 
tradition.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 208–9. 
I am deeply thankful to Shrivatsa Goswami’s hospitality in Vrindavan, for sharing his precious time, memories, 
experiences and insights with me, and letting me stay in his ashram. (18th-19th August 2017, Sri Caitanya Prema 
Samsthana, Vrindavan) 
372 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, i. 
373  Bhakti (devotion, attachment, fondness) is first a fundamental generic category that signifies a complete 
devotion from the devotee (bhakta) to the divinity founded on a personal relationship through devotional practice; 
as a concept, it applies to Hinduism in general. A long bhakti tradition however, composed of different religious 
movements, encompasses this basic idea of bhakti characterized in various forms. Flourishing in South India 
between the 6th and 9th century and developing in North India, flourishing in Vrindavan in the 15th and 16th century, 
developed by ācāryas (scholars) and saints, the long-lasting and spread tradition renders the details on the means 
and practices of the devotion, the referring texts and debates on the nature of the divinity complex (impersonal or 
personal God); it is to be noted that the bhakta Kabīr, of Muslim origin, and the Guru Nānak, founder of the Sikh 
religion, are among the most famous bhakti saints. W. J. Johnson, A Dictionary of Hinduism, 1st ed (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
374 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, ii. 
375 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 254. 
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accommodated in Bhakti thought? How does Bhakti relate to the realization of other ideals-
personal or social such as justice, freedom and equality?” 376  The investigation explored 
alternative ways of gaining knowledge and the possibility to reflect on religious devotion. What 
is the space left for knowledge in the conception of absolute love and how can it be compatible 
with contemporary societies? J. L. Mehta can help us re-contextualizing the tension between 
feeling or devotion (bhakti) and knowledge when he discloses bhakti as follows:  
“whatever is communicable from one to another, like a message, or teachable, like a theory or 
doctrine, is within the grasp of the intellect and its way of relating man to the ultimate, through 
understanding and insight. This we see here shattering to bits when confronted with the 
actuality of the gopis’ at onement with Krishna in love, in separation even more fully so than 
when he was in their midst as a physical presence. What we also see here is that such a vision 
of the Lord as beloved is mediated by prior thought and knowledge, as a necessity imposed 
upon us as ordinary inquiring and seeking mortals, not to speak of learned participants in a 
seminar, which can aspire at the most to be a dance of thoughts and views and information 
exchanged. The dialectical movement between thinking, a finite man’s attempt to touch the 
Absolute, and the ecstasy of love for the supreme as Person continuously goes on and one must 
find ever new ways of putting this in words.”377 
There, due to the nature of the matter and the approach from which it was organized, it bears a 
different motivation than the first published saṃvāda. It specifically questioned in the dialogue 
the very possibility of dialoguing on bhakti. More exactly, it asked how to understand the 
intellectual mediation of the absolute bhakti while discussing it, how to articulate the 
intellectual expression of the experience of a pure feeling.378 
The participants were Sanskrit scholars, among whom some were actively belonging to this 
tradition, Indian scholars in philosophy (mostly Western philosophy, with exceptions), two 
American scholars of religious studies and two Indian scholars in the fields of art or history. It 
is worthwhile to remember that the published version of the saṃvāda379 is on the one hand an 
incomplete reproduction of the dialogue and on the other hand reflects only partially the lively 
                                                 
376 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 255. 
377 Mehta, Philosophy and Religion, 205–6. 
378 Daya Krishna, at the beginning of the first Session (as published), addresses this problem as follows: “I am 
suggesting that one of the foundational issues with respect to bhakti or thinking about bhakti is that bhakti is 
feeling-centered, emotion-oriented. It treats feelings and emotions as the basic instrument or means of grasping 
ultimate reality. If this is so, then what is the place of reason in it? Reason and an argument are the heart of 
philosophy, and this is so not just in the western tradition, but even in our own tradition, right from its very 
beginning. As far as bhakti is concerned, it is supposed to be just the opposite. Bhakti is a cultivation of the 
emotional life of man in relation to transcendent; it is also the underplaying of doubt, saṃśaya. As they say, 
‘saṃśayātmā [saṃśaya-ātman, the essence of doubt, EF] vinaśyati [vanishes, EF]’. But in darśana [philosophy] 
saṃśayātmā does not vinaśyati. Without saṃśaya or doubt one cannot make a movement in thought. First there is 
doubt; then the doubt is tentatively settled by an argument. And this goes on; doubt is the eternal motive behind 
the movement of thought. If there is darśana in bhakti then we have two questions before us. One is: what is the 
textual evidence of this philosophical tradition and what are the arguments, and what is or could be the pratipakṣa 
[counter-position, EF] of bhakti? This is the first issue. There is also a factual aspect to it. The other is that even 
supposing there is no literal evidence about the philosophical aspect of bhakti, can we not start a philosophical 
tradition of thinking now?” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 10–11. I am 
grateful to Elisa Freschi (‘EF’) for her translations or corrections. The translations that are not specified with an 
acronym are mine; mistakes remain also mine.  
379 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion. 
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experience and the programs that were organized. For an instance of the incompleteness, the 
opening address by Shrivatsa Goswami (of about 45min explaining the reasons for the dialogue) 
could not be reproduced due to the alteration of the recordings. Concerning the second, the 
saṃvāda proposed a complete experience of bhakti that included the visit of temples (one partial 
recording of a visit to the Govindadeva temple is published as Session VI380), rāsalīlās381 
performances in the evening, etc. The experiential dimension of engaging with bhakti went 
much beyond the intellectual expression contained in the published book. It is in view of this 
second dimension that I develop the connection to the Govindadeva temple in this section, 
explaining the relation of the content of the dialogue with its place. This expresses the 
manifoldness of the idea of dialogue (see chapter 4) as an encounter with living persons, 
traditions and places. It also helps us understanding from the dialogical practice why Daya 
Krishna does not reduce in his philosophy knowledge and dialogue to the linguistic analytical 
philosophical domains, but includes these concepts into the larger framework of values. In 
particular the idea of ‘seeking knowledge’ in dialogue, and of participants as seekers (jijñāsu) 
developed in 6.2 could be related with such a practice. Furthermore, Shrivatsa Goswami added 
during our meeting that beyond the book, the encounter constituted a complete shared 
experience since all were staying in his ashram, sleeping, eating, enjoying the music and the 
rāsalīlās together, and it is this togetherness which created an experience much beyond the 
limited recordings available. This prompts me to outline a limitation of the textual in general 
for analyzing dialogues, since the oral and the experiential characters cannot be rendered justice 
in a written reproduction. This limitation applies to the present analysis of dialogue as well, for 
which reason I draw on Shrivatsa Goswami’s account, commenting and narrating the Bhakti 
dialogue during our meeting in Vrindavan (18th-19th August 2017) as organizer and participant. 
In contrast to the previous one, which focused rather on the organization of the dialogue and 
the methodological insights derived from it, this section considers the interlocking of reflecting 
and experiencing in dialogue by connecting the topics discussed and the forms in which they 
were expressed. When approaching the “liveliness” of saṃvāda, this dimension, which is lost 
in the experience for those who did not participate, must not be forgotten in order to imagine 
the nature of the dialogue. 
My approach is here again not to explore all the concepts and argumentation contained in the 
dialogue, but rather the dialogical dimension itself. In this regard, I start by distinguishing 
between the Pune and the Bhakti saṃvādas. In Pune, the dialogical relation consisted in sharing 
common interests, which resulted in the discussion of how creative it can be to develop a 
question through another philosophical tradition, and how to respond anew in such a situation. 
In Vrindavan, since the question itself had a performativity implied in it (where the 
interrogation “can we express the absolute experience of devotional feeling” served both as 
                                                 
380 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 126–43. 
381 “rās(a) līlā (‘ dance pastime’): Narrowly, Kṛṣṇa's dance (rāsa) with the gopīs, described in the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa (10.33). The women dance in a circle; Kṛṣṇa inserts himself between each pair, so that each individual 
supposes that he is attending to her alone. For many Vaiṣṇava bhakti traditions, this typifies the individual's 
relationship to God, an experience intensified through various meditation and visualization practices focused on 
the rāsa līlā. More widely, the term rāsa līlā refers to the full extent of Kṛṣṇa's divine play (līlā) with the gopīs—
their love, union, incomprehensible separation, and reunion—described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (10.29–33).” 
Johnson, A Dictionary of Hinduism. 
 
139 
 
intellectual self-reflective topic as well as an exercise implied in the dialogue), the matter 
constituted a challenge to ‘philosophy’ itself, as conceived by Western-trained philosophers, 
and integrated a spiritual dimension which was intellectually apprehended.382  
For Shrivatsa Goswami 383 , the dialogical is inherent to bhakti: bhakti requires a bhakta 
(devotee) and Bhagāvan (the supreme deity). The former incarnates the humanity, the latter the 
divinity, and bhakti is the way of celebrating togetherness in a reciprocal way. These two 
dimensions require communication, and this must occur for humans in a dialogical process. 
Since our human condition limits us to the understanding of the human sphere (we cannot reach 
a supra human understanding), we need to humanize the divine, which is what Krishna stands 
for, as a human god. The necessity felt to communicate the sense of bhakti is discussed several 
times in the dialogue, in terms of relation (what is the relation between the feeling of the 
experience and the communication of this feeling in the writings), of impetus (why did the 
bhaktas feel the need of writing about bhakti?) and transcendental levels (what is the relation 
between the divinity and the self who expresses it?). Thus, dialoguing seems to be an impossible 
and yet, unescapable issue related to bhakti, and Shrivatsa Goswami comments in the Bhakti 
dialogue384 as follows:  
“Why then do we communicate if it is unthinkable? As I have already said, the śāstras [systems 
of knowledge, EF] are mundane affairs. But why is there this communication? One answer I 
can suggest is that at least there is the continuity of the self. The self that enjoys that bhāva385 
at the transcendental level, does not always stay there. It comes down, so to say. And so, we 
can say, it is because of this continuity of the same self at the two levels, that there is prapatti 
[self-surrender (of one’s soul to God), EF]. What is higher than prapatti? It is said, this self 
continues, and that is why when it comes down there is an urge to communicate with others 
what one has realized in the higher state. But, unfortunately, one fails, and therein lies the 
tragedy. We try, we attempt to describe it. We can’t really define. Logic and all such things are 
inapplicable in the realm of the acintya [inconceivable 386]. But when one returns to the 
everyday level one again becomes bound by this logic and everything else. So, we create a 
śāstra. We try to make some approach to communicate with others.”387 
                                                 
382 The following remark by Prof. Pande in the dialogue helps clarifying the relation of bhakti vis à vis religion,: 
“Now I would like to argue regarding the question whether bhakti is possible without a personal god or not; 
Religion is possible without belief in a personal god. There may be a religion without belief in a personal god, but 
it cannot be called atheism. It is also theism; it is religion. But bhakti without faith, without belief in a personal 
god is not possible. Bhakti is something too intimate, too personal. A saint can be and in fact is a bhakta, but he is 
not called upon to give a rational explanation, of the object of his devotion. What, then, is bhakti? Two things are 
required. Firstly, a belief in a personal god, and secondly, a belief that god has something to do very intimately, 
with oneself in particular. It is not universal, it is not social. It is a personal, intimate something. If one believes in 
a transcendental love, who is sarvajña [omniscient], sarvaśaktimāna [omnipotent], kṛpānidhāna [graceful, 
omnibenevolent], karmanidhāna [receptacle of all ritual acts; omni-active], then alone one is entitled to be called 
a bhakta. It is not, thus, the duty of one who is devoted to such a god, to argue out, to work out what that god is, 
or what is its nature; that is the duty of the ācārya, the commentator or the philosopher.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and 
Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 46.  
383 The comments without quotation marks are all made by Shrivatsa Goswami during our meeting in Vrindavan, 
18th-19th August 2017. I adapt here and reformulate excerpts from our interview.  
384 In order to distinguish between the philosophical concept ‘bhakti’ and the ‘Bhakti dialogue’ organized, I 
capitalize the latter as a proper noun.  
385 bhāva means ‘emotion’ or ‘passion’ in the classical Indian aesthetic theories which are developed and expressed 
in relation to theatrical performances (the answer relates to a discussion on Aesthetics). 
386 In a literal sense: a-cintya, what cannot be grasped, conceived by the intellect. 
387 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 165–66. 
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This conception extends to the very definition of saṃvāda: in crossing traditions and in 
demanding translations (of concepts and modes of thinking), saṃvāda remains unsatisfactory 
and uncomplete, yet necessary. This definition provides for Daya Krishna’s the productive force 
of dialoguing: it makes saṃvāda a regulative idea, which means something perfectible to be 
attained, ad infinitum pursued (as necessary) yet never ending (since it is impossible). This 
perfectibility ad infinitum is a fundamental characteristic of the idea of saṃvāda in Daya 
Krishna’s analysis of the puruṣārtha (a point developed in 4 and 6) from which the creativity 
of dialogue originates. The Bhakti dialogue is an experience of this dialogical tension. 
In our meeting, Shrivatsa Goswami commented on this aspect in disclosing the intrinsic relation 
between experience and expression, due to which this tension occurs. Experience and 
expression are necessarily implied as soon as we mention or are located in the human or in the 
mundane world, even in liminal forms of consciousness such as sleep or even samādhi 
(profound meditation, intense contemplation), beyond any division of awareness. Even the 
Yoga-Sūtra designates as “samādhi experience” the highest form of contemplation, which 
shows that even experience remains at that level. This experience has no value if we cannot 
communicate it. For him, this originates from the necessity for the unbound (divinity) to meet 
the bounded (humanity): incarnations, avatars and prophets who come as expressions of the 
absolute to manifest the experience of the unbounded divine are illustrations of this 
communication and relation. They are the necessary mediation between the two spheres that 
allow communication, which makes them necessary (and transient in comparison to the divine 
itself): ‘the incarnations are limitations of the unlimited out of freedom’, he adds, and thus they 
act in a way like teachers guiding human via expression on the way to the experience.388 They 
allow the dialogue without which the experience could not be communicated, and thereby 
would not exist.  
However, in bhakti the communication is not limited to the relation with the divine, but also 
emphasized in the community of bhaktas, as Daya Krishna remarks with interest in the Bhakti 
dialogue: 
“We were just talking about the problems of communication even in spiritual life. But in bhakti 
there is a collective community of bhaktas. Bhakti is not an isolated individual thing. 
                                                 
388 Shrivatsa Goswami comments in the dialogue: “Let us take our clue from Vaiṣnava and bhakti history, whether 
Basava or Caitanya and the Gosvāmīs: feeling is the core. But the articulation and the intellectual exercise is a 
must as it holds everything together. (…) What has happened at this moment in our history is that we have 
intellectually mortgaged ourselves to the west. We have accepted that ideas should come to us from a high seat of 
learning in the west (…). But, what did the Gosvāmīs do? They experienced. (…) But they did not stop there. If 
you see their life work, they were the most articulate jñanīs and philosophers and scholars. (…) Imagine Gopāla 
Bhaṭṭa’s plight. He was collecting this Smṛti, trying to give a complete system or life style. (…) He wrote a book, 
which is in 600 pages, where he quotes from almost 300 (…) texts. No library was there at the end of the 15 th 
century in Vrindavana where one could get the Smṛtis he quotes from. Where to get even the hand-made paper 
and ink in Vrindavana where nobody was living? (…) At the same time, they had understanding and sensibility, 
for after writing these six volumes on bhakti-rasa (…), Jīvā Gosvāmī writes these last words (…): I might have 
diluted it, the rasa, in this jñāna and the jñāna-process. But nonetheless, what was done was important. When he 
is writing this, he mentions Rādhā. He says, without the dhārā [stream, uninterrupted flow] of Rādhā your saṅga-
raṅga [the colour of your attachment, EF] would not have been available to anyone, and without the dhārā you 
would have been unknown and meaningless and useless for us. So the whole process of manana and jñāna is 
important.” Dhā-rā and Rā-dhā Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 233–35. 
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Particularly in the Caitanya sampradāya it is not an isolated seeking of the self in relation to 
the divine alone. Even Kṛṣṇa had to be surrounded by gopīs in the plural. I have called our 
seminars ‘bauddhika saṅkīrtana’ [collective intellectual devotional singings/mental 
celebration of God’s name]. I have not propounded the idea yet, but the idea is to see life itself 
as a bauddhika saṅkīrtana. Saṅkīrtana is where there is a community of bhaktas; the feeling 
relationship of to the Lord [Kṛṣṇa] is its essential part. This notion of a collectivity, which 
inter-communicates feelings amongst its members, and by doing so intensifies the feelings of 
each in relation to the divine principle or order, is what is to be emphasized. What I meant to 
say was that this community aspect, this collectivity in bhakti is to be emphasized.”389 
The question of the relation is not only transcendental, or rather, in Shrivatsa Goswami’s terms 
in the Bhakti dialogue, “it is not an exclusive transcendence but an inclusive transcendence in 
the socio-political realm as well”390; the relation, and with it the communication also comprises 
the community of bhaktas, and furthermore, the society in general. Daya Krishna’s naming of 
this saṃvāda as “bauddhika saṅkīrtana” shows his typical ‘playing’ with insights from different 
realms to think. Bauddhika means noetic or intellectual, namely what concerns buddhi (whose 
function is resembled by the Greek nous), the intellect as faculty to order and grasp concepts. 
Apparently oxymoric in this association, kīrtana designates devotional songs or litanies, a 
popular form of celebration in the bhakti culture. The prefix sam- (like in saṃ-vāda) emphasizes 
the collectivity of the community of bhaktas singing together. This devotional model was 
introduced by Caitanya and consisted in devotional songs about Kṛṣṇa and the gopī’s relation 
in Vrindavan.391  The relation between bauddhika to kīrtana is obviously not an orthodox 
interpretation. It illustrates Daya Krishna’s creativity, and a possible provocation of both the 
buddhi-relying community of academic philosophy and the kīrtana-relying community of 
bhaktas. If interpreted a bit further, it could suggest the requirement of both buddhi and kīrtana 
together (sam-) for (saṃ)vāda to occur in this intersection of realms and displacement of 
thinking.  
The emphasis on the community (and the reiteration of sam-) implies that otherness is not 
excluded from my personal relation to the divine and the untranslatable singularity of my 
experience, but constitutes a necessary component of the devotion. In the Bhakti dialogue, Prof. 
Dwivedi suggests an original reinterpretation of the Bhakti-sūtra, which includes otherness in 
the definition of bhakti as a condition for the dialogue:  
“Bhakti is defined in the Śāṇḍilya Bhakti-sūtra as: sā parānuraktirīśvare. [I.e.,] Īśvara me 
parama prema bhakti hai. Two meanings of the sūtra are accepted. One is: a great anurakti in 
God is bhakti. In the other meaning, ‘parama’ is taken with Īśvara. So, the second meaning is 
love towards that which is the highest, which is Īśvara. The two meanings together are: great 
love or softly love for God who is the loftiest. But a third meaning is possible. ‘Parānurakti’ 
can also mean, love for the para, the other. Thus we have, ‘bhakti is anurakti, love, for the other 
in the presence of God.’”392 
Grammaticaly, ‘sā’ refers to bhakti; para [highest, other]-anurakti [affection, love, devotion] 
is a compound, which can be understood in different ways according to Sanskrit grammatic 
                                                 
389 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 185–86. 
390 Mostly thematized in the Sessions IX-X of the retranscription.  
391 Johnson, A Dictionary of Hinduism. 
392 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 193. 
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rules. Īśvara means Lord (the divine). The usual translation is given in Hindi (Īśvara me parama 
prema bhakti hai), which means ‘the absolute attachment in Īśvara (the Supreme Lord) is 
bhakti.’ This corresponds to the first meaning Dwivedi elucidates. In the third meaning, his 
novel reinterpretation, he suggests another interpretation of the relation between the terms para 
and anurakti playing both on the grammatical relation and the different meanings of para: he 
analyzes it as “love for the other”, grounding otherness at the core of the concept of bhakti.  
What this reinterpretation of the bhakti definition attests, is that a personal relation to the divine 
does not imply exclusivity. Such an aspect is enacted both in the celebration of bhakti, for 
instance in the saṅkīrtana, where the community participate together in singing and recitation, 
and in so doing, constitutes an integrated part of it. But beyond participation, or collective 
experience, there is a further relation implied: the idea of service. Dwivedi explains: 
“The real problem in all these discourses is whether bhakti is more important or Bhagavāna or 
the bhaktas are more important. In the final analysis, what is important is the bhakta393. If the 
qualifications and the qualities of a bhakta are important, then, there is no need for any further 
discussion. If Bhagavāna is important, as philosophers thought, then intellectual awareness of 
Bhagavāna is sufficient. In that case, we can do away with the bhaktas because the intellectuals 
will take over the issue. So, it is in this context that we may say that it is neither Bhagavāna 
nor bhakta, but the bridge which connects the two, that is bhakti, which is important. And 
bhakti has two well-known forms (…) But in both of them intellectual awareness or action-
oriented awareness is not important. It is service, which is important in the ultimate 
analysis.”394 
Shrivatsa Goswami supplemented this idea in our meeting when he added that the essential 
nature of a devotee is to be the eternal servant of bhakti. However, the awareness of this 
“serving” occurs in the other who has experienced the same and communicates his relationship 
with the devotee. “It clicks”, he says, which means that it deciphers the moment of self-
revelation, unravels the awareness of being a devotee, which leads to the transformation as a 
devotee. This idea of becoming aware through the other in dialogue, in particular in realizing 
our essential bound with each other, is further explored with Daya Krishna’s philosophy in 
chapter 7, even if it does not bear a direct relation with bhakti. The idea of philosophical 
dialogues as a service to philosophy would need further investigation. 
The idea of expression in the community implies a relation between selves who share the same 
idea in constant dialogue, and the saṃvāda with the divine is a continuous celebration and 
revelation. However, Shrivatsa Goswami goes even further in the exploration of dialogue, with 
two further implications. First, the “inclusive transcendence in the socio-political realm” above 
mentioned indicates not only a ‘community’ but also a relation with the society, namely external 
communication with members of different communities. The session X transcribes discussions 
concerning the actuality of the ideals propounded by bhakti (notably in terms of equality and 
abolition of caste that characterize the bhakti movement), and the difference between principles 
of bhakti and the limits encountered in reality. It also questions the capacity for a feeling-
centered community to connect with external communities and guarantee a social order. The 
                                                 
393 Given the following of the quote, I believe what was said here is “bhakti” and not “bhakta”. 
394 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 226. 
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question implies a historical dimension concerning the integration at the time of emergence and 
propagation of bhakti and its relations to other communities, and the answer refers to the 
historical development and the foundation of Vrindavan. Shrivatsa Goswami interprets further 
the idea of saṃvāda at two different levels in connecting place and politics to elaborate the idea 
of “a dialogue in stone”. It is this idea that I want to elucidate now for its political but also for 
the literal anchoring of the dialogue in stone – and consider the relevance of the place to 
saṃvāda, not only as ‘embodiment’ but even as ‘engravement’.  
The epitome of the dialogue in stone is for Shrivatsa Goswami located in the Govindadeva 
temple in Vrindavan, whose visit constitutes the Session VI of the saṃvāda, and a specificity 
of the experiential dimension of dialogues on this occasion. The idea of a dialogue in stone was 
also expounded earlier in a paper by Shrivatsa Goswami entitled ‘Govinda darśana: lotus in 
stone”, where he develops the meaning of the temple from the metaphor of the lotus, carved at 
the main entrance of the temple. “The central part is a six-petaled form, which expands into the 
ever-increasing circles of the nine waves of the lotus. It is the key, or the mantra, for 
understanding the fabric and meaning of this structure in stone called Govindadeva.”395 The 
petals are history, power and politics, ritual, architecture, arts and the most important, saṃvāda 
(this discussion is developed in the Bhakti dialogue as “one, dialogue in stone, two, history in 
stone, three, ritual in stone, and four, power politics in stone”396). Shrivatsa Goswami evokes 
the subtle political game of the creation of Govindadeva, a dialogue between enemies and allies, 
Muslims and Hindus, North and South India:  
“This temple was a creation out of a political and power game design. And who was the plotter? 
It seems to me that it was Śri Caitanya. When the creation was beginning, he was living in 
Baṅgāla, and his movement was being persecuted. When his people went into the street and 
chanted the holy name, they were attacked, their drums were broken, they were beaten to death 
and thrown into the river Gaṅgā. (…) But when it came to the creation of Vṛndāvana, he chose 
a site at the eye of the storm, on the marching route of the invaders’ armies – whether of the 
Lodīs397 or the Mughal. Śri Caitanya knew that when political power is not at the core of any 
cultural or artistic or sublime creativity, the whole thing will collapse.”398 
At a time of Muslim domination of the territory, Śri Caitanya selected very carefully his “project 
managers”399, influential ministers having connections with Muslims rulers, as well as powerful 
people from South India, and convinced them via numerous visits400. Shrivatsa Goswami speaks 
of bhakti as the “resurrection of the Hindu psyche” in a time of political Muslim domination. 
                                                 
395 Case, Govindadeva, 269. 
396 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 129. 
397 Afghan dynasty (Muslim rulers) governing Delhi and founder of Agra at that time. 
398 Case, Govindadeva, 270–71. 
399 Case, 271. 
400 “Śri Caitanya very carefully designed the way he would carry out his purpose. He selected his project managers 
very carefully. The core of his management team came from a ruling family that had to flee Karṇāṭaka; in the 
second generation, the children had become the finance minister and prime minister of Husain Shāh, one of the 
more powerful rules of Baṅgāla at that time. Through correspondence, Śri Caitanya first establishes rapport with 
them, then he visits them and meets with them clandestinely at the village of Rāmakeli. He returns and continues 
to plan. Again he visits them and again goes back to Uḍīsā. On his third visit, he tells them that now the time has 
come to quit. Husain Shāh arrests his ministers and puts them in jail, but they escape. Śri Caitanya meets them at 
Kāśī and Prayāga, carefully briefs them and sends them to Vṛndāvana. Earlier, he travels south and picks up one 
of the most powerful people in all of South India.” Case, 271. 
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While bhakti, representing a religious minority, could have been seen as a threat to the power 
(arrested and condemned), it would not have achieved its state peacefully without an art of 
dialogue. Furthermore, and more extraordinarily, Shrivatsa Goswami adds that Vrindavan came 
as a gift from the Mughal to the Goswami. He added in our discussion that there is no other 
parallel in the world history of the holiest of the holiest of places for one religion to be a gift by 
another religion. In return of this Muslim gift administered by the legendary Mughal emperor 
Akbar (offering the township but also financing the temple construction), Caitanya ‘answers’ 
in the architecture of the temple:  
“Govindadeva can be seen as an expression of what might be called the Indian style of politics, 
the politics of embrace. The exterior of the temple expresses a reserved and carefully 
modulated interweavings of Hindu and Muslim architectural styles (…) One might say that 
when a Hindu temple, decorated with Buddhist features, danced in love with an Islamic 
monument, Govindeva was born. The politics of embrace culminates in the transformation of 
the other as part of your own body.”401 
The temple presents a combination of genres and aesthetics, which pays attention to the fact 
“that the sensitivity of the benefactor, that is, Akbar, may not be hurt, the Gosvāmis deliberately 
chose not to have a single picture or sculpture outside.”402 The architectural foundation, through 
engaging in politics, constitutes an inter-religious dialogue, which justifies for Shrivatsa 
Goswami the last petal, the most important of all, namely saṃvāda.  
“There are two kinds of dialogue that are manifest in the building of Govindadeva: the inter-
religious and the intra-religious. (…) A dialogue with the other is relatively simple; one 
confronts well-defined characteristics, and there is not much danger of losing one’s own 
identity. But still dialogue in these conditions becomes meaningful only when both sides are 
willing to give up something. In the case of the creation of Govindadeva, both Akbar and the 
Gosvāmīs gave up something. Akbar, who firmly disbelieved the worship of images, gave land 
to Govindadeva – not to the priests, not to an establishment, but to Govinda Rāya himself! And 
the Gosvāmīs gave up some important traditions in the buildings of temples; their move was 
daring, challenging, adventurous. In the end, both parties were enriched.”403 
Shrivatsa Goswami further develops the example of a British during colonization, who spent 
his resources in restoring and writing about Mathura’s architecture, opposing the colonial power 
that tried (and lastly succeeded) in dismantling his work.404 For him, this dialogue in stone, 
which was initiated by the strategies of the early construction, was then illustrated by the 
respectful and unique diversity of genres, continued in the ritual celebrations405. It moreover 
                                                 
401 Case, 274. 
402 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 132. 
403 Case, Govindadeva, 275. 
404 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 135–37. 
405 If politics may be said to be an effort to create in this world the realm of the perfect, then we have to look into 
the vision and needs of the people involved in this game. The main players here are Śrī Caitanya and the company 
of his disciples, whose ultimate desire is to be in a loving relationship with Kṛṣṇa. Their devotional life style, their 
spiritual discipline, centers around full-time devotional service, which leads them into an eternal loving 
relationship with the divine. The grammar and discipline of bhakti are mostly injunctional and are practiced 
through a set of rituals. In the standard ninefold bhakti discipline, ritualistic workship of Kṛṣṇa is the major demand 
on the seeker.” Case, Govindadeva, 272. 
 
145 
 
formed the actual background for inviting the participants in Vrindavan, to express and 
experience in “stone”, namely in direct experience with the temple that ‘incarnates’ (‘engraves’) 
all these principles at many levels and in all its layers. Could this temple and its visit represent 
a concrete example of what Daya Krishna calls ‘the art of the conceptual’406? Despite the lack 
of explicit connection in his philosophy, I suggest that it be understood as such and related in 
particular to conceiving dialogical knowledge as ‘multifaceted’, which I analyze in chapter 4.  
He further specifies the intra-religious dimension in the temple with examples in the 
architectural foundations of the temple407: 
“Intra-religious dialogue is of different nature. In such dialogue, very subtle nuances are in 
play, and the processes are often automatic and unconscious. But in this case the Gosvāmī’s 
dialogue was very conscious, because they were designers, and not only of temples in stone, 
but also of history, theology and ritual. (…) The other side chapel enshrines a devī never heard 
of before. (…) Vṛndā Devī is on a high pedestal, the realm of manifest nature. Where does this 
devī come from? It is the Gosvāmīs’ environmental awareness through the experience and 
enjoyment of Kṛṣṇa’s līlā in the pastoral landscape of Vraja that makes the basil shrub the 
presiding deity. The powerless is made the most powerful through an ecological process of 
aesthetic theology, ritual and arts, from the pastimes of Kṛṣṇa to the enactment in rāsalīlā and 
pilgrimages in the forests. The forests, the bower, has now been made into a house; the trees 
have been translated into stone.408 (…) The potential for dialogue to violate what has been 
established is a very interesting process. What happens here in this temple is a conscious 
violation of śāstra, so that a new śāstra can be created, and it reminds us of the dialectical nature 
of the creation of śāstra. There must be some material, some phenomenon, available to start 
with. From this can emerge categories and analysis that are systematized as śāstra. This in turn 
becomes part of the material available for further creation. This temple grew out of śāstra, but 
was developed in a dialogical creativity.”409 
‘The creativity of the violation of what was established previously’, here applied to the intra-
religious, can be extended to a further definition of the dialogical process aimed by Daya 
Krishna. The novelty of the critique of one’s philosophical tradition by transcending it, is 
however effectuated in Daya Krishna’s project via the externality of another conceptual 
paradigm, rather than in an internal exploration. The dialectical move of knowledge conceived 
in Daya Krishna’s terms in the opposition between ‘thought’ (as śāstric knowledge, a fixed 
body of established theories) and ‘thinking’ (as process and action working on the ‘thought’), 
                                                 
406 This expression refers to the title of a compilation of his articles, Daya Krishna, The Art of the Conceptual. The 
individual articles republished here however are not connected to Bhakti or dialogue. 
407 “For example, one such design was the Ujjvalanīlamaṇi of Rūpa Gosvāmī, the definitive work analyzing, 
incorporating and transcending the Indian tradition of aesthetics and poetics. In his chapter on Rādhā, Rūpa 
Gosvāmī made the bold statement that the śakti of the tantric tradition is Rādhā herself. This statement became 
formalized in this temple when the image of Rāsaraseśvarī Rādhā came to be installed beside Govinda. (…) Rādhā 
first took concrete form in the image established in Govindadeva temple in the sixteenth century. It was an event 
of dialogical evolution. Absorbing the śakti tradition, the aṣṭadurgās and aṣṭasakhīs, it was a very definite creation 
to make Śrī Govindadeva powerful (śaktimān).” Case, Govindadeva, 275–76. 
408 Another example: “The doorways of Govindadeva temple are decorated with the birds of the forest, not with 
other animals; and among the birds, the overwhelming presence is of peacocks, the emblem of the nikuñja. The 
brackets, overhead, which elsewhere are shaped like elephants and boars, here have been systematically changed 
by the Gosvāmīs into peacocks.” Ibid. 
409 Case, Govindadeva, 276. 
 
146 
 
or the opposition between śāstra and puruṣārtha (as seeking of knowledge)410, two poles in 
dialectic tension from which creative thinking can emerge, can be here anticipated in Shrivatsa 
Goswami’s words (see 4). 
Finally, the dialogue in stone that is expressed in the temple contributes to my exploration with 
a definition of saṃvāda: a performative dialogue built in the expression of a temple, upon which 
one reflects on dialogue itself. Following the logic of expression/experience above described, a 
last thing is missing with Govindadeva, namely the experience of the temple in the bhakti 
dialogue led by Daya Krishna. Did the experience enable something in the bhakti saṃvāda? 
And what does the introducing remark of Daya Krishna mean, when he specifies that “rather 
than meet in Delhi or Jaipur or Bombay or Calcutta, it is preferable to get together in a 
traditional place and to share the style of living, the ethos and to have a living contact with those 
who keep the tradition alive”411? It is naturally difficult to comment without extrapolating on 
the experience of the participants, but I can only suggest the influence of the holy place of 
Vrindavan, whether in the ashram of Jaisingh Ghera or in the Govindadeva temple visit, the 
relevance of the place for dialoguing itself. A concluding remark by Dwivedi can hint at the 
embodiment of dialogue (or even the “enstonement”, engravement of dialogue) and what 
Vrindavan meant for the dialogue itself (in Hindi): 
“I experience a strange mega-aphorism whenever I get invited for a contemplative session in 
a place like Vrindavan. It is an entirely different experience. Any dialogue happening in any 
city affects by way of the things learnt, but what affects the most is the significance of the 
location. Why is it so that Dayaji realized only on coming to Vrindavan that bondage and 
liberation, enjoyment and salvation are linked together? That there is no contradiction. Until 
now we have been habitual of thinking under the effect of the compartmentalized 
philosophizing of Greek thought, as Srivatsaji pointed out in the beginning. This is foreign 
manure. (…) When worship assumes the form of knowledge, a vision which is called akhaṇḍa 
[undivided/undifferentiated] assumes visual form by itself; differentiated vision ends and 
undifferentiated vision appears. As Dayaji said, “from reason into the realm of feeling and 
from feeling into action.” All three have been referred to in Gita by the term Yoga. It refers to 
karmayoga, jñanayoga, bhaktiyoga [path of action, path of knowledge, path of feeling]; what 
was implied was that the awakening of one after the other is necessary. There is a massive 
independence in the Indian tradition; you have to attend the company of sages to experience 
this freedom. We seem to have a vision bound to the outside. In their presence, it seems as if 
the democracy of freedom of thought has been established. This is the biggest particularity of 
Indian thought tradition. Everyone has a receptive vision, and a reconciliatory viewpoint as per 
his own era and his own age. This sense of freedom we realized in Vrindavan and if we can 
see this sense transform into mahābhāva [the absolute emotion] in front of Bankebihariji 
[Krishna temple in Vrindavan], then nothing like it!412 
 Daya Krishna continues in this sense, and in the variation of his naming the bhakti dialogue: 
“I have named it as an intellectual saṇkīrtana. Such a conversation can also be called an 
intellectual yajña [ritual]. Mukund has called it ‘satra’ [‘session’, also a great Vedic sacrifice], 
where everyone is a ‘yājak’ [one who performs yajña], as well as a ‘yajamana’ [one for whose 
                                                 
410 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 20–26. 
411 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 8. 
412 Original in Hindi, translated by Varun Sharma. Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 249. 
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benefit yajña is done]. But it looks into a new direction too, that when all of us attempt to think 
together, everyone’s ideas undergo some transformation. In the end, I will only implore all of 
you to continue this process wherever you go. Where we are, staying at such places and 
participating even a little in their lifestyle and routine gives our experience a new 
dimension.”413  
Daya Krishna reiterates here the basic principle of saṃvāda, the transformation (and violation) 
implied by the dialogue in practice, for which he integrates the experience of collectivity and 
the particularity of the holy place. The integration of a ritualistic lexical in the denomination of 
saṃvāda shows the way the dialogue proceeded, beginning with a skeptical question mark “is 
there an intellectual dimension to the bhakti tradition?”, which was meant as the initial 
philosophical doubt towards the religious bhakti, to naming the very dialogue as saṇkīrtana and 
intellectual yajña. Shrivatsa Goswami was amused by the “conversion” that occurred to these 
philosophers who came as opponents (pūrvapakṣa) of the spiritual and got transformed in the 
dialogue. The transformative dimension of the pūrvapakṣa that arouse here and in general, that 
was at play in the bhakti dialogue, is a significant part of Daya Krishna’s theorization of 
saṃvāda and will be developed in the next section 5.  
Finally, I would like to point out the influence of the practical saṃvāda in Daya Krishna’s 
philosophy has many aspects: one direct consequence of the bhakti dialogue is the writing and 
publication on bhakti with the provocative title “Did the Gopīs Really Love Kṛṣṇa?: Some 
Reflections on Bhakti as a Puruṣārtha in the Indian Tradition”414 and further “Bhakti, the New 
Puruṣārtha: The Tidal Wave from the South”415. My belief is that it opened a new way for him 
to understand the meaning of a dialogue and entering into the world of others, thus while 
keeping a critical voice. Instead of dismissing the religious, he came to investigate it critically, 
but however respectfully and playfully: 
 “At times it almost seemed blasphemous to say the things we said when the eternal flute of 
the Divine itself called to us every moment to give up the vain, empty, dry worlds of the 
intellect and the greeting of the “Rādhe Rādhe’ which reminded us of the ecstasy of divine 
love. But amidst these enticements and allurements what sustained us was the unbelievably 
long, hard-core tradition of the ever-seeking, ever-doubting sāttvika [genuine, true] quest for 
the ultimate Truth by the buddhi in the Indian tradition, which has never been afraid of raising 
the most formidable pūrvapakṣas against one’s own position and attempting to answer 
them.”416 
Thus, it further persuaded Daya Krishna of the necessity of saṃvāda and possibly developed 
new insights for conceptualizing saṃvāda, which means that I believe the points elucidated 
above in the concept of bhakti also contributed to rooting his theory.  
 
                                                 
413 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 250. 
414 Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, 175–88. 
415 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 148–54. 
416 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 4. 
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3.3.3. Unpublished Saṃvādas 
 
Further references417 can be found to different unpublished experiments, which illustrate the 
scope of a ‘saṃvāda movement 418 ’ under Daya Krishna’s organization. The “Sarnath 
Experiment” (Varanasi) pursued the discoveries of the Pune experiment and the possibilities of 
connecting Nyāya with Western logic, “where, for the first time, more than a hundred 
Naiyāyikas from all over India met under the leadership of the late Pandit Badrinath Shukla to 
discuss some modern issues in respect of Nyāya.”419 From Nyāya, a move to explore Mīmaṃsā 
was made in Tirupati, while another tried to explore Kashmir Saivism in Srinagar.420 
 “The first meeting of such a kind, i.e. of Nyāya pandits from all over India, was held in Benaras, 
the home of Sanskrit learning in India for millennia. The meeting, held for a full five days was 
such a resounding success and aroused so much enthousiasm that it was felt by everybody 
involved in its organization that such a meeting must also be repeated with traditional scholars 
specializing in other schools of Indian philosophy. Steps were therefore taken later to organize 
a meeting of Mīmāṃsā scholars at Tirupati in Andhra Pradesh, and of scholars in Kashmir 
Shaivism at Srinagar in Kashmir. One of the constant features of these meetings was the 
challenging question posed before the scholars of these traditions as to how they would further 
develop the thinking in these schools in modern times. Also, what was the doctrine or the 
position which the adherents of those schools could not give up without giving up their identity 
as belonging to a recognizable school, distinctly different from others. The more sensitive 
question, perhaps, concerned their own dissastisfaction with the traditional formulations – with 
                                                 
417 Due to their similar objectives and patterns, they can easily be brought under the same name of a continuous 
attempt. Comment by Shail Mayaram: “A series of dialogues were organized with traditional Indian scholars, the 
pandits. Seminars would always be held with plenty of breaks to let ideas seep in, and they always needed good 
food, particularly sweets, and sometimes novel venues. One session, on Vastusastra, was held at Amber Fort; 
another on Kashmir Saivism was held at Srinagar in one of the mountain valleys of Gulmarg; and on another 
occasion scholars of Arabic and Persian came together with scholars of Sanskrit. Francine worked with Mukund 
Lath on a book, titled Bhakti, that was the product of a dialogue at Vrindavan hosted by Srivatsa Goswami. The 
pattern was similar: The purpose was to confront traditional Indian scholars with a set of new questions, to de-
fossilize traditional Indian Philosophy, as it were, in order to spur a new impetus to thought.” Mayaram, “Daya 
Krishna,” 442. 
418 Mentioned by Mukund Lath, reported by Shail Mayaram in her Foreword to Daya Krishna, Civilizations, xii. 
419 Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and 
Polity, vii. 
420
 In a letter on 10. 02. 2006, Daya Krishna writes: “It would be ‘something’ if the exercise is continued and the 
presentation of Western thought in different fields of knowledge in Sanskrit for the information of Sanskrit 
knowing pandits in this country is done as it might provide a challenge to our traditional thought to ‘think’ in a 
new way as when two different intellectual traditions meet, something like the Sangam in Prayagraj might happen.” 
As Daniel Raveh pointed to me, this comparison beautifully expresses the idea of the saṃvāda project: in Prayagraj 
is the confluence of the rivers Ganga and Yamuna, the respective colour of each remaining distinguishly 
identifiable. In this confluence emerges also the (mythical) river Saraswati, who is a personification of the goddess 
of wisdom.  
“Later we had held meetings of Sanskrit pandits in the fields of Nyaya, Mimamsa and Kashmir Saivism at 
Varanasi, Tirupati and Srinagar respectively. Mimamsa meeting at Tirupati was held under the auspices of 
Kendriya Vidyapeeth itself. The idea was to bring all outstanding scholars together at one place to think and reflect 
how ‘Navya’ or ‘new’ thinking could be done in the contemporary context of knowledge in this country and 
abroad.” See also Mayaram, “Daya Krishna,” 442; Ventakesh, A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of 
Two Indian Philosophers, 35. 
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their defects, incompletenesses, weaknesses – as without these there can be no such thing as 
the living growth of a system.”421 
“Prof. G. C. Pande, Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya and Prof. N. S, Dravid held a series of 
sessions with the pundits of Varanasi. Then in Calcutta, Prof. Bhattacharyya, Prof. Dravid and 
myself met the Bengali pundits. There we had a very lively meeting and the pundits responded 
creatively to what we were trying to do; in fact they reversed the process and asked us to try to 
deal with traditional problems in the light of modern philosophy. One began to have a sense 
that the tradition was active and alive and one also became aware of the immense complexity 
of the different schools, a sense that the usual textbooks on the different systems of Indian 
philosophy just do not reveal.”422  
Dialogues also engaged with Islamic philosophy, as was mentioned earlier, with Ulema in 
Hyderabad and Lucknow (27-29 October 1987), to which Mustafa Khawaja refers to and 
provides us with the questions circulated in Urdu and English at that time in his article,423 and 
Daya Krishna mentions an attempt by Jamal Khawaja at Aligarh Muslim University with the 
support of the Indian Council for Philosophical Research424. Although it ensued the experiments 
with Sanskritists, its general relevance to contemporary India is not underestimated by Daya 
Krishna:  
“The existence of Arabic philosophy is fairly well known though it is usually treated either as 
an appendage to Greek philosophy or as a transmitting channel through which Greek 
philosophy was introduced to Western Europe. Its existence in its own right has seldom been 
recognized, nor its own independent contribution to philosophical thought carefully assessed. 
(…) The story of its transplantation into India and its independent treatment there is, however, 
hardly known to anybody. To have become aware of it, is itself an immense gain whose 
philosophical fruits can only be known in the future. But (…) it imposes on the philosophical 
intelligentsia of contemporary India the same tasks and duties with respect to it. And this is to 
become aware of it and to establish a living dialogue with it, so that it may transform both itself 
and us in the process.”425 
Furthermore, Mukund Lath426 also mentions saṃvādas that happened on Mīmaṃsā in Chennai 
and on Nyāya in Delhi. The need to connect traditions but also fields of research, which 
expresses a need to draw anew the borders erected between scientific domains, was also felt427 
                                                 
421 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 74. Further mention: 
“We have also tried to bring scholars in one area together, as, for example, in the field of Nyāya, where a hundred 
people from all over India gathered together at Sarnath, Varanasi for five days and discussed some new issues 
which had been formulated with respect to Nyāya. This has also been attempted with respect to Mīmāṃsa and 
Kashmir śaivism. We have held meetings at traditional places like Wai at the Prajñā Pāṭhaśālā of Pt. Laxman 
Shastri Joshi, one of the greatest scholars this country has produced, and the editor of Dharmakośa, twenty one 
volumes of which have already been published.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary 
Discussion, 8. 
422 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, xxiii. 
423 Mustafa Khawaja Mayaram, Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj, 108–19. 
424 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 81. 
425 Daya Krishna, 80. 
426 Personal communication with Mukund Lath, which took place in Jaipur, on 06h Mai 2016.  
427 “However, the discovery of a living, alternative philosophical tradition cannot long remain confined to the field 
of philosophy alone. It inevitably raises the issue of alternative cognitive traditions in other fields of knowledge, 
too. As philosophy itself is not an isolated cognitive activity, it is intimately related to all other fields of knowledge 
and is both affected by them and affects them in a substantive manner over a period of time. But in case this is 
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and led to the organization of interdisciplinary saṃvādas. In Bhubaneshwar and in Orissa, 
dialogues in the field of linguistics in cooperation with the Central Institute of Indian languages 
of Mysore and the Central Institute of English and Foreign languages in Hyderabad were 
organized.428 “Current issues in linguistics were framed for discussion by these two institutions 
jointly and then translated into Sanskrit and circulated to traditional scholars beforehand.”429 
One step further in transcending fields limits was taken in a dialogue in Amber about Vastu 
ṣastra, described by Ventakesh as  
“an offbeat case is when he got together a group of traditional Indian ‘Sthapathis’ rooted in 
‘Vaastu Shastra’, including Shri Ganapathy Sthapathy from Chennai to directly interact with 
modern Indian architects, at a seminar in Jaipur, to help uncover conceptual issues and 
structural divergences.”430 
However, the apparent loss of the reports concerning their organization makes it difficult to 
analyze how they could have contributed either to their philosophical field or to a methodology 
of dialogue. The contents have also not been published and I could neither locate recordings 
nor any substantial details, neither administrative nor philosophical. The different mentions to 
various saṃvādas testify of a certain sustainability of the project under the guidance of Daya 
Krishna. They also outline the wide range of topics touched upon and the participation, the 
interdisciplinary and intercultural commitment of the project. However, since no further 
publication and transcription have been made, research on these unpublished saṃvādas is 
necessarily limited. Indeed, the important number of dialogues that have not been transcribed, 
the lack of systematic reports analyzing the results and the future of the project and the absence 
of theoretical methodology of saṃvādas makes it vulnerable to oblivion and unusable by further 
researchers. In that sense, it indicates a lacuna by the organizers and participants (or if results 
have been lost, by successors) concerning the reports and the analysis of outcome. If the 
participants individually benefited from the saṃvādas, the lack of systematic publication 
seriously undermines the future use of the project. 
 
3.4. Dialoguing Between Contemporaries: Challenging the ‘Temporal Imbalance’ and the 
‘Assymetry’ of Classical Indian/Contemporary Western Philosophical Encounters 
 
Saṃvāda emerged from the will to acknowledge the diversity of philosophizing in India, 
linguistically and conceptually, rooted in multiple traditions. It certainly drives its relevance 
and its scope from the interaction with paṇḍits in Sanskrit. This commitment to Sanskrit over 
Arabic or other languages, correlates to Daya Krishna’s discovery that Sanskrit could be the 
national language of philosophizing in India, possibly completing, if not replacing, the place of 
English, the use of which is commonly justified as a link between different linguistic 
communities in India. However, while the idea of saṃvāda is born from this postcolonial 
                                                 
even marginally true, one has to seek and search for alternative cognitive traditions in other fields of knowledge 
in India and establish a dialogue with their living representatives, if any.” Daya Krishna, “Emerging New 
Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 75–76. 
428 Daya Krishna, 76. 
429 Daya Krishna, 76. 
430 Ventakesh, A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of Two Indian Philosophers, 35. 
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awareness and its milestones belong to the area of Sanskrit-English communication, it would 
be unfair to limit saṃvāda to this scope. I mentioned several occasions of inclusions of Ulema. 
The reports include Buddhists, and also numerous interactions with non-Indian philosophers. It 
is however true that the lack of publication of these dialogues makes it difficult to evaluate the 
results.   
 
However, there is one more category which has been underestimated in Daya Krishna’s 
enterprise, and even severely condemned for its lack by A. Raghuramaraju: the relevance of 
contemporary Indian philosophers writing in English in the project, not as participants 
questioning paṇḍits, but as topics of investigation. Raghuramaraju indeed mentions in his 
publications the “temporal imbalance”431 of the saṃvāda project, answering ‘classical’ Indian 
philosophy with ‘contemporary Western philosophy’432. This conception is already, I believe, 
a certain misunderstanding, since Daya Krishna did not conceive of the paṇḍits as classical, but 
precisely as contemporary, answering now and here contemporary questions in Sanskrit from 
the traditions. Daya Krishna even responded to this question of “temporal imbalance”, even if 
he analyzed it in a slightly different way. He addressed the “asymmetry” that one could object 
to the project due to the one-directional preparation of saṃvāda, which prepared ‘contemporary’ 
questions to ask to ‘traditional philosophers’. He thus answers:  
“Though it was inevitable that in the initial stages problems had to be taken from the 
contemporary western context, the situation need not remain asymmetrical for long and the 
pandits trained in the classical philosophical traditions of India may raise counter-questions of 
their own with respect to the western formulations. In fact, such questions become inevitable 
in the course of the dialogue as the intelligibility of the problems posed itself depends on 
assumptions which, though widely accepted within the western tradition, are hardly accepted 
within the Indian one. And, once the hidden assumptions are brought into the open they 
themselves become the subject of discussion. Further, as the traditional Pandits become aware 
of the western philosophical tradition, they are bound to raise questions regarding it and, to 
some extent, they have already started doing so. In one of the summer/winter schools in modern 
logic for traditional Nyāya Pandits, held on their own request to acquaint them with modern 
logic, this has occurred to some extent.”433 
Raghuramaraju expends however his argument in his book Philosophy and India, suggesting 
that Daya Krishna completely missed the ‘modern philosophers’ of India, such as Vivekananda, 
Sri Aurobindo and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, who were the ones able to bridge the 
classical and the modern in their own writings, in particular in the case of Advaita Vedānta. He 
further considers that rather than pointing at the absence of the classical in the modern as Daya 
Krishna and the participants did, one should focus on pointing at the wrongness of the 
“antagonism” between classical and modern inherited from the Western structures 
(acknowledging thereby the political matrix in which these modern philosophers were 
embedded, unlike the paṇḍits). He writes accordingly: 
                                                 
431 A. Raghuramaraju, Philosophy and India: Ancestors, Outsiders, and Predecessors, First edition (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), xv; 55–65. 
432 A. Raghuramaraju, Debates in Indian Philosophy: Classical, Colonial, and Contemporary (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 16–17. 
433 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 78. 
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“This proposal of the modern contemporary Indian philosophers for a synthesis between 
classical Indian philosophy – in this case Vedānta – and modern science, rather than the 
rejection of the classical instituted by modern Western philosophers, provides a good 
foundation for facilitating the recognition of pandits as philosophers. However, the opportunity 
that these modern Indian philosophers, such as Vivekananda, provide, and their immense 
contribution have escaped the attention of the authors of the Saṃvāda project. There is no 
reference in the project of modern Indian philosophers. One might say that what pandits are to 
modern Western philosophers, contemporary Indian philosophers are to the philosophers of 
the Saṃvāda project. This project, in its enthusiasm for their ancestors, neglected their 
predecessors, an omission which costs them dearly. The neglect is particularly ironic, 
considering that the project is authored by those very philosophers who are making out a case 
for the victims of exclusion.”434 
Two further counterarguments answer Raghuramaraju’s claim: firstly, Daya Krishna, student 
of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, himself son of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, remains throughout 
his work435 deeply influenced by the Bhattacharyyas’ philosophies (Krishna Chandra’s theory 
of feeling is at length discussed in the Bhakti dialogue itself436). Daya Krishna’s philosophical 
work is marked by the English academic scene in India with which he was constantly engaged. 
Furthermore, beyond the influence exerted by the Bhattacharyyas, a clear endeavor to bring 
acknowledgment to them, in a way close to the one he claimed for the paṇḍits, can be read in 
the publication of his work Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century 
Onwards: Classical and Western437, developed in several steps438 until becoming part of the 
voluminous collection “History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization” 
edited by D. P. Chattopadhyaya. Another, although smaller, analysis can be found in the chapter 
“Developments in Classical Indian Philosophy after British Intrusion and the Creation of the 
Apartheid in the Intellectual World of Modern India”439. These works constitute an elaborated 
overview of the Anglophone post-colonial Indian philosophers to disseminate their work and 
relate to their thoughts.  
 
But since Raghuramaraju specified that his critique concerned the saṃvāda project, let us 
consider the integration of contemporary philosophers within this scope. Even there, the stance 
is univocal, for example when Daya Krishna claims during the saṃvāda on Bhakti:  
                                                 
434 Raghuramaraju, Philosophy and India, 62. 
435 -, “K.C.Bhattacharya on Indian philosophy”, Visvabharati Quarterly 24, 1958-59 ; Daya Krishna, “Appearance 
and Reality,” in Current Trends in Indian Philosophy, ed. K. Satchidananda Murty and K. Ramakrishna Rao 
(Waltair: Andhra University Press, 1972), 177. Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth 
Century Onwards; Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions; Daya Krishna 
and Bhatnagar, Agenda for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy, 427-438;507-508; Bhattacharyya, “Svaraj 
in Ideas,” 563–65. 
436 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 176–91. 
437 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards. 
438 Requested by D. P. Chattopadhyaya, a first chapter of the future Prolegomena has been for example published 
in another volume of the same project: Daya Krishna, in D. P. Chattopadhyaya and Ravinder Kumar, eds., Science, 
Philosophy, and Culture: Multi-Disciplinary Explorations (New Delhi: Project of History of Indian Science, 
Philosophy, and Culture in association with Indian Council of Philosophical Research : Distributed by Munshiram 
Manoharlal Publishers, 1996), 480–504. 
439 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 197–216. 
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“I started this seminar on the first day by saying that we have to develop a living relationship 
with the past tradition of this country, and I have tried to articulate what a living relationship 
means. But I must further add that we have to make a living relationship with the contemporary 
present or the recent past also. If we do not pay attention to our thinkers, if we do not take 
seriously what they say, if we do not develop it further, if we do not criticize it or modify it, 
how can we build any tradition? The utter neglect in this country of not only our traditional 
thinkers but of our recent thinkers is appalling. I cannot really find a word to express my 
indignation, anger and surprise at the fact that even the works that have been done in India 
since the 19th century onwards have not been paid attention to by subsequent thinkers. 
Everyone seems to be writing in vacuum.”440  
Even when the dialogue addressed the bhakti traditions, the objective was to include the 
traditions as living, including the contemporary works on the traditions and the differences and 
plurality of traditions by recent thinkers, also those from the post-colonial Anglophone world. 
 
I finally agree with Raghuramaraju’s argument concerning the specific lack of discussion on 
Gandhi and Vivekananda.  However, I do not find the argument particularly relevant for the 
general dialogical project, which was in particular concerned with bringing visibility to 
unknown and/or discriminated philosophers and traditions. Gandhi’s and Vivekananda’s works 
are extensively researched and mentioned in any textbook and philosophical corpus on modern 
Indian philosophies. Thus, they are also among the rare Indian philosophers to be 
internationally known. As Shail Mayaram also mentions in the words she attributes to Daya 
Krishna in her fictive dialogue,441 it was probably not felt as a lacuna nor as a lack of dialogue 
but as the crystallization of what ‘Indian’ philosophy seems to represent in the reception it 
encountered. However, I sympathize with Raghuramaraju’s basic argument on the imbalance 
with regard to Anglophone Indian philosophy if it is extended to academic Anglophone Indian 
philosophy: the works of M. P. Rege, S. S. Barlingay, Sundara Rajan, Srinivasa Rao, K. J. Shah, 
to name just a few, would have deserved independent saṃvādas. It would nevertheless be unfair 
to Daya Krishna to conclude that he did not at all consider his peers in the saṃvāda project. If 
I concede the qualification ‘imbalance’, it does not however mean absence. Daya Krishna did 
bring attention to Anglophone academic philosophy, notably in organizing with his colleague 
K. L. Sharma discussions and publications of articles which were published under his name on 
J. N. Mohanty and Kalidas Bhattacharyya,442 followed in the same series by an edition of N. V. 
Banerjee edited by Margaret Chatterjee, 443  which included answers by the concerned 
philosophers. A note in the same volume mentions that “the papers written by Professor A.G. 
Javadekar, Professor N.S. Dravid and Professor Hiranmoy Banerjee were originally presented 
at a seminar on the philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee held in April, 1982 under the 
auspices of the Department of Philosophy in the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, and organized 
by Professor Daya Krishna”444, which points at further possible engagements on contemporary 
                                                 
440 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 174–75. 
441 Mayaram, Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj, 283–84. 
442  Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose, and P. K. Srivastava, eds., The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, 9 (Pune: 
Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, 1985). 
443 Chatterjee, The Philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee. 
444 ‘Editor’s Preface’, xxiii. 
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Indian philosophies that could have happened at the University of Rajasthan, of which traces 
are not available. In the introduction to the edited book on Kalidas Bhattacharyya follows an 
anticipated answer to Raghuramaraju’s critique445: 
 “We are happy to release our ninth publication, 'The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya ' 
edited by Professor Daya Krishna with the assistance of Prof. A. M. Ghose and P. K. 
Srivastava. The papers included in this volume were presented at a seminar on the philosophy 
of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, planned and organized during January 1981, by the Department of 
Philosophy, Rajasthari University, Jaipur.”446 
“There can be little doubt that hardly any attention has been paid to philosophical thinkers of 
India's recent past. Somehow the attention has either been focused on contemporary 
philosophers in the West or on those Indian thinkers who have played a significant role in the 
religious or political life of this country. While Vivekananda, Tagore, Aurobindo and Gandhi 
have been discussed a great deal, the same cannot be said of such professional philosophers as 
K. C. Bhattacharyya, G. R. Malkani, S. Radhakrishnan, K. D. Bhattacharyya, N. V. Banerjee 
and others. The alleged spirituality of Indian philosophy and its relation to mokṣa seem to have 
continued to haunt contemporary Indian philosophers also. That perhaps may be one reason 
why hard-core philosophers have not attracted the attention even of those who have considered 
themselves philosophers in the current Western sense of the term. There can be little doubt that 
after K. C. Bhattacharyya, Kalidas Bhattacharyya was one of the most original thinkers 
amongst the professional philosophers in the country in this century. It has been our desire for 
long to organize seminars about the work of living philosophers of this country so that they 
may respond to a critical appraisal of their work by their colleagues in the country.”447  
Lastly, another critique on the crucial idea of ‘asymmetry’ in the encounter between these 
philosophical traditions must be addressed, which calls into question the whole saṃvāda project. 
Written almost en passant in his weighted manner, Wilhelm Halbfass was actually answering 
Rada Ivekovic on the politics of comparison in the volume dedicated to his research and edited 
by Franco and Preisendanz when he formulates this sharp critique. He uses Daya Krishna as a 
                                                 
445 In the publication of the volume on J. N. Mohanty, another argument can be found: “The volume on the 
philosophy of Professor J. N. Mohanty was conceived as a part of the exercise to awaken interest in the work of 
contemporary Indian thinkers in the field of philosophy, to subject their work to a critical scrutiny and to persuade 
the thinker to creatively respond to his criticism. The enterprise itself was part of a wider concern that for certain 
reasons, both the past and the present traditions of philosophizing in India had ceased to be matters of living interest 
to the philosophical community in the country. In fact, there was no philosophical community; there were only 
individuals who took interest in philosophy, or sometimes philosophized on their own. And, though there were a 
few outstanding individuals, there was no live give-and-take, no feeling of growth, no sense of critical indebtedness 
to the achievements of the past masters, or of intellectual accountability to future generations of philosophers in 
India.  
It was these feelings that made the Department of Philosophy at Jaipur in the University of Rajasthan undertake a 
series of activities such as the preparation fo Subject and Author indexes to about twelve important philosophical 
periodicals published in English in India, the holding of a series of seminars in which contemporary philosophical 
issues were to be examined in the light of classical Indian philosophy, the establishment of a live dialogue with 
traditional pandits in the field of philosophy, the attempt at a differentiated conceptual mapping of the hard core 
intellectual terrain in different fields of knowledge in the Indian tradition, and a critical examination of the 
philosophical writings of some of the important living thinkers in contemporary India.” K. L. Sharma and Daya 
Krishna, eds., The Philosophy of J. N. Mohanty, 1991 edition (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical 
Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1991), vii. 
446  ‘Editors’ Preface’ (by S. S. Barlingay and Rajendra Prasad), Daya Krishna, Ghose, and Srivastava, The 
Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, vii. 
447 ‘Introduction’ by Daya Krishna, Daya Krishna, Ghose, and Srivastava, ix. 
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(rather failed) example of contemporary approach trying to re-balance the encounter between 
‘India and Europe’, the topic of which concerned his own endeavor: 
 “Recent efforts to explore the actual feasibility of balancing the situation of the encounter and 
perhaps reversing the asymmetry of the dialogue deserve our attention. But are they really 
more than isolated curiosities? In a series of conferences initiated by Daya Krishna on behalf 
of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, attempts have been made to test whether (and, 
if possible, to demonstrate that) traditional Sanskrit pandits can deal, in Sanskrit, not only with 
their own tradition, but also with problems of Western philosophy and science in a manner 
which would not be fundamentally different from the way modern Western terms and concepts 
are used to deal not only with the Western, but also the Indian tradition. (…) Can such efforts 
produce convincing answers to questions such as the following ones, which I raised in India 
and Europe with regard to the inherited hermeneutic resources of traditional or traditionalistic 
Sanskrit pandits: 
“Do they possess traditional means of understanding which are sufficient to respond to and 
interpret the modern world? Does the tradition itself provide such a framework of 
understanding? (IE, p. 261).”  
The setup of Daya Krishna’s meetings is, of course, somewhat artificial and remains embedded 
in a thoroughly Western or Westernized context. Such experiments ought to be encouraged, 
but we can hardly expect any significant hermeneutic reversal from them. In general, there 
seems to be little we can do, in terms of organized, methodic procedures, to bring about a 
fundamental change. The urge to act, to organize, to initiate change may, in fact be 
counterproductive. For the time being, there seems to be little choice but to continue the 
(admittedly asymmetrical) dialogue, the careful reading and listening, the patient work of 
understanding the other, but also understanding our own conditions and limits. We have to be 
ready for a certain amount of ‘Gelassenheit.’”448 
The critique is penetrating, and to a certain extend justified. Let us first clarify the context from 
which Halbfass speaks. Halbfass naturally is not located on the same side as Daya Krishna. 
Daya Krishna may primarily have been trained in a Western-fashioned philosophy and in a 
‘Westernized context’, his location in India nevertheless strongly distinguishes his hermeneutic 
situation from Halbfass’. Admittedly, ‘we’ who are working outside of India and/or with 
Western colleagues and who have to present our theses and arguments to this audience, “have 
to be ready for a certain amount of ‘Gelassenheit’”, for the simple reason that we do not have 
the material or ‘fundamental’ resources to create dialogues akin to the saṃvāda experiments. 
By fundamental I mean a ‘familiar’ hermeneutic ground (a mixture of friendship and trust 
required to honestly engage in vāda, the relevance of which has been clarified in 2.2.2). Are we 
however followingly allowed to conclude that what we cannot do ourselves cannot bring “any 
significant hermeneutic reversal”, which is implicitly what seems to constitute Halbfass’ 
argument? If there is little ‘we’ can do in terms of organization, can we not participate in the 
dialogue when invited and use further our colleagues’ resources? Are we also those who decide 
what should be encouraged without however believing into the relevance of what we cannot 
‘do’ ourselves? This passage is quite problematic for what could be seen as some disregard 
from Western Indologists towards their non-Western counterparts, positioning themselves as 
                                                 
448 Halbfass, “Research and Reflection: Responses to My Respondents. III. Issues of Comparative Philosophy,” 
303–4. 
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autonomous epistemic agents, and rejecting collaborating forms they cannot control. 
Nevertheless, although this normative judgment cannot be held, and although the saṃvāda 
project cannot be dismissed due to the lack of self-reliance or trust by others, some limits of the 
results of the saṃvāda project are precisely outlined by Halbfass.  
The question “but are they really more than isolated curiosities?” refers to the limits of the 
audience I already mentioned above, and can also be affirmatively stated again: the experiments 
included a limited number of paṇḍits and cannot be - as of today - said to have reached 
unanimity (nor majority) in the world of Sanskrit philosophies in India. Followingly, the answer 
to the questions “Do they possess traditional means of understanding which are sufficient to 
respond to and interpret the modern world? Does the tradition itself provide such a framework 
of understanding?” will vary: responses produced by Badrinath Shukla in the saṃvāda for 
instance, testifies of a “yes”; but can it be expended to all and become a systematic answer? 
Probably not. However, I have highlighted the difficulties in locating and finding paṇḍits who 
are (sometimes remotely) away from the academic system: wouldn’t it be more prudent, and 
maybe humbler, to provisionally doubt whether they at first have been given a chance to 
participate in such a dialogue before definitively judging of their ability to answer?449  
Finally, to concede the end of the argument to Halbfass, it is highly improbable that paṇḍits 
would provoke this chance themselves, considering the certain closure of the traditions exposed 
above (itself a topic of Halbfass’ India and Europe450) but also, and more importantly here, the 
fact that the embodiment “in a thoroughly Western or Westernized context” is a condition for 
the elaboration of such dialogue. Indeed, as Mohanty also noticed,451 the emergence of these 
contexts in India is the consequence of a hybrid, cosmopolitan and postcolonial world that 
brought attention to the persisting asymmetry and ways to correct it. This justified in this work 
introducing the larger context in which the dialogues took place (2.1.2 and 2.2). The exposition 
                                                 
449 One could redirect Daya Krishna’s following critique to Halbfass (Daya Krishna does not mention any explicit 
name here nor indication on the Indologists he addresses): “There is so little knowledge about traditional scholars 
and their work that hardly anything can be said with confidence about it. However, the more we have come to 
know about them and their works during the last few years, the more suspicious we have become about the 
stereotypes built up over the past century-and-a-half under the leadership of western Indologists.” Daya Krishna, 
“Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 79. 
450 See for example Halbfass’ famous stance: “Traditional Hinduism has not reached out for the West. It has not 
been driven by the zeal of proselytization and discovery, and by the urge to understand and master foreign cultures. 
It has neither recognized the foreign, the other as a possible alternative, nor as a potential source of its own identity. 
“It has at no time defined itself in relation to the other, nor acknowledged the other in its unassimilable otherness.” 
[Mehta, India and the West, 117] India has discovered the West and begun to respond to it in being sought out, 
explored, overrun and objectified by it. Its initial position in the encounter was that of a target of European interests 
and expectations. It was not the course of Indian history, nor the inner dynamism of the Hindu tradition, that led 
to the encounter. Europeans took the initiative. They went to India. This is a simple and familiar fact. Yet its 
fundamental significance for the hermeneutics of the encounter between India and the West is often forgotten.” 
Halbfass, India and Europe, 172. 
451 I mentioned this quote in the clarification of the Indian philosophical context in Saṃvāda as a Reaction. Being 
Located in an Intellectual Context. Between Over-Presence’ (of the West) and Absence (of India): “One who is 
asking “What is Indian philosophy? What is ‘Indian’ about it?” has already situated himself outside of that tradition 
which we call ‘Indian’. None of the philosopher who shaped that tradition, and with those writings we are 
acquainted, ever asked such a question. They lived and thought within that tradition, which today we are, by the 
very questions we are asking, thematizing. In that very act of thematizing, a rupture has taken place.” Mohanty, 
“Indian Philosophy between Tradition and Modernity,” 233. 
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to the Westernized world is the condition for this awareness to arouse provoked by the colonial 
encounter. How paradoxical would it be to expect paṇḍits to provoke these dialogues occurring 
from a postcolonial perspective when we expect them to participate at the same time in these 
dialogues as the holders of an untouched tradition? In that sense, it is therefore true that the 
initiation and motivation of the saṃvāda is de facto embedded into Westernized and 
postcolonial contexts, since the debate simply does not exist without this awareness - this is 
also what justifies my appellation of the saṃvāda project as a postcolonial response in (2.2.1.1). 
It is also true that the dialogue entails an assymetric dimension, in terms of efforts and initiatives. 
However, renouncing to the dialogue due to this asymmetry does not remove the asymmetry 
either, it just leads to accepting to its political conequences in terms of exclusion of traditional 
modes of philosophizing. Denying this asymmetry is probably also not desirable, since it simply 
creates another illusion. Halbfass himself was very much aware of this hermeneutic situation 
that constitutes the concern of India and Europe, and it is slightly odd to read him escaping - in 
my understanding - the Halbfassian method itself452. 
 
3.5. Conclusive Remarks: A Philosophy of Saṃvāda? 
 
To conclude, this chapter developed the idea of saṃvāda on the account of the experiences of 
the dialogues organized under this name. I attempted to extract from the experiments described 
a certain methodology and practice of dialogue, hinting at possible procedures, requirements 
and definitions for thinking saṃvāda. The procedures are two-folded: the seminars (Jaipur 
experiments) and the JICPR proposed two regular and spontaneous dialogical laboratories. 
Weekly organized or scheduled for ongoing issues, they maintained and extended networks and 
resources in order to try different formats and to refine methodologies. These attempts could be 
in terms of interculturality, interdisciplinary, or modifying the rules of a seminar or a journal. 
Exploration of interculturality includes the discussion on the validity of looking for ‘Indian’ 
                                                 
452 Franco addresses the question “To what extent was Halbfass himself a Halbfassian while assessing the reception 
of Halbfass’ method and inheritage in the Forword in the volume edited by Preisendanz in commemoration of 
Halbfass (in Karin Preisendanz, ed., Expanding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-
Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass, Denkschriften / Österreichische Akademie Der 
Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse ; Beiträge Zur Kultur- Und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, 351. Bd. 
Nr. 53 (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2007), xi).  The two authors also discuss more extensively 
what could constitute a “Halbfassian method” in their Introduction and Editorial Essay on Wilhelm Halbfass in 
their earlier publication, Beyond Orientalism in particular its hermeneutic development both vis-à-vis Gadamer 
and Neo-Hinduism : “Is there a distinctive name to this Halbfassian "method"? Halbfass himself has not termed 
his "method," but two reemerging words, Gespräch/" dialogue" and Verständnis/"understanding," could capture 
what he has in mind. It is quite clear that the usual everyday meanings of these words do not always correspond to 
the Halbfassian usage; this is indicated already by the fact that "dialogue" appears in inverted commas in the 
Epilogue (chapter 20) of India and Europe. For instance, Halbfass seems to speak of a "dialogue" or "dialogic 
situation" even when one party is not addressing the other party, but is rather turning to itself in responsive 
reflection: even when someone like Hacker writes for a European audience, Halbfass considers what he says as 
part of the ongoing "dialogue" between India and Europe. Also, contrary to what is sometimes presupposed, this 
"dialogue" is not necessarily a balanced communication between two parties; Halbfass is of course clearly aware 
of the fact that the "dialogue" has been dominated by Europe so far.” Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, 
“Introduction and Editorial Essay,” in Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on 
Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, 1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), XI. 
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methodologies in social sciences by Anglophone Indian scholars versus including paṇḍits as 
the ‘authentic’ Indian philosophers - and what the Indian of Indian philosophies could 
accomodate or not.453 The interdisciplinary aspect was for example explored in questioning a 
“text” and “commentary” in different fields (see Appendix 1). The dialogical exploration of the 
JICPR integrated the different additions of columns and categories presented above. In all these 
cases, the use of an established platform enabled the changes in the structure itself, without 
need for pre-organization.  
On the other hand, the occasional saṃvāda experiments required a different organization. 
Although the idea of each saṃvāda occurred in ‘spontaneous occasions’ (philosophical 
questions that emerged in personal meetings), it was occasional in its frequency and larger in 
scale. It therefore required a rigorous material and philosophical organization, notably to 
formulate bilingual questions and invitations. This, which I described as a careful setting, 
reveals how rigorously planned the experiments were. The procedures are therefore divided 
between a regular, yet spontaneous organization supported by established structures on the one 
hand, and a spontaneous dialogical execution of a carefully staged organization on the other 
hand. The difference between oral and written accounts also makes a difference in these 
different experiments, notably in terms of the spontaneity: the orality and the direct 
confrontation with others in the different dialogues contributes to creative thinking in the form 
of ‘naked’ thinking described above. Although the arguments might not always be proved exact 
or accurate when spontaneously formulated, they illustrate Daya Krishna’s ‘thinking’ as a 
process in opposition to the fixed thoughts that constitute the resources from which one can 
think (see 2.1).  
More important than the opposition between thinking and thought is their necessary relation.  
The dialectic implied between the two motivates the saṃvāda project, criticizing the usual 
academic model that values thoughts over thinking. In the common vision of academics where 
knowledge is to be acquired by accumulation, thinking is believed to constitute of the addition 
of resources on known topics that do not necessarily question the perspectives from which and 
the grounds on which these resources are organized and thought. However - at least this is the 
regulative idea underlying the saṃvāda project - facing the visage (face) of the Other in a 
dialogue, in a Lévinassian sense, asks not only for an answer to one’s thoughts with one’s 
‘contribution’ on the same topic. It also asks for an answer of one’s ‘thinking in process’ hic et 
nunc, the orality of which is relevant for the spontaneity and directedness. The treatment of the 
JICPR as a blog reproduces this orality at a written level. While the context and the objectives 
of these two thinkers differ, the encounter in dialogue with the other has something in common: 
the insufficiency of the Other-as-object, either as character (persona)454 or as ‘thoughts’ and 
the overcoming of this objectivity in the direct relation.  
                                                 
453 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions. 
454 “Le visage est signification, et signification sans contexte. Je veux dire qu’autrui, dans la rectitude de son visage, 
n’est pas un personnage dans un contexte. D’ordinaire, on est un ‘personnage’ : on est professeur à la Sorbonne, 
vice-président du Conseil d’Etat, fils d’Un tel, tout ce qui est dans le passeport, la manière de se vêtir, de se 
présenter. Et toute signification, au sens habituel du terme, est relative à un tel contexte : le sens de quelque chose 
tient dans sa relation à autre chose. Ici, au contraire, le visage est sens à lui seul. Toi, c’est toi.” Emmanuel Lévinas, 
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These characteristics bear an influence on the definition of dialogue: it places the others at the 
centre of the definition, however as the other-in-thinking. In the first definition of dialogue 
(1.1.4), I emphasize on the difference with debate where arguments are posed on the same 
ground, which enable to agree on one common criteria to validate them. On the other hand, I 
suggested that dialogue was taking into account the notion of encounter in a continuous 
movement between the participants in the confrontation of whom the arguments were emerging. 
I think that the saṃvādas points at this oscillation between participants as persons ‘en chair’ in 
the direct encounter where the rules for debating can be questioned and the presuppositions 
implied in one’s conceptual framework can be unveiled. However, the persons appear as 
‘thinking persons’, in that they are not the object discussed and they are required to develop 
what Daya Krishna called a ‘detached intellect’, which is the thought being reflected upon. In 
‘thinking’ therefore, in Daya Krishna’s distinction, appears the flow of thoughts of one person. 
A saṃvāda is a platform for different thinkings in process to meet.  
There are, however, at least two serious limits to consider: this going-back-and-forth implied 
in collective thinking cannot seem to sustain alone. It should be regarded as a melting pot of 
thinking, a laboratory for novelty in thinking, and for the benefit of its experimental, thought-
provoking character. However, it cannot replace the labor of individual research. It generates 
impulses for new researches and it inspires the emergence of new ideas, but it cannot permit 
the elaboration of these ideas alone. Daya Krishna himself testifies on this point when he 
considers the slow fainting of the Jaipur experiments: “We gradually began to realize that we 
could not proceed significantly beyond what had been achieved so far. I realized then that, 
ultimately, only ‘individual’ effort would enable us to take any further steps towards the goal 
that we had set ourselves.” 455  These lines, written in the preface of his monograph The 
Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought, attests of the insufficiency 
of dialogues alone456. However, in spite of critiques on the “peril of autonomy” for knowledge 
and the “utopian character” of the “self-reliant epistemic agent” 457, such a conception of the 
                                                 
Ethique et infini: dialogues avec Philippe Nemo, Éd. 16, Livre de Poche 4018 (Paris: Librairie Général Française, 
2011), 80–81. Original Text. Personal translation: “The face is signification, and signification without context. I 
mean that the Other, in the rectitude of his face, is not a character in a context. Normally, we are a “character”: we 
are professor at the Sorbonne, vice-president of the Council of State, son of So-and-so, all what is [written] in the 
passport, the way we dress, we present ourselves. And all signification, in the usual sense of the term, is relative 
to such a context: the meaning of something holds in its relation to something else. Here, on the contrary, the face 
is meaning alone. You are you.” 
455 Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and 
Polity, vi. 
456 This is also attested by Bäumer’s account when she states that “the seminar was an exploration of Kashmir 
Śaivism, a relatively new discovery for Indian philosophers. Dayaji discovered it for himself, and was also viewing 
it critically. It was more the fact of meeting and discussing the issues involved, than a real contribution to the 
research on Kashmir Śaivism.” Bäumer, “‘Falling in Love with a Civilization’: A Tribute to Daya Krishna, the 
Thinker,” 35. (emphasis are mine) 
457 Chakrabarti’s analysis strictly investigates ‘knowledge from words’ in this paper and not the simultaneity of 
collective thinking. Nevertheless, his starting point serves my purpose: “The ideal seeker of knowledge in Western 
philosophy, at least since Locke, is a lonely figure. He does his job single-handed, finding out facts about his 
environment by direct observation, deducing, generalizing, and explaining on the basis of principles of inference 
which he has himself enunciated using his own 'natural lights'. However handy and plausible a bit of personally 
unchecked information might be, he would never take anyone else's word for it. Language does contribute to his 
knowledge- gathering enterprise, but only by facilitating the filing system, as a medium of preserving and 
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role of researchers and intellectuals remain the norm, relying on one’s own tower of doctrines. 
And however insufficient dialogues are alone for the foundation of knowledge, what Daya 
Krishna proves with the saṃvāda project is the other side of the same coin (of knowledge): the 
necessity of collectivity for thinking tout court. If dialoguing alone entails the risk of 
superficiality, as witnessed by Daya Krishna above, researching alone entails the risk of 
(besides arrogance and self-limitation) reproduction of knowledge under the appearance of 
continuity, where footnotes completes a thesis already pre-established. This account is based 
on a summative conception (I actually cannot know alone everything) but also on interaction, 
namely what the others do to my doxa in the dialoguing process, when what I hold to be true is 
proved wrong, when what I could not imagine is told in front of me. Insofar, it is the 
reciprocated dynamic of dialoguing, for the reflexive judgment on one’s knowledge and the 
impetus for opening new ones, that constitute knowledge after systematizing these inputs and 
questions into doctrines. Therefore, Daya Krishna continues in the same preface:  
“There is another obstacle preventing these traditions from becoming an active presence in the 
intellectual consciousness of the present. This is the attitude common to most traditional 
scholars who feel that all the thinking on these subjects has already been done and that nothing 
more is required except to ‘understand’ it as fully as possible. Their only dispute, therefore, is 
with regard to the ‘correct’ understanding of what the texts say in these matters. The question 
is not whether the understanding of a concept or of a set of concepts is ‘correct’ in the light of 
what has been said in a particular text or a series of texts on the subject, but whether one is 
creatively using and developing it to understand one’s own experience as did so many of the 
great thinkers in the past.” 458 
However, Daya Krishna himself pursued his individual effort half way only: while this effort 
led him to deepen topics on Indian philosophies explored during the saṃvādas (such as the 
above-mentioned book, but also the papers on bhakti, etc.), it did not prompt him to formulate 
a theory of saṃvāda. There is no explicit monograph on Daya Krishna on dialogue459 nor any 
systematic organization and reflection on the saṃvādas460. There are no explicit leads for a 
theory of dialogue, neither of Western conception nor grounded on Sanskrit sources, but only 
a few mentions, in particular in the introduction and prefaces of the published saṃvādas 
                                                 
processing, rather than procuring, data. Of course, none of us who learnt our first (and second and third...) 
languages by trusting our natural or appointed tutors and know most of our Science, History, and Geography from 
books, actually resemble this strictly self-reliant epistemic agent. But then, as an heir to Sextus Empiricus, much 
of modem epistemology wears its utopian character on its sleeve. One interpretation of the Socratic disavowal of 
knowledge could be that when he applied the strict criterion of knowledgehood to his own cognitive repertoire he 
found that nothing came up to those standards. Neither among the specialized scientists of our times who work in 
teams and depend more and more heavily on previously gathered results nor among educated common folk do we 
actually find such obstinate refusal to share epistemic responsibility with fellow-cognizers.” Bimal Krishna Matilal 
and Arindam Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” in Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of 
Understanding and Testimony, Synthese Library 230 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994), 1–2, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2. 
458 Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and 
Polity, ix. 
459 The most explicit full paper on dialogue is unpublished: Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, 
Debate and the Problem of Knowledge.” 
460 The most explicit full paper devoted to the saṃvādas is entitled: Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches 
in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy.” 
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explaining the project, in unpublished letters, in Daya Krishna’s statements in the dialogue on 
dialogue with Maurice Friedman - namely, an erratic conceptual journey.  
In our meeting461 , T. N. Madan conceded regretting the lack of a concluding theoretical 
approach that remains unachieved by Daya Krishna. Madan presents a worthwhile critique: he 
began from the fact that Daya Krishna was first of all trained in Western philosophies, where 
he started to bring his own contributions462  and from where he thinks. In reaction to the 
monopoly of Western philosophies and with a growing consideration for the discriminated 
philosophical traditions of India, Daya Krishna developed an urge to include the latter into the 
philosophical dialogue. In so doing, he chose to turn his back on Western philosophies. Madan 
therefore compared him to Louis Dumont and his relation to anthropology, stating the need to 
know the Other in order to know oneself. This anthropological prospect is wholeheartedly 
pursued by Daya Krishna in the saṃvāda project when he puts together different traditions in a 
question/answer setting. However, for Madan the problem remains the following: “Did he turn 
completely back?” For him, Daya Krishna gave up his strength for some “gold holders”, i.e. he 
jettisoned his strength and knowledge for some (exceptions) that do not leave space for others. 
I described earlier some limitations in the audience in terms of a certain familiarity: it included 
those scholars who were sympathetic to the project, but it certainly did not connect the whole 
communities of Indian traditions. The participation was gradual and Daya Krishna made 
effortless gestures to encourage the diversity of the participation and to extend invitations to 
different philosophical traditions and scholars. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the circle 
remained limited and only a few resurgences were effectuated after his death. Thus, for Madan 
it constitutes a certain sacrifice from Daya Krishna’s side. He did not have the same level of 
knowledge in Western and Indian philosophy, which leads Madan to estimate his project as 
“unfinished”. The latter considers the advantages of the project and the implication of numerous 
persons in the dialogues. However, as he notices, Daya Krishna “didn’t come to an end of his 
own”. He lacks a theoretical work in the way Dumont did: similarly, Dumont started working 
on Europe in the same way Daya Krishna started on Western philosophy, and then came to 
India like Daya Krishna came to Indian philosophy. Nonetheless, Dumont came back to Europe 
to draw his own conclusion (on the ground of his Indian analyzes), a last move that Daya 
Krishna did not effectuate. For Madan, this last synthesis is missing. While in Dumont, two 
texts are superposed, a theoretical and an ethnographic description (Madan specifies that 
Dumont disagrees with his interpretation), he sees a lack of the former dimension in Daya 
Krishna’s work. This is a serious critique with which I agree, and which justifies my work as a 
theoretical outline of the dialogical with Daya Krishna, inductively based on his saṃvāda 
experiments (the numerous dialogues in praxis) and connected to his theoretical philosophy 
(lacking a philosophy of dialogue). This chapter therefore consisted in an organization and 
description of the experiments upon which I outlined the above described characteristics. The 
next part connects these practical characteristics to Daya Krishna’s philosophy, yet not on 
dialogue. As much as the description of the experiments is based on personal reconstruction 
grounded on the material available to me, the following part is a personal reconstruction of the 
                                                 
461 Personal communication, 15.02.2017, New Delhi.   
462 In particular Daya Krishna, Nature of Philosophy. (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - 
Munshiram Manoharlal, 2009); Daya Krishna, The Art of the Conceptual. 
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relation between dialogue in praxis and the dialogical in theory: it does not focus on the whole 
of Daya Krishna’s philosophy but freely selects concepts (according to their general importance 
in Daya Krishna’s work and their specific relevance for the dialogical) to be related to the 
saṃvāda project, suggesting one interpretation of the multifaceted dialogical in Daya Krishna’s 
philosophy.  
If there is no theory of saṃvāda, is it legitim to postulate one in Daya Krishna’s philosophy? 
Does it mean that saṃvāda cannot be theorized in his work? Does it mean that it should not be 
theorized at all? (1) Indeed, some could fear a “fixity” implied in the theorization, which would 
confine saṃvāda in a definite system, against which Daya Krishna himself would stand. (2) 
Some could fear that trying to reconstruct the concept in Daya Krishna’s theoretical works 
would prevent the development of a practice of saṃvāda, that the theory would occult the 
praxis. (3) Some could even deny Daya Krishna the ability of reflecting on what could have 
been only a random experimental practice that could not be rooted in philosophical concepts – 
Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda would be an accidental and non-reflected practice detached from any 
methodological conception.  
(1) To the first criticism, one could answer that, although any theory is limited in the form of a 
finite paper, thesis or book, nothing prevents it from describing, analyzing, and defending 
creativity or dynamism, what Daya Krishna himself did throughout his work. His distinction 
between ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ can be helpful. If any theory on Daya Krishna will be to some 
extent a thought, i.e. something delimited by a particular author in a particular paper, nothing 
prevents this author, may it be Daya Krishna, to express the dynamicity of thinking. This 
dynamic can be found as an engagement with an idea, with a concept that can be further 
developed into other ‘thoughts’, delimited books for example, or into new dialogues. (2) 
Secondly, theory and practice are not excluding each other, and one could obviously develop a 
theory of dialogue while organizing dialogues at the same time, or engaging the same theory in 
dialogues. (3) The next chapters precisely constitute an attempt to answer to the last objection, 
namely the fact that Daya Krishna’s experiments are not grounded in his philosophy, or the fact 
that saṃvāda was exclusively a practice without methodological philosophical foundation. In 
spite of the lack of explicit theory, I believe it is justified to postulate a theory of dialogue in 
Daya Krishna’s philosophy, considering the relevance of his saṃvāda project for him as I tried 
to outline in chapter 2 and in general the relevance of dialoguing for Daya Krishna. First of all, 
it would be suspicious to imagine a hiatus between Daya Krishna’s practical engagement in 
dialogues and his philosophy, that is, in spite of a lack of explicit theory, to conclude simply of 
an absence of thinking dialogues. In a review article dedicated to the memory of S. N. Ganguly 
and edited by S. P. Banerjee and Shefali Moitra, Daya Krishna harshly reproaches the authors 
and editors to have not reflected in the edited volume on the practice of the concepts they use 
in their title, namely communication, identity and self-expression. For him, the identity of the 
contributors is very much restricted to Bengal, the communication is limited to the English-
sphere and the high cost of the volume restricts its availability. He further comments on the 
nature of the critiqus he makes:  
“If these remarks [the above mentioned critical points] seem both flippant and irrelevant, that 
would only mean that we accept the deep dichotomy between what is said and what is lived or 
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even what the act of saying itself implies, to which most intellectuals wittingly or unwittingly 
seem to subscribe. Perhaps the dilemma faced by all writers who are concerned closely with 
matters pertaining the the fact of living itself is avoided through recourse to the notion of 
engaging in a second-level activity, which all philosophy is supposed to be.”463 
The dichotomy that Daya Krishna condemned would apply to him if his dialogical practice 
would not have any colouring of his theory, if his dialogue would not be reflected in his 
discourse, or would contradict it. Would it be possible to bracket the experiments to the point 
of not thinking dialogues with Daya Krishna’s philosophy? While it is impossible to directly 
formulate a theory of dialogue, I hypothesized until now that one could reconstruct one from 
the intentions, the practices and the concepts of the experiments. While it does not constitute a 
central concept in his theories, the idea of a relation with others is more and more present and 
relevant in the saṃvādas from the 1980ties on, and it will constitute my following task than to 
show how this relation can be seen as dialogical. Moreover, Daya Krishna’s writings on 
knowledge, precisely ‘human’ knowledge, imply both others as constituent of the process, as 
well as correlated dimension of values in which knowledge is formed. This conception 
integrates the human seekings toward knowledge as a part of the process. Thus, intersubjectivity, 
including the intercultural variations as source of creativity, are very much part of his 
philosophy, to which I will turn now. Finally, the dialogical remained a method of 
philosophizing in Daya Krishna’s philosophy, something Raveh qualified as dialogue-as-
pramāṇa464, due to the method of approaching texts, in dialoguing rather than commenting in 
particular in his works after 2000. I believe that this last series of articles and texts can be seen 
as Madan’s expected ‘attempted conclusion’ and I wish to use it for suggesting a ‘prolegomena’ 
for thinking a philosophy of saṃvāda.  
 
  
                                                 
463 Daya Krishna, “Book Review: Communication, Identity and Self-Expression: Essays in Memory of S.N. 
Ganguly by S. P. Banerjee and Shefali Moitra,” Philosophy East and West 38, no. 4 (1988): 431, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1399121. 
464  Daniel Raveh, “Philosophical Miscellanea: Excerpts from an Ongoing Dialogue with Daya Krishna,” 
Philosophy East and West 63, no. 4 (2013): 491–512, https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2013.0046. 
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Part II: Saṃvāda in Theory 
 
4. Dimensions of Dialogues and their Entanglements  
  
“Daya Krishna ended his youthful enquiry into the nature of philosophy with the “contrary” 
reflection that philosophy is cognitive activity par excellence, which itself consists in getting 
into unsuspected conceptual muddles and aims at clarifying them, that philosophy lives in the 
clarification of its own confusions, “a clarification that is its own death.” So should we look 
forward to solutions of philosophical problems or shrink away from any solution for fear of 
the death of the thinking enterprise?  
Till the end, when he wrote the strategies for creativity in thinking, he never resolved the 
emotional tension, the love-hate of the subject that we see in the concluding chapter of his first 
book. He loved conceptual analysis, the ideal method of clarifying confusions, which, as we 
noted at the start, he called “the art of the conceptual.” But at the same time, he was open about 
the informational sterility of conceptual analysis. Not only did he mock all pretensions of 
philosophers’ special knowledge of ultimate reality as the confusion-mongering conceptual 
analyst wearing “the false plumes of the shaman, the priest, or the prophet”, he also threw up 
his hands at the conceptual disputations among philosophers about reality of time, permanent 
objective physical objects vis-à-vis subjective awareness of them by remarking: “What a 
mess!” There is always a tension which keeps him going at these issues. He enjoys the tension 
thoroughly and has no desire to ease it out.  
By the time he came to his last optimistic writings on the future of creative, cooperative, 
“cognitive journeys”, he seemed to have become iconoclastic about his own variety of 
iconoclasm also.  
An individual thinker cannot alone have this sort of idol-breaking desire. New insights take 
birth only when intellectual rebels get into a dialogue with the traditionalists, different 
incommensurable critiques of the old ideas start talking to each other even about the 
impossibility of talking to each other. It is then that what Daya Krishna called “the realm of 
between” emerges. Genuinely new cognitive desires come to be in that realm.” 465 
  
                                                 
465 Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” 23. 
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4.1. Dialogue as a Multifaceted Whole 
 
Admittedly, Daya Krishna was more engaged in actual dialogues than in methodologically 
constructing them, more preoccupied with philosophically responding conceptual questions 
raised by scholars in the world and from different traditions than theorizing how intercultural 
responses could at first emerge. The published saṃvādas, but also his numerous publications 
on Indian philosophies466, testify of this conceptual journey among traditions without needing 
supplementary methodological explanations regarding their elaboration in the context described 
in the preceding chapters. Nevertheless, it is possible to take note of the significance of 
intercultural dialogue if one reinterprets his later publications and connects his theoretical works 
on the relations between and signification of knowledge(s)467, truth(s)468 and freedom(s)469, the 
tension between values (puruṣārthas) and doctrines (śāstra)470 for creative thinking471. These 
definitions and relations include descriptions of the obstacles for thinking creatively and the 
‘thinking tools’ to be used (e.g. counter-position and questioning). Since Daya Krishna was 
intensely participating into dialogues among philosophical traditions before and during the 
period he developed these notions, it would be difficult to assume that these sides of his 
philosophizing had nothing to do with each other (which is also witnessed by Arindam 
Chakrabarti in the opening quote above). Could we, therefore, not assume that creative thinking 
was realized by his dialogical practice? Can we intrinsically relate philosophizing and dialogue, 
in the sense that philosophizing (in opposition to the exegetic and historical presentation and 
repetition of an earlier text) was necessarily taking place in the form of dialogues, intercultural, 
interdisciplinary or intertextual, and that in consequence, although not always explicitly, these 
later texts could provide us an entrée into a philosophy of dialogue, or in his terms, a 
prolegomena to dialoguing? How to think intercultural dialogues with Daya Krishna, in a 
theoretical way that nevertheless reflects the practice he was engaged with, and what does 
‘creative thinking’ mean for philosophizing in dialogues? Does the latter necessarily guarantee 
                                                 
466 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997; Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy; Daya Krishna, 
The Nyāya Sūtras; Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006; Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking. 
467 Daya Krishna, “Knowledge: Whose Is It, What Is It, and Why Has It to Be ‘True’’?,’” Indian Philosophical 
Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2005): 75–89; Daya Krishna, “Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of Knowledge,” 
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XXII, no. 1 (March 2005): 75–89; Daya Krishna, “Thinking 
with Causality about ‘Causality’: Reflections on a ‘Concept’ Determining All Thought about Action and 
Knowledge’,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 22, no. 3 (September 2005): 123–38; Daya 
Krishna, “Chance, Probability, Indeterminacy and Knowledge,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical 
Research XXIII, no. 3 (2006): 91–110; Daya Krishna, “Some Reflections on the Knowledge Called 
‘Mathematics,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 24, no. 1 (March 2007): 1–20. 
468 Daya Krishna, “Time, Truth and Transcendence,” in History, Culture and Truth: Essays Presented to D. P. 
Chattopadhyaya, ed. Daya Krishna and K. Satchidananda Murty (Delhi: Kalki Prakash, 1999), 323–36; Daya 
Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 
20, no. 4 (December 2003): 129–46; Daya Krishna, “Madness, Reason and Truth,” Journal of Indian Council of 
Philosophical Research 21, no. 1 (March 2004): 89–100; Daya Krishna, “Reality, Imagination and Truth,” Journal 
of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 21, no. 4 (December 2004): 115–28. 
469 Daya Krishna, “The Cosmic, Biological, the Cultural Conditionings and the Seeking of Freedom,” Journal of 
Indian Council of Philosophical Research 23, no. 4 (December 2006): 133–60; Daya Krishna, “Freedom, Reason, 
Ethics and Aesthetics,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 24, no. 2 (June 2007): 1–12. 
470 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 20–25.  
471  Daya Krishna, “Thinking vs. Thought : Strategies for Conceptual Creativity”; Daya Krishna, “Thinking 
Creatively about the Creative Act,” Punjab University Research Bulletin, 1999. 
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the former, do dialogues form and actualize creative thinking? Does creative thinking in this 
way encompass dialogues, does it exceed it? In this sense, would creative thinking be the goal 
‘seeked’ at when dialoguing, a criterion to evaluate the ‘success’ of a dialogue? And what could 
bring the ‘intercultural’ dimension, or the thinking between philosophical traditions, to 
creativity? Does it necessarily expand the possibilities to be creative, or does it impede the 
communication? Does it constitutively change creative thinking, or does it simply ‘taint’ it with 
different types of illustrations and communication practices? These questions raise different 
dimensions of the problems that are progressively developed in this theoretical part, and the 
difficulty with Daya Krishna is to retain the relations between these dimensions while clarifying 
the problems, which is however the core of the issue, and, in my sense, his most relevant 
contribution to the topic. For these reasons, the present chapter (4) attempts at highlighting the 
connections between the key concepts of Daya Krishna’s philosophy that I relate to his idea of 
dialogue, which I successively distinguish to delve in the next chapters (5 to 7). While it is for 
me a hermeneutic necessity to separately articulate the different dimensions that I consider 
fundamental for thinking dialogue with Daya Krishna, I am nevertheless firmly convinced that 
it is their entanglement that forms the dynamicity of intercultural dialogues. Hence, I first 
introduce the relations before exposing the complexity of each concept. I start from the dialectic 
tool Daya Krishna argues for to emphasize how these dimensions should be seen in 
interconnection and the central theme that I want to follow.  
The dialectic tool Daya Krishna often uses and refers to is retained from the Sanskrit concept 
of pūrvapakṣa (see 5.1), or counter-position: pūrvapakṣa in this sense is not simply a ‘counter-
’, i.e. an anti-thesis (pratipakṣa472). It rather implies to defend the other position to the best of 
one’s ability, i.e. to be (in) the other’s position for a moment, to integrate it to one’s exposition 
and ideally, to let one’s argumentation be transformed by the act of being in the other’s position. 
This refers to the task of intellectually detaching oneself from one’s position while engaging in 
dialogue with the other (see 1.1.4 and 5.2.1). But how to do so, what enables this movement of 
engagement via detachment? Engaging in dialogue while seeking non-attachment (niḥsaṅga 
buddhi473) as an ideal for participants implies, on the one hand, a detachment from a position, 
a mode of reasoning, a philosophical doctrine and a philosophical tradition. But if one 
acknowledges that philosophical positions, doctrines and traditions are situated at “the 
intersection of the past and the future as well as that of the here and the beyond”,474 i.e. at the 
crossroads of historical heritages, present interpretations and future applications, then it follows 
that this intersection “provides thus a matrix within which the history of any civilization or 
culture may be apprehended.”475 The challenge of the search for niḥsaṅga buddhi in dialogue 
thus implies revealing and unveiling this matrix, in the multiplication of the expressions of 
                                                 
472 On the analysis of pratipakṣa, see in particular Prets, “Theories of Debate, Proof and Counter-Proof in the Early 
Indian Dialectical Tradition.” 
473 “I would like to add that in all intellectual matters one has to have what I have called “Niḥsaṅga buddhi,” which 
is analogous to what the Lord had called “Niṣkāma Karma” in the Gītā.” “Shock-Proof, Evidence-Proof, 
Argument-Proof”, in Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 204. Commenting on this quote, see Raveh, “Text as a 
Process: Thinking with Daya Krishna,” 195; Daniel Raveh, “Knowledge as a Way of Living: In Dialogue with 
Daya Krishna,” Philosophy East and West 58, no. 4 (2008): 432, https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.0.0027. See also 
Khawaja, “The Dialogue Must Continue,” 108–9. 
474 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 15. 
475 Daya Krishna, 15. 
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different positions, modes of reasonings, doctrines and traditions - and in their intersections. 
Detachment is a way of letting differences appear in the game of dialoguing (see 5.3).  
Is that even possible? How can dialogue allow the detachment of its participants towards an 
intersection of positions, which would have no location of its own? And how can we argue and 
dialogue if there is no position, no location? Does that point at a dialogue in vacuo? There seems 
to be a middle point between a-position and a position, which is self-reflection via the 
intersubjective engagement, of analyzing from the perspective of the other’s position - and to 
change it accordingly, or to discover new questions in the enterprise. For self-reflection is 
grounded in what Daya Krishna sees as the fundamental capacity of consciousness “to move 
out of itself and to move back to itself” that “self-consciousness encounters when it reflects on 
itself”, or “the capacity for attending and withdrawing that is the foundation for all the 
consciousness does in its attempts to change itself from one state to another”476 (see 6.2.3 and 
7.3). This capacity is located in our very possibility to consciously be an active part of the world 
in which we are located, and while being fully involved in it, to be able to withdraw from it,477 
either by a critical ability to reflect on what we are engaged,478 or at a more spiritual level of 
detachment from the reality surrounding us. The force of such a motion is further elicited by 
Daya Krishna as constituting freedom (see 6.2.3): 
“Yet, that which is felt to be ‘unreal’ can become ‘real’ in an instant, the moment one wants or 
desires something, and feels simultaneously its ‘present absence’ and future ‘presence’, if only 
one were to do something to bring it about through action based on some knowledge relevant 
to it, and also pertaining to the same. The Indians call this pravṛtti, the generalized name for 
the ‘out-going’ movement of consciousness, determined by desire, and memory, and 
                                                 
476 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 2. 
477 Relating this metaphysical stake to saṃvāda, Daniel Raveh previously emphasized the importance of the ‘back 
and forth’ of the movement of engagement and disengagement: “Taking issue with traditional positions of 
disengagement-as-freedom, such as Patañjali’s stance in the Yogasūtra, Daya Krishna suggests that freedom 
cannot be achived through disengagement alone. Instead, he offes his own prescription of freedom in the form of 
the capacity to disengaged but also to ‘return’ and to re-engage at will. For him, the two movements, ‘withdrawal’ 
and ‘return’ are complementary, and freedom consists of both. Daya Krishna further suggests that if one accepts 
the possibility of ‘withdrawal’ and also of the ‘return’ from it, one has (…) to ask how the attainment of the former 
afflects the latter. One’s phenomenal existence, he argues, cannot remain unaffected by one’s metaphysical 
journeys. Hence he pleads for what can be referred to as abstract-concrete mediation, or more precisely, for an 
‘enlightened action’ in the world.” Daniel Raveh, “On Philosophy as Saṃvāda: Thinking with Daya Krishna,” in 
Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj: Dialogical Meditations on Daya Krishna and Ramchandra Gandhi, ed. Shail 
Mayaram (New Delhi: SAGE, 2014), 106. See also Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of 
Cultures and Civilizations, 68–70. 
478 In S. S. Barlingay’s words, which can be applied to what Daya Krishna expresses here: “Man’s role as a knower 
and doer or creator requires that he is not just a passive observer outside the process of creation but that he is a 
part of the creative process itself. His uniqueness is that he can patiently observe the process and be a critic of it 
although he is a part of the process. He is a part of the process because he is a product of the process, because he 
is governed by the cosmic laws. He can be a detached observer because of the awareness that arises in the process 
itself. It is this awareness which makes him a universe by himself, capable of looking upon the rest of the universe 
to which he actually belongs, as different from himself. The formation of his self-identity and alienation (or the 
otherness) from the rest of the universe take place simultaneously like the two ends of the sea-saw, one going up 
and one going down.” Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, “Experience and Reflection,” in Problems of Indian 
Philosophy, ed. S. P. Dubey, Facets of Recent Indian Philosophy, v. 3 (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical 
Research : Distributed by Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1996), 200–201. 
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imagination, and resulting in that perpetual ‘seeking’, or ‘thirst’ for what-is-not, which the 
Buddha called tṛṣṇā, and which lies at the root of saṃsāra, or the human world as we know it. 
 But if there is pravṛtti, there is also nivṛtti, the counter-movement of consciousness, 
the 'withdrawal' from it all, and 'returning' to oneself to find once again what one had lost to 
the ‘world of objectivity’, the saṃsāra with its myriad charms and unending frustrations, ever-
changing, never remaining the same or being ‘still’ even for a moment, as ‘time’ is the essence 
of it.  
 Freedom, thus, lies in this double capacity of consciousness at the human level to 
move outward or return inward as it pleases, bound neither by the one or the other, and hence 
at another level, feeling itself ‘free’ from both. Neither of these can define it exclusively, or 
exhaust its reality as it ‘appears’ to itself as transcending both, no matter if this is ‘judged’ to 
be illusory by the consciousness itself when it ‘sees’ the situation ‘objectively’ and tries to 
understand it. Both the ‘outward’ and the ‘inward’ movement seem to have in-built limitations 
not exactly known to man, and perhaps, ‘unknowable’ in principle, as the former encounters 
the ‘givenness’ of the body and the physical world on the one hand and the socio-cultural and 
politico-economic ‘worlds’ on the other; while the latter seem to result from the very nature of 
consciousness and self-consciousness, and the interactive inter-relationship between them.”479  
The freedom to oscillate originates from the ‘possibility’ of imagining further and of seeking 
further, thus of contemplating what is not (6.2.3). It is thus a freedom expressed negatively in 
the experience of the limits of the given, either of the natural condition of man or of the social 
conditions of one’s ‘world’. This external movement outward is furthermore constantly 
hindered by the centricity arising in consciousness: the ‘I-centricity’480, namely the fact that I 
cannot not escape from of the ‘self-ness’ of self-consciousness, further influenced by cultural 
centricity (along with the power-relations at stakes), tradition-centricity, doxa and school 
centricities - different battles engaged by Daya Krishna481- (see 7.3). In that sense, the capacity 
to move out and back, to withdraw and return, is not devoid of limitations, and the quest for 
detachment does not seek absolute liberation. Nevertheless, the awareness of these limits also 
unveils the potentialities of overcoming them in the movement of realization back and forth 
(7.2).  
It also points at the “feeling of constraint or determination by something outside itself, 
particularly when it finds that this dual movement is not a free act of itself, but is determined 
or influenced by factors in the external and inner worlds over which it has little control.”482 
Daya Krishna, rather than trying to erase any identification to reach a transcendental liberation 
                                                 
479 Daya Krishna, “The Cosmic, Biological, the Cultural Conditionings and the Seeking of Freedom,” 145–46. 
480 “The “identification” with one of these aspects [knowing, feeling, willing] and its relative predominance 
perhaps defines one’s personality and the self-consciousness in respect of them generates what may be called the 
‘structural illusions’ which are primarily rooted in the fact that one is generally able to effectuate or bring into 
being some state of affairs through the act of attending and intending alone. This generates the feeling that one can 
achieve whatever one wants through the mere act of willing or, as we have called it, attending and intending it. 
This illusion of almost omnipotent power centred in one’s consciousness is tempered by the fact that at the human 
level one needs the material reality of the body to bring into being what one intends and that one can be and many 
a time is opposed by other centres where the “I-consciousness” dwells as much as it does in one’s own case.” Daya 
Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 151. 
481 Raveh, “Knowledge as a Way of Living,” 431.  
482 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 3. 
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(7), suggests for example to turn to alternative views, namely to oscillate further between 
oneself and others (see 5.2.2). Concretely for instance: 
“Amongst the many possible ways of overcoming the limitations imposed by those natural 
identifications which are an inevitable concomitant of having been born and grown up in a 
particular region, language, religion and culture, perhaps the most important is the attempt at 
an imaginative identification with the other and trying to see things and situations from his or 
her point of view. (…) In a cognitive enterprise such as history for example, one may 
imaginatively try to write different histories from multiple points of view. No one of course 
has yet attempted it, but it would be an interesting exercise for any one historian to undertake 
and attempt to write different historical accounts of the same event or sets of events by 
imaginatively identifying oneself with diverse groups and persons involved in the historical 
event.”483 
The objective is therefore to find strategies to “free philosophy from the prison house of I-
centricity”484 (7.3). To be able to reach a counter-position requires space and time in thinking 
- to locate one’s position and to be aware of the resources (in terms of śāstric knowledge) and 
presuppositions of a particular place and time, but also to have the imagination to “move out” 
of it - to contemplate alternatives, to create other stories. The position and the seeking for an 
ideal of a-position, or freedom from one’s positioning, requires a faculty of imagination that is 
enabled with the experience of dissatisfaction of the reality (see 6.1). This dissatisfaction, in the 
forms of critiques, insufficiencies, lacks and inadequacies, makes us aware of our own 
conceptual presuppositions and limits: a capacity to picture the unboundedness of knowledge, 
and the desire and seeking to reach elsewhere.485 
“Imagination, normally, is supposed to be the preserve of the arts. But the capacity to go 
beyond what is given lies at the root of all innovation and creativity. ‘What is not’ is, therefore, 
more important than ‘what is’ or ‘has been.’ (…)  But, in the context of concepts, limitations 
arise from the settled habits of the past, which constrain thinking to move in certain grooves 
only. To break the habit one has to make a conscious effort to think against the grain, and one 
may develop as many strategies to achieve this as one can think of. The central point in all 
strategies, however, is a subdued, skeptical attitude toward the sufficiency of what is given and 
an openness to everything that suggests the possibility of the development of a new conceptual 
alternative or even of a new way of looking at old concepts that have ceased to excite curiosity 
or wonder or even interest by long familiarity and mechanical use. One of the simplest 
                                                 
483 Daya Krishna, 89–90. 
484 Daya Krishna, “Freeing Philosophy from the Prison House of ’I-Centricity,” Journal of Indian Council of 
Philosophical Research 20, no. 3 (September 2003): 135–43. 
485 Already in 1989, when the volume “The Art of the Conceptual. Explorations in a Conceptual Maze Over Three 
Decades” was published, in which Daya Krishna selected and edited articles he had written ‘over three decades’, 
he describes in his Preface the connections he sees between these (quite variegated in fields and topics) articles in 
the following terms: “Looking back, it seems that there is a perennial concern with certain central philosophical 
issues in these articles - the relation of logic to reality and its relevance to philosophy or philosophizing, the 
multifariousness of values and their essential conflict with one another, the essential irreducibility of diverse realms 
and the concepts and categories through which we demarcate them, the centrality of consciousness and the strange 
fact that beliefs tend to bring corresponding realities into being through the actions they influence, the strange and 
paradoxical nature of social reality as the continuing creation of a plurality of free beings, each simultaneously a 
subject and an object, an agent and a recipient, all rolled into one.” Daya Krishna, The Art of the Conceptual, xi. 
Most of the dimensions above described correspond to these topics “rolled into one”, although I do locate dialogue 
and counter-position as the mean that enables the connections of all these dimensions in intersubjective worlds.  
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strategies, perhaps, is to realize that, though one is aware of concepts in certain contexts alone, 
there are other contexts and settings in which they may also occur.”486 
Daya Krishna continues on the benefit of curiosity and unfamiliarity brought by the challenge 
of interdisciplinarity that develops our “comparative judgment about the way the knowledge-
enterprise is conceptually structured in the two different disciplines”.487  Whenever this is 
possible, “there is every possibility of returning with a new feel and fresh look regarding the 
concepts one is habitually used to.”488 Returning to one’s field, to oneself and one’s own 
conceptual structure after a detour into an imaginative journey to other domains gives us a clue 
of the creativity of such an imagination, as well as a concrete illustration of a moving back of 
one’s consciousness that consequently influences oneself as well as the other. Further, the most 
radical move to the other seems to be the intercultural move, “for normally within a cognitive 
culture even different disciplines share a certain way of looking at things or certain ways of 
asking questions or seeing certain issues as problematic. It is, therefore, only when one 
undertakes a conceptual journey to another cognitive culture that one really encounters a 
different world.”489 This stake sounds indeed like the philosophical manifesto underlying the 
saṃvāda project. 
Dialogue is integrated in these creative strategies as the incarnation and articulation of 
unresolved tensions between different dimensions of human reasoning, less in view of solving 
them by homogeneous methods and uniform conclusions than in exposing their complexities. 
In so doing, dialogue is nothing but the space that can allow these meetings, a carefully 
organized space for thinking to occur. But how to think this space if it is supposed to be only 
what let thinking emerge, i.e. if it is conceived as a ‘recipient’ or an ‘in-between’ without its 
own definite entity, malleable tool to be rearranged and redisposed at each occasion? If it has 
no fixed substance of its own but only an ongoing practice, can it be theorized upon? Would 
that already contribute to fixing it into a model that its very nature seems to contradict? We saw 
however, in the description of the experiments, that flexibility and openness did not occur from 
chaos, but that it followed a conscious organization. Can we think a careful organization that 
would avoid becoming a fixed model?  
 
4.2. Śilpa, Śāstra, Puruṣārthas and the Art of the Conceptual.   
 
To articulate further these dimensions, I retrieve from Daya Krishna’s analysis on 
historiography in Prolegomena To Any Future Historiograpphy of Cultures and Civilizations490 
- that is, I reinterpret the connections he makes between the concepts of śilpa [technology, skill], 
                                                 
486 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 34. 
487 Daya Krishna, 34. 
488 Daya Krishna, 34. 
489 See also 2.1.2 where the full citation is provided explaining the relevance of conceptual journeys for the 
empirical dialogues organized by Daya Krishna in the context of postcolonial Indian academics. Daya Krishna, 
35. 
490 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations. 
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śāstra [knowledge system] and puruṣārthas 491  [values, seeking]. For thinking history of 
cultures,492 Daya Krishna argues, one cannot confine oneself to give a “snapshot picture of a 
culture”493 (see also 2.1.2), i.e. a to describe a “culture primarily in static terms”494. On the 
contrary, he brings attention to the tension between a value apprehension and a value realization 
(6.1) that renders the complexity of cultures. This tension unveils an essential difference 
between conceiving values and the way these values are de facto realized. The first attempt, of 
conceptual nature, tries to grasp and qualify the values of a society and culture at a particular 
time, while the second consists in ‘living’ the present values in the given society and culture. 
But the difference does not only lie between the intellectual and the experiential levels: what is 
more relevant even is the fact that realizing values itself modifies the gap between the idea one 
had of them and the way they have been realized. This gap is felt in terms of dissatisfaction, 
implying the sense of limits of an idea when coming to grisp with reality. Thus, the tension is 
not only something a posteriori reflected upon, it itself affects the realization. In return, it also 
bears an affect on the apprehension itself, since the realization generates new concepts out of 
critiques and evaluations of the forms the ideas took shape in. In that sense, history or 
anthropology would rather be constituted of “the delineation of successive modifications in the 
value apprehension in the light of the negativities revealed in the course of its actualization and 
implementation.”495 “This is for Daya Krishna the story of puruṣārthas”, defined as values and 
valuational seekings (see 6.1), in the complexity of their intellectual modifications and the 
multifoldness of their realizations that is at the core of cultures. The value apprehension relies 
on śāstric knowledge, in the sense of systematized bodies of knowledge inherited from the 
traditions, on which the corrections and reflections provoke the formation of new values.  
However, for the actualization and implementation to occur, one needs something else, called 
skill or technology, a term Daya Krishna reinterprets from the Sanskrit śilpa. I prefer to 
                                                 
491 Concerning Daya Krishna’s interpretation of the ‘classical’ puruṣārthas (artha, kāma, dharma and mokṣa), see 
6.1 and Elise Coquereau, “Seeking Values in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy,” in Kontexte Des Leiblichen, Contexts 
of Corporality, ed. Cathrin Nielsen, Karel Novotny, and Tom Nenon (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz Verlag, 2016), 
125–49. I restrict here the concept of puruṣārtha to its interconnection with śāstra and śilpa, referring mostly to 
Daya Krishna’s use in Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations.  
492  Daya Krishna distinguishes sharply between civilization and cultures, however his use of these terms 
demonstrates the intrinsic continuity and interdependence of them. Shail Mayaram comments thus on the 
difference between civilization and culture: “Daya Krishna’s lectures on civilization need to be read against the 
backdrop of his earlier effort to use Indian categories to theorize cultures and civilizations [referring here to 
Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations]. ‘At the heart of any civilization’, he 
asserts, ‘lies the drama between consciousness and self-consciousness that assumes multifarious forms, the most 
subtle of which stems from reason itself’. ‘The dialectics of faith and doubt is fundamentally the dialectic between 
consciousness and self-consciousness...’. Human beings, like animals, live largely at the conscious level and have 
only rare moments of self-consciousness. Cultures are characterized, he argues, by śilpa or a repertoire of skills 
and smṛti or memory. Cultures become civilizations as self-consciousness predominates over consciousness along 
with systematization and as ‘reflection takes precedence over experience’, resulting in śāstra formation and 
distinctions such as the desī and the mārgī or the provincial and the universal. This is done by elite groups in a 
civilization ‘who lay down norms in the various fields of human endeavour’. The puruṣārthas of a culture now 
undergo transformation, becoming ‘objects of self-conscious reflection and critical evaluation along with a newly 
emerging problem of hierarchy and inter-relationships’.” ‘Foreword’ by Mayaram, in Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 
ix–x. 
493 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 19. 
494 Daya Krishna, 19. 
495 Daya Krishna, 21. 
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understand it here in the sense of skill or tool for art and craft in a reinterpretation of Daya 
Krishna’s title of his collection of articles “the art of the conceptual”. In this sense, I suggest 
seeing dialogical tools such as pūrvapakṣa and saṃvāda as providing a skill for the art of the 
conceptual. What does Daya Krishna mean with the ‘art of the conceptual’ in this context? In a 
later lecture delivered at Punjab University, he defines it as follows:  
“In my view, thinkers are conceptual artists. They deal with concepts, and create new worlds 
of concepts by giving prominence to one concept rather than another. They bring concepts into 
being, or change old concepts by bringing them into relationship with other concepts in the 
context of which they had never occurred before.”496 
Now, how do these thinkers create new worlds of concepts, how do they attribute significance, 
what are the laws arbitrating the relationships between concepts, and the laws to break in order 
to be able to bring these concepts in new contexts? In other terms, what are the causes for the 
conceptual art? For him, causality, in particular in the realm of imagination and creation, cannot 
be limited to a logical unfoldment from a single cause to an effect by an individual who would 
organize his concepts in his own categories, no matter the complexity of the unfolding itself (a 
critique addressed in particular to Kant497). It must reflect on the one hand the “cooperative, 
complementarity of diverse actors with different skills and abilities”498, from which it would in 
consequence follow that “the effect, it should be remembered, cannot be decomposed into 
separate, individual effects ascribable to each separate individual cause in the complex unity 
created by the complementary and cooperative character of the causes concerned.”499 This does 
not mean that nothing can be causally created by a single agent, nor that an effect necessarily 
has different causes. But it points at some ‘things’ - dialogue belonging, I believe, to this 
category - that cannot be reduced to a single causality, cause-effect relation, or causal agent and 
which furthermore, cannot be separated from this very multiplicity. They constitute inseparable 
‘wholes’. Thus, the picture of cultures abovementioned consists of the unfolding and 
                                                 
496 Daya Krishna, “Thinking Creatively about the Creative Act,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya 
Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 42. 
497 “The distinction between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’, like the distinction between the ‘true’ and the ‘false’ or 
between the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, or between ‘intelligible’ and ‘unintelligible’ is as much a ‘given’ to human 
consciousness as any other. The ‘given’, therefore, is not of just one sort, or of one type, and not only this, it may 
even ‘change’ as one’s experience changes. Causality is no exception to this, and the ‘demand’ for intelligibility 
in ‘causal terms’ is only a ‘demand’ like other demands, which may either be fulfilled or not. The attempt to save 
it at all costs by treating it as an a priori constituent condition of ‘understandability’ as in Kant, or as a necessary 
methodological precondition of engaging in any cognitive inquiry or research would mean giving up the empirical-
experiential foundation of the caim of knowledge to be ‘scientific’ in the most radical sense of the term. This is 
not a return to Humean skepticism, either overt or disguised, as it does not deny the possibility of finding an actual 
relation between a certain class of events which may be ‘causal’ in nature. It only says that it is not necessary that 
such a relation be always found, or that it is a necessary condition for the ‘understandability’ or ‘intelligibility’ of 
the event or events concerned. ‘Causal relation’, in other words, is as contingent as any other empirical relation, 
and thus may factually obtain or not as the case may be.” Daya Krishna, “Thinking with Causality about 
‘Causality’: Reflections on a ‘Concept’ Determining All Thought about Action and Knowledge’,” 124. On the 
specific use of the term ‘demand’, see 7.2. 
498  Daya Krishna, “Thinking with Causality about ‘Causality:’ Reflections on a ‘Concept’ Determining All 
Thought about Action and Knowledge,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini 
Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 52. 
499 Daya Krishna, 53. 
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entanglement of these dimensions of inseparable wholes500. Not only in the plurality of values 
and knowledges that are generated in different cultures, but also in the sense of the plurality of 
those who are embedded into this nexus, who need to communicate in the plurality of values 
and knowledges, with it and about it. This view denounces the fact that only one type of 
epistemological causality has been taken into consideration. It claims to admit ‘creativity’ and 
its ‘creations’ as specific kinds of activities or ‘things’ that cannot correspond to this 
understanding of causality501:  
“The same is the case with the ‘causality’ of a plurality of beings in interactive interaction 
between themselves, resulting in the production of something which none of them could have 
brought about on their own. The usual thought in this regard has taked of ‘plurality of causes’ 
and ‘inter-mixture of effects’, but it has always been thought to be the result of a lack of 
sufficient analysis (…). The idea of a ‘one-one’ correlation between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ has 
plagued thought since its beginning, without anyone ever having asked what was meant by 
‘one’, and how did this ‘one’ come into being, or how if it was ‘one’, it did become ‘many’?”502 
In other words, the singular and individual contributions cannot form by simple cumulation the 
‘whole’: one can understand this in the perspective of concreativity that was explained in 
(1.1.4). What interests Daya Krishna in this relation between the one and the many is the fact 
that “the parts contribute not only towards the maintenance of the ‘whole’, but also to its 
effective functioning as a ‘unitary entity’ in relation to other ‘wholes’ which are in such an 
inter-relationship that they all mutually influence one another.”503 So it is not about dissecting 
the complexity of a whole into a combination of several independent causes and effects, and 
into a combination of independent positions to understand the dialogue. On the contrary, what 
should be underlined are rather the effects brought by the plurality of parts and plurality of 
participants into the whole itself (considered as philosophical traditions, cultures, persons from 
the point of view of the whole unity).  
                                                 
500 “The difference between diverse civilizations may be viewed in terms of diversities in the dominant puruṣārthas 
which they pursued over a long period of time and which they explored in depth and articulated and embodied in 
the products they left behind. (…) Yet, as one’s own language seems to be the most natural for a human being 
born in the group in which it is naturally spoken, so also do the puruṣārthas as articulated in one’s culture. It is 
only when one encounters a different formulation that one begins to apprehend the contingency and the 
parochiality of what one had unconsciously accepted as the only possible formulation of the ends worth pursuing 
and the means for their pursuit.” Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and 
Civilizations, 25. 
501 This conception of the necessary cooperation and complementarity is in the present context presented from the 
ontological part/whole perspective, as well as from its application to multiplicity in dialogue. One can also notice, 
however, that it bears political consequences, which, although not directly relevant for the present purposes, can 
not be separated for Daya Krishna due to his ‘wholistic’ conception of philosophy: “The theoretic knowledge about 
the causal relationships is continuously changing and, thus, challenging us to a reorientation of our instrumental 
action. The causal chains get more and more complicated and the realization of ends comes to depend more on 
other persons and groups and nations than on one’s own effort and endeavour. The necessity of collective co-
operation even for the achievement of individual ends in a mass society of present dimensions raises problems of 
individual dependence deriving from the inevitable hierarchical organization of interlocking role-specialisations 
requiring integrating functions within some institutional set-up or other.” Daya Krishna, “Action and 
Contemplation,” Visva-Bharati Quarterly 24 (59 1958): 3. 
502 Daya Krishna, “Eros, Nomos and Logos,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 22, no. 2 (June 
2005): 169–70. 
503 Daya Krishna, 170. 
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These unexpected effects are, on the other hand, also subject to the same dissatisfaction as the 
one above mentioned, namely the fact that once actualized, the effects do not exactly correspond 
to the expectations and the objectives that were set. If one conceives dialogue in such a way, 
this dissatisfaction accounts for the open-endedness of dialogue (both in the sense of 
incompleteness and critical self-reflection in the post-analysis that opens for new directions for 
dialoguing). Thus, a dialogue can be also characterized as a ‘seeking’, a value to be attained 
(6), which accounts for the ‘idealistic’ connotation of dialogue. This, as we have seen in the last 
section (4.1) does not mean that it cannot be realized at all, quite the contrary. But it points at 
the necessary gap between particular realizations and ‘seeked’ apprehension as a puruṣārtha: 
 “What appears as an indubitable fact of experience is that the effects man wants to achieve are 
of such a strange kind that they are not only unrealizable by any identifiable individual unit of 
causality, but that the effect even when seemingly achieved, does not seem to be what one 
really wanted to achieve, for what one wanted to achieve was the realization of a value that 
alone seems to give meaning to human life. Values are what one wants to achieve, and yet they 
are hardly the sort of things that can be specified as effects achievable through causes that one 
can effectuate individually or collectively.”504 
Thus, the cooperative complementarity of actors with different skills bring about a complexity 
into the causal picture, rendered multi-layered and multi-directional. The effects that are seeked 
depend on this plurality and escape a unicausal realization, due to the ideality that they entail, 
namely the difference between their apprehension and realization.  
But what is the epistemological difference of dialogue that grounds the impossibility of a single 
cause-effect relation? What accounts for the specificity of this type of causality? This 
continuous modification is further clarified by his colleague S. S. Barlingay (University of 
Pune) in view of man’s condition as a knower505 (or seeker for knowledge, see 6.2). Hence, a 
knower is “not just a knower, (…) [but also] an enjoyer, modifier, constructor, builder, critic 
and appreciator of the total situation simultaneously.”506  While, he says, it is possible to 
distinguish these different roles, they cannot be separated. They can be understood in different 
ways and point at different functions, but they cannot operate singularly: they depend on the 
whole that is man. 507  Consequently, man, besides being an epistemological agent, and 
simultaneously to this role, “is a gestalt or a unified temporal whole of action.”508 This implies 
that s/he is not only an outsider detached from the laws ordering the cosmos, since s/he is an 
active part of any process s/he is observing. S/he is however able to be a “detached observer 
                                                 
504 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 53. 
505 S. S. Barlingay further explicits this idea: “I think it is to the credit of Gaudapāda that he pointed out that instead 
of using the model of the knower and the known we should use the model of bhoktā and bhojya. But usually the 
activity element in our life is ignored with the result that the problems we pose are only about the possibility of 
knowledge, and not about the total experience. It is forgotten that the theory of knowledge is only an element in 
the total experience-situation. From this point of view the Vaiśeṣikas were on the correct track. For, their scheme 
of padārthas or categories was an analysis of experience and was not merely concerned with knowing as in the 
case of Locke or even Descartes.” Barlingay, “Experience and Reflection,” 199. 
506 Barlingay, 199. 
507 Here and elsewhere, ‘man’ is not understood in terms of gender. 
508 Barlingay, “Experience and Reflection,” 200. 
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because of the awareness that arises in the process itself.”509 In that sense, being a knower also 
implies “continuously modifying that which is given.”510 But here also, the fact that these 
different dimensions or roles operate simultaneously within the same person renders the 
cooperation and the communication necessary: 
“He [the scientist] takes this two-track world as a one-track-objective world and discovers the 
laws of this world. These laws, in a sense, are objective but the frame in which laws are 
expressed, codified, is not necessarily objective. The framework of these laws, since they 
involve concepts, categories and the relationships between them, is a man-made fabric. It is 
not a personal subjective frame, it is an impersonal intersubjective one. (…) Again, all the laws 
of the scientist are not necessarily objective. They are, to a great extent, the laws of his 
experience also. However, what is important is that when a man discovers these laws he does 
not simply discover them and stop at that. He also expresses them, codifies them, creates a 
machinery for communicating them. He does this by the process of abstraction, by thinking 
away (removing) space and time out of experience.”511 
There are here two different consequences underlined from the conception of man as a 
“knower” who is not only a knower, but a “critic and appreciator”.512 These complete, in my 
view, Daya Krishna’s explanation. The first goes along with the plurality mentioned by Daya 
Krishna, in terms of the intersubjective constitution of knowledge, the “frames” and ways 
knowledge is conceived, expressed and communicated through experience (see 5.3). Secondly, 
the formative elaboration of knowledge (here expressed by the active “he does this”) connects 
knowledge and action, the fixity of the former and the motion of the latter. For Barlingay, this 
is due to two factors: “1) selectivity and 2) shortening of duration”513 (both in terms of memory 
and condensation of the experience into a narrative), due to which knowledge is made. 
To go back to Daya Krishna, it is due to selectivity and shortening of duration that knowledge 
takes a static appearance. He thus differentiates knowledge from skill based on this apparent 
fixity: 
“The formation of a śāstra out of preceding skills in certain areas results in both an advantage 
and disadvantage. The advantage obviously is that the knowledge is organized, codified and 
assumes a self-conscious form which is primarily intellectual in character and conceptual in 
nature. It also treats the so-called skill in terms of ‘knowing’ rather than ‘doing’. It is thus the 
cognitive aspect that comes to be emphasized rather than the performative aspect in which the 
skill was solely embodied earlier. This, however, gives it a fixity of a very different kind from 
the one that was there at the level of the skill which was continuously modified not only in the 
process of transmission and training but also because of the challenges which the changing 
situation exercised or imposed on it.”514 
Thus, between the tension of thinking and thought, between the process implied by the value-
realization and the fixity of the corpus, the fundamental ground upon which one might act 
(which in turn, influences the knowledge already established by calling it into question), one 
                                                 
509 Barlingay, 200. 
510 Barlingay, 200. 
511 Barlingay, 200. 
512 Barlingay, 200. 
513 Barlingay, 197. 
514 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 22–23. 
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needs conceptual tools. To take in consideration the whole interaction between these 
dimensions constitutes, I believe, Daya Krishna’s objective, and the articulation of these 
dimensions forms the stake of dialogue which confronts the reality of conceptual problems.  
“The relation between śilpa and śāstra, on the one hand, and of both of these to the 
puruṣārthas, on the other, should be a matter of investigation. It is equally necessary that one 
does not see it as a one-way movement where the puruṣārthas determine the śilpa and the śilpa 
gives rise śāstras, as the śāstras may themselves give rise to new puruṣārthas, or at least bring 
a radical transformation in our understanding of the puruṣārthas by making that possible whose 
very possibility could not have been conceived of before for the lack of adequate 
conceptualization or technology to achieve it. Similarly, śāstric formulations not only bring 
the whole differentiated world of intellect and reason into existence but also provide a new 
puruṣārthas of intellectual or rational knowledge for man which is absent if they are not 
developed or only marginally developed in a culture.”515 
It is for this reason essential to keep in mind the intrinsic correlation of these dimensions, which 
are expressed, articulated and reformed in the engagement with others in dialogue. It is, indeed, 
surprising that dialogue is not thematised in such a philosophical development. It is mentioned 
at some occasions in Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations 
and Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, mostly in connection, on the 
one hand, to language and communication 516 , and on the other hand, to Otherness and 
intersubjective composition of the world.517 (see 7.3). Dialogue conceived from the perspective  
of  rhetoric rules and compositions of (saṃ)vāda (as presented in 2.1.1) belong to śāstric 
knowledge in the processus of abstraction that defines it. Differently, dialogues realized as in 
the saṃvāda experiments (3) are grounded in the confrontation of śāstric knowledges in 
contemporary intercultural discussion that were realized. In that sense, the apprehension-
realization tension above explained also applies to dialogues, and the dynamism that resorts 
from it, thus to a puruṣārtha. This will be further investigated in chapter 6. 
What is exactly the place of dialogue in such an account of knowledges, values and skills that 
are related by the dissatisfaction of the apprehension vis-à-vis actualization? How does the 
function of dissatisfaction apply in dialogue and with dialogue vis-à-vis śāstric knowledge and 
puruṣārthas? If we grant at the present the possibility for dialogue to be the locus where these 
dimensions and their entanglements are revealed by the meeting and engaging with others, then 
how to articulate these dimensions to the concept of dialogue, if dialogue is only a method?  
  
                                                 
515 Daya Krishna, 25. 
516 See notably Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 91. 
517 See notably Daya Krishna, 79; Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and 
Civilizations, 78;202.  
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5. (Presup)positions: Unveiling Together the Unquestioned of My Beliefs 
 
“A proper understanding of the nature of philosophical disagreement and dialogue will, I 
believe, change the whole complexion and purpose of philosophical discussions. For over two 
thousand years philosophical controversy has been dogmatic and polemical. Philosophy has 
been the arena of battles, skirmishes and tug-of-wars. And this has appeared to philosophers 
to be the unfortunate, but unavoidable, outcome of their occupation. Much of discussion in 
philosophy has been futile giving opportunity not for the pursuit of truth and the clarification 
of ideas, but for the exercise of ingenuity and the exhibition of dialectic skills. As Śamkara 
pointed out - though he drew a totally erroneaous conclusion from theis fact - the crown in a 
philosophical controversy goes to the disputant who shows subtler ingenuity and superior 
dialectical skill. Satyameva Jayate [Truth Alone Triumphs] is unfortunately not true where 
philosophical wrangling is in question.  
The maxim, ‘Know thyself’, is applicable as much to Philosophy as to the philosopher and the 
seeker of salvation. There have been sporadic and partial attempt at self-knowledge made by 
the so-called reformers of philosophy, but all of these have failed because they have tried to 
build on the foundations of a deep-rooted dogmatism which is fatal to critical inquiry. This 
dogmatism which prevents thought from attaining freedom through self-awareness is what may 
be called the rationalist fallacy which pervades the whole of philosophy and influences the 
thought of the empiricists as much as that of the rationalists. (…) 
The deep-rooted and all-pervasive fallacy consists in the assumption, never examined, but 
simply taken for granted, that all assertions in philosophy should be so well-grounded as to be 
indisputable. Hence disputes necessarily multiply, for each of the alternative and mutually 
incompatible systems claims to rest on indisputable grounds. (…) 
But what if this universal and firmly-rooted assumption concerning the role of reason in 
philosophy has no better foundation than sheer thoughtlessness and error?  
A detached contemplation of the entire panorama of philosophy with the rise and fall and 
perpetual clash of innumerable systems has led me to the belief that though philosophy was 
born more than two millenia ago the consummation of philosophy in the direction of the growth 
of self-consciousness has yet to be achieved. Philosophy claims to give knowledge of many 
things and illumine many aspects of life and existence, but it has yet to come to know and 
illumine itself. When this happens there will take place, for the first time, a true revolution in 
philosophy as it will mean the freedom of thought from dogmatism, partisanship and 
unconscious assumptions, leading to a wide tolerance and a new comprehension of all points 
of view. Differences of opinion may and, perhaps, will persist, but discussions will cease to be 
polemical and disputatious, dealing dialectic death-blows to rival theories and, instead, have 
for their purpose the exploration and probing of each other’s points of view to discover their 
alogical basses and the nerve or pattern of their dialectic.”518 
  
                                                 
518 ‘Philosophical Arguments and Disagreement’, Jehangir N. Chubb, Philosophical Papers of Professor J.N. 
Chubb, ed. H. M. Joshi (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2006), 288–89. 
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5.1. Introductory Remark: Presuppositions, Dissatisfactions, Illusions: the Force of Being 
Fallible. 
 
The relation between śāstra, śilpa and puruṣārtha is thus characterized in terms of 
dissatisfaction between the ideality and the reality, between the apprehension and the realization 
(see 6). This dissatisfaction originates from the structural and transcendental illusions of 
consciousness (7). These illusions give rise to different presuppositions that condition thinking 
in the cultural, historical and ontological limitations of its conceptions (5.2). However, it also 
conditions the possibility for thinking. At the same time as it attaches us to certain traditions 
and categories, it provides the capacity to ‘move out’ of them when becoming aware of their 
limits: this capacity is the one given by imagination and is called ‘creative thinking’. The 
dialogical encounter with the other who reflects the parochiality and limits of my position 
enables the awareness of the limitation and the arising of creative thinking (7.3). 
This description of creative thinking - and the contribution that interculturality could bring forth 
in terms of plurality of inputs and solving the “limited parochialism”519 - although it seems 
intelligibly plausible, appears until now likewise highly speculative and intuitive. However, the 
development of the philosophical process and reasoning that underlies such a journey is 
rigourously complex in Daya Krishna’s philosophy, notably because of the multifolded 
entanglement that I highlighted above. Furthermore, I conceive this process as reflecting the 
dialogical practice described in the earlier chapters 2 and 3. I limit myself in the following part 
(4 to 7) to the theories and implications that are relevant to include and analyze dialogue in this 
framework. First of all, let me clarify the relation between three concepts that are closely 
associated to describe the relational processus between śāstra, puruṣārtha and śilpa: 
presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions. I will then proceed into developing each in 
relation to dialogue in the next sections. 
While Daya Krishna himself closely and apparently loosely uses these three concepts,520 I want 
to emphasize internal differences in their connotations and functions that are nevertheless 
                                                 
519 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 35. 
520 Different reasons can explain the variations, one of which being simply the timespan between the first attempt 
to explain the ‘presuppositions of philosophical thinking’ in Daya Krishna’s PhD Thesis, published as The Nature 
of Philosophy (1955), to its posthumous book on Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions 
(2012) (where the Kantian influence is more evident in the choice of his vocabulary). In so doing, my separation 
might not always be correct in the terms used by Daya Krishna, but I maintain that it expresses different dimensions 
of the same domain of the unreflected and commonly assumed that shape our thoughts. In the earlier monograph, 
Daya Krishna defines as presuppositions 1) “the belief that the nature of ultimate Reality is such that it can be 
discovered by pure thought alone”; 2) “both the object and the organon of knowledge are finished, unchangeable 
and final”; 3) “the identity of the rational and the valuational” and 4) “the final and ultimate absoluteness of the 
knowledge with which Philosophy is concerned.”. Qualifying these four presuppositions, he explains: “By calling 
them ‘presuppositions’ we neither wish to imply that philosophers have always been unaware of them nor that 
they have never thought they had sufficient grounds for believing in them. Nor do we wish to imply, in the strict 
logical sense of the term, that they are mutually independent and jointly sufficient for the building up of 
philosophical activity. (…) That we have called them ‘presuppositions’ is because they are of such a final and 
ultimate character that to give them up would mean to give up Philosophy completely in the traditional sense of 
the term.” Daya Krishna, Nature of Philosophy., 29. In his latest text, illusions are thus defined as follows: “The 
criterion of a transcendental illusion would, then, be that it arises from the fact that something which is 
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discernible in their adoption. Surely, they are all employed to enhance ‘unveiling’ philosophy 
from its confusions and from the sense of finality and givenness that philosophical theories 
produce. The specific differences of the concepts highlight different kinds of obstacles. Daya 
Krishna does not pursue the naive dream to simply free philosophy from its puzzles and riddles. 
On the contrary, he rather seeks an awareness of the overshadowed complexity. The role of 
question/answers521 in dialogue corresponds to the clarification that Daya Krishna defends, 
which does not erase presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions per se but reveal them as 
potentialities for new discoveries - or clarified issues generating other questions.522 Thus, these 
concepts are closely related in terms of objectives and purposes.  
However, and interestingly, as objectives and purposes, they are rather negatively expressed. 
Since the highest goal seems prima facie to remove them to clarify an issue, this precisely 
implies becoming aware of a kind of inherent defect of the human condition. In so doing, 
freedom and liberation from this state of ignorance and insatisfaction, a rather prominent topic 
for Daya Krishna 523  (see 6.2.3 and 7.3), precisely does not mean self-liberation as an 
autonomous act, but an engagement with others with whom these presuppositions, 
dissatisfactions and illusions can be unveiled. The basic intuition underlying this tension is not 
uncommon to various traditions of classical Indian philosophies (as the relevance of the concept 
                                                 
transcendentally presupposed is treated as phenomenally given, and that this gives rise to insoluble antinomies for 
thought which get dissolved or resolved when the mistake is realized. A ‘structural illusion’, on the other hand, 
arises when the structure of the cognizing mechanism itself creates the illusion whose ‘illusoriness’ is realized 
because of the incoherence which such an apprehension produces in respect of the object which appears to be 
different under other conditions.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 
15. This latter definition is explained in 7.1. 
521 Elise Coquereau, “Peut-on Dialoguer Avec Un Texte ? Interculturalisation de l’herméneutique, de Gadamer à 
Daya Krishna.,” AUC Interpretationes Studia Philosophica Europeanea V, no. 1 (2016): 67–73. 
522 See Freschi’s comment on Daya Krishna’s definition of philosophy in dialogue: “Since his PhD thesis, which 
was subsequently published as Nature of Philosophy, Daya Krishna conceived philosophy as an exercise in the 
decontamination and refinement of thought. A philosopher is primarily someone who brings clarity without 
unneeded complications, and it is the very task of dialogue and collective dialogical thinking to practice refinement 
and clarification of thought by continuously questioning unclear issues and responding to them.” Freschi, 
Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and 
Dialogue,” 183. See also Daya Krishna, Nature of Philosophy. 
523 “The idea that ‘freedom’ involves within it the ideal of kaivalya [perfect isolation, detachment] is as mistaken 
as the idea of siddhis [completion, fulfillment] also adumbrated in the Yogasūtra. The Sāṃkhya has a notion of 
plurality to puruṣas, or a plurality of the kevalin, without asking the question: ‘What is the relation between them?’ 
Nor does Pātañjala-yoga seem to be aware of the problem created by the postulation of the siddhis, promised by 
it to all on the road to samādhi, through the practice prescribed in its third chapter, known to all who have even a 
nodding acquaintance with this fundamental text on Yoga in the tradition of spiritual seeking, that is not confined 
now to India alone but has spread all over the world and become global in character. Freedom, then, has to be 
conceived in a different way if it has to become the possession, not just of one, solitary, isolated individual but of 
others as well. A plurality of ‘centers of freedom’ in inter-communication, in interactive relationship, has to be 
conceived if one is to resist the temptation of a ‘false’ monistic singularity of the idea of a 'God’ who cannot bear 
to have any others besides Himself and, thus has to be both omniscient and omnipotent without ever being ‘known’ 
or influenced by anyone else. Freedom, thus, is limited by the freedom of others, many others, just as it limits their 
freedom in return. The relation between ‘freedoms’, however, need not be of just ‘limitation’ in the negative sense; 
it can also be positive in the sense that each person's freedom may enhance the ‘freedom’ of others and, in many 
cases, it actually does so.” Daya Krishna, “The Cosmic, Biological, the Cultural Conditionings and the Seeking of 
Freedom,” 136.  
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of māyā indicates in Daya Krishna’s writings524). However, its expression, and in particular the 
refusal of a transcendental unity, and its embodiment in socio-cultural pluralities go much 
further than a simple application of the terms and traditions to modern times: 
“Freedom, thus, is not what the existentalists or post-modernists, or even the mokṣa-seekers 
have thought it to be. It is embedded in a plurality of ‘interactive beings’, ‘living’ and ‘human’, 
where there is no such thing as freedom, given once and for all time, but something that is 
continuously ‘lost’ and ‘gained’ by the dynamic interplay of the interacting constituants of the 
dynamics.”525 
These concepts therefore point, as ‘illusion’ in particular indicates, towards a certain seeking of 
freedom from the given, commonly accepted and unquestioned ‘knowledge’. This in return 
requires the actions and values that are correlated to the knowledge that we have, as the relations 
between śāstra, puruṣārtha and śilpa indicates. Finally, they designate a ‘path’, i.e. a dynamic 
movement onwards, from the state of ignorance, error, insatisfaction, insufficiency, to 
something that is corrected and improved. However, unlike mokṣa-seeking philosophers,526 for 
Daya Krishna there is no transcendental liberation per se: the path is unending and consists 
rather in a wordly movement, back and forth, between the realization of presuppositions that 
generates new insatisfactions, which themselves turn to be illusory, raising new questions in 
the difference between the apprehension of presuppositions. Both creativity and illusions arise 
in intersubjective relations, in dialogue with others: this signals the open-ended character of 
dialogues.527  
However, presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions apply to three distinct domains of 
reflection: presuppositions are epistemological assumptions of (philosophical) theories, and 
thereby signal the limits of one’s śāstric knowledge (5). Dissatisfactions originate from the 
                                                 
524 See for instance in the collected papers of Contrary Thinking: ‘Madness, Reason, and Truth’ (pp.157-164), Can 
the Analysis of Adhyāsa Ever Lead to an Advaitic Conclusion’ (pp.206-216)  and ‘E ros, Nomos, Logos’ (pp. 309-
322): Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking; Daya Krishna, “Appearance and Reality,” 176–77; Daya Krishna, 
Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions. 
525 Daya Krishna, “Freedom, Reason, Ethics and Aesthetics,” 11. 
526 The terms (mukti, mokṣa), the nature, paths of liberation and the objects from which one should free oneself 
certainly differ from philosophy to the other, and from one commentary to the other, but even the radical rejection 
of these terms consists in an internal negation of them, not an external alternative from the conceptions they entail. 
For Daya Krishna’s critique of mokṣa, see in particular Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006, 3–59. See also K. 
H. Potter’s critique of Daya Krishna’s rejection in Potter, “Are All Indian Philosophers Indian Philosophers?” and 
the more recent critical appreciation of Daya Krishna’s stake by Matthew Kapstein, “Interpreting Indian 
Philosophy: Three Parables,” in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy, by Jonardon Ganeri (Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 1–19. 
527 See Raveh, “Philosophical Miscellanea,” 497–99. Raveh elsewhere extends the intersubjective dialogue to 
dialogue between an author and a reader through texts characterized by the same ‘open-endedness’: “For DK 
[Daya Krishna], the process of thinking is never-ending; its ‘products’ in the form of articles, books, works of art 
etc., are merely stops along the journey, intended to collect questions and queries, feedback and 
counterperspectives, based on which one’s thinking develops in new directions. Therefore DK’s suggestion is to 
cut through the ‘finality cover’ of a text, any text, and see it as a process. Text as a process means not merely that 
the writer’s thinking process is reflected in the text, but also that the text is where the author and the reader meet, 
that the reader is as integral a contributor to the text as the author. If one’s sees a text as a process, then the balance 
between authorship and readership is changed. The reader becomes not less active in the process than the author. 
The text no longer ‘belongs’ merely to the latter, but in fact turns into saṃvāda.” Raveh, “Text as a Process: 
Thinking with Daya Krishna,” 196–97. 
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difference between reality and ideality in the attempt to describe or realize something (what is 
and what ought to be, what is and is thought to be, what is and what is imagined to be), and 
point at the limits of our condition vis-à-vis our seeking to be something else (6). Illusions point 
at the limits of consciousness: they encompass, so to say, internal presuppositions of 
philosophy, and touch to our human condition and the very way our apprehensions are shaped 
(7). 
But let me now define them one by one more precisely. What does presupposition mean, and 
how does it apply? Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Daya Krishna’s teacher and influent inspiration,528 
begins his essay ‘Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy’ as follows: “Whatever points, 
principles, topics or propositions are used in a study but not themselves studied there, though 
they are, or may be, studied elsewhere, are called presuppositions of that study.”529 In other 
terms: all what is, voluntarily or not, presumed in a study, in order to enable elaborating the 
theory is a presupposition. They can be formed for example on the basis of intuition motivating 
the study, or resources that are unquestionably accepted, or on the very specific logic and 
methods used. He further distinguishes between different types of presuppositions, of which 
axioms and postulates are of greater relevance in the present context.530 The difference between 
the two corresponds in my interpretation to Daya Krishna’s dialogical project. Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya continues his reflection on presuppositions as follows:  
“Though both axioms and postulates are unquestionable by the X that presupposes them, 
axioms differ from postulates in that while the latter can yet be questioned by something other 
than X no axiom can ever be questioned that way even from outside X. As long as one is 
pursuing X one is not indeed very much conscious of its axioms and postulates and has, so far, 
no occasion to ask any question about them. But he may have occasion to doubt or question 
the entire system X from a standpoint outside the system. This generally happens when some 
crucial case, which is a challenging fact, refuses to fit in any manner with that system, so that 
unable to deny its facthood, one is compelled to question the very foundation of the system. 
Or sometimes, out of simple theoretical curiosity, one may sportively question a total given 
system and suggest its replacement by another, generally a wider one comprehending it. (…) 
Axioms are unchallengeable because, by definition, they are self-evident. (…) Axioms are 
unconditional principles that have application as much in the system in question as in other 
                                                 
528 See Daya Krishna’s acknowledgment of Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s philosophical contributions in Daya Krishna, 
Indian Philosophy, 1997, 203–6; Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century 
Onwards, 299–302; Daya Krishna, Ghose, and Srivastava, The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya. More 
specifically on the later book conceived as dialogue, see 3.4. 
529 Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy & Other Essays (Santiniketan: Centre of 
Advanced Study in Philosophy Visva-Bharati, 1974), 1. I am grateful to Asha Mukherjee for generously gifting 
me this book from her own library. See also of K. Bhattacharyya, “Metaphysics - A Genuine Cognitive Pursuit”, 
in Devaraja, Indian Philosophy Today, 19–53. 
530 Kalidas Bhattacharyya summarizes them thus as follows: “(i) A presupposition of a study X, which cannot be 
questioned either from inside or outside it is an axiom. (ii) A presupposition which cannot be questioned from 
inside X but can well be questioned from outside it is a postulate. (iii) A presupposition which can be questioned 
both from inside and outside X is just an empirical factual presupposition. (iv) When, however, a presupposition, 
already accepted, is theoretically questionable at least from outside X, but when at the same time there is no 
possibility even of theoretical verifiability, because it is a presupposition regarding the world as a whole which 
can never be presented to observation, it is a heuristic principle.” Bhattacharyya, Presuppositions of Science and 
Philosophy & Other Essays, 10. 
 
182 
 
systems, and this is at all possible only because, whether one likes it or not, one has to admit 
that they have some sort of Platonic status.”531 
It is to be noted that Kalidas Bhattacharyya is only concerned here with the presuppositions of 
sciences and consequently defines the role of philosophy as epistemology constituting the meta-
level of investigation of science. He is, in this respect, not taking in consideration other 
dimensions or kinds of presuppositions, may they be historico-sociological à la Foucault,532 or 
rather cultural in my interpretation of Daya Krishna. But he does inform us on the constitutions 
of presuppositions of any philosophical reasoning, and on the necessity of ‘moving out’, to 
speak in Daya Krishna’s terms, from one’s system to unveil its postulates - as well as the very 
limits of this move, the axioms that apply to different systems. Kalidas Bhattacharyya does not 
investigate much further on axioms, which seem to me to rather signal the structural and 
transcendental limits that Daya Krishna understands as illusions (see 7.1). It is perhaps useful 
to remind the reader here of Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s parallel with illusion, warning us that the 
“study of illusion is not itself an illusion; it is rather formulable as a proposition about the actual 
phenomenon of error.”533 In the same manner, the study of presuppositions is not devoid of its 
own particular presuppositions, i.e. is not equal to ‘presupposition-ness’ either. In that sense, a 
meta-study on the presupposition of a certain study, notably by its confrontation with external 
theories (from other disciplines, cultures or systems) is eventually bringing forth other sets of 
presuppositions. But although it seems that presuppositions remain inherent to any study, the 
specific presuppositions of a study can be unveiled by reorienting the study from a different 
standpoint. There is, in so doing, no vicious circle inherent to presuppositions, but external 
viewpoints are required to disclose the given presuppositions. In other words that are relevant 
to dialogue: different positions are necessary to unveil presuppositions (5.2.2).  
How does this externality operate in the study of presuppositions? Let me relate the latter with 
Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s description of a meta-study of a second-order in the same chapter. 
“Meta-X, corresponding to a factual study X, enumerates and analyses the postulates of X and 
studies how these were used in X, and studies them also in their interrelations.”534 Further,  
                                                 
531 Bhattacharyya, 8. 
532 On the presuppositions of sciences, Foucault rather insists on the “onerous and complex conditions” that allow 
a certain discourse to come to existence. In other terms, sciences have to ‘fit’ certain implicit presuppositions, 
which are rather socio-historically constituted. For example, in the scientific fields of botanic and biology: “People 
have often wondered how on earth nineteenth-century botanists and biologists managed not to see the truth of 
Mendel’s statements. But it was precisely because Mendel spoke of objects, employed methods and placed himself 
within a theoretical perspective totally alien to the biology of his time. (…) Mendel, on the other hand, announced 
that hereditary traits constituted an absolutely new biological object, thanks to a hitherto untried system of filtrage 
(…) Here was a new object, calling for new conceptual tools, and for fresh theoretical foundations. Mendel spoke 
the truth, but he was not dans le vrai (within the true) of contemporary biological discourse: it simply was not 
along such lines that objects and biological concepts were formed.” Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & 
the Discourse on Language, 224. As I will show later in this section, such a view is also in line with Daya Krishna’s 
conception of presuppositions, including the ‘human’ and subjective dimension in forming knowledge and truth-
conceptions. However, Foucault never extended further his historical investigation to the (inter)cultural level or to 
the study of cultural presuppositions, what Daya Krishna was more inclined to do.  
533 Bhattacharyya, Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy & Other Essays, 25. 
534 Bhattacharyya, 29. 
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“Meta-X that studies the postulates of X is only the study of the movements of thought by 
thought itself, without those movements being ever objects to the studying thought or, what is 
the same thing, without this latter being the subject for them. The thought in question here is a 
type of self-revealing consciousness and the study in question nothing but that thought showing 
itself in self-conscious movement. To be more precise, it is the statement of how it shows itself 
as so moving.” 535 
He underlines thus the “dynamic process”536 by emphasizing the movements537 of thinking 
while thinking something - the ‘something’ becoming a thought, in Daya Krishna’s term, in the 
sense that its form (illusorily) appears fixed and definite. A meta-study is by distinction the 
‘flow’ of consciousness that creates the thought without itself being revealed in it, a condition 
for its possibility and at the same time the cause of its limitations. Self-revealing consciousness 
as a movement does not constitute a detachment from the object of study, it rather designates 
the activity that cannot be separated from it.538 If the postulates require an external viewpoint 
to be revealed, and if a meta-study of postulates is a conscious study of the movement of the 
thought at play in the study, could not dialogue be a meta-tool for revealing the presuppositions 
of thinking?  
 
5.2. Pūrvapakṣa: Defending Your Position in mine, Transcending Ours 
` 
Regarding their application to dialogue, pre-sup-positions refer to the unreflected implications 
and assumptions of a certain position within a debate, from which the consequence of the 
argumentation is derived. The development from presuppositions to a position implies a logical 
unfolding of an argumentation. However, the logical unfolding accounts for earlier steps, which 
themselves are not included in the logical unfolding, but determines it a priori. Thus, the ‘pre’ 
signals ‘pre’-intellectual intuitions that motivate one’s argumentation, and one’s position 
                                                 
535 Bhattacharyya, 31. 
536 Bhattacharyya, 32. 
537 Although he himself does not seem to be satisfied by this word, he justifies his choice by the emphasis on 
dynamicity: “And, what is recorded in the study are, we have seen, neither particular movements as events in time 
nor their empirical generalizations, nor even a priori facts - not this third alternative because these movements are 
the presuppositions of metaphysics which studies a priori facts. It is better not to call them even ‘movements’. 
‘Modes’ is a better term, provided it is used with a dynamic bias. Or, perhaps, the dynamic term ‘movement’ or 
‘act’ or ‘function’ is used just for the purpose of distinguishing this de-ontological thought from whatever thought 
is only an empirical event.” Bhattacharyya, 32. 
538 Kalidas Bhattacharyya disagrees here with both theories classified as realist and idealist of classical Indian 
philosophy: “By far the most of the traditional Indian philosophers hold that they are not so assured and are 
unwilling, therefore, to regard any kind of cognition, be it thought or imagination or sense-perception - even non-
cognitive mental affairs like will - as dynamic. It is just in contrast to such cognitions as are empirical events that 
the self-revealing thought is called act, function, referring, etc., though it may be noted that those traditional Indian 
philosophers who have admitted such non-empirical thought have proposed to call it just consciousness without 
bringing in any dynamic import. For these Indian philosophers, consciousness as subjectivity proper does not refer 
to anything: it only reveals things, and even there the revealing is no act or function of consciousness; rather 
consciousness constitutes revelation. A to be revealed just means that it gets somehow related to consciousness, 
not the reverse: consciousness does not get related to it; so that, from the point of view of consciousness, the 
portion of A (including A) of the situation ‘revelation of A’ falls entirely outside consciousness and does not in 
any way affect; whereas, in contrast, if we look at the situation from the point of view of A, its revealedness, i.e., 
its relation to consciousness, is, in various ways, of enormous importance to it, though, of course, it could well 
remain (unheeded) without that relation.” Bhattacharyya, 33. 
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(analogical to the Vor-urteil for judgment). They derive from a certain choice that one makes, 
consciously or not, when elaborating an argument: either by affiliating oneself to a certain 
tradition, school, method or scholarship, or in being embedded in a certain nexus of concepts 
and possibilities of thinking - which entails, as a necessary consequence, other choices left out. 
This operation refers to the selectivity mentioned by S. S. Barlingay above. While the choice 
can be conscious, the vastness of the unseen possibilities that are left out are, by definition, not 
conceivable (and refers to structural illusions, see 7.1). In that sense, presuppositions define the 
limits of one’s position. ‘Limits’ comprises here the two implications of the definition: 
enclosure (what is included up to its limits) and restriction (what is left outside the limits). In 
Gadamerian terms, a position is inscribed within a horizon, which is pre-ontologically limited 
(notably by prejudices entailed in beliefs and assumptions). On the contrary, suppositions differ 
from presuppositions in the sense that they constitute the objective logical consequences of 
presuppositions that are required for the argumentation of a position. In Barlingay’s words: 
“Thus, if in my investigation, I am analyzing my experience, I must confess that I am already 
believing in, assuming, a particular kind of picture of Reality. This is a common sense, 
pluralistic picture. In a way, I am only rationalizing my beliefs. I am technically committing 
the fallacy of petition principi; for I am only explicating what I have already assumed. My only 
explication for this is that it is inevitable, for no investigation can start without some such 
assumptions. Do we give the name presuppositions to such inevitable beliefs? I think we should 
make a distinction between initial beliefs and presuppositions. For example, that there is a 
multiplicity in the universe should not be regarded as a presupposition. It is my belief only. 
But if such a belief logically requires Space and Time, these should be regarded as 
presuppositions. My beliefs and what I assume are subjective, they are concerned with me 
primarily, presuppositions take us to the sphere of objective pre-conditions.”539 
To connect Barlingay and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, I suggest understanding ‘presuppositions’ in 
K. Bhattacharyya’s sense as entailing both the initial beliefs and suppositions that Barlingay 
calls presuppositions, i.e. the objective logical conditions that unfold my beliefs. The ‘pre’- of 
presuppositions implies beliefs, and the ‘sup’- (sub-) of suppositions the objective pre-
conditions that are necessary to build my argumentation. This is nothing new to philosophy, 
since the diversity of irreconcilable methods and systems originate from the ‘inevitable’ 
contradictory beliefs that are then systematically and logically articulated. However, the 
dialogical approach that I want to develop now concludes differently on the status of this 
inevitable doxa. Indeed, what provokes dialogue is not the attempt to minimize or remove 
presuppositions, but the need to communicate within and between these different 
presuppositions. In that sense, the aim of dialogue cannot be to bracket the different beliefs, but 
rather to explore the potentialities of different sets of presuppositions in argumentative 
encounters.  
This is relevant in the case of cross-cultural dialogues and in intercultural discourses. Political 
analyzes, in particular postcolonial studies, have shown the impossibility of negating the 
presuppositions involved in any standpoints. They outlined the power at stake in philosophy 
and dialogues, demonstrating that any attempt at removing presuppositions implicitly rather 
                                                 
539 Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, “Distinguishables and Separables I,” in Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, 6 (Pune: 
Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, 1983), 2. 
185 
 
tends to conform philosophy to the presuppositions of the most ‘powerful’ proponent. In other 
words: denying presuppositions, or trying to eradicate presuppositions to make philosophy 
more ‘scientific’ does not lead to an absence of belief, but rather to uniforming them according 
to a distribution of (rhetoric) power. It is therefore urgent to consider other ways to acknowledge 
this ‘inevitable’ state and take advantage of primary and unconscious presuppositions without 
reducing philosophy to a fight of beliefs. 
One answer could be found in a device for unveiling the presuppositions of each position, which 
neither amounts to obliterate them nor to assert their legitimacy. I have already introduced in 
section 4.1 such a device, which I now want to relate more closely to the challenge of 
intercultural dialogues or dialogues between philosophical traditions. The term pūrvapakṣa540, 
or in its English use, counter-positions, has been widely used by Daya Krishna541, thereby 
associating himself with this method. In his own writings, it can be seen in his recurrent (and 
somewhat unconventional) use of the locution “but then”, an example of which can be seen 
here: 
“Take the notion of duḥkha or ‘suffering’. What exactly is the notion and why is there such a 
persistent and prevalent concern with ātyanta duḥkhanivṛtti, or the complete cessation of the 
very possibility of all sufferings for all times? This will involve a discussion of possibility and 
what it means. One solution is the state of the soul where it loses the very possibility of being 
conscious. But then what is the difference between such a soul and an inanimate object except 
that it is still characterized by having had such a consciousness in the past which the inanimate 
object can never be said to have had. Also, the difference of such a position with that of the 
Cārvāka would only be something like postulating a soul to survive after the destruction of the 
body. But, then, even for the grossest materialist something survives and it is generally called 
‘matter’. The only difference between this matter and the soul would be that the latter is still 
supposed to have a uniqueness of its own which the surviving matter lacks. But then what could 
this uniqueness consist of except with reference to the past which is no more? This is something 
similar to what Strawson has discussed in his book entitled Individuals. But then (…)”542 
                                                 
540 According to the definition of the Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien, pūrvapakṣa 
is translated as “‘[Gegnerische] Stellungnahme.‘ Der Terminus (…) bezeichnet in der wissenschaftlichen 
Darstellung das Darlegen einer vom Autor selbst nicht vertretenen Lehrmeinung, die in der ‚Antwortenden 
Stellungnahme‘ (uttarapakṣaḥ) oder der ‚Erwiderung‘ (nirṇayaḥ) zurückgewiesen wird. Gemeinsam mit seinen 
Gegenbegriffen (uttarapakṣa bzw. nirṇaya) bestimmt er damit wesentlich den dialektischen Charakter indischer 
wissenschaftlicher und philosophischer Darstellung, die die eigene Lehre zumeist im Gegenüber zu gegnerischen 
Lehren entfaltet oder durch die Widerlegung gegnerischer Thesen und Ansichten die eigene Lehre zu festigen 
sucht.“ The definition insists on the continuity of the meaning throughout the tradition, with emphasis on different 
aspects of it: on the confutative (Kauṭilya) and refutational, or the interrogative (Suśruta). Oberhammer, Prets, and 
Prandstetter, Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien, 167. My translation: pūrvapakṣa is 
translated as “‘[Opposing] statement’. On the scientific account, this term [...] signifies the demonstration of a 
doctrine not given by the author himself and which is rejected in the ‘answering statement’ (uttarapakṣaḥ) or in 
the ‘rejoinder’ (nirṇayaḥ). Together with its antonyms (uttarapakṣa and nirṇaya), it thus essentially determines 
the dialectical character of Indian scientific and philosophical presentation, which mostly unfolds the own teaching 
as against opposing teachings or attempts to strengthen the own teaching via the refutation of opposing theses and 
opinions. 
541 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006; Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking; Daya Krishna, New Perspectives 
in Indian Philosophy; Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997; Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras. 
542 Emphasis added. Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, 17–18. 
 
186 
 
Insignificant in appearance, the mentions of this repetitive “but then” often signal more than a 
mere contradiction, complexity or ambiguity. It implies in the flow of his writing the serious 
consideration of possible counter-positions that one could address. Logically, it signals a “if X, 
then Y” where, while defending X, one has to take in utmost consideration Y, which can lead 
to X2 (variation of the initial position) or even Z, i.e. opening of a new position. More exactly 
with Daya Krishna, it points to a “if X, then the problem follows that”, i.e. not simply a logical 
causal consequence of X, but the perspective of further problems and questions originating from 
the initial thesis. It also reflects different ‘voices’ from imagined opponents, or rather from 
‘real’ opponents retrieved from debates between different schools and authors of classical 
Indian philosophies (here Buddhist and Cārvāka), in connection with positions retrieved from 
Western philosophy (here Strawson).  
The creativity of the counter-position lies in interconnecting 543  positions that have been 
separately exposed, without yielding to a parallel ‘comparative’ juxtaposition. The 
interconnection is established in view of the questions and answers to a philosophical problem 
rather than an evaluation or contrasting comparison between two schools, authors or systems: 
this constitutes the fundamental critique made to comparative philosophy, which in its earlier 
phases (see 1.2.1) had been rather ‘school’- and ‘parallel-presentation’-oriented, namely 
contrasting schools or thinkers rather than questioning a concept in the counter-perspective of 
different traditions.  The development and conclusion thus originate from a critical evaluation 
of the relevance of the arguments provided from positions and counter-positions to analyze the 
problem.544 Beyond his own incorporation of the idea to his philosophical texts, Daya Krishna 
shows a reflective awareness of the resources that this device entails:  
 “In any work of Indian philosophy, pūrvapakṣa (the opponent’s position) has necessarily to 
be presented and refuted before one can establish one’s own position. The counter-position, it 
would be remembered, is not merely stated but rather presented with all the arguments that 
have not only been already given in its favor, but also those which one can imagine to support 
it in any way whatsoever. If one simply asserted something and could not provide any reason 
or hetu for it, one opted out of the philosophical arena and ceased to the counted therein (…) 
Then, all reasons are not regarded as equally valid; a great deal of thought went into 
determining what was valid reasoning and how to distinguish it from that which was fallacious. 
Not only this, the history of the debate on any philosophical issue documents, thinker by 
thinker, the development of the argument and the flaws pointed out by each in the position of 
the others. There was, however, in this process, no static repetition of positions but a 
modification of one’s position in light of the trenchant criticism of the opponents or even a 
more sophisticated reformulation of one’s position in light of those criticisms.”545 
                                                 
543  See the practical consequences of this idea described above in 2.2.3, as well as the already referred to 
explanation by Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” 5. 
544  This approach forms the most contemporary development in the fields of cross-cultural, comparative, 
intercultural or world philosophies. See for example the idea of ‘fusion’ philosophy developed by Arindam 
Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber along with its practice by the contributors of Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative 
Philosophy without Borders., and my discussion of its advantages and limits in Coquereau, “’From Comparative 
Philosophy to Fusion Philosophy’, Ed. Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, Comparative Philosophy Without 
Borders, London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2016, 246 Pp.” 
545 Daya Krishna, “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be,” 2011, 61–62. 
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As it has been noticed by scholars of Indian literature and philosophies,546 this optimistic 
scenario is not exempt from the dissatisfaction above noted between model and applications: it 
historically de facto often happened that the counter-positions were already known and 
fictitious, thus not requiring any modification or any sophistication of one’s own position. It is 
not free from the same risk that applies to any abstract model or device, namely to be formally 
applied without in practice emulating any of the initial principles for which the model ‘ought’ 
to be used. The degradation of the raison d’être into a mere format symptomatizes the 
dissatisfaction at stake in any relation theory and practice (see 6.3). Nevertheless, overall and 
in spite of its concrete limits, it remained conceptually a scholastic model widely used in śāstric 
knowledge.547  
By a game of reflection of one’s limits in confrontation with another’s position, the 
multiplication of dialogical partners consequently entails wider chances to point out the 
presuppositions of one’s tradition. Thus, since widening the limits of one’s position constitutes 
a criterion for creative thinking according to Daya Krishna, dialoguing with multiple partners 
offers itself as an efficient device:  
“The atmosphere necessary for creative thinking to emerge is (…) a half-serious, half-playful 
attempt to explore collectively the various possibilities that spontaneously arise when people 
gather together to think about something that appears problematic to anyone belonging to that 
group at that moment. The attempt is to welcome each idea that spontaneously suggests itself 
to anyone present, and to see in it the possible opportunity for a new direction of thought. (…) 
The purpose, ultimately, is not so much to find a definitive answer or solution to the question 
raised or the problem posed, but rather to see how many directions thinking can take when 
confronted with a question or a problem.”548 
But does a collectivity of participants directly implicate a multiplicity of directions in thinking? 
Numerically multiplying partners does not guarantee multiplicity of directions: first, evidently 
because homogeneity can also be found in a large number of people sharing the same ‘approach’ 
(methodologically or doctrinally) to a given problem. But more importantly, even heterogenous 
groups of thinkers might not open new directions for thinking - and most often, do not.  They 
                                                 
546 “Ideas are, accordingly, not just enunciated but rather emerge from a discussion. This does not always and 
automatically guarantee a pluralistic discussion since some of the pūrvapakṣins “upholders of the prima facie 
view” and even more of the uttarapakṣins “upholders of the antithesis to the prima facie view” can be just fictitious 
opponents, emerging out of the author’s desire to reach a given conclusion. Thus, some of the opponents’ view 
may have been chosen or adapted in order to make them appear less appealing to the audience, and some 
uttarapakṣins may have been fictively created in order to voice speculative positions that had never been actually 
upheld by real thinkers.” Freschi, in Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. 
Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 178.  
547 “A thorough understanding of the pūrva-pakṣa (the prima facie view) is required to start a vāda. There are 
philosophers who could present the opponent’s view with such exact comprehension that we can restore some of 
the lost philosophical systems only through the debate that was carried on in their refutation. For a real vāda, the 
argument should be meaningful. It is true that there were debates in which facts were distorted, reasoning were 
mutilated, and arguments were not properly utilized. Kālidāsa had perhaps witnessed debates with meaningless 
arguments. Duṣyanta in Abhijñānaśākuntala says: kiṁ vṛthā tarkeṇa anviṣyate (what is to be sought by futile 
arguments?). Dharmakīrti, a renowned Buddhist philosopher has given an account of futile debates. (…) But for 
more than two millenia, Indian culture has thrived because of real good debates.” Radhavallabh Tripathi, Vāda in 
Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues, and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses (Shimla: 
Indian Institute of Advanced Study and DK Printworld, New Delhi, 2016), 13. 
548 Daya Krishna, “Thinking versus Thought: Strategies for Conceptual Creativity,” 33. 
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can simply remain proponents of their own view, disregarding other positions as opponents to 
be defeated, or integrate external elements (arguments or examples) into their own 
argumentations without questioning the presuppositions of their positions, or even plainly 
withdraw from the discussion. Thus, there is no certainty in plurality to guarantee the 
‘atmosphere’ above described. This atmosphere depends on a collective seeking (puruṣārtha, 
see 6) and of concrete conditions established to favor the possibilities of a dialogue: the 
developments of these practical conditions were explained in 3 and constitute the endeavor of 
Daya Krishna in the creation of the saṃvāda experiments. They also remind us of the necessity 
of considering conjointly theory and practice for thinking dialogues. 
Beyond the practical limits of its realizations, the conceptual device offers two relevant 
functions for dialoguing: it is first an exercise in intellectual detachment (from one’s position), 
and consequently, a tool to articulate different standpoints across philosophical traditions, 
which avoids both relativism and absolutism. 
 
5.2.1. An Exercise in Intellectual Detachment 
 
To seek dialogue implies a desire to reach an ideal (of) dialogue constituted by non-position: 
as a regulative idea, non-position can either be interpreted as complete detachment from all 
positions (non-position), or as the ideal of vāda (see 2.1.1), reaching the true, perfect position 
(position of none, position of all). It depends on whether we conceive position as a positive 
(unity of the whole of all) or negative (devoid of) entity. The difference between non-position 
as detachment from all positions (absence of position?) or non-position as the negation of one’s 
position in order to reach a position constituted by imply two implications of the concept. In 
Daya Krishna’s postmodern awareness549 both interpretations resist the temptation of believing 
in ‘the’ Truth, the latter alternative could only implicate an intersubjective objective truth 
composed by the whole participants of the dialogue as a consequence of honest discussions 
from diverse standpoints. The epistemological consequences of pūrvapakṣa for dialogues are 
developed in the next section 5.3.  
Thus, if it is conceptually possible to imagine such an ideal of saṃ-vāda as non-position, it 
would in its realization a) never reach a complete truth (which is the negation of the dynamic 
of dialoguing itself) and b) risk absolutizing any part out of powerful rhetoric. While Daya 
Krishna saw in the ‘postmodern tendency’ an excess in jettisoning the concept of truth, to which 
he remained committed (albeit in a non-absolutive way), the relevance of the practical 
consequences of dialogue implies a two-steps articulation equally significant: first, to practice 
a detachment for oneself, to then engage ‘honestly’ (in the sense implied by classical rhetorics 
described in 2.2.2) with others to reach an intersubjective objectivity of truth(s).  
Concretely, Daya Krishna argues for pūrvapakṣa as a device for seeking detachment of one’s 
own position and ‘freedom’ from one’s tradition. The concept of intellectual detachment, 
                                                 
549 See Miller’s thesis on the postmodern connection and affiliation malgré lui of Daya Krishna, Dor Miller, 
“Reading Derrida with Daya Krishna: Postmodern Trends in Contemporary Indian Philosophy,” Sophia 57, no. 3 
(September 1, 2018): 425–42, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0677-2. 
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introduced as a characteristic of dialogue in 1.1.4 and further in chapter 4 as part of the 
movement inward and outward one’s position, has a far-reaching meaning in Daya Krishna’s 
philosophy. It is constitutive of freedom to withdraw and engage (see 6.2.3), part of 
consciousness’ move in and out of itself, i.e. in relation with others (see chapter 7). As an 
expression of the dialogical movement, it will be further used with other (valuational and 
ontological) implications in the subsequent chapters. I now restrict the idea of intellectual 
detachment as the ability to detach oneself from one’s philosophical position and one’s tradition 
in a dialogue, to the process towards listening and understanding other’s position. In so doing, 
intellectual detachment cannot be separated from engagement: read in the lines of what Daya 
Krishna interprets from pūrvapakṣa, an intellectual detachment is a way to dialogically engage 
with others by considering alternative arguments. It is a critical and creative ability to envision 
other’s positions and even be a part of other worldviews. Daya Krishna conceives pūrvapakṣa 
in this regard: 
 “Ultimately, it is arguments given for a certain position that are of interest to a philosophical 
mind and in this respect, the Indian philosophical tradition is especially rich as its very format 
of presentation consists of giving the arguments of the opponent first and then the 
establishment of one’s position by their rebuttal. To search for distinctive philosophical 
problem, or for distinctiveness in the solutions offered to familiar problems, is not only to see 
the alien tradition in a new way but to enrich oneself with the awareness of an alternative 
possibility of thought, a possibility that has already been actualized. The awareness of this 
alternative, actualized possibility may, hopefully, free one’s own conceptual imagination from 
the unconscious constraints of one’s own conceptual tradition.”550 
In being forced to think through the other’s position to the best of one’s ability requires to reflect 
and justify one’s presuppositions, or to realize that one’s thesis, which might have been obvious 
from its standpoint, needs further explanations. What Daya Krishna emphasizes in this process 
of de-identification is more specifically the de-identification of a thinker from a specific 
tradition, school, system or another thinker to whom/which he relates. His criticisms insist more 
on the ‘Indian’ self-association and genealogy of one’s thinking to a school (one ‘seeing’ 
himself as a Naiyāyika, Vedāntika, etc.), which he thought was epitomizing the difficulties of 
contemporary Indian philosophy (see 2.1.2). Nevertheless, the criticism is not devoid of 
application to its ‘Western’ counterpart (as a ‘phenomenologist’, Neo-Kantian, etc.). Thus, de-
identification is first a call to overcome one’s loyalty to another thinker for a rather conceptual 
evaluation of one’s philosophical problem. In this sense, Daya Krishna’s pūrvapakṣa does not 
only take into consideration adversity, but also alterity (the alter of my position, the ‘counter’-
position) and otherness (positions which are beyond a contradiction of my own position, which 
entail other conceptual structures).551 
                                                 
550 Daya Krishna, “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be,” 2011, 66. 
551 More extensive developments of this idea, in particular on the differences that this conception entails vis-à-vis 
the Gadamerian conception of understanding and the role of question for his dialogical hermeneutics, has been 
examined here: Coquereau, “Peut-on Dialoguer Avec Un Texte ? Interculturalisation de l’herméneutique, de 
Gadamer à Daya Krishna.” 
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This, in turn, allows crossing boundaries, since, while schools and thinkers are related to a 
tradition, problems - although illuminated by different perspectives - are not bound to any 
tradition. 
“There is, in fact, no problem the discussion of which does not end across the boundaries of a 
traditionally demarcated system. (…) It is not the problems and the issues that are seen as 
central and the siddhantas of the so-called schools as peripheral, but instead the latter are 
viewed as central and the forms as peripheral. This is because the self-identification of the 
thinker is treated as more important than the problem he is concerned with. But, philosophically 
viewed, it is the latter that is important and not the former. The question, for example, of what 
is meant by ‘śruti’ and what is regarded as such is more important than the specific answer that 
a Mīmāṃsaka or a Vedāntika or a Naiyāyika or even a Buddhist or a Jain thinker gives to it.”552 
But isn’t the śruti a tradition-specific question, just like mokṣa or duḥkha?553 Questions can be 
of specific relevance in a particular tradition. Thus, these concepts have taken a singular 
importance in some scholastic debates (but not in all), which explains their meanings, the 
connotations that they imply and the (assumed) worldviews (ontological, epistemological, etc.) 
that sustain their existence. Thereby, the concepts themselves remain untranslated, since no 
single equivalent can render the complexity of the nexus of meanings they entail. Can they thus 
be ‘uprooted’ to be discussed in extended contexts even if other participants have no knowledge 
of their particularities? Is the usual careful hermeneutics or the historical interpretation to be 
erased in dialogue? If they are, isn’t dialogue more inclined to the comparative ‘mistakes’ than 
a careful exegesis, and is this approach not prejudicial in trying to project one’s own belief into 
another? This is a crux of the matter: what to choose? On the one hand, the carefulness of the 
historical exegesis and the awareness of prejudices and beliefs in any cross-cultural 
hermeneutics tend to repetition, imitation and lack of creativity, as denounced by Krishna 
Chandra Bhattacharyya notably.554 On the other hand, a creative and free interpretation of 
                                                 
552 Daya Krishna, “Towards a Field Theory of Indian Philosophy: Suggestions for a New Way of Looking at Indian 
Philosophy,” in New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2001), 20. 
553 G.C. Pande, Daya Krishna’s long-time friend and colleague in Jaipur, explains more systematically the cultural 
dependency of concepts as follows: “There are words describing perceptual or logical objects in a practical or 
cognitive situation, or words expressing the self-exploration of the intersubjective consciousness of a society. We 
have thus a class of meanings which could be called inter-cultural constants. These are meanings given to 
consciousness objectively. Words signifiying them in different languages and cultures are, in principle, more or 
less exactly translatable in specific practical or scientific contexts. On the other hand, there are meanings which 
are clearly accessible only in social self-consciousness. The corresponding words differ in different cultures and 
their meanings too are nebulous and variable. No strict parallels or equivalents for these can be found. ‘Culture’ 
itself is one such word. All cultures have their own reflective notions about what they are or ought to be, i.e. they 
have their own notion of ‘culture’ which comprises a general view of the nature, condition, ideals and means of 
human life, the proper way of being human.” G. C. Pande, “Culture and Cultures,” Journal of Indian Council of 
Philosophical Research XI, no. 3 (1994): 43–44. On G. C. Pande and Daya Krishna, see Garfield and Chakrabarti, 
“Remembering Daya Krishna and G. C. Pande.” 
554 See 2.1.2 where I exposed Daya Krishna’s criticism of historicism when this implies to reduce classical Indian 
philosophies to a past and fixed philologico-historical object of studies that cannot be contemporarily further 
developed, in accordance with K. C. Bhattacharyya’s plea for ‘sympathetic interpretation’. For the latter, the 
danger of “too easily reading one’s philosophic creed into the history” does not justify the historical attitude, for 
its danger is “more serious’, it is the “danger of taking the philosophic type studied as a historic curiosity rather 
than a recipe for the human soul”. The defense of the contemporary creativity of Indian philosophies and the 
freedom to reinterpret them, including in heterodox ways, constituted a main incent for the saṃvāda project that 
is now elaborated more theoretically. On the other hand, the ‘feeling in a living continuity’ with a tradition, what 
 
191 
 
materials from another culture easily run into the risk of plain misunderstandings, cultural 
reductions and distortions. Can we get out of this epistemological dilemma? Or does this 
dilemma at the end amount to a valuational choice between exactitude and creativity, thus 
between the ideal of truth and the ideal of freedom (or free thinking)?  I believe we can draw 
on pūrvapakṣa and dialogue to address a few points related to this matter.  
First, I believe that this problem precisely outlines a constitutive deficiency of ‘dialogues with 
oneself’ vis-à-vis dialogues with others: using counter-position does imply to take in 
consideration the other position as oneself, and thus, ideally (and in Daya Krishna’s sense), 
pūrvapakṣa allows the Otherness in oneself, and the dialogue with oneself to be ‘truly’ other. 
But in cases of dialogues between philosophical traditions, can pūrvapakṣa guarantee to reach 
an Otherness not only constituted of another position within the same conceptual structures, but 
also between different structures? 555  Let us consider the phenomenological thesis of an 
intercultural philosopher such as Waldenfels, that the Other (Fremde) is precisely what escapes 
the own (in difference to the alter) thus what is beyond any understanding and horizon. In 
consequence, one must question whether dialogue with oneself - even in the exercise of 
pūrvapakṣa - contains enough ‘otherness’ in itself. The ‘shock (Gadamerian Anstoß, the 
hermeneutic reaction when facing inexpected things, see 2.1), the ‘surprise’ and the questions 
arising when reading different works can certainly provide pūrvapakṣa within one’s writing 
and readings, thus impulsion to other arguments. But they will eventually be integrated within 
one set of presuppositions and prejudices, or in Gadamerian terms, within one hermeneutic 
horizon: even if they can enlarge it to a certain extent, they remain committed to one rationality 
and the infinite possibilities remain entailed within one unity conceptually organizing and 
constituting a theory. Daya Krishna does not consider the problem from this pluricultural 
perspective, but since consciousness has an irremediable tendency to ‘I-centricity’ (see 7.3 for 
an analysis of this illusion), namely to revolve around itself and making others as objects of 
one’s own, dialogue with oneself seems only temporarily possible:556 
                                                 
I discuss in the next pages, easily explain the reluctance of ‘Western exposants’ of Eastern relations (in K. C. 
Bhattacharyya’s terms) to allow themselves this freedom of interpretation, for it risks plain reductions and 
misunderstandings if one’s presuppositions are radically different from those entailed in the tradition one studies. 
While this dilemma cannot be solved, it itself justifies the need of dialoguing between internal traditions of reading 
the same philosophical texts from different perspectives. This, in turn, argues against Halbfass’ critique of Daya 
Krishna’s saṃvāda exposed in 3.4, who reproached it an artificial and ‘Western’ setup leading in consequence to 
no hermeneutic reversal. For it seems to me again that different reading methods operate no differently than 
different traditions having different presuppositions, and thus can be used in the same way for fostering dialoguing. 
In other words, is there only one proper way of hermeneutic reversal und who can define it? 
555 See 1.1.2 and 1.1.4: I distinguished debates and dialogues on this ground to outline the conceptual difference 
entailed at this point. I defined there debates as a form of communication in which a common ground of 
argumentation is already assumed, within which different positions are discussed. On the contrary in dialogues, 
this ground is not assumed but emerge in the encounter of the participants. The conceptual structures can be 
questioned, and the framework shaped by different rhetorics. Theoretically, it constitutes an important difference 
for outlining the constitution of the rational basis in which we communicate. In practice, the distinction is rarely 
clear between these two forms and the communication usually oscillates between both forms, notably in case of 
misunderstandings when one has to clarify the ground on which he argues, as also already mentioned in 1.1.5. 
556 Sundar Sarukkai in his article ‘On Quiet Conversation: Ethics and the Art of Self-Conversation’ seems prima 
facia to disagree with such an idea when he writes that “the basic difference [between conversation and self-
conversation] is that the other with whom the conversation is being conducted is ‘outside’ the self. One way in 
which this outside is represented is through the medium that separates the self from the other - a physical space 
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 “One may at times be said to ‘converse’ or ‘discuss’ with oneself, but, then, one not only treats 
oneself as the ‘other’ but soon finds the limitations of this and seeks the ‘real’ other, the other 
than oneself who may look at whom one ‘thinks’ more objectively, critically without lies, or 
prejudice, or ‘self-love’ that the inevitable ‘I-Centricity’ in ‘thinking’ always involves.” 557 
I believe for both the reasons of an ‘intercultural gap’ (differences to others) and the tendency 
of making the other one’s own, this is where dialogue with oneself becomes possibly 
insufficient alone.558  
Thus, in its contemporary reinterpretation, pūrvapakṣa is not limited to the inclusion of different 
positions on the same map of conceptual nexus, what I used to characterize debates (1.1.2). It 
becomes a device for integrating a plurality of modes of reasoning, by a widening of the concept 
of otherness. In so doing however, an engagement with actual dialogues prevents the emptiness 
of otherness that I criticized in 1.2.2 with Rada Ivekovic, and the lack of determination of an 
other whose main qualification is to be ‘other’ or ‘beyond’. To avoid the problems inherent to 
the literature on the institution of an other that is the other of myself in the logic of alterity, or 
an other who, being ‘beyond’, nevertheless is characterized by ‘me’ only, the presence of actual 
others from different traditions enables participants to reinterpret their own positions in the light 
of different (definite and characterized) standpoints. The other is not simply somewhere to reach 
or to come back to, s/he is a definite standpoint participating in the collective ‘universality of 
knowledge’ with an acceptance of the śāstric tradition from which her/his concept occurs. This 
multiplicity of standpoints does not go without disadvantage either, which I discuss in the next 
pages, but it answers the insufficient practical applications of this account. During the Bhakti 
dialogue, Daya Krishna introduced this otherness, in view of detachment, as follows: 
                                                 
through which sound is transmitted, for example. The separation or the gap or the chiasm is essential to 
conversation, not just for the physical act of transmission of some sound or information but also because it marks 
the character of conversation, it makes possible the anticipation within oneself. This space marks the process of 
waiting that is essential for anticipation. In the case of self-conversation there is no ‘physical’ gap between the 
participants in the conversation since it is the ‘same’ self that is involved in the conversation. Our access to our 
inner conversation is mediated through the body and not through the space between the hearer/speaker. The 
possibility of self-conversation indicates first the possibility of the distance between the self and itself. The 
multiplicity of the self is first indicated to us through this capacity to converse with ourselves. In other words, it is 
not that conversation is possible because there is a notion of difference between the participants of the conversation 
but it is because there is conversation, self-conversation, that we recognize the distance between the self and itself.” 
I agree that distance between the self and itself is necessary for conversation tout court, whether with oneself or 
with other - this distance I have qualified in terms of de-identification or detachment from oneself. However, I 
consider this distance as a preliminary requirement, which does not exclude that others can contribute more to 
myself than my self-conversation in the differences that they bring into the dialogue. In other words, I do not 
consider the distance to exclude the difference, but the distance to be necessary to acknowledge the difference. 
Sundar Sarukkai, “On Quiet Conversation: Ethics and the Art of Self-Conversation,” in Grounding Morality: 
Freedom, Knowledge, and the Plurality of Cultures, ed. Jyotirmaya Sharma and A. Raghuramaraju (New Delhi ; 
New York: Routledge, 2010), 136. 
557 Grammatical typing mistakes of this unpublished manuscript have been corrected. Daya Krishna, 
“Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 8. 
558 See the discussion, following Daya Krishna’s intervention, on Buber’s emphasis on dialogue that is restricted 
to dialogue with ‘real otherness’ in contrast to dialogue with oneself. Daya Krishna, Maurice Friedman, Bijoy 
Boruah, Gautam Biswas, Jaideep Singh and S. A. Sayeed (in order of speech), in “Dialogue”, Friedman, Malik, 
and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 180–88.  
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“Today what we are to discuss should open new avenues for thinking, not merely for us but 
for others, other cultures and civilizations which have as much right to our cultural heritage as 
ourselves. We talk of ego. But what is ego in the Indian tradition? Is it not ego when I identify 
myself only as an Indian? The shedding of ego is not easy. One will engage a rational pursuit 
ones [sic.] when one has identified one say [oneself, sic.] with universality. In other words, I 
am a rational animal only to the extent I become universal. I shed my ego to the extent I 
participate in this universal reason in the game of knowledge. In the game of knowledge when 
we enter into a dialogue, I do not remain Daya Krishna, you are not just Kriplani and he is not 
just this particular, specific human individual. But we get out of our individual prejudices, 
biases and try to reach an objective universality, which can be mutually corrected and jointly 
explored. It is continuous with the whole of humanity, past and present, which man has built 
over time.”559 
An identification with universality does not mean that specific concepts from different 
traditions cannot be answered or counter-argued from another angle or that we should restrict 
dialogues to the topics or questions that ‘seem’ universal enough to be applied everwhere or 
being responded to by anyone. The locality of concepts retrieved from traditions embedded in 
a cultural nexus versus the universality of ideas that can be meaningfully questioned by all 
traditions (albeit bearing different connotations and implications) remains a paradox. In 
operating precisely between these two extents, dialogue offers itself as a way to confront an 
actual plurality of thinkers from their own (cultural) standpoint. At the same time, it allows 
transcending their standpoint in the idea of a universality of ideas. This universality, if not 
reached and corrected by the different views offered in the dialogue, remains a necessary ideal 
for communication. In the same way, if one does not ‘become’ the opponent in presenting his 
pūrvapakṣa, the bracketing of one’s position to imagine being the other for a moment has the 
merit of pointing out the limits of a position and to incite the imagination of others. Thus, ideally 
a position is something I hold without it to be me, and a counter-position is something you hold 
that I have to defend as if it were mine. In this mirror, the presuppositions of each of us are 
elucidated by the change of standpoints. 
Further, since (in Daya Krishna’s terms) the “capacity to resonate and feel a living continuity 
is the heart of understanding of at least some aspects of a civilization with which one feels 
identified and in harmony” 560 , a real plurality of traditions is preferable to avoid 
misunderstandings. However, avoiding misunderstanding does not guarantee ‘understanding’ 
either. It is a well-known fact that identity can be constructed by distorting historical events and 
ideological uses of concepts, as well as it is known that one can be identified with a culture 
without feeling in harmony with it, and even ‘resonate’ more with another culture than the one 
s/he is in living continuity with. The danger of such a sense of belonging is particularly relevant 
in cross-cultural dialogues, since it can lead to excessive associations and exclusions, where 
one feels intrinsically bound to what he/she considers as its own cultural heritage to be defended 
against the opponent, what appears in the ‘ego’ question raised by Daya Krishna above. In 
postcolonial contexts, the resentment and the de facto inequality against which postcolonial 
thinkers have to struggle often lead to confusion in the allegiance they feel committed to in 
particular in their defense of the superiority of Indian philosophy to Western philosophy (See 
                                                 
559 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 64–65. 
560 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 95. 
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2.2.1.1). Dissociating the conceptual critique made to an argument from the fact that this 
argument might have originated in a tradition, the reception of which might remain problematic, 
is a way to liberate it from its political unevenness. However, it goes without saying that this 
can function only if participants also detach themselves from the privileges of their living 
association with traditions whose legacy have been imposing the standards and modes of 
reasoning on others. The second part of this equation remains the most problematic, for they 
are often not felt as problematic - and fall themselves under the category of unreflected ‘belief’. 
The actual presence of others, who have a right to point these beliefs out is again a necessity 
for cross-cultural dialogue, and this de facto asymmetry justifies the need of going one step 
forward out of our privileges, i.e. of deconstructing these standards to include other modes of 
philosophizing remaining at the margins. Thus, the detachment from one’s living continuity 
with a civilization remains more complex than the more obvious attachment to one author or 
school (even if the attachment to an author or school often implies a deeper attachment to a 
civilization). In such a complexity, intercultural dialoguing between different living continuities 
and discontinuities requires the challenge of accepting misunderstandings, and even more: of 
using misunderstanding as potential creativity.  
Accepting the ‘risk’ of misunderstanding as a necessity for unveiling new possibilities does not 
mean falling into relativism: not all theses will be accepted, and not all misunderstandings can 
establish new directions of thinking. The engagement in dialogues is precisely a process to 
clarify what is potentially creative and what can potentially lead to new interconnections in the 
actual confrontation with others embedded in these traditions. Nevertheless, misunderstanding 
must be included in the necessary fallibility that creates the dynamic of dialogue. In that sense, 
rather than considering dialogue as a hermeneutic tool in which exegesis enables understanding, 
I contemplate the hermeneutic dimension of dialogue by focusing on listening.561 Listening, a 
                                                 
561 Although beyond the scope of this present work, it could be interesting to investigate how classical approaches 
on listening could be creatively reinterpreted into a contemporary ethic of dialogue or a dialogical attitude. This, 
with Daya Krishna, would imply a move of critically investigating the resources of the concept śabda-pramāṇa 
(devoid of the social exclusion and the authority that it implies, see 6.2.2) to decipher the relevance of listening 
for knowledge in general, and listening to the other-as-seeker-for-knowledge (6.2) in particular. As a very broad 
opening into such a question, I quote here Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s emphasis on listening in classical traditions as 
a philosophical method (which could be further investigated as used by his father’s philosophy, Krishachandra): 
“When we consider transcenenral philosophy, however, we find a basic difference in approach. The transcendental 
philosophers of the West were all seer-speakers. They, in whatever manner, first discovered apriorities and then 
expressed them, systematically or unsystematically. In India, on the other hand, the dominant attitude was that of 
a hearer, a learner, intent on discovering apriorities, but not having yet discovered them or discovered them fully. 
This is why they relied so much on scriptures. Even to acquire a right to listen to scriptures they had first to undergo 
a training such that the truths to be discovered would not be distorted, and, also, that one might not submit blindly 
or be hypnotized. This listening, technically called śravaṇa, was understood as already constituting transcendental 
intuition, though in the making. But even this was not considered enough. The hearer was required to go on 
continuously substantiating the truths, half realized, by means of arguments pro and con. (This second process was 
called manana.) But this was again to be followed up by a third process, viz., that of deep concentrationc, called 
nididhyāsana, which was to serve a double purpose. It was to dissipate the philosopher-hearer's subconscious 
doubts, if any were still left, and, second, a sustained deepening of concentration was considered capable of 
disclosing deeper implications and ultimately the whole system of relevant apriorities. This last process, known as 
jñāna-sādhana, was a process which Plato hinted at and Kant developed to a degree and which is in modern times 
treated in all seriousness by phenomenologists, and vicariously by many existentialists.” Kalidas Bhattacharyya, 
“Classical Philosophies of India and the West,” Philosophy East and West 8, no. 1/2 (April 1958): 35, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1397419. See also Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “Traditional Indian Philosophy as a Modern 
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pre-condition for understanding, leaves space for the otherness of the other’s position, even 
when understanding the Other as Other would remain inaccessible. In its close relation to 
‘understanding’, listening is at the crossroad between epistemology and ethics, insofar as it the 
act of listening determines the reasoning and the logic that will unfold, but, embedded in human 
behavior, it implies first an acknowledgment of the Other and a readiness to comply with his 
difference.562 It presupposes to accept that I might not understand the Other’s intention and 
meaning, but that I am ready to admit the limits of my condition, and to acknowledge her/his 
position within my own horizon. The difference between the two pushes the dialogue forward, 
between ‘silence and conversation’: 
“Supposing I’m prepared when I listen, what do I do? I don’t really comprehend what the other 
person is saying, though that is the minimum condition of listening, but also I am prepared to 
accept it not really as it is but seeing it as potentiality in a significant manner. Now what is the 
difference between conversation and dialogue? (…) A dialogue is after all a communicative 
act. But silence can also be communicative, particularly in the spiritual traditions, about which 
Prof. Malik and some others have been talking. But if we take the distinction, a dialogue is 
somewhere between a communication through silence and conversation. It involves an act of 
listening which is also a kind of silence.”563 
In that sense, dialogue is not a hermeneutic enterprise if hermeneutic is understood as a quest 
for understanding and consensual clarification. It is rather conceived as an event that allows to 
transcend the limits of each presupposition and position from the difficulties of understanding 
and the disagreement occurring in the confrontation. An understanding564 is a necessary step 
and requirement of pūrvapakṣa, which implies to defend the other’s position to the best of one’s 
abilities, namely of one’s understanding of the other’s position. However, since it cannot merely 
constitute a repetition, it requires the ability to listen, feel and explore the other’s realm as one’s 
own. This does not mean an appropriation into one’s own framework, but a trying to reach out 
of one’s own limits into another alternative thinking. In this sense, it indicates a seeking towards 
the universality of thinking, beyond the distinction of one or another position. This creates a 
position where there is no distinction between my position and the other’s position, i.e. where 
the mutual contribution turns into a creation that belongs neither to the one nor the other. This 
                                                 
Indian Thinker Views It,” in Indian Philosophy: Past and Future, ed. S. S. Rama Rao Pappu and R. Puligandla, 
1st ed (Delhi: Motila Banarsidass, 1982), 214–18. 
562 “There is something special in an ethical relation and that is already captured in the art of conversation. To 
converse with another is to acknowledge the other - this is primarily an ethical act and not an epistemological one. 
To converse is to listen, not only to what is said but also to what is not said - this is an ethical move and not a 
pragmatic one such as one for more efficient communication and so on. To converse is to engage with the silence 
between utterances - the fact that there is no need to do so implies that this is not a part of communication but an 
impulse that is ethical in character. To converse is to anticipate - as described earlier, this idea of anticipation, also 
related to that of waiting, is again an ethical character and not a behavioural one. To converse is to anticipate - as 
described earlier, this idea of anticipation, also related to that of waiting, is again an ethical character and not a 
behavioural one. To converse is to understand language as something more than its representations in the spoken 
and written mode - and this awareness about language is again not knowledge about language but an orientation 
towards language, an orientation that can be characterized as ethical.” Sarukkai, “On Quiet Conversation: Ethics 
and the Art of Self-Conversation,” 140. 
563 Daya Krishna, in the dialogue in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 
193. 
564 A more precise outline of the difference of this understanding and the role of dialogue vis-à-vis understanding 
in Gadamer and Daya Krishna is given in Coquereau, “Peut-on Dialoguer Avec Un Texte ? Interculturalisation de 
l’herméneutique, de Gadamer à Daya Krishna.” 
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engagement into the universality of knowledge is a participation in the common ‘seeking for 
knowledge’ that will be explained in 6.2.2 , where I show in particular the valuational nature of 
this ‘desire’ for knowledge. This tension constitutes a condition for dialogue: it signals the 
tension between reasoning from particular standpoints and the feeling of a universality that is 
not limited to the rational realm nor to the addition of the standpoints, which however must also 
be communicated and debatable. In this communication, agreements and disagreements occur, 
which point at differences and pluralities (see 7.2), although we seek an ideal which unites us 
together in this search. 
 
5.2.2. An Articulation of Different Standpoints 
 
Furthermore, pūrvapakṣa is mainly a tool to articulate different standpoints across 
philosophical traditions. The dismantlement or decomposition of presuppositions operates due 
to the pūrvapakṣa tool (śilpa) that distinguishes between the universality of knowledge and the 
particularity of the standpoints. It is useful here to remind us of the difference between 
distinction and separation according to S. S. Barlingay: “When things are not only distinguished 
as different but can also be separated or divided, I call them separables. When they are purely 
distinguished but cannot be divided or separated, I call them distinguishables.”565 Barlingay 
insists on this fundamental difference between separables (like the branch of a tree which can 
be divided into two), which determine the actual plurality of objects, and distinguishables, 
which signal a possibility of envisioning differences. The differentiation between the two 
becomes clear and necessary when applied to cases “where there is definite distinctness but it 
is not possible to separate one distinct from another distinct.”566, such as the color or the 
extension of something. Thus, distinctions are made necessary for the purpose of 
communication and conceptualization: “when we explain, we re-arrange our experience in a 
linguistic form so that it may become meaningful or communicable”567, which however, is not 
tantamount to an actual separation of things. To apply it to the realm of communication, I would 
apply this differentiation to the forms of communication exposed in 1.1. While I distinguished 
between lectures, debates, discourse-discussion and dialogue, I added that these forms cannot 
be separated, first because the communication evolves and makes consequently the separation 
in practice impossible: a question to a lecture can give rise to a dialogue and a discourse can 
become a debate. Furthermore, the characteristics of each form that I distinguished for the sake 
of conceptual clarification are not strictly delimited to one form, i.e. they cannot be separated 
from others. For the sake of conceptual clarification, such classifications are helpful to start 
investigating the complexity of a concept and its interrelations. They point at emphases, 
connotations and conceptual problems which can be distinguished from the concept as well as 
from other forms, but they cannot be separated from them.  
Having clarified this difference, we can admit pūrvapakṣa as a distinguishing tool between 
positions that as a whole, render the ideal of universality of knowledge from a panel of possible 
                                                 
565 Barlingay, “Distinguishables and Separables I,” 5. 
566 Barlingay, 3. 
567 Barlingay, 4. 
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standpoints. In a dialogue, standpoints are distinguishable parts of knowledge, which is 
conceived as a whole implicating all standpoints in interactions seeking this universality. It 
could be possible to consider a standpoint separately, in a monograph where one would develop 
‘one’s own thesis’, although I doubt this thesis would anyway be possibly developed in total 
independence from other references and influences, even if they are criticized and destroyed in 
the argumentation. In a dialogue however, standpoints are only distinguished insofar as the 
communication makes their relation necessary: one indeed needs different points for a relation 
between them to exist, which is why an ideal total consensus does not enable 
communication.Furthermore, knowledge is here conceived as a whole created not only by the 
sum of the standpoints but by their interrelations in counter-positions, i.e. by the transformations 
of the standpoints. Thus, it is this “distinguishability-qua-distinguishability”568 (namely, the 
fact that the two entites are not separated) that allows the creative tension in dialogue between 
particular viewpoints of the standpoints and the universality of the concepts.  
This emphasis on the difference between separation and distinction also pursues an objective 
that I consider salient in postcolonial Indian Anglophone philosophy: seeking reconciliation of 
different systems, worldviews and viewpoints that appear irreconciliable. Referring to the 
Naiyāyika K. K. Banerjee who comments on the acceptability of a system depending not on 
logic but on the individual and society of the individual, Margaret Chatterjee, close friend and 
classmate of Daya Krishna, elaborates on the plurality of realism that modern Indian 
metaphysicians try to articulate: 
“Several modern Indian metaphysical thinkers find entry to a metabasis eis allo genos within 
stances of reflection. Such reflective shifts seem to me to take the place of the classical 
distinction between the paramārthika [highest, supreme realm] and the vyavahārika [worldly, 
daily, practical realm]. To the phenomenologically inclined they take the place of the turn from 
the naturalistic standpoint to the post-epoché stance of ratio intuitive. However, it is usually 
maintained that a purged mode of reflection, that is, one which has left behind the unreflective, 
can provide insight into the nature of what is. But since these insights are so various, 
philosophers like K. K. Banerjee and Kalidas Bhattacharyya concede how diverse our 
standpoints can be. Herein lies both their modesty and, I would say, their realism.”569 
Chatterjee comments further that K. K. Banerjee’s statement shows “how standpoints come into 
existence thanks to a multiplicity of factors”.570 Thus, without jettisoning the possibility of 
gaining insights into the nature of what ‘really’ is, it is acknowledged that these insights might 
be plural, even if they are immediate. Furthermore, it is also recognized that different modes to 
gain insight can be accepted, including those retrieved from the phenomenal or worldly 
existence, which might be in contradiction with unreflective insights. At both levels, plurality 
exists, as well as between these levels - a connection which must also be articulated without 
excluding one for the other. For these Indian metaphysicians, such an insight into the diversity 
of our standpoints challenged them to develop ways of integrating radical internal differences 
of philosophy. This applies to J. N. Chubb, to K. C. Bhattacharyya, and even more to his son 
                                                 
568 Barlingay, 5. 
569 Margaret Chatterjee, “Indian Metaphysics,” in Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey Edited by G. Fløistad. 
Volume 7. Asian Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 85. 
570 Chatterjee, 85. 
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Kalidas Bhattacharyya with the concept of alternation, on which I will come back in the next 
chapter 5.3. For Daya Krishna, who refuses both relativism and jettisoning reason or truth 
themselves, it is a challenge for diversity in dialogue and creative thinking.  
To illustrate how pūrvapakṣa can unveil the particular presuppositions involved in an 
argumentation, let us come back to the Bhakti dialogue (see 3.3.2)571. In a session examining 
the problems of applying the rational term pūrvapakṣa itself to bhakti, realm of feeling par 
excellence, Kedar Nath Misra (Banaras Hindu University), a participant questioned the 
assembly’s presuppositions on bhakti itself. More precisely, he underlined the “presupposition 
about the unchanging character of the tradition”, that he interpreted as possible 
misinterpretation of previous positions. He adds: 
“The concept of bhakti that we are discussing, I presume, follows the way, which thinks that 
there was no bhakti in India and it is with Rāmānuja that it began and so on. But that is not the 
case. There is a pūrvapakṣa to bhakti; but within bhakti there are many pūrvapakṣas also.”572 
As obvious as this statement could sound to a reader outside this debate, this awareness during 
the dialogue is the reflection of the collective undertaking of analyzing bhakti from different 
perspectives, or more exactly, to notice the insufficiencies of each perspective. The debate 
therefore followed the possible break between Vedic traditions (the relation of which suggested 
by Kedar Nath Misra being counter-argued) and later stages, on the divergences of meanings 
in the traditions of ācāryas (the scholarly tradition) and the saints, more importantly on the roots 
of the contemporary idea of bhakti being rather located in the latter tradition, and on the 
possibility to relate a ‘core’ idea of bhakti to all traditions, or rather to one conceptually more 
influential on today’s idea.573 If it is conceptually self-evident, the reasoning of individual 
thinkers when writing their own papers tends to take for granted that their assumptions and 
presuppositions are the only possibility, which becomes self-evidently contradicted in a 
collective endeavor.  
There are however, three limits to be considered: the first is inherent to the definition of dialogue 
as “open-ended”. Considering pūrvapakṣa as a device in Daya Krishna’s interpretation implies 
never to be able to reach a finite conclusion. The tension between model and standpoints and 
between locality and universality can per definition, not be resolved since it constitutes the 
fundamental dynamic of dialogue. There is thus no certainty and no conclusion to be reached. 
Dialogue remains fallible, open for counter-positions, which lies at the core of the matter.  
One could however easily object that each dialogue ‘ends’. Whether it is due to time-restriction 
or a consensual silence that leads to concluding the session, the outcome remains that each 
transcription of the saṃvāda experiments is contained in a book, and that each dialogue, debate 
and discussions come to an end. But are all endings the end? Daya Krishna observes:  
                                                 
571 This analysis of pūrvapakṣa with the bhakti dialogue is a revision of a version originally published as Freschi, 
Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and 
Dialogue,” 191–200. The section that is being reworked here is the author’s sole work.  
572 Kedar Nath Misra, in Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 35. His complete 
explanation is found in ibid., p.33-43. 
573 In the transcription, Shiv Kumar Sastry responded in English and Hindi, followed by G. C. Pande and Kedar 
Nath Misra responding again. Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 43–49. 
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“Whether it is a dialogue between two persons or more than two persons, there is a start and 
there is an end. The end is not really an end but something occurs, and we have to think about 
what happened. It is very difficult to really understand what happens, but at some point, after 
an hour or two hours, everybody feels that now, nothing more can be said on the issue. It is a 
very strange thing because the something that happened exhausted the possibility of creativity. 
It does not mean that we can come back to it tomorrow or the day after and the thing will not 
flow again. Something new will happen. What will happen we will not know. But the point is 
that there is a sort of temporal span of creative thinking, and that something happens, but it is 
a rest. It should not be seen as a closure. And if we do not see it as a closure then this is an 
infinite activity - an activity that can be carried on till eternity and dying.”574 
This is thus the difference between the end and a rest - a pause of creativity, and a rest of the 
dialogue. There is no closure nor any definitive conclusion, but a possible momentary stop of 
the process, which allows both to reflect on what has been reached and in which directions to 
proceed further (the analysis of which are usually done in the introduction and conclusion of 
dialogue, see part 3). In that sense, it is a necessary introspective part of dialoguing. Dialogues 
are not only constituted of the collective thinking on the given topic, but also of the reflective 
awareness on its contents and methods (which affect in return the topics) and of the silences 
that occur between the creative duration. Thus, the ideal of perfection or the refinement of one 
truth, although remaining operative as a regulative idea, cannot be the actual objective of a 
dialogue. This intrinsic defect signals also the creative dynamic of dialogue.  
2) The second defect is more difficult to dismiss: it concerns the limits of the particular entailed 
in a standpoint. Although pūrvapakṣa as a device can generate boundless dialogues, the 
starting-point however is by definition, strongly limited to the standpoints of individual 
participants. In other words: while dialogue can a priori cross any disciplinary or cultural 
boundaries, in practice each participant is limited, which allows delimit the broadness of 
concrete dialogues. I underlined the fact that it is this individuality that avoids the emptiness of 
an a-cultural Other characterized in opposition or ‘beyond’ me. Nevertheless, the opposite is 
not devoid of its own difficulties, namely: are all standpoints relevant? How to ensure possible 
communication among an infinite field of possibilities? How to allow enough unity in diversity 
to be able to exchange? Where is the limit between heterogeneity that would impede 
communication and a diversity that would enrich it?575 It would be naive to believe that a 
maximum heterogeneity can be plainly absorbed into a collective and creative dialogue. Some 
stances, behaviors, ways of reasoning and arguments often obstruct the discussion more than 
they contribute to it, and the rigorous procedure to prepare the diverse saṃvāda testifies of such 
an awareness. Scholars were certainly diverse in terms of the philosophical traditions they 
belonged to, or in interdisciplinary fields, but they did share a scholarship on the given topic, 
even if from various aspects; they were trained in diverse learning institutions and models, but 
they were, indeed, trained; thus, most of the time, they knew each other or part of the assembly. 
Thus, having a position takes a set of beliefs and presuppositions for granted, consciously or 
not. But does counter-position help us out of this muddle? Is not counter-position also restricted 
                                                 
574 Daya Krishna in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 183. 
575 I addressed some of these questions in reviewing Ralph Weber and Arindam Chakrabarti’s project of ‘fusion 
philosophy’ in their edited volume Comparative Philosophy Without Borders. Coquereau, “’From Comparative 
Philosophy to Fusion Philosophy’, Ed. Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, Comparative Philosophy Without 
Borders, London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2016, 246 Pp.” 
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to standpoints, even if these standpoints are different than mine? Does pūrvapakṣa ‘free’ my 
argumentation from presuppositions and beliefs if other positions also assume another set of 
presuppositions? To say the least, it depends on the pūrvapakṣa that I am facing. Although Jay 
Garfield does not conceptualize this problem, he raises it very efficiently in responding to Daya 
Krishna’s article ‘Eros, Nomos, Logos’, in his speech delivered at the Daya Krishna Annual 
Lecture 2018 in Jaipur. He maintained there that the paradoxes arising from our human 
condition itself, in particular the problem of I-centricity, or the impossible way out solipsism, 
require another perspective than Daya Krishna’s, in the sense that they occur as insoluble 
because of the standpoints he chose. According to Garfield, Daya Krishna criticizes Kant’s and 
Hegel’s positions because of his insatisfaction of their legal conception of society. Daya 
Krishna thus introduces as a counter-position the concept of Eros, reinterpreted from Śaṅkara 
and Aurobindo, “to draw our attention to the possibility of the re-enchantment of the 
commonplace and to the easy availability of a transcendental sensibility”.576 Garfield concludes 
on Daya Krishna’s interpretation: 
 “So, this is the final point. So long as we remain trapped in the immanent, egocentricity is 
hard to avoid. This is simply because, on Daya’s view, the world as it is merely empirically is 
bereft of value: value enables and requires connection to the transcendent. And without value, 
desire is all that can drive us. When Eros is understood as mere individual desire, it serves 
Nomos in its causal sense. But when Eros is taken as care for others, it serves Logos, and 
motivates a life of gratitude and beneficence. I have to regard this approach to those goals as a 
noble failure. And I think that the failure was built in from the start, that is, from the use of 
resources drawn from Kant and Hegel in Europe, and from Śaṅkara and Aurobindo in India; 
that is, from sources that begin analytically with the individual subject and then try to work out 
from there. My own suspicion is that Daya’s prison-house of I centricity is in fact inescapable. 
The only way not to become imprisoned therein is never to enter in the first place. I would 
therefore like to help Daya to work his way towards these same goals by starting elsewhere, in 
the matrix of interdependence and collective life, drawing inspiration from Hume in the West 
and from Buddhists such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva in India. The relation between Eros, 
Nomos, and Logos may look different from there.”577 
Garfield continues his development, but I would like to interrogate the nature of the dialogical 
move he undertakes. What Garfield implicitly underlines (or what I interpret in his suggestion 
to displace the counter-positions) is the following: in view of the fact that Daya Krishna chose 
Kant, Hegel, Śaṅkara and Aurobindo here as counter-positions to answer to, he remains thereby 
strongly influenced and limited by them. Even as counter-position, they determine his answer 
in a certain direction. This implies a certain location within a particular conceptual framework 
and thereby, within a certain “prison-house” (of transcendence). So, if counter-positions 
determine the answers according to their own presuppositions in exactly the same way as 
positions determine one’s answer, are counter-positions a solution to unveil presuppositions or 
simply the variation of one set for another? In other words: are they fundamentally a creative 
tool to escape the prison-house of presuppositions, or simply a slightly more diverse and 
heterogenous contribution to a position confined in presuppositions? Is Daya Krishna’s use of 
                                                 
576  Jay L. Garfield, “Love, Law and Language: Continuing to Think with Daya-Ji” (2018), 9, 
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pūrvapakṣa free of conditioning? Or doesn't he assume the presuppositions of those he 
disagrees with and thereby reproduces the illusions he is denouncing?  
Pūrvapakṣa does not erase limits. It does not allow a ‘dialogue without borders’ in itself. 
However, what it opens is the (in abstracto) infinite possibility of counter-positions from a 
boundless spectrum of presuppositions and positions. De facto, it entails the inclusion of several 
counter-positions limited to the actual participants taking part in the dialogue. Thus, the same 
topic on dialogue can be engaged on infinitely by different participants, and the results will be 
unique (but not infinite). The difference between the results and conceptions obtained in the 
abstract ideal of dialogue and the limits of any particular realization of it constitutes the 
dissatisfaction (see 6) of any empirical realization. On the one hand, the creativity that arises 
from pūrvapakṣa is the one of the plurality itself, and the one originating from the tension 
between the particularity of the plural standpoints and the ideal of universality engaged by all. 
The creativity arising from dissatisfaction, on the other hand, arises from the tension between 
conceptual imagination and empirical realization. It signals the gap between the ideal of 
dialogue in its apprehension and the limits of its realization. The dissatisfaction, which is the 
awareness of the limits of any particular realization with regard to the idea one had imagined, 
enables however to re-think and correct both the model and its realization. This, in turn, leads 
to new dialogues. This creative tension is exposed in 6. 
3) The last one is one with serious epistemological and ontological consequences, and the one 
studied by Daya Krishna himself (and taken up by Garfield above): the problem of ‘I-
centricity’. Given its relevance for dialogue and otherness, it constitutes the topic of 7.3. In 
short, counter-positions are not rhetorical devices detached from the person. Although a person 
is not bound by her/his position on a topic, a position is enabled by a thinking person, which 
explains that her/his presuppositions as ‘intuitions’ and ‘beliefs’ relate to larger worldviews and 
values than the bare unfolding of its logical premisses. It is as a person that I can formulate a 
position, expressed as ‘I think that’ or a counter-position, ‘I disagree with’ (and their variations). 
This ‘I’ expresses my consciousness, thinking and disagreeing with my (intellectual) actions, 
and ‘that’ or ‘with’, the objects of my consciousness. The basic problem that occurs is how to 
overcome the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’, i.e. the absolute sense of subjectivity entailed in my 
consciousness. While I can conceive myself as an object of consciousness and reflect on myself 
as self-consciousness, it does not seem possible to conceive of others as subjects of my 
consciousness (as other-consciousnesses). At least, it does not seem possible for me to have 
access to their ‘I’ in any way other than in making them objects of my consciousness. This, in 
view of my explanation of pūrvapakṣa, raises serious difficulties: how to defend the other’s 
position as if it were mine if ‘I’ cannot be the ‘other’, i.e. if the other’s position is bound to 
remain an object of my consciousness? Can I ‘be’ the other?  
 
5.3. Witnessing Epistemic Plurality in Dialogues 
 
Let us now turn to the epistemological background for the use of pūrvapakṣa as an intercultural 
tool for dialogues. This implies to include pūrvapakṣa within the larger epistemological context 
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of Truth in avoiding the extremes of dogmatic absolutism and relativism. I also want to 
investigate the epistemological foundations that can justify how the device operates. 
Connecting epistemology (as the science of knowledge having been foremost developed by 
logic) and rhetorics (as the science of correct reasoning and rules of debate) is nothing new to 
Indian philosophies: the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, from which the concept of (saṃ)vāda was 
retrieved, and the commentarial tradition that followed, precisely refined this connection 
between valid arguments and correct means of knowledge. At this point however, it is to be 
expected that Daya Krishna remained unsatisfied (albeit influenced) by its presentation: 
“Vāda, Jalpa [disputation] and Vitaṇḍa [eristic wrangle] are forms of argumentation and they 
have nothing to do with the strict pramāṇa-vyāpāra [activity of knowledge] as they have 
nothing to do with the argument. (…) As for chala [fraud], jāti [futile rejoinder] and nigraha-
sthāna [point of defeat], these are terms that have nothing to do with the theory of pramāṇa 
[means of knowledge], as they refer to debate or strategies employed by disputants to win an 
argument, the last specifically referring to winning or losing which can hardly be considered 
to be the prayojana [ultimate goal] of engaging in the pramāṇa-vyāpāra to attain certitude or 
knowledge.  
The ‘extensional’ enumeration of the subject-matter of the Nyāya-sūtras, thus, is an 
amalgamation of two different discourses, the one relating to the forms of argumentation 
between different persons debating a point and winning or losing in the argument, and the other 
relating to the theory of proof or justification.”578 
The confusion of the equivalence between the ‘victory’ of an argument when the terms of this 
victory are discussed from a rhetorical point of view, and the ‘victory’ understood as 
epistemological validity of the truth of the argument is called into question. In other terms, 
Daya Krishna criticizes how the acknowledgment of rhetorical skills can lead to establishing 
the epistemological validity of an argument. Such a conception of epistemological validity 
bereaves the speaker of her/his subjectivity in the constitution of knowledge that is elaborated 
in a debate because it confers an objective validity to a particular truth-statement. Rhetoric 
provides universal rules that determine the validity of a statement in any situation, which 
corresponds to the epistemological validity of the argument. In equating both, the speaker is 
considered as an ‘epistemological subject’ in opposition to a ‘person’, which raises difficulty, 
notably in view of the I-centricity above mentioned.  
Moreover, the outcome of a debate in terms of victory and defeat of an argument according to 
a set of predeterminated rules, indicates further problems for considering epistemology as the 
outcome of rhetoric. Although vāda aims at truth rather than at victory, the overall conception 
of debates remains determined by this focus, for truth equates victory of the debate. Secondly, 
the enterprise of the Nyāyasūtra is committed to a metaphysical seeking for mokṣa or liberation 
being achieved by knowledge of an argument. This further questions the logical relation 
                                                 
578 Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras, 48. 
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between a valid argument and a state of consciousness,579 or how rhetoric can influence a 
metaphysical quest.  
Thus, while Daya Krishna (and his contemporaries) can connect epistemology to rhetoric on 
how truth is elaborated in debates, his perspective differs in a contemporary context. He rather 
questions how to determine ‘valid arguments’ in the context and the plurality of subjects if the 
validity is not consensually determinable anymore. While classically, the debate was rather 
questioning how to erase errors and illusions in order to reach truth and liberation, it is rather 
the discordance of opinions and the possibility to reach different truths that interest a 
contemporary philosopher like Daya Krishna. This discordance is not conceived as the 
ignorance of subjects to be overcome to reach a higher state of knowledge, but as what 
constitutes forms of knowledge out of the very differences of subjectivities. Thus, he is rather 
interested in the contradictory manifestations of truths and the disagreements in dialogue than 
in any overarching consensus. In his words:  
“The inalienable and irreducible subjectivity of the other is, however, encountered in a more 
intractable manner by its nonacceptance or opposition or rejection of what one communicates 
even after the other has understood it. Many a times one deludes oneself into thinking that if 
the other had really understood what one is saying, one could not but have agreed to it. But 
this is to forget that one has oneself disagreed or rejected someone else’s contention after 
having claimed to understand it as otherwise one would not, or could not, have done so. The 
continuous and continuing refutation of views and counterviews thus proclaims aloud the 
plurality of subjectivities in inter-subjective interaction, as nothing else could.”580 
Counter-positions and disagreements reveal the intersubjective nature of knowledge, 
understood as knowledge of the other. It is only when we start to consider knowledge not only 
in terms of contents, i.e. of objects of knowledge, but when we introduce modality and 
contextuality, i.e. the way knowledge is subjectively constituted, that we perceive the relevance 
of persons in the construction and activity of consciousness. The subjectivity of another 
consciousness is necessary for interacting, validating, contradicting, and resisting in the process 
of creating knowledge. One knows for oneself and thinks for oneself, but one knows because 
of an alterity.  
This, in return, questions the presupposed unity of truth if we accept a plurality of valid 
arguments. Rather than jettisoning the concept of truth altogether or proposing a strong 
relativism, contemporary Indian metaphysicians share a certain commonality in a project of 
‘accommodation’ and ‘integration’ of plural viewpoints as evoked by Margaret Chatterjee 
above (in 5.2.2). They not only react to the argumentative perspective of the Nyāya tradition, 
                                                 
579 “The claim that a correct knowledge of all the elements mentioned in the sūtra will lead to tattva-jñana is 
preposterous as, firstly, to win a debate certainly cannot be a sign of having knowledge of that which is ultimately 
real, assuming that the term tattva in the sutra efers to that which is ultimately real, as it would only prove that one 
is more skillful in debate or argumentation than the other with whom one is debating. moreover, the idea that from 
this one would Niḥśreyas, that is, liberation or Mokṣa, is highly debatable, for it is difficult to see how a knowledge 
of valid argument can ever give rise to a state of being or consciousness, which is free from any kind of 
determination or bondage.” Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras, 48–49. 
580 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 297. 
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but also against the scientific and positivist equivalence between knowledge and truth581 (in the 
singular), and the distinction between natural and social sciences/humanities.582  The more 
contemporary developments of conceiving knowledge in economical neoliberal terms, on the 
other hand, are captured by Daya Krishna as a collaborative process involving a plurality. This 
plurality, however, only operates at an instrumental level for producing technological means in 
view of knowledge devoid of values. The plurality involved there is limited to the instrumental 
effort, not to the ‘seeking’ of man (puruṣārtha) without developing the conception of truth or 
knowledge.583                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
The difficulties to account for multiple and intersubjective truths which lie at the core of  
dialogue explain the necessity to establish other epistemological conceptions that more 
adequately correspond with the subjectivities at stake. However, objectivity remains a 
necessary parameter, because a pure relativism cannot enable dialogue if it consists in 
presenting parallel truths that cannot be discussed:  
                                                 
581 “The dispute about knowledge in the social sciences or the humanities is well known, as also the question 
whether knowledge in these fields is strictly to be accorded the status of knowledge as the process of establishing 
a knowledge claim is generally not clear, or even agreed upon. There are, as everybody knows, schools 
(saṃpradāyas), each with its own orthodoxy and methodology, self-enclosed in its own certitude, oblivious of the 
criticisms offered by others. (…) Some may cite the so-called “schism in Physics” and the Intuitionist revolt in 
Mathematics as evidence that even these hard-core knowledge-fields are not immune from the problem. But if this 
is accepted then the problem will be seen to lie deeper still, and not just be confined to certain kinds of knowledge 
only. The problem relates to the notion of knowledge itself. Does it form a unified whole covering everything that 
is known, or does it consist of disparate atomic sentences each mirroring a fact or displaying or showing it? There 
can be in-between positions, loosely organized unities relating to certain fields only, along with the hope that some 
day it will all be tied so neatly as not to be disturbed ever again. But this will be a utopian absurdity as it can only 
be achieved by a suicide of the knowledge-entreprise itself even while humanity is living and has not become 
extinct.” Daya Krishna, 142–43. 
582 In an early paper prepared for a UNESCO survey on the problems of social sciences and humanities, Daya 
Krishna already noticed that “the social sciences and the humanities, however, suffer from a situation which, at 
least, does not seem to be prevalent to the same extent in the natural sciences. The diversity of trends seems not 
only much greater and more complex than the one found in the natural sciences but also, which is perhaps unique, 
opposite and even contradictory in character. The very fact that ideological disputes find themselves more at home 
in the social sciences and the humanities than in the natural sciences is, by itself, almost convincing evidence of 
this. If we further take into account the fact that there seems to be far more of a national tradition in the former 
studies than in the latter, the evidence is further strengthened. It is not as if the different areas of a study were 
differentially emphasized and pursued in different countries but that the same area is differently and even 
contradictorily pursued in different countries.” Daya Krishna, “On the Distinctions Between the Natural Sciences, 
the Social Sciences and the Humanities,” International Social Science Journal (UNESCO) XVI, no. 4 (1964): 514. 
583 “At the centre of it [the problem of freedom in the contemporary context of globalization] lie the radical change 
in the conception of knowledge, which now is seen not only in purely instrumental terms, but also as something 
that can be self-consciously ‘created’ by the collective effort of man, through planning and management and 
investment of huge resources, mobilized for the purpose by the state or the political centre, that sees itself now in 
terms of the ‘future’ and not as the ‘preserver’ of all that was achieved in the past. It is not the dharma, or the 
status quo, or the socio-cultural realities that give meaning and identity to a people. It is rather ‘development’ in 
all fields and all directions that is seen as its ‘defining’ function, leading to perpetual instability whose quality and 
intensity is increasing at such a rate, that not only all social relations, including the one between the generations, 
are being disrupted, but also the conceptual structures that man had evolved to ‘understand’ human reality and the 
values it was supposed to enshrine and pursue to make it ‘human’ and give it meaningfulness.” Daya Krishna, 
“The Cosmic, Biological, the Cultural Conditionings and the Seeking of Freedom,” 142. See also Daya Krishna, 
Civilizations, 83–86. See also Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and 
Civilizations, 279–82. 
 
205 
 
“Without the notion of objectivity, human seeking will not make much sense in any realm 
whatsoever. If every perception is veridical, every thought true, every feeling adequate, every 
action right then there is just no question of seeking anything, for everything is realised all the 
time. The possibility of the illusory, the false, the inadequate, the wrong gives meaning to 
human seeking but these terms themselves have meaning only if there is some objectivity with 
which they can possibly be confronted and judged in its light.”584 
Objectivity585 is here conceived as “’the knowledge of object’ [which] should be the same as 
the object itself”. 586  In concordance with the view that presuppositions, fallibility and 
misunderstandings are creative potentialities for dialogue, objectivity can be considered as a 
necessary parameter to enable dialogues. However, such a conception of objectivity cannot be 
detached of space and time, nor be of universal applicability. It is also subject to change and 
modification when objective facts are themselves proven wrong. It is, thus, grounded in an 
experience. This explains that subjectivity and objectivity cannot function independently: even 
if they stand in radical opposition, both poles are required to give each member its intelligibility. 
In such a perspective, the admitted relativism could not mean the absence of objectivity. On the 
other hand, such a concept of objectivity implies admitting a possible plurality of truths that 
would emerge from conflicting accounts, and the possibility that something held to be true can 
be demonstrated false without it to be necessary an error, but simply based on a different 
objective presupposition. But how to account for different objectivities that are still 
distinguished (and not separated) from subjectivities?  
This has two implications: it refers first back to the beliefs and presuppositions above mentioned 
in 5.1, and secondly, qualifies philosophy itself as inherent conflicts and paradoxes that must 
be elucidated vis-à-vis the systems that produce them, rather than an accumulative quest for 
truth that would be jointly and harmoniously constituted. The attempt at philosophical 
dialoguing seems to depend on an articulation of contradictions apparently inherent to the 
nature of philosophy, rather than a correction of earlier mistakes to reach a collective Truth. 
These implications go hand in hand and the connection is made by the philosopher Jehangir N. 
Chubb in distinction to scientific epistemology:  
“Philosophical thinking reaches no new conclusions for it is at its origin committed to a point 
of view and ‘evidence’ in its case simply means the presenting of considerations which tend to 
show the reasonableness and the logical coherence of the ‘conclusion’ already presupposed in 
                                                 
584 Daya Krishna, “Appearance and Reality,” 168–69. 
585 See Kalidas Bhattacharya: “If in place of the simple word ‘object’ we here use a more complex expression ‘the 
thing which stands to subjectivity as its object’, this is because we here mean alternation between such thing 
(standing over there in nature and on its own right, as the realists understand it) and subjectivity (that refers to it): 
we do not mean any alternation between subjectivity (in Husserl‟s language, ego = noesis) and content (in 
Husserl‟s language, object = noema).” Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “My Reaction,” in The Philosophy of Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya, ed. Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose, and P. K. Srivastava, 9 (Pune: Indian Philosophical Quarterly 
Publications, 1985), 190. 
586  Daya Krishna, “Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation,” in The Philosophy of Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya, ed. Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose, and P. K. Srivastava, 9 (Pune: Indian Philosophical Quarterly 
Publications, 1985), 16. 
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the production of ‘evidence’. In science reasoning is anterior to belief, in philosophy it is 
interior to belief.”587  
The problem that arises is many-sided. It points at the constitutive but neglected differences 
between sciences and philosophy regarding the role of belief: neglected in the sense of the lack 
of methodological consequences drawn from this difference, in particular if philosophy ‘seeks’ 
to become ‘scientific’.588 It also outlines some grounds of failure of philosophical dialogues. In 
remaining a truth versus false conception of philosophical systems, it leads to a closure of 
philosophical discussion, for each interlocutor will simply argue against the other. In conceiving 
philosophy’s process of verification in correspondence with the scientific one, however without 
having any empirical proof nor external logical justification at one’s disposal, philosophical 
debates are bound to remain endless ‘wranglings’. “Wrangling in philosophy can never come 
to an end, since each of the disputants claims that her/his ultimate grounds alone are self-evident 
or indubitable.”589 What needs to be considered, however, is that ‘her’ or ‘his’ grounds are 
intrinsic to ‘her’ or ‘his’ system, and thus cannot be verified outside of internally logical 
systems, nor independently of one’s presupposition.  
J. N. Chubb elaborates further, albeit bearing different consequences, on presuppositions that 
account for conflicts (in distinction to dialogue) in philosophy: 
“On being included in a metaphysical system, and not before, the scientific presuppositions are 
turned into propositions and assigned a relative truth or a lesser degree of truth than the 
propositions which form the body of the metaphysical system. The notion of truth itself is 
organic to the system and inseparable from it. The mistake of the metaphysicians is to assume 
that the presuppositions of science are in themselves propositions, that they are unconscious 
metaphysical commitments about the Universe or the ultimate nature of things.”590 
The problematic assertion of truth within a philosophical system (depending on certain 
presuppositions) is responsible for the incompatibility between different philosophical systems. 
                                                 
587 J. N. Chubb, “Critical Philosophy,” in Current Trends in Indian Philosophy (Waltair: Andhra University Press, 
1972), 116–17. 
588 “In the beginning Philosophy was regarded as co-extensive with the whole of knowledge. It was the mother of 
all sciences. Gradually the special sciences broke away from the tutelage of Philosophy and established themselves 
as separate disciplines with their own characteristic methods. This was all to the good. But though science has 
liberated itself from philosophy it has not occurred to philosophers to see whether there is any need for liberating 
philosophy from science. As at one time they formed a single body of knowledge it is natural that they shared 
many presuppositions. One of these is that science and philosophy are both forms of knowledge in the same sense, 
both sciences in the wider sense of the term, and with the separation of the special sciences from philosophy it was 
naturally assumed that the difference between the two lay primarily in their subject matter. (…) Now it seems to 
me that there is a need to question the assumption that philosophy is a science in the wider sense of the term, only 
with a different subject matter and perhaps a different method. If this assumption is not questioned then the mind 
naturally falls a prey to the fallacy of rationalism. The empirical and the mathematical sciences each have their 
own way of supporting the truth of their assertions. What then is more natural but to assume that philosophy must 
do likewise and produce logical grounds to support its theories. Rationality, it is assumed, consists in not making 
any statements which are not supported by reasons. And the supporting reasons must themselves not be open to 
question. Philosophy does not rest on any other science for providing a justification of its grounds. Hence it is 
assumed that the ultimate grounds of all philosophical statements must necessarily be either self-evident or 
indubitable in the sense that if you doubt them your doubt destroys itself.” ‘Philosophical Arguments and 
Disagreement’, Chubb, Philosophical Papers of Professor J.N. Chubb, 290–91. 
589 Chubb, 291. 
590 Chubb, “Critical Philosophy,” 108. 
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Chubb takes the example of a positivist who would suppose that speaking about reality as 
something that transcends the senses is a meaningless proposition. However, denying 
metaphysical propositions on the ground that the positivist denies transcendence is not founded 
on a logical analysis. This is eventually a choice based on a set of presuppositions that leads the 
positivist to hold such a view.591 In that sense, the positivist theory is just ‘one’ attempt at 
translating her/his experience into a theory, i.e. a particular communication of a general 
experience. 592  Chubb concludes from this unsatisfying state of affair that philosophy in 
consequence makes no “ordered progress”593 and cannot hold any “universal statement”594, 
unlike science. What the early Daya Krishna could add to this is the relevance of ‘significance’ 
to highlight the differences between systems,595 which determines the choice of the criterion 
                                                 
591 “The positivist, for example, would neither assert nor deny that there is a Reality which transcends the senses. 
He would say that talk about such Reality is meaningless. But this attempt to deny truth-value to metaphysical 
propositions rests on an ontological commitment. The metaphysical point of view is not logically self-
contradictory. The rejection of the positivist’s theory of meaning violates no law of thought. The positivist cannot 
show and perhaps does not claim to show that his Verification Principle is an analytic proposition such that its 
denial is self-contradictory. Hence the positivist in rejecting metaphysics is not rejecting a flagrant self-
contradiction, but what is logically considered, a possible point of view. (…) Nevertheless, he rejects the truth of 
one statement which, without being a part of any metaphysical system, is necessarily presupposed by every 
metaphysical system, the statement, namely, that the Verification Principle has only a limited application and is 
not true of all significant utterances that claim to give information about the nature of things. The statement is not 
self-contradictory and to reject it as meaningless because it does not satisfy the verificationist’s criterion of 
meaning is obviously to beg the question. At the level of presuppositions, therefore, the positivist cannot simply 
ignore the metaphysician, but must join issue with him and hence positivism cannot completely free itself of all 
ontological commitments. In this rather indirect way the positivist cannot help being a brother metaphysician with 
a rival theory of his own.” Chubb, 109. 
592 These terms represent M. Chatterjee’s formulation of the same idea: “A metaphysical theory does not describe 
anything but it expresses an attempt to put into words a vision of things which the philosopher himself has 
experienced. It is an essay in communication, a communication of something which is itself progressively 
articulated through the verbal expressions used, be these arguments, examples, imagery or all three. (…) Just as a 
translator often has to incorporate the ‘untranslatable’ (the proper name, the idiom, the word which is highly 
culture-determined), a metaphysician may find himself having to accommodate the ‘undigested’ elements. (…) 
Furthermore, just as there are alternative translations, so there are alternative metaphysical theories. The touchstone 
in the one case is the ‘original’ and in the other experience. Now, our experience does have a common structure to 
be sure. But differences of temperament go a long way in conditioning our reactions to this common structure. It 
has often been pointed out that the difference between the idealist and the realist, the monist and the pluralist, has 
much to do with differences in overall orientation to life. If in the physical world the possibilities are so vast as 
often to make predication and control hazardous, the possibilities in the case of man (whose endowment includes 
and goes beyond the physical) are infinitely more. To read conflicting metaphysical statements is to read diverse 
records of human experience.” Margaret Chatterjee, “Towards an Anthropological View of Philosophy’, in 
Devaraja, Indian Philosophy Today, 119. 
593 Chubb, “Critical Philosophy,” 109. 
594 Chubb, 109. 
595 “(…) Radically different and even contradictory answers are asserted as true by eminent thinkers; If this term 
‘real’ is to be distinguished from the term ‘unreal’, we would have to take some selective criterion, the presence 
or absence of which would make “reality or unreality”, as the case may be. But at the point of choosing of the 
criterion, an arbitrariness enters which would inevitably result in different philosophers choosing different criteria. 
any attempt to determine the choice of the criterion is bound to fail for, unless one chooses to accept, one cannot 
be forced to do so. (…) Time and again have we come across the singular fact that philosophers, while aware of 
each other’s arguments, fail to be convinced by them. It is not the argument that is disputed, but its significance. 
Of course, there are times when the arguments themselves are disputed, but the deeper difference always relates 
to the significance of certain facts or certain arguments. Descartes’ ‘Cogito, ergo sum’, Berkeley’s ‘Esse est 
percipi’, Husserl’s ‘Phenomenological reduction’, Alexander’s ‘Democracy of mind among the objects of the 
world’ are all obvious truisms which may be accepted, but the significance that they have tried to attach to them 
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that will eventually lead to a theory. While the arguments can be internally disputed between 
philosophers, the primary choice lies rather in the “significance that they have tried to attach to 
them and the superstructures they have sought to build on the fact of this significance.”596 For 
him, this can also be interrogated, however it “is a thing of which one cannot be convinced and, 
therefore, the failure of philosophers to convince each other is not surprising.”597 Thus, while 
arguments within a system can be disputed and their validity asserted, the structures and the 
systems that entail their logical and rational unfolding is not a matter of argumentation.598 It 
belongs to the freedom of self-consciousness to choose between structures and systems, a 
choice that is itself not logical, but the fact of ‘significance’ related to other spheres of self-
consciousness, such as values (developed in chapter 6).  
Continuing with Chubb’s account, this choice does not simply result in a logical unfolding of a 
premise, the conclusions of which allow us to question the premise after the deduction has been 
effectuated. Rather, it is a criterion, i.e. “it is in the light of the underlying point of view that 
our thinking takes shape”.599 There is therefore no deductive verifiability that can operate 
backwards to the premise since the criterion determines the whole direction and shape of the 
system entirely permeated by it. In my interpretation, the criterion gives the significance to the 
system, and belongs to the valuational aspect of philosophizing in Daya Krishna’s terms. For 
dialogue and rhetoric, this means that in spite of the ‘rationality’ entailed in philosophical 
dialogues, and in spite of the ‘objectivity’ of rhetoric as analyzed by the Nyāya, an 
argumentation is bound to a logical unfolding of a valuational choice that provides the overall 
significance of one’s position (see 6.1).  
Moreover, Chubb does not argue for erasing this arbitrary choice on the ground of a 
correspondence of philosophical methods with scientific ones. He rather shows the inadequacy 
of what is actually already contained in a primary ‘belief’, the scientific paradigm of philosophy 
itself being a presupposition in the sense above described. It is rather the prevalence in accepting 
this scientific paradigm as the norm for philosophy that leads to the ‘impossibility of dialogue’ 
in philosophy. While this could be ‘one’ structure to be put into dialogue, it cannot constitute 
the overarching framework stipulating truth to all structures. This impossibility lies in the 
arbitrariness of truth implied in the presuppositions internal to philosophical developments. In 
                                                 
and the superstructures they have sought to build on the fact of this significance may be, and, in fact, have been 
disputed.” Daya Krishna, Nature of Philosophy., 294. 
596 Daya Krishna, 294. 
597 Daya Krishna, 295. 
598 “The rationality of a philosophical system is something that exhibits itself within the system. It is interior to it 
and does not serve as its foundation. Though its sole activity is to mature a point of view which is alogical, the 
process of maturation is shot through and through with logic. Thought must accept the criterion of coherence. Its 
rationality is shown in its purpose, which is to construct a coherent, closely-knit system of ideas in which the 
elements are connected together by purely logical links. The laws of thought and the rules of inference preside 
over the whole process and permit no deviation from their exacting standards. Though the system as a whole is 
not deductive in the sense that, like mathematics, it merely draws out the implications of axiom-systems or 
premises which are taken for granted or which are acknowledged as self-evident truths, within the system itself 
there are stretches of deductive reasoning, chains of arguments, which move from premise to conclusion with the 
same inevitability which we find in mathematical reasoning.” Chubb, Philosophical Papers of Professor J.N. 
Chubb, 292–93. 
599 Chubb, 294. 
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consequence, he notices, “philosophical polemic takes the form of rejecting what one’s 
opponent says as false, and in recent times of charging him with talking nonsense. Victory in 
philosophical disputes depends, as Śankara points out, on superior dialectic skill and not on the 
persuasive force of Truth.”600  
Chubb, however, does not rashly conclude that “philosophy is not a dialogue”601 or can in 
essentia not be so.  He reconsiders the impossibility of dialogue as a sign for the needs of 
establishing a philosophical method that would be adequate to philosophical truths:  
 “They have sought to make philosophy an objective science by attempting to get rid of deep-
seated dissensions instead of rising to a point of view from which all these dissensions are seen 
to fall into place without feeling the need or even admitting the possibility of bringing them to 
an end by a dialectical process. (…) What we should do instead is to look steadily at 
philosophy and philosophical reasoning and try to become aware of what it is that we all 
philosophers do when we set out to philosophise. This implies cultivating at the level of 
philosophical thinking what in the spiritual discipline of the Samkhya and the Vedanta is called 
the Saksin or the Witness attitude. It implies a capacity to stand back from the turmoil of 
polemical thought in a poise of detached contemplation and to become conscious of our 
thought wholly at its very root. This is the secret of critical philosophy because it results in 
philosophy becoming conscious of itself.” 
There are two intertwined ideas to elucidate here: the witness or sākṣin attitude602, reinterpreted 
from Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, is here defined as a ‘detached contemplation’ providing awareness 
of thoughts ‘at their very roots’. Thus, in Chubb’s account, the witness attitude is a detachment 
from one’s position grounded on the epistemological consideration of one’s presupposition, i.e. 
the awareness of the origin of one’s thought. It is an attempt at reaching a higher level of 
contemplation transcending the particular philosophical systems. However, this transcendence 
does not aim at a universal unity, but reaffirms an anthropological foundation, for the roots of 
the systems are grounded on subjective attitudes. It thus prescribes a method to consider 
philosophy to be the activity of re-discovering one’s thought, which is, however, itself not 
detached from the world, but embedded in the human condition. He correlates the human 
foundation and the need of detaching oneself (from one’s assurance of the scientific objectivity 
of one’s thought) with the idea that the activity of philosophy lies in witnessing this origin: 
                                                 
600 Chubb, “Critical Philosophy,” 109. 
601 Žižek, “Philosophy is not a dialogue”, in Badiou, Žižek, and Engelmann, Philosophy in the Present, 49–72. 
602 In another article, Chubb expands on sākṣin as a critique of the Mādhyamika dialectic: “The distinction which 
I have made between the two levels of thought, the level of constructive thinking which rests on and develops an 
alogical criterion-concept and the higher level of detached contemplation, corresponds to a certain extent to the 
distinction made by the Mādhyamika between dṛṣṭi (point of view) and prajñā (wisdom). The Mādhyamika 
philosophers were the first in the history of philosophy to make a sustained attempt to free thought of all dogmatism 
and raise it to the level of self-conscious freedom. From their point of view freedom of thought is achieved by 
freeing the mind from all views (dṛṣṭi). Wisdom (prajñā) is the perception that all dṛṣṭi are false. The Mādhyamika 
system, however, fails to achieve its goal of liberated thought since it sets about it in the wrong way. Its thesis is 
that, while holding no position of its own, it can successfully refute all philosophical positions. (…) I believe the 
Mādhyamika dialectic fails of its purpose, which is to liberate thought from dogmatism, precisely because its 
approach is dialectical. The mind cannot reach the stage of detached contemplation by committing what amounts 
to intellectual mayhem on all philosophical theories. It is like trying to cast out Satan by Satan.” Chubb, 
Philosophical Papers of Professor J.N. Chubb, 295–96. 
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Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. This is true not of the whole of philosophy but of 
critical philosophy, and the activity is not that of clarifying linguistic puzzles and muddles, for 
this itself presupposes a notion of clarity and intelligibility which would not be acceptable to 
all, and so would rest on a theory; it is the activity of contemplating or witnessing thought. 
Critical philosophy is not primarily a theory but a form of what I have called epistemological 
introspection, to distinguish it from psychological introspection. It is a clear awareness of what 
we are doing when we philosophise and of the origin of our thought, i.e. the points of 
orientation and on what they rest, whatever the particular structure or system into which our 
thinking results.”603 
Margaret Chatterjee, in her comment on Chubb’s metaphysics, interprets this introspection as 
intellectual biography, which, at first glance, does not seem to equate contemplation or 
witnessing thought. However, I believe that this witnessing the origin of one’s thought, which 
could be an interpretation of Daya Krishna’s withdrawal of consciousness (see 6.2.3 and 7), 
implicates as a ‘return’ to dialogue, the detached awareness that allows for criticism. Chatterjee 
also considers that it is this awareness that allows criticism, in particular “self-criticism, 
something that there is evidence of when a philosopher adopts a radical change of 
standpoint.”604 This change is the one effectuated in the exercise of pūrvapakṣa, which is 
enabled after such an epistemological introspection, if we understand counter-position not as a 
rhetorical device but as an act that implies this witness the origin of one’s and other’s thought. 
Chubb’s witnessing remains, thus, anthropological in character, and the epistemological 
introspection - in my interpretation - an intellectual detachment of the kind Daya Krishna 
suggests,605 which does not lead to a transcendental abstraction or to the elaboration of a supra-
standpoint encompassing all others.  
The anthropological dimension of philosophy and philosophical knowledge is, I believe, what 
Daya Krishna calls ‘human knowledge’606, whereby it does not imply that there would be non-
human knowledge, but rather that knowledge cannot be detached from the human condition in 
which it is embedded. While this seems quite evident, the consequences of this statement remain 
relevant for considering knowledge (as fallible, in process and finite) and more importantly, the 
constitutive role of dialogue for creating knowledge. D. P. Chattophadyaya, another prominent 
                                                 
603 Chubb, “Critical Philosophy,” 115. 
604  “Critical philosophy practiced in this way is elsewhere described by him [by Chubb] as a form of 
‘epistemological introspection’. It is reckoned to result in a clear awareness of “the origin of our thought, i.e. the 
points of orientation and on what they rest”. It seems to me that, in so far as the activity advocated involves 
something very much like intellectual biography, the ‘findings’, in the nature of things, must necessarily be 
different. However, Chubb says they are not exempt from criticism. This criticism, I would suggest, might very 
well be self-criticism, something that there is evidence of when a philosopher adopts a radical change of 
standpoint.” Chatterjee, “Indian Metaphysics,” 86. 
605 Daya Krishna, ‘Dialogue’, in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 181–
82. See also 1.1.4. 
606 See in particular Daya Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth.”: “The realization that there 
is no such thing as knowledge but only knowledges and that what is thought of as knowledge or described as such 
in any domain is only a short-hand term describing the tentative results of a collective seeking on the part of a 
large number of individuals that is continuously being challenged, questioned and modified in the light of the 
inadequacies and imperfections that people see will change the situation in a fundamental way. It will thus see 
human knowledge as subject to all the weaknesses and strengths that define the human situation in its basic 
structural aspect.” Daya Krishna, 140–41. On collective seeking, see 6 and on the relation of these knowledges 
and seekings to the human situation, see 7. 
 
211 
 
philosopher and close interlocutor of Daya Krishna, can be mentioned here to clarify the 
anthropological roots in such an epistemological perspective: 
“Some philosophers have been overimpressed by the model of physical science, its precision 
and testability, and some others by the analogy of God, his comprehensiveness and power. 
Underlying all philosophical positions there is a more or less inarticulate anthropological 
presupposition. Philosophy being essentially a reflective enquiry, every philosopher in the 
course of rounding up his position consciously or otherwise touches upon its anthropological 
root or principle of unity. Man is obliged to be present in all his thought and action, and this 
obligation is existential. The more he deepens and willfully explores the consciousness of this 
obligation the more he realizes the human foundation or pre-reflective presence and function 
of his being in all his works, theoretical and practical. In philosophical reflection we get what 
we have already got in a pre-reflective form. It is a sort of getting the got, prāptasya prāpti.”607  
The qualification of knowledge as ‘human’ or anthropological, reveals the presuppositions of 
the different subjects elaborating on knowledge-systems, but also the dissatisfaction in the sense 
of the remaining gap between the development and construction of philosophy as an activity 
(realization) and its apprehension (see chapter 6). It also points at the structural illusions rooted 
at the core of self-consciousness that conditions it (chapter 7). It thus permeates the different 
dimensions of human fallibility that are exposed in this chapter. Underlining the correlation of 
these dimensions shows the advantage of thinking dialogue in relation with knowledge. 
Dialogue as a confrontation of different standpoints between persons enables to highlight this 
intermingling that constitutes knowledge. It also renders explicit why such ‘human knowledge’ 
is fallible and open-ended, which is however not seen as an epistemological defect but as a 
necessary correlary to its constitution. Finally, it includes what Chubb calls ‘critical 
philosophy’, as the activity of epistemological introspection via contemplation and witnessing 
of thoughts. In unveiling the presuppositions of one’s theory, this activity also avoids that 
dialectic becomes sophistry. Different standpoints across philosophical traditions are coming 
together in a dialogue and the counter-positions of these standpoints are enabled by witnessing 
their different origins and beliefs. 
 
5.3.1.  Negation and Dialectic  
 
The realization of the ‘human’ of knowledge appears first negatively, in the epistemological 
limits and finitude of ‘humans’, in the awareness of the infinite that one seeks for or can 
imagine. These dimensions have epistemological, axiological and ontological consequences, 
which are respectively the delineation I drew under the names presuppositions, dissatisfactions 
and illusions. In such a broad and fundamental perspective, the ‘negativity’ involved also bears 
different aspects, but it always indicates a relation of opposition, that is, that which cannot be 
separated but rejects the other term of the correlation. It is in this broad sense of negativity that 
the tension operates. In an article elaborated on the different emphases given by different 
civilizations either to grammar, logic or mathematics to articulate knowledge, Daya Krishna 
expresses the force of this negativity. The self-reflection on language, becoming an object of 
                                                 
607 D. P. Chattopadhyaya, ‘Prospects of Anthropological Rationalism’, in Devaraja, Indian Philosophy Today, 115. 
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knowledge, can be articulated in terms of highly-sophisticated rules of grammar (with the 
example of Pāṇini), in rules of logic 608  or even in mathematical terms in self-conscious 
articulation of truth-statements and expressions of a specific world609. They are manifested in 
different ways and results. Nevertheless,  
“All civilizations discovered the puzzling, paradoxical mysteries of language, thought, 
counting and measuring but they were not equally struck by them. (…) Civilizations, then, may 
be distinguished by the fact whether grammar, logic or mathematics first achieved the Śāstric 
form or that which is nowadays called ‘science’ (…) The notion of ‘infinite’ involved in it [is] 
different from the one that is encountered when one is struck by the phenomenon of self-
consciousness in man. The last, however, is a negation of all the three we have mentioned, and 
as the latter constitute what we have called ‘civilization’ as it is a result of the way man sees 
himself ‘objectively’ in terms of the one or the other, the ‘history’ of any civilization may be 
seen as the result of a tension or conflict between that which negates and that which is negated 
and the way it is negated. The other side of the story is the influence of that which is negated 
on that which negates it. In other words, how objectification of consciousness in the field of 
grammar, or logic or mathematics changes the consciousness when it reflects on itself, after 
the objectification.”610 
The objectification is the negation of the universality pretended or ‘seeked’ at in the rules 
elaborated, for the enunciation of their universality contradicts the limited developments of their 
forms in different epistemological realms. The infinity of self-consciousness in terms of open-
ended possibilities of creating anew contradicts the specific infinite of the rules. In other words, 
the finality of their expressions and the objectivation at stake in the knowledge-enterprise denies 
its own root and development in the very process of universally codifying the elaborated rules. 
The tension of the perpetual negation between self-consciousness and its objects in self-
reflection forms the dynamic of knowledge.  
Without elaborating now on the axiological and the ontological consequences of such a 
conception, let us focus on the epistemological role of negation in such a perspective. It can, I 
believe, articulate further an epistemological understanding of the role of counter-positions in 
                                                 
608 “But grammar is not the only thing which the self-consciousness of a civilization may take shape and, in turn, 
shape the ‘personality’ of that civilization. Thought which articulates and embodies itself in language may itself 
become an ‘object’ of reflection and one may ask the question what makes one spontaneously say, or judge, that 
what the ‘other’ has said is ‘wrong’, or what the other is saying does not ‘follow’ from the grounds he is giving 
for it. Logic is the usual name given for this though, perhaps, the term ‘Pramāṇa Śāstra’ or ‘Pramāṇa Vidyā’ as 
given in the Indian tradition expresses the idea better.” Daya Krishna, “Grammar, Logic and Mathematics: 
Foundations of the Civilizations Man Has Built,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19, no. 3 
(September 2002): 68. 
609 “Unlike grammar or logic it [mathematics] is not generally considered to be the result of a self-reflection on 
the part of a more or less pre-existent activity of his such as that of ‘speaking’ or ‘thinking’. But mathematics is 
also the result of a self-reflecton, though it is not generally seen as such because we do not have two distinct names 
for the activity that is ‘reflected’ upon and that which results as a consequence of the activity of reflection. 
‘Counting’ is the activity that is reflected upon and which, as everybody knows, gives rise to that which is known 
as arithmetic. (…) What one discovers to ones amazement and surprise through a reflection on ‘counting’ is the 
realm of the ‘infinite’ and the ‘truth’ about it. What can be counted are things, not numbers, which always extend 
beyond those one has counted and one need not, and usually ones does not, pay attention to this. But the 
mathematician does, and it is he who, like the grammarian or the logician, makes the ‘ordinary’ human being 
aware of the ‘mystery’ that lies all around him and in which he is immersed each time he speaks or thinks and 
argues or counts.” Daya Krishna, 70–71. 
610 Daya Krishna, 74. 
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dialogue. Negation, shortly introduced in 5.2.1 as non-position, could be interpreted as absence 
of position (non-position as detachment) or the negation of one’s own position to reach a 
position constituted by all the positions of the participants in a dialogue. The ability to negate 
in linguistic propositions, but by extension also to negate an argument, seems to imply first the 
recognition of the existence of the argument itself, for every negation must go along the a priori 
recognition of the positive entity. Furthermore, negation implies doubt and opens the possibility 
to, by extension, see how different the argument could be, or not be. This ability to negate opens 
a sense of ‘freedom’ entailed in the act of negation that Daya Krishna describes: 
“The facts of feeling, consciousness, and language at the human level need no proof even if, 
for methodological reasons, some may deny the one or the other or even all of them. But the 
denial, even if it be only for methodological purposes, reveals a new dimension of 
consciousness which is not found at any non-human level (…). This is the ability to deny, to 
negate, to doubt everything, including itself. In language, this is symbolized by the sign of 
negation without which no language can function as ‘language’ at the human level. (…) 
Negation, however, is only one aspect of language that has been noticed. The other, and 
perhaps the more important aspect, is the ‘freedom’ that it confers on consciousness because 
of the unending possibility of linguistic combinations that it offers which bring into being new 
‘worlds’ for the apprehension of the listener and, eventually, to that of the speaker also.”611 
The freedom of creating new ‘worlds’ will be further analyzed in 6.2.3 and 7. Negation thus 
appears to be not only a linguistic device, but also to entail a possibility to imagine further the 
existence of what is negated and the alternatives of this negation. This works closely to 
pūrvapakṣa, as the argument that must be refuted, however only after its defense is made - a 
defense, which ideally, should go further its initial presentation, namely envision new 
possibilities. In that sense, the negation operates first as the negation of one’s own position. 
And if one has to reflect on the negations entailed in one’s position, then one has to pause on 
this possibility. This rest that self-negation implies in the dialogue allows for detachment and 
witnessing of one’s thought. Daya Krishna critically observes the insufficiency of the debate of 
negation located at a perceptual level in Nyāya and Buddhist theories, and immediately 
expanded it to values in the sense of what ought to be but is not612, which I characterized as 
dissatisfaction, a term used by Daya Krishna in the next page: 
                                                 
611 Daya Krishna, “Sign, Sense and Reference: Reflections on Problems in the Philosophy of Language.,” Journal 
of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19, no. 2 (June 2002): 133. 
612 “The exclusive concentration of the discussion on abhāva at the perceptual level seems to have deprived the 
Indian thinking on the subject from paying attention to the active element involved in it and treat it only as 
something passively received, which is generally the way in which perception has been treated almost in all 
philosophical thought. A shift to the consideration of the active element might have resulted in seeing abhāva as 
negation which has been extensively discussed in the western tradition. Even the attempt of Dharmakῑrti to see 
abhāva in terms of an inference whose ground or hetu was supposed to be anupalabdhi did not change the situation 
as it did not see the active element in negation which characterizes self-consciousness at all levels, and more 
particularly in the activity called thinking. The Buddhists tried to come to terms with this in their doctrine of apoha 
but either they did not see it as an essential element of self-consciousness or thought or vikalpa as they called it, 
or they could not grasp the dynamic creative element which negation. brings into being through an awareness of 
the demand generated by what is negated. This is the well-known realm of values which is disclosed by self-
consciousness when it sees the object not as what it is but as what it is not and what it could be, or should be, or 
even ought to be. What is perhaps even stranger is that this did not take place, in spite of the centrality of the 
pūrvapakṣa in India’s philosophical thinking. (…) A rethinking on the notion of abhāva, in the Nyāya and the 
 
214 
 
“Negation is of various kinds and can take multifarious shapes which logic has not yet taken 
note of. One of the most important of these is the one that lies at the root of moral, aesthetic, 
and spiritual consciousness which, though radically different in the directions of their 
development, share a common origin which lies in the dissatisfaction with what ‘is’ and the 
feeling that something is lacking which would be there if one makes the effort required to bring 
it into being. Indian thinkers have thought of this in positive terms and called it ‘abhāva’ and 
treated it as an ontological correlate of that which functions as ‘negation’ in language. (…) The 
effect that such a postulation could have and perhaps did have, to some extent, on the nature 
of self’s reflection on itself or of self-awareness, is still a matter of historical investigation.”613 
In such a conception, negation can be interpreted as an epistemological and linguistic device 
having ontological consequences for the understanding of presuppositions, dissatisfactions and 
illusions. The faculty of negating can instantiate the gap between reality and seeking, and a 
detachment between one’s argument and the possibility to negate its truth-value (6).  
Daya Krishna did not investigate the role of negation connected with this possibility of 
epistemic imagination, nor the epistemic consequences for counter-position and dialogue. 
However, in his explanation of further developments of the Nyāya dialectic, B. K. Matilal 
extended his reflection to the realm of logic and dialectic. As an expert on Nyāya engaged in a 
widening of philological materials to philosophize as such, he questions the problem of 
skepticism that could arise from the infinite negation of all positions which would not result in 
establishing any position. “Can there be a debater without any positions?”614, he asks. Indeed, 
what would a debate be constituted of if there were no position at all but only successive 
refutations? Is negation not the end of dialogue if it functions ad infinitum? This grounds 
criticisms elaborated on debate understood as vitaṇḍā if the debater does not have any position 
of his own to defend, but only present to destroy others positions to win the debate. However, 
as Matilal remarks, “it is not necessary that a debater in the third type of debate [vitaṇḍā] is 
always looking for victory as the goal and using tricky devices. It is conceivable that his 
business is also to find out or seek after truth.” 615  But can one seek after truth without 
establishing any assertion or (positive) position? Can anything be elaborated by negations only? 
And if the negation is simply not-A, how can it lead to the freedom above described by Daya 
Krishna for conceptual imagination, if it is restricted by the same ‘A’ (the criticism elaborated 
on pūrvapakṣa as the simple ‘counter’-position)?  
Matilal thus continues in this direction: 
                                                 
Buddhist traditions may help us to bring that dynamic rethinking into the Indian tradition, which is the preeminent 
abhāva —which has been present in Indian thought since it started its journey two and a half millennia ago.” In 
‘Some Problems Regarding Th inking about Abhāva in the Indian Tradition’,  Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 
131–32. 
613 Daya Krishna, “Sign, Sense and Reference: Reflections on Problems in the Philosophy of Language.,” 134. 
614 Bimal Krishna Matilal, Logic, Language, and Reality: An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies, 1st ed 
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), 16. 
615 Matilal grounds this position on Udayana’s comment, Nyāyadarśana: “Some Gauda Naiyāyikas, such as 
Sānātanī, talk about a foud-fold classification of debate, a) vāda, b) vāda-vitaṇḍā, c) jalpa and d) jalpa-vitaṇḍā, 
the first two being for the honest seekers after truth, and the last two for the proud people who intend to defeat 
others.” Matilal, 16–17. 
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“Is not the negation of a position another position? If the proposition p is refuted, does it not 
amount to the defense of not-p? This was actually the import made of vitaṇḍa by Vātsyāyana 
and Uddyotakara. But the sceptic-debater after refuting p will only proceed, under the 
circumstances (i.e., being faced with such a question), to refute not -p. This will probably imply 
that p and not-p do not exhaust the possibilities, and that might mean in turn that the law of 
excluded middle does not apply here. (…) For it is possible for p and not-p to be both false. 
(…) Alternatively, we may hold that the refutation of a position need not amount to 
commitment to the ‘negation’ of the proposition involved.” 616  
By definition, the negation of a position does not (directly) lead to affirming any theory or 
position, although it can lead to establishing a third position. In itself, it can be insufficient in 
view of its impossibility to state anything. Nevertheless, it is linguistically and logically the first 
sign for doubting one’s own truth-statement contained in one’s position.  The reluctance to 
accept negation as a valid device for dialogue originates on the one hand from the difficulty to 
assert truth to a negative statement,617 and on the other hand from the issue of contradiction, if 
two contradictory statements are accepted as being true. However, in the case of pūrvapakṣa 
and of dialogue in general, contradiction is also seen as an opportunity to articulate different 
positions which might be true from different perspectives or alternatively. In that sense, 
negation is ‘temporarily’ necessary as negation of one’s own and the other’s position and as a 
logical ability to foster interrogations: 
“Knowledge, thus, is a succession of interconnected assertions perpetually expanding and 
perennially changing as a result of doubt and questioning, in which negation plays only a 
subsidiary role that is purely temporary in character. This, however, is not to see it as a logician 
does, not even of the type that sees logic as dialectics, for neither doubt nor questioning are 
negation and, in any case, they are not predetermined either as to their content or even form, 
as negation has to be.”618 
I interpret ‘temporary’ here in reaction to the lack of position of a vitaṇḍic debate: negation 
cannot constitute the core of a debate, for it lacks position tout court. The intellectual 
detachment in the sense of negation or absence is not simply the inexistence of position per se. 
It is either the act of temporarily negating the truth-claim contained in one’s position, or the 
‘rest’ of one’s position in contemplating alternative and negative positions. In that sense, 
negation allows a temporary distance to the arguments that enables the ‘change of knowledge’ 
mentioned by Daya Krishna in its relation to doubt and questioning. In consequence, it does not 
constitute a (negative) dialectics for the negation does not condition knowledge, but it only 
impels the dynamic dimension of its constitution. 
“Strangely, neither Hegel ,or Marx seem to have understood the nature of true dialectics as 
they superimposed on what was a free activity of reason the notion of necessity taken from 
traditional logic where the movement of reason was bound by necessities that no seeker of 
                                                 
616 Matilal, Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis., 17. 
617 “The ambiguous role of negation in language, thought and experience has created problems and paradoxes for 
philosophy. (…) Negation is usually a sign of something being untrue. But a negative statement may be true, and 
in case it is true, its truth should be of the same order or type as that of a positive or affirmative statement. On the 
other hand, if it is supposed to be different, the truth itself will be given apart and become a divided house, leading 
to consequences that might be difficult to live with.” Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 115. 
618 ‘Negation: Can Philosophy Ever Recover From It?’, in Daya Krishna, 119. 
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knowledge could ever be free from as they were the very conditions of knowledge that was not 
only defined but constituted by them.”619 
Dialectic is seen as another systematic way to constrain knowledge by sublation (Aufhebung) 
of the positive and the negative. What Daya Krishna hints at is rather the possibility offered, 
once negative counter-positions are made, to arise our awareness of the contradictory nature of 
these.  
 “The more fundamental problem relates to the question regarding the meaning of ‘self-
contradiction’ itself and the question of whether what is regarded as self-contradictory obtains 
only in the verbal or linguistic formulation that is being treated as self-contradictory. At a 
deeper level still, the problem relates to the ontological status of language itself, for, if it were 
regarded as having any ontological reality of its own, then the so-called ‘self-contradiction’ 
would have to be granted some sort of ontological status therein. (…) One may find it [the 
reality of self-contradiction] in philosophy itself, for it would be difficult to believe what 
philosophy would be if there were no self-contradiction in thought. One has only to remind 
oneself of the role that ‘dialectic’ has played in the formation and development of philosophical 
thought since at least Plato onwards and its acknowledgment in thinkers such as Hegel, Fichte, 
and others. In fact, the movement or motion in philosophical thought occurs primarily because 
of self-generation of opposition that each formulation of thought entails, resulting in an 
unending movement that continuously propels thought further and further from the point where 
it started. The problem then is how to conceive of this negative movement in thought and what 
reality to assign to it.”620 
If linguistic negation has ontological consequences on presuming the existence of the entity that 
it negates (as in the case of Nyāya on which Daya Krishna draws his reflection), it then raises 
the question of the law of contradiction further. This means that self-contradiction is not only a 
linguistic problem but induces the possibility of contradictory realities. How to account for 
contradiction in this perspective? How can contradictory statements be simulteanously real 
and/or true? For dialogue, this raises the question of how to accommodate different systems 
and positions that entail different truth-claims without one necessarily being false. For Daya 
Krishna, this possibility grounds the ‘motion’ via the generation of oppositions that form the 
development of philosophical thought, a ‘motion’ that is reflected in dialectics, however 
without sublation, but as an open-ended process that reflects the character of dialogues.  
 
5.3.2. Disjunctive Unity and Alternation 
 
Let us come back to the previous example of an objectivist theory and a subjectivist theory 
appearing contradictory because of the beliefs grounding their views (5.3). In such a case, 
negation would seem to be insufficient if it would be the sole conclusion to resolve the issue, 
since we have seen that negation can only be temporary. The positivist or the realist can suspend 
her/his judgement, temporarily negate her/his position defend the truth-claim of the Other, 
thereby negating the truth-claim of his own, but a simple negation of one for the other could 
                                                 
619 Daya Krishna, 119. 
620 ‘Some Problems Regarding Thinking About Abhāva in the Indian Tradition’, in Daya Krishna, 127. 
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not enhance the dialogue between the two. In dialectic terms, a conclusion would arise by 
sublating both positions into a synthetic one. However, the point of dialogue (for Daya 
Krishna’s conception) is not to look for a conclusion, even of the synthetic type, but to take the 
contradiction as an opportunity for questioning the presuppositions of the positions, and 
proceed with further problems. So, rather than asserting the truth of one and refuting the other, 
or sublating the two, let us raise the question: in view of the conflicting theories that are 
irremediably contradictory such as subjectivist and objectivist theories of knowledge, how to 
understand the contradictory nature of philosophical arguments in a dialogue? Is there another 
means to account for differences of viewpoints without resorting to errors? This means, on the 
other hand, not to deny the existence of mistakes or errors within a theory or a philosophical 
argumentation. However, in the case of subjectivist versus objectivist theories, i.e. idealism 
versus realism, the problem does not lie within a certain system but in the confrontation of 
different systems. Mistakes and errors are integrated within a certain framework that predicates 
the conditions of truth and falsity. However, as seen above with Kalidas Bhattacharyya, what 
now needs to be taken into consideration is the meta-articulation of different frameworks 
external to truth and falsity. I do not want to justify the logical or argumentative mistakes within 
one of them but on the contrary, to account for the pluralities of systems, the confrontation of 
which seems endless. In Daya Krishna’s terms: 
“The “Knowledge-situation”, thus, presents a problem, for it reveals a close unity of two terms 
which, however, seem also opposed to each other [subject / object]. The usual solutions of this 
problem have taken either the form of asserting the primacy or even the absolute reality of the 
Subject or the Object or the denial that there is any opposition between them. (…) The 
movement from epistemological objectivity to metaphysical objectivity is the central problem 
in almost all the great thinkers from Descartes to Kant and though they all find alternative 
routes to their solutions (or do not find a route at all) they are convinced that the immediate 
awareness of consciousness is indubitable in a sense in which the consciousness of the object 
is not. 
On the other hand, the whole movement of modern realism is based on the immediately felt 
independence of the object from the fact of its being known. The object is, thus, revealed to be 
independent in its very being, the situation of being known being essentially accidental to its 
very nature. (…) The opposition between the two terms in the ‘knowledge-situation’ is, thus, 
the reason for the divergent movements in philosophy. But the very fact of the ‘knowledge-
situation’ reveals that there is also a close unity between them. The question, then, arises: “can 
we intelligibly conceive of a unity of elements which are in mutual opposition to each 
other?”621 
The clue lies in the mentions of ‘they are convinced’ and ‘immediately felt’. In other terms, 
object and subject stand in a relation that affects both parts. They indicate that, regardless of 
the complexity and truth implied in both answers to the opposition of subject and object, it is 
the belief of the ‘immediate awareness of the subject’ ‘or’ the one of the ‘independence of the 
object’ that grounds apparently contradicting solutions. This, in logical terms, favors a 
conception of inclusive disjunction, or in Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s terminology, a ‘disjunctive 
unity’, i.e. a unity of the form ‘either A or B’. In rhetorical terms, it argues for considering 
                                                 
621 Daya Krishna, “Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation,” 16–17. 
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disjunctions as possibilities rather than as logical incompatibilities.622 The connection that is 
pointed out here is the one from doubt, which arises when incompatible predicates are attributed 
to one predicant, and freedom, when the incompatibility is seen from the self-reflective 
consciousness having the freedom to consider it from different angles. 623  Following 
Chakrabarti’s discussion of ‘or’, “the swing of disjunction is always a cognitive attitudinal 
indefinite. The so-called weakness of uncertainty lies at the heart of the power of free choice. 
If free-choice makes us more powerful than choiceless agents, then uncertainty must be 
empowering. Epistemic hesitation may be the source of freedom and hence a strength rather 
than weakness.”624 Disjunctions create a multitude of possibilities if one accepts the uncertainty 
contained in the notion of choice and the possibility of alternative conceptions that cannot be 
dismissed as simple errors. In dis-junction signaling un-certainty, it is the ‘force’ of ignorance 
for dialogue that is revealed (see also 6.2.1). This ignorance is to be distinguished from the 
internal ignorance leading to errors, as the ignorance within a philosophical theory or argument 
that insufficiently proves one’s point and is thus counter-argued and invalidated. The dialogical 
ignorance that underlies epistemic hesitation and uncertainty is meta-epistemological, because 
it denies a sense of overarching truth which necessitates to accept alternative conceptions as 
possibly true, or alternatively real. It is thus the uncertainty and ignorance that is existentially 
related to the limits of one’s condition, transcendental to human’s knowledge. To follow 
Kalidas Bhattacharyya, this ignorance is related to the alternative philosophical condition and 
is thus irremediable: 
                                                 
622 Kalidas Bhattacharyya formulates the necessity of disjunctive unities as follows: “It is ordinarily believed that 
every unity is of A and B or of A and B and C etc. Several items are there, and they conjunctively form a unity - 
this is our general attitude to unities. A unity is a whole, and a whole is at least an aggregate; and an aggregate 
means several things together, i.e., joined by ‘and’. With this notion of unity we are sure to stumble at the 
phenomenon ‘knowledge of object’ [where knowledge is defined as the subjective feeling of the object that rejects 
the object]. The items united here are antagonistic; at least one of them, viz. subjective knowledge unqualifiedly 
contradicts the other. How in the face of this contradiction can the two be taken together un unity? (…) Those who 
believe in conjunctive unity here have not admitted the contradiction, and those who admit the contradiction have 
not spoken of conjunctive unity. (…) This does not mean the denial of all unity. It is not true that a unity is either 
conjunctive or nothing at all. (…) This other form of unity is the unity of alternatives, a unity which, as opposed 
to the conjunctive type, may be called disjunctive and is expressed in the form Either A or B.” Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy) 
(Calcutta: Das Gupta & Co, 1953), 135–36. 
623 I reduce here A. Chakrabarti’s detailed exposition on the relation between doubt and freedom in the logical 
analysis of ‘Or’ in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Kashmir Śaivism, Kant, Russell and Strawson. The further comment draws 
on his conclusion in particular on the concept of vimarśa between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Kashmir Śaivism: “The 
sub-commentary Uddyota here raises the subtle question of different kinds of alternativity. There is a distinction 
between vikalpa and vimarśa. In case of the latter, the options exclude each other, they are incompatible. (…) In 
case of the former (vikalpa), when clear options are given, the limits of choice are set most determinately: “Either 
do this or that, and there is no third option. This is to be distinguished from doubt.” I just want to record one very 
important linguistic fact here. The word “vimarśa” is used in Nyāya-Sūtra and other places simply to mean “doubt” 
(vimarśaḥ saṃśayaḥ). Yet, in Kashmir Śaivism, this very word is used to mean “freedom of choice” (vimarśaḥ 
svātantryam). Consciousness has the unique feature of being playfully self-ruled (sva-tantra) and hence exercising 
the powers of knowing, distinguishing, remembering, willing, and acting; and these powers are contained in its 
reflexive self-consciousness which is called “freedom to mirror itself in whichever way it chooses to” or vimarśa. 
This extension of meaning from doubt to freedom is not accidental.” Arindam Chakraborty, “Or,” in Studies in 
Logic: A Dialogue between the East and the West: Homage to Bimal Krishna Matilal, ed. Madhabendranath Mitra, 
Mihir Kumar Chakraborty, and Sundar Sarukkai (New Delhi: Sanctum Books, 2012), 41. 
624 Chakraborty, 49–50. 
 
219 
 
 “The disjunction between knowledge and object is precisely such a case. It may involve 
ignorance, most probably it does. But there is no possibility of transcending this ignorance. 
There is no conceivable standpoint from which one specifically of these subjectivity and object 
will appear as the final definite reality. What we have learnt so far belies such possibility. 
Subjectivity or object - this is the final disjunctive structure of reality. If this is incompleteness 
or indeterminacy, it has to be submitted to, as there is no way out. This notion of reality as 
indeterminate involves a large amount of ignorance. But it is a form of ignorance which cannot 
be removed.”625 
A disjunctive unity indissolubly and negatively relates disjunctive predicates such as 
knowledge/object (the subjective and objective attitude) which are distinguished and even 
opposed, but cannot be separated, for one seems to (negatively) involve the other. Disjunctive 
unities for Bhattacharyya are thus a logical way to articulate the contradictory reality of 
philosophical alternatives which ultimately lies in one’s belief and commitment and are related 
to each other via the negation of the other’s position. Daya Krishna’s answer to the question of 
intelligibly conceiving a unity of elements that are contradictory to each other, in his 
explanation of Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s logic of alternation, is elaborated in two steps: first, the 
unity of alternatives operates in disjunctive judgements:  
“The disjunctive judgement, being a judgement, unites in itself elements which are in 
opposition to each other. The judgement, however, does not assert either the one or the other 
or both together but only the excluding relation between them which is of such a nature that if 
one is true, the other is false and vice-versa. The difficulty, in fact, has been felt because - so 
Bhattacharyya contends - almost all thinkers have presupposed that unities can only be of the 
conjunctive type. If the unities were only of the conjunctive type then, obviously, there could 
be no unities, i.e., conjunctions of incompatible elements. But if the unities can be of types 
other than the conjunctive then there is, at least, a possibility that even incompatible elements 
can form a unity.”626 
The ‘judgement’ indicates (as Kalidas himself explains627) that there is a distinction between 
the verbal enunciation and the ontological status: the disjunctive unity is a verbal attempt at 
                                                 
625 “This entails consequences in conceiving reality that go much further any mystic or divine approach of the 
‘unknowability’ on the one hand, and the unknowable metaphysical thing-in-itself on the other hand: “This would 
be a form of avidyā [ignorance] deeper than any offered by a philosopher. it is an avidyā which persists even in 
the highest knowledge. A position like this goes beyond even the most far-reaching Mysticism. For while to 
Mysticism Reality is after all contacted, though in a super-ordinary attitude, the present position denies even that. 
To it Reality is absolutely unattainable. The mystic after all prescribes some way of approaching Reality, but here 
there is no possibility of even that, as the removal of this infra-primal ignorance is unconceivable. So it has to be 
admitted that if there is at all a Reality beyond the disjunctive indeterminacy of subjectivity and object, it is 
inscrutable. One may, if one likes, go further. One may hold that perhaps there is no such transcendent Reality, 
perhaps Reality itself is disjunctively indeterminate.” Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An 
Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy), 162. 
626 Daya Krishna, “Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation,” 18. 
627 “In the disjunctive judgement there is a disjunctive unity of alternatives. So here also knowledge and object, or 
the subjective and the objective attitudes, have to be taken as alternatives forming a disjunctive unity. Each attitude 
is valid, but alternatively. (…) The subjective and objective philosophies are each self-complete and totally in 
disregard of the other. Each alternative fulfils itself in a system, and the two different systems so developing stand 
in such a way that from the point of view of each the other is as good as nothing. Idealism and objectivisim are 
such alternative systems, each absolutely valid on its own ideology. There is no question of treating both as true, 
except verbally. (…) This view may be called ‘Alternative Absolutism’ - each is absolute but alternatively.” 
Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy), 153. 
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articulating the contradictory nature of reality that is intelligibly impossible to grasp in the 
experience of one subject, and to embody in one philosophical attitude. Conjunctive unities (of 
the type ‘A and B’) are insufficient for providing an account of the contradictory nature of 
reality which however is revealed in the existence of conflicting philosophical systems 
(expressed as ‘either A or B’). The existence of conflicting philosophical systems shows that 
reality does not function as conjunctive aggregate into a harmonious whole, but rather integrates 
contradictory elements that cannot be articulated together without one rejecting or negating the 
other. Disjunctive unities are by extension thus a way to articulate the different positions that 
are embodied by different speakers attached to one view of reality, seemingly contradictory to 
each other. But how does this unity operate between these systems?  
“The unity of elements in a disjunctive judgement, thus, is an extremely close unity of 
alternatives which either actively reject each other or are, at least, completely indifferent to 
each other. In the wider sense of negation, they negate each other and yet form a close unity, 
for each is related to the negative of the other. The question, therefore, whether we can 
intelligibly conceive of a unity of elements which are in mutual opposition to each other, gets 
its answer in the affirmative. The unity, in such a case, must be conceived of as a disjunctive 
unity- and, at least, the disjunctive judgement is no mysterious or unintelligible affair.”628 
A unity of mutual opposition asserts alternatively one or the other position while the negated 
position remains intrinsically related by this very act of negation.629 It is again to be emphasized 
that this alternation operates at a meta-philosophical level, or in Kalidas terms, a ‘super’-
philosophic630 level: a system cannot alternate within itself, the alternation cannot present 
‘parts’ of one attitude or the other, nor combine them within the philosophical theory, according 
to Kalidas Bhattacharyya. In that sense, the alternation does not provide a philosophical system 
per se but only a logical framework for including contradictory philosophical systems. In other 
words, it is a method for philosophizing, philosophy itself being seen as an evolving activity of 
alternation. From a rhetorical perspective, this implies that we have no choice but to stand 
within a philosophical position while cultivating at the same time an awareness of its alternation 
at a super-philosophic level: 
“In the disjunctive judgment there is a disjunctive unity of alternatives. So here also knowledge 
and object, or the subjective and the objective attitudes, have to be taken as alternatives forming 
a disjunctive unity. Each attitude is valid, but alternatively. So we cannot have both knowledge 
and object at the same time, unless of course, we utter the verbal trite that there are these two 
                                                 
628 Daya Krishna, “Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation,” 23. 
629 See also: “Kalidas Bhattacharyya did not remain satisfied with grounding the whole philosophical enterprise of 
man in the search for the three absolutes which K.C. Bhattacharyya had apprehended and which, according to him, 
could only be seen as alternatives without the possibility of any synthesis between them. He tried to provide a 
logical grounding for this synthesis in the unity of disjunctive judgment which, according to him, was as 
fundamental as the unity in a conjunctive judgment. For him a genuine disjunctive judgment asserts a unity 
between alternatives which are related in such a way that in case one is asserted or actualized, the other is either 
positively negated and denied, or nothing is said about it, that is, whether it is real or not. The disjunctive judgment 
for him, then, includes both the exclusive and the non-exclusive uses of ‘or’ in the usual judgments. He has also 
argued for its being more fundamental than the conjunctive judgment, as, in the ultimate analysis, alternatives can 
only be asserted ‘alternatively’ as it would be an act of arbitrary dogmatism to assert only the one and not the 
other.” Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 205–6. 
630 Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy), 155. 
 
221 
 
alternatives. Actual philosophy which is more than this trite is either from the subjective or 
from the objective point of view, not from both. The subjective and the objective philosophies 
are each self-complete and totally in disregard of the other. Each alternative fulfills itself in a 
system, and the two different systems so developing stand in such a way that from the point of 
view of each the other is as good as nothing. Idealism and Objectivism are such alternative 
systems, each absolutely valid on its own ideology. There is no question of treating both as 
true, except verbally. As in philosophy, we must be either Idealists or Objectivists. From each 
to both there is no passage in Philosophy the ultimate logic of which is alternation. This view 
may be called Alternative Absolutism - each is absolute, but alternatively.”631  
This seems to be in line with Chubb’s ‘critical philosophy’ when he argues for a meta-
philosophical tool that could articulate different viewpoints and positions632. This investigation 
of meta- or super-levels could be also another reason for an absence of philosophy ‘of’ dialogue 
in Daya Krishna’s philosophical writings, if we consider, like Chubb and Bhattacharyya, that 
dialogue as a tool is also located at a meta or super-philosophic level. I thus conceive dialogue 
as a platform to enable disjunctive unities with regard to truth, and alternative standpoints that 
enable a common articulation of contradictory views on reality. In entailing the idea of different 
‘standpoints’ and a reality that can be felt as contradictory, it also leaves space for expressing 
and witnessing different conceptual frameworks and larger worldviews from which these 
standpoints originate, namely for philosophies across traditions. In such a sense, this ‘critical 
philosophy’, ‘super/supra philosophy’ concretely applied into dialogues, is not intrinsic to any 
philosophical theory or system, but rather a dynamic tool and an activity for articulating theories 
and positions. While Chubb and Kalidas Bhattacharyya expanded on the very logic, reasoning 
and necessity for elaborating such a tool for the practice of philosophizing, which I use to 
ground a theory for Daya Krishna’s dialogical experiments, it is rather directly in the practice 
that Daya Krishna developed it.633 
                                                 
631 Bhattacharyya, 153. 
632 Chubb does not refer to Kalidas Bhattacharyya in his paper. Nevertheless, their account is largely in agreement, 
regarding the relativity of truth-statement to their philosophical systems and the need to develop an attitude to 
contemplate a meta-level of alternation. The strongest difference I would see lies in the fact that Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya, although concerned about logically grounding the metaphysical account of alternative absolutes of 
his father, remained embedded in a metaphysical investigation, whereas Chubb was motivated by a criticism of a 
the latter. The terms of the alternation, however, remain close: “In philosophical controversies the disputants use 
words like ‘right’, ‘correct’, ‘satisfactory’, ‘true’, without realizing that there are criterion words and so do not 
have uniform meanng. Thus when A says that his theory is right he really means, though he may not be aware of 
it, that his theory is right, when properly understood and made explicit, would similarly amount to the claim that 
he has worked out a point of view whch is in conformity with the criterion implicit in it. But as the two criteria are 
different the two statements only apparently clash. In reality they merely afford evidence of the fact that the 
sameproblem can be viewed in two different ways, provided we approach it with different sets of criteria and 
presuppositions. The two viewpoints do not contradict each other. Each is simply an alternative to the other.” 
Jehangir N. Chubb, “Philosophical Arguments and Disagreement,” in Philosophical Papers of Professor J.N. 
Chubb, ed. H. M. Joshi (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2006), 303. 
633 According to J. N. Mohanty’s observation, however, it was also practiced by Kalidas Bhattacharyya in his 
lectures, although not in a plural dialogical way involving participants, but as an alternation of philosophical views 
he would defend: “In Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s lectures during the forties and also in the two major publications of 
these years, there was one central thesis which he sought to amplify, illustrate and defend by showing the 
application in various domains and to various philosophical issues. This is the thesis that in philosophy there are, 
in the long run, theoretically undecidable alternatives. Between realism and idealism (…) no final decision can be 
made, no decisive refutation of any is possible. There are, at the end, based on commitments which are theoretically 
neither defensible nor refutable. As a consequence of this elaborately worked out position, Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s 
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Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s theory is more ambitious and far-reaching than the use I want to make 
of it now in a dialogical context, for it articulates the contradictory nature of reality rather than 
its expressions by different participants. He develops the logical alternation of knowledge and 
object without an explicit embodied person. He conceives philosophy itself as an alternation 
between object and subject in deviation to his father’s account of the alternative absolutes. For 
K. C. Bhattacharyya, the alternative absolutes emanate from self-consciousness itself and the 
problem of its reflection raised to philosophy: the relation between consciousness and object 
being itself problematic, the alternative absolute is thus necessary to express the different 
possible approaches to the absolute for self-consciousness.634 For his son, this became the 
alternation of philosophy and philosophical systems themselves:  
“He [Kalidas] tried to provide a logical underpinning to K. C. Bhattacharya’s thought and not 
only developed it in a new direction but also tried to see the whole history of western 
philosophy from its perspective. Kalidasa Bhattacharya sees the whole history of western 
philosophy as built around the three alternative absolutes of K. C. Bhattacharya moving in 
three different directions which he called “philosophy of the object, philosophy of the subject 
and philosophy of the absolute”.”635 
I consider here that such an alternation (in Kalidas’ sense rather than Krishna Chandra’s636) can 
also be an epistemological tool for dialogue in the sense of an alternation of truth-statements 
between different pakṣas and pūrvapakṣas among philosophical traditions. Indeed, the 
alternation between systems themselves is here extended to an alternation between the persons 
defending a system, i.e. between different philosophical positions hold in a dialogue. These 
positions, crossing philosophical traditions and disciplines, might be in contradiction with each 
other, for they express incompatible views or they do not even share a possible area of 
agreement. I thus limit myself in the present context to drawing consequences of this account 
                                                 
lectures and writings of this period were marked by attempts to defend every basic philosophical position against 
all possible criticisms, to give it as plausible a formulation as possible, to trace it back to the strongest arguments 
in its favour and to lay bare its most basic presuppositions. The roots of this liberalism lie, no doubt, in Jaina 
doctrine of naya, but also in the thoughts of his father K. C. Bhattacharyya.” J. N. Mohanty, “Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya as Metaphysician,” in The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, ed. Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose, 
and P. K. Srivastava, 9 (Pune: Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, 1985), 133. 
634 See Daya Krishna’s comment: “K. C. Bhattachaya introduced the notion of “alternative absolutes” which is 
almost a contradiction in terms. For, if something is absolute then, by definition, it cannot have alternatives to 
itself. The term ‘absolute’ was introduced in the western philosophical tradition by Hegel and since then it has 
generally been used in the sense in which he used it. Yet, K. C. Bhattacharya introduced this notion self-
consciously to show that the postulation of an absolute was a necessity of thought to resolve a fundamental 
problematic question or paradox which was found in self-consciousness itself. It was the self-conscious reflection 
on “self-consciousness” which gave rise to philosophy and the philosophical enterprise consisted first in becoming 
aware of the paradox involved in self-consciousness and then, secondly, in the attempt to resolve it. As this 
resolution, according to him, could be attempted in different ways, the idea of an alternative absolutes was entailed 
by the possibility of alternative ways of resolving the problematic question posed by self-consciousness to the 
philosophical reflection on it.” Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century 
Onwards: Classical and Western, 295. 
635 Daya Krishna, 299. 
636 For another development of the alternative absolutes of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya with Daya Krishna’s 
philosophy (knowledge, will, feeling, or jñāna, karma, bhakti) see Elise Coquereau, “Relational Consciousness: 
Subjectivity and Otherness in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy,” in Unzugänglichkeit Des Selbst. Philosophische 
Perspektiven Auf Die Subjektivität, ed. Filip Gurjanov (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2016), 299–325. I develop 
there the metaphysical account of self-consciousness’ relation to object with Daya Krishna’s philosophy in reaction 
and distinction to Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya.  
223 
 
of disjunction and alternation to articulate positions presenting different alternative theories, 
facing others whose positions are seemingly irreconcilable in dialogue. I therefore do not 
integrate here the purely logical alternation and its logical possibility but the possibility of 
seeing contradictions in dialogue as a potential alternation for thinking and the contribution that 
such an articulation could bring. I believe however that such a restricted use of Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya’s theory is, although insufficient for rendering a full account of his complex 
view, not incompatible with his own thinking. He himself refers to rhetoric in his own account, 
which seems to indicate that this concern was also his own, although he proceeded further into 
a logical direction of alternation: 
 “How is it possible for me to refrain from attacking others when the philosophies they offer 
are opposed to mine? If their ideologies contradict mine I am bound to reject them unless I am 
a nincompoop. (…) The best form of reconciliation is our Alternative Absolutism. Let 
everyone develop his doctrine from his basepoint, let him attack and reject the views of others 
as he must, but let him realise that the standpoints of others are also alternatively correct, that 
while he is understanding the world in one language there are equally other alternative 
languages, and that each such languages is alternatively final. 
In Philosophy (which is the essence of life) thus one has to identify himself with one or other 
of the different alternative ideologies - for all of them cannot be accepted. Yet at the same time 
there must be an eye to a super-philosophic standpoint from which the different ideologies and 
their developments into systems of philosophy will appear in their true colour as alternatively 
absolute. But this super-philosophic standpoint, it should be remembered, can offer no solid 
content. The conjunctive attitude that comprehends several alternatives together is only verbal 
and as such knows nothing more than the trite that there are so many alternatives. So is the 
super-philosophic attitude of indifference. By itself it cannot construct a philosophy, as it has 
nothing to start with, no incipient idea that can develop into a system. Only after the different 
systems have developed from alternative standpoints can it pronounce a conjunctive judgment 
on them. Only then can it declare ‘There are so many alternative philosophies, each absolute 
in its turn, so no one has a right to condemn others as absolutely wrong, though in his own 
philosophic life he will have to stick to only one of these.’”637 
From a perspective of cross-cultural philosophies, I do not think that such an articulation 
recedes into the problems of a tertium comparationis638 (see 1.2.1), for it precisely suggests a 
different level of interpretation. While in comparative philosophy the problem is that in 
articulating two (culturally distinctive) alternatives, we pretend to extract ourselves from our 
own - which denies our own presuppositions - to reach a tertium or neutral point of view, 
Kalidas precisely argues for the impossibility of doing so. However, this impossibility does not 
mean the end of dialogue, but calls for cultivating another level external to the philosophies 
from where these alternatives can be organized as per their own truth-statements: in other terms, 
to accept other positions as absolute and alternatively valid. Practically for dialogue, this 
attitude entails the humility of accepting that, as absolute as one position can be felt, there are 
contradictory absolutes that are equally valid. This commitment, needless to say, itself implies 
the ‘presupposition’ of plurality that led him to develop such a device. It has been however 
                                                 
637 Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy), 154–
55. 
638 Ralph Weber, “Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What, and in What Respect?,” 
Dao 13, no. 2 (June 2014): 151–71, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-014-9368-z. 
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clarified in the preceeding section (5.2) that presuppositions are necessary postulates to hold a 
position and to articulate any view in a dialogue. They become prejudicial only when they are 
used to dogmatically refuse taking in consideration the other’s position. In that sense, Kalidas’ 
own presupposition is a self-conscious exploration of the very prejudices entailed in one’s 
position if we refuse to alternate with other positions.  
This logical development of alternating of philosophical systems is Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s 
earliest contribution. It is quite interesting to notice that, towards the end of his career, he 
rearticulated his earlier theory in a very similar way as the detachment described by Chubb 
above. In the publication that I analyzed in an earlier chapter as ‘dialogue between 
contemporaries’ (see 3.4), i.e. a further application of saṃvāda in the form of papers engaging 
contemporary philosophers who in turn responded to the papers, Kalidas thus proceeds to 
answer the different papers by first reformulating his earlier theory of alternation in the light of 
his further developments. Four decades later639, Kalidas Bhattacharyya thus writes:  
 “At the far end of my philosophical career, I feel increasingly inclined to believe (…) that the 
alternation of ‘itself’, ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, etc. is as much a full sympathetic understanding of the 
positive possibility of each of these philosophies through cultivating, as far as possible, an 
authentic catholic attitude to each possibility as not also to not committing oneself permanently 
to any one of them, and thus maintaining a scrupulously neutral attitude between them. It is a 
sort of authentic spiritual neutrality - a sort of genuine averaging - steering a safe middle course 
by not committing to any of these thoughts permitting, at the same time, the possibility of every 
one of these - a sort of full exclusion and full inclusion in and the same attitude. This last 
attitude is precisely the awareness that these philosophies are only alternative philosophies, 
each equally acceptable and yet each to be kept at an equal distance. In short, it is to have no 
special philosophy of one’s own but to maintain a sort of free sympathetic aloofness from all 
philosophies of the absolute developed, or to be developed, anywhere in the world at any time. 
And this itself is no philosophy. If one likes, one may call it super-philosophy - a strict attitude 
of neutrality, a transcendence equidistant from every one of these.”640  
This reformulation of ‘super-philosophy’ indicates a certain development tending towards a 
complete detachment in terms of ‘spiritual neutrality’. Kalidas initially argued for a necessary 
commitment within philosophy to a single absolute and a single alternative, together with the 
cultivation of an awareness of their alternation at a super-philosophic level. The present 
articulation remains quite in line with this. However, the focus shifted: the recognition of 
alternatives was a non-dogmatic acknowledgment of possible truths and realities required (in 
                                                 
639 Kalidas Bhattacharyya states that his philosophical career began around 1938 and the manuscript of Alternative 
Standpoint in Philosophy was ready in 1942 even if it was published in 1953. The Philosophy of Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya in which he answered criticisms, questions and papers was published in 1985. See there the details 
of his philosophical journey, Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the 
Fundamentals of Philosophy), 149. 
640  Kalidas grounds and distinguishes at the same time such a super-philosophic attitude to Mādhyamika 
Buddhism, also closely related here to Chubb: “(…) the super-philosophy that I am driving at is in an important 
respect very much like that of the Mādhyamika Buddhists. They prescribe that we should transcend all philosophies 
(dṛṣṭis) and that yet this transcendence of theirs is not another philosophy co-ordinate with others. But though 
agreeing with them so far, we, however, differ in another important respect from them. (…) While for them all 
existing philosophies, including the resilient ones, are erroneous, we are rather inclined to hold that all these are 
correct though, certainly, we have to transcend all of them in order that we may view each in its full possibility 
from a super-philosophic distance. It is only then, i.e., when we view them from the super-philosophic standpoint, 
that we feel we must not commit ourselves to any of them.” Bhattacharyya, “My Reaction,” 152–53. 
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my interpretation) to engage in a dialogue with others holding incompatible positions. It differs 
from a detachment of all positions that are seen in alternations, holding each view temporarily. 
While he still maintains that there is a need to have ‘a special’ philosophy, i.e. a position - 
necessary to ground a philosophy -, it goes with a stronger personal commitment (sympathy) 
towards others, i.e. a need to articulate and defend ‘other’ or counter-positions. The equal 
distance between positions is expressed as a personal attitude of ‘free sympathetic aloofness’. 
Margaret Chatterjee comments this interpretation by distinguishing the epistemological 
detachment of Kalidas Bhattacharyya (as of Chubb and Daya Krishna) from a metaphysical 
detachment leading to liberation from the world: 
 “If the freedom of man shows itself par excellence in the attitude of detachment from objects 
(including under this rubric al possible types of accusatives) the culminating point will be a 
state where consciousness is turned in on itself. However Kalidas’s own stress on alternation 
keeps him from any dogmatic pronouncement regarding the end term of the metaphysical 
quest. In fact he ventures an innovative use of the līla (sportive play) idea traditionally applied 
to the absolute, saying that it is the philosopher who almost in a playful way approaches the 
absolute through various alternative paths. This image which he left with us in his latter dates 
(when arguments often ended in laughter on his part) is as different from that of the detached 
observer as it is from the stance of those who claim to have ‘realized’ Himalayan heights. 
Along each path, and at every rung on the scale of ascent, that is to say in multiform ways, 
Bhattacharyya finds evidence of what he calls the ‘spiritual’. He was never attracted by a 
synthetic attitude that combined disparate approaches. He was, moreover, sufficiently 
interested in the relations that selves bear to each other to write critically about the concept of 
mukti (liberation).”641 
The detachment via alternation cannot be a singular procedure towards liberation, which would 
obviously recede into an absolutive or dogmatic conception. It rather corresponds to an 
epistemological exploration of alternatives, which, on the one hand, leaves the field of 
metaphysical consequences and ethical behaviors open-ended. On the other hand, it places the 
other at the center of the exploration rather than as a bondage to be overcome. The valuational 
dimension that underlies this conception is developed in the next section 6 and the ontological 
consequences for thinking others is 7.  
Nevertheless, if alternation and such a playful detachment constitute an epistemological frame 
for thinking dialogue, the former remains limited to a certain extent. Although alternations 
enable articulating different absolutes in their very contradictions, they imply a definite and 
final scope, an ‘either-or’, which delimits the range of positions that can be established. 
Admittedly, it is necessary for philosophies to be developed by positions, as the grounds on 
which they stand. Similarly, a range of positions is equally required to enable any choice to be 
made between them. However, what Kalidas Bhattacharyya does not tell us, is how to modify 
and renew the range of positions, or the scope of alternations according to different cultural and 
historical contexts and different consciousnesses. What if the absolutes of Object, Subject and 
Dialectic have no equivalent elsewhere? What if they are no absolute at all in other traditions? 
And if they are not, does that make the alternation unnecessary or inapplicable? What if these 
paradigms evolve in a way that renders the alternation obsolete? Would that be impossible for 
                                                 
641 Chatterjee, “Indian Metaphysics,” 95. 
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Kalidas Bhattacharyya? I must concede that he himself also developed the alternation between 
different absolutes beyond object/subject/dialectic, which I have not exposed here. He came 
back to his father’s division of knowledge, will and feeling, for instance.642 Nevertheless, he 
does not question the development of the logic of alternation itself in these further 
considerations, but rather extends it to different spheres of consciousness. In that sense, he does 
not tell us how to create alternations, how to renew the very idea of alternation, but applies it 
as a model or structure.   
For Daya Krishna’s dialogical perspective, however, this remains insufficiently ‘open-ended’, 
for as we will see in the next chapter (6.3), according to the tension between apprehension and 
realization, a model is itself influenced by its applications. Alternation as a logic thus cannot 
remain untouched by the realization of alternations in philosophies. In other words: the 
realization of a process has reciprocal consequences, affecting the alternations as well as the 
logic of alternation that underlies their articulation. The logic of alternation must itself alternate 
or be modified in different ways by its alternations: would that be possible? It is possible that 
the main contention between Daya Krishna and Kalidas Bhattacharyya lies in Kalidas’ 
commitment to his father’s remaining Advaitin approach committed to an idealism whose 
transcendentalism means an investigation of the unity of the Absolute. Plurality is for the later 
a verbal necessity for expressing an Absolute in each sphere of human consciousness 
(knowledge, will, feeling). The Absolute is thus distinct but unique. Although Kalidas is himself 
less committed to such a view, the influence of his father’s philosophy might have been too 
strong to avoid it. For Kalidas, alternatives are also the verbal necessity of a reality that remains, 
however, transcendentally inaccessible.643 Daya Krishna thus comments: 
 “His [Kalidas’] last and final alternation is related to the question whether the alternative 
formulations that we are forced to make are merely due to the limitations not only of our 
intellect but also on account of our way of experiencing the world along with the manner in 
which we are constituted or whether it is an intrinsic and inalienable nature of reality itself. As 
this is an unanswerable question, we are, according to him, ultimately left with an alternation 
where we might choose any of the alternatives but where we can never assert on any 
substantive ground that any one of them alone is true.” 644 
The indeterminateness of reality leaves further room for possible alternations and variations 
than in his father’s philosophy, but Kalidas nevertheless does not seem to question how his 
                                                 
642 See the Chapter III, ‘Cognition, Feeling and Conation’ and IV ‘Further Alternations’ including jñāna, bhakti 
and karma. Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of 
Philosophy). 
643 This entails consequences in conceiving reality that go much further any mystic or divine approach of the 
‘unknowability’ on the one hand, and the unknowable metaphysical thing-in-itself on the other hand: “This would 
be a form of avidyā [ignorance] deeper than any offered by a philosopher. it is an avidyā which persists even in 
the highest knowledge. A position like this goes beyond even the most far-reaching Mysticism. For while to 
Mysticism Reality is after all contacted, though in a super-ordinary attitude, the present position denies even that. 
To it Reality is absolutely unattainable. The mystic after all prescribes some way of approaching Reality, but here 
there is no possibility of even that, as the removal of this infra-primal ignorance is unconceivable. So it has to be 
admitted that if there is at all a Reality beyond the disjunctive indeterminacy of subjectivity and object, it is 
inscrutable. One may, if one likes, go further. One may hold that perhaps there is no such transcendent Reality, 
perhaps Reality itself is disjunctively indeterminate.” Bhattacharyya, 162. 
644 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 
301. 
227 
 
super-philosophic structure could itself be questioned.  One could object that such an attempt 
would proceed into an infinite regress, for it would involve a super-super philosophy that would 
itself requires a super-super-super philosophy, etc. However, I believe that we can, with Daya 
Krishna, rather understand it in terms of reciprocal consequences of the alternation. It thus does 
not suggest the endless elaboration of ‘super’ transcendental levels, but the ‘comeback’ in terms 
of reciprocal effects of the practice itself into the model.  
This refusal of a transcendental unification shows that for Daya Krishna, reality is itself plural, 
which includes the appearing incompatibilities entailed in plurality. There is a shift from 
plurality in formulation (cognitive and verbal apprehension) to the realization of the 
contradictions that constitute self-consciousness, which has no transcendental resolution, 
neither in a transcendental unity nor in an indefinite reality. Thus, dialogue is not meant to solve 
the contradictions, but to clarify the roots of the appearing contradictions into conjointly 
exploring their consequences and the problems that they raise. Rather than ordering the plurality 
into definite alternatives, the alternatives constitute starting-points for questioning the 
contradictions of plurality itself. Thus, Daya Krishna comments: 
“The necessity of resolution, however, is felt only because it is assumed that a pair of 
contradictories cannot characterize a real situation. The notions of ‘appearance’, ‘maya’, 
‘phenomena’, ‘unreal’ derive all their strength from this basic assumption. The history of 
philosophy may be understood as a continuous struggle between those who are bent on 
showing contradictions in different areas of experience and those who are trying to show the 
inadequate nature of the analysis that leads to such a conclusion. Dialectical philosophers are 
no exceptions; they seek resolution of the contradiction as assiduously as those they content 
against. The Absolute is needed just for this reason; otherwise one would not think of it at all. 
Even the religious philosophers who usually tend to articulate their insights in the simultaneous 
assertion of pairs of contradictory propositions seek their ultimate resolution in God who is 
supposed to be completely real and completely ecstatic just because it has no blemish of the 
shadow of the opposite in itself. The concept of Alternative Absolutes elaborated in the 
writings of the two most original thinkers of contemporary India, K. C. Bhattacharyya and 
Kalidas Bhattacharyya, does not escape, in my opinion, the charge of having made this 
assumption. The only possible reason why the alternative absolutes cannot be asserted 
simultaneously is because it would involve the affirmation of a contradiction, a thought too 
radical even for the radical Bhattacharyyas.”645  
Dialogues constitute the challenge of simultaneous contradictions, for solving it would simply 
end the dialogue. In that sense, the contradictions enable dialogues. Positions (with their 
respective presuppositions) remain necessary, and their alternation in terms of detachment and 
witnessing the origins of thoughts is required for ‘entering’ into a dialogue with others. Without 
positions, no ground for argumentation is possible, and without their alternation, dogmatism 
and absolutism of a single truth can impede any dialogue. However, the process of dialogue 
overcomes alternations and positions at the same time, since not only individual positions are 
set in alternations, but the logic of alternations is itself called into question by the enworlded 
intersubjectivity of the dialogue. It is the conjunction of participants being both epistemological 
subjects (in Kalidas’ and Mohanty’s sense of subjectivity of the universality of consciousness) 
                                                 
645 Daya Krishna, “Appearance and Reality,” 177. 
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and persons (in Mohanty’s sense, as a “concrete, corporeal entity” who is “in the world, and 
with others”646, which Kalidas does not consider) which enables the very logic to be modified. 
Since subjectivity (as consciousness) is not only what reveals the object to itself, but also an 
enworlded person in interactions with Others who affect her/his way of revealing the object, 
the process of dialogue can provoke new ways of conceiving the object-subject relation.  
This implies that not only the philosophical contents, or positions are alternating, but also the 
orientations, criterion (in Chubb’s definition) and the values that were in the first place 
determining the particular presuppositions of their philosophical positions. While the 
alternation is a logical device that enables the articulation of different positions, dialoguing 
between subjects modifies the terms of the alternation itself. Thus, in my interpretation, the 
logic of alternation is not entirely logical and universal, since it is also constituted by the 
different subjectivities in dialogue. It belongs to the ‘human knowledge’ and is in consequence 
characterized by the same tension as the one of the alternations. In another article, Daya Krishna 
writes (however without referring to the Bhattacharyyas): 
“The existence of other subjects presents problems of a metaphysical kind also. (…) The 
dilemma is significant in the sense that every seeking of man involves in some sense an 
intrinsic reference to other subjects. (…) The dilemma is mirrored in the every day situation 
where each holds his vision to be true and yet continuously appeals to others for confirmation 
in argument and discussion. The intrinsic necessity for others in every seeking of man coupled 
with the continuous demand for essential independence from them epitomizes this situation 
very well.” 
The others are not limited to the different alternative philosophical theories or arguments, but 
they also participate in the very logic of alternation, which becomes then as subjective and 
alternative as the positions and arguments. In this sense, ‘knowledge’ is not made of one’s 
consciousness and does not belong to anybody, which constitutes another firm claim of Daya 
Krishna when he considers knowledge formed by dialogue in his unpublished paper:  
“A ‘knowledge-claim’ entertained on whatever grounds has to be submitted before others and 
‘accepted’ by them before it is accepted as ‘knowledge’ even by oneself as in case others 
question the claim that it is knowledge, one begins to doubt oneself if it were really so. The 
submission before other, the ‘competent’ others, for their judgement and their ‘acceptance’ of 
it as ‘knowledge’ however tentative such as acceptance might be, makes knowledge lose its 
private character and make it a public possession in the most radical sense of the term.”647 
Participation not only implies that the theory has to be simply put into a practice, but that this 
very practice brings other dimensions to be included in the theory. In other terms: the 
confirmation and refutation is not a logical alternation of theories but also a relation to others. 
                                                 
646 “The person, on the other hand, is a concrete, corporeal entity who calls himself „I‟, a bodily-psychic unity that 
is appropriated into the structure of a unitary self-consciousness. It is in the world, and with others. Its mode of 
being in the world is not an epistemological subject‟s having a world stand over against it, but a concernful, caring, 
willing and acting temporally structured by systems of recalling, anticipating, and fulfilmentfrustration. In the 
language of the Indian philosophers, the person is characterized by kartṛtva and bhoktṛtva; he is an agent and an 
enjoyer; his being an enjoyer and being an agent together form one total structure of mundaneity. For the person, 
objects (artha) are primarily not objects (viṣaya) of knowledge, but objects of affective-volitional concern 
(arthyate anena).” Mohanty, Essays on Indian Philosophy Traditional and Modern, 75. 
647 Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 1. 
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Thus, the freedom involved is not only the freedom to choose between alternatives, and to 
choose to detach oneself from one absolute, but also the contradictory relation of freedoms to 
others. This tension is manifested in seeking independence from others to elaborate a position 
of one’s own, or to seek to overcome the otherness in a transcendental resolution of liberation, 
while however requiring their confirmation and their refutation for grounding the very theory 
that allows independence from them. The contradictions are therefore not limited to the 
epistemological level of philosophical theories, but also imply the way these presuppositions 
are generated. This ‘generation’ of presuppositions occur from values that are experienced in 
dialogue rather than consciously apprehended. This implies further conflicts to be elucidated in 
the realm of dialogue, which I have classified under the name given by Daya Krishna, 
‘dissatisfactions’. The unfolding of all these dimensions at once summarizes what Daya Krishna 
calls ‘the story of civilizations’: 
“The story of civilizations is the story of this interplay between the delusion and deception 
superimposed by the successive definitions of reality at all levels, both of objectivity and 
subjectivity, and the attempts to get out of them only to get caught in some new snare or 
conceptual net created by the cognitive enterprise of man. (…) Each of these [entreprises, 
which can be cognitive, but also spiritual, aesthetic, economical, political], paradoxically, 
however gives rise, because of the reflexive self-conscious nature of man, to a view of self and 
reality which are not only at loggerheads with one another, but results in the creation of that 
human world which has necessarily to be self-contradictory because of this very fact. Man has 
to see himself in terms of all of these, including all that he knows about them even if it results 
in contradictions which he finds difficult to live with. The contradictions arising from the 
conflicting definitions which continue to persist even after one is supposed to have superceded 
the other provides a clue not only to the dynamics of the human situation in all its dimensions, 
but also to the unbelievable tragedy which permeates every aspect of it since its very inception. 
(…) Definitions constitute knowledge and knowledge determines the way ‘reality’ is seen, and 
the way reality is seen determines the way men feel and behave and act on its basis. Once, one 
loosens the bonds between these, one would also ‘free’ oneself from the compulsions which 
the uncritical acceptance of reason and the belief or ‘faith’ in the knowledge that is its result, 
result in.”648  
  
                                                 
648 Daya Krishna, “Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of Knowledge,” March 2005, 87–88. 
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6. Dissatisfactions: The Creative Deception of Reality vis-à-vis Ideality 
 
“The realization that there is no such thing as knowledge but only knowledges and that what 
is thought of as knowledge or described as such in any domain is only a short-hand term 
describing the tentative results of a collective seeking on the part of a large number of 
individuals that is continuously being challenged, questioned and modified in the light of the 
inadequacies and imperfections that people see will change the situation in a fundamental way. 
It will thus see human knowledge as subject to all the weaknesses and strengths that define the 
human situation in its basic structural aspect. 
The seeking for knowledge, however, is quite different as it makes everything, including all 
other seekings, its subject and hence has a supervening character unlike any other seeking of 
man. That is one reason why truth seems to have such a supreme value that when that is 
questioned, no one knows what to do in the face of that questioning. The raising of the question 
about the truth of anything, it should be remembered, is not a question of verisimilitude or even 
of veridicality but of something else that is perhaps more adequately conveyed by that which 
relates to the seeking itself and as the seeking cannot be separated or divorced from the one 
who seeks, ultimately therefore it is the seeker who becomes the central concern of all those 
who want seriously to think about either knowledge or truth. 
To talk of the seeker is to talk of a being who is self-conscious and conscious of his inadequacy 
and imperfections, as that is why he seeks or wants to know and through that knowledge 
become something that he is not.”649 
  
                                                 
649 Daya Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination, and the Problem of Truth,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of 
Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
173. 
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6.1. What ‘Ought to Be’ and ‘Is Not’: Dialogue and Puruṣārtha650 
 
For philosophical dialogues, ‘knowledge’ is multiple. It is constituted first by each 
argumentation propounded by the participants, inspired by their own ‘knowledge theories’. 
These knowledge theories, broadly defined as śāstras, are bodies of knowledges and resources 
on which one draws her/his personal argumentation. These theories originate within particular 
cultural and historical horizons which are influencing the elaborated doctrines. These śāstric 
knowledges are inherited by the participants who followingly construct their individual 
argumentations through certain languages, conceptual structures and references. The transition 
from śāstric knowledge to particular positions connects the historical heritage to the present 
possibility of revising and questioning these resources. For instance, while a contemporary 
Advaitin is likely to endorse a position that articulates an argument in accordance or in 
refutation with classical positions found in the texts, or methods of arguing inherited from them, 
the possibility to ‘free himself’ (an expression regularly occurring in Daya Krishna’s texts, 
pointing at the activity and the process of freedom,651 see 6.2 and 7.3) remains to find new 
counter-positions.652 While these positions are resources for thinking, it is only the ‘act-ivation’ 
or the ‘realization’ of knowledge into particular arguments that avoids the closure of the 
tradition leading to the feeling of its authority with regard to which personal interpretations 
ought to be ‘true’ or not. Such an activation breaks on the one hand with the idea of philosophy 
to be composed by fixed and definite ‘thoughts’ (as opposed to ‘thinking’, see 2.1.1 and 3.5) 
and with the idea, for Sanskrit philosophy in particular, of ‘classical’ Indian philosophy about 
which only exegesis of the past is adequate (see 2.1.2). The past heritage is thus ‘set up on 
motion’ into the present, i.e. dynamically formulated and reflected upon by each participant in 
her/his argumentation.653  
                                                 
650 This section draws on an already published article of which portions are reproduced here: Coquereau, “Seeking 
Values in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy.” 
651 See the Preface by Shail Mayaram: “Daya Krishna is committed to a philosophy of freedom. Freedom is 
multiply constituted in his writing. It manifests as the work of consciousness emancipating itself from the world 
of necessity and causality and in the capacity for reflective self-consciousness. Thinking itself is an act of freedom, 
as the conceptual imagination seeks to distance itself from one’s inherited conceptual tradition. Freedom is also 
evinced in the experience of art, each form of which constitutes its own distinctive kind of freedom. 
In his letters, Daya Krishna refers to death as freedom. The poet, Gagan Gill, told me that she had once asked him, 
“Dayaji, don’t you want to take another birth-[since] you have known real love?” His reply was, pyār bhī bāndhā 
hai (love also binds)! His ultimate quest was for complete freedom.” Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, ix. 
652 I have analyzed different dimensions of counter-positions with regard to the distinction between historical and 
contemporary pūrvapakṣas by retrieving examples from the Bhakti dialogue in ‘Unveiling the Historicity of 
Concepts: Dimensions of Pūrvapakṣa’. I am in the present section more concerned about the implications of these 
distinctions for thinking the concept dialogue in relation with values than with concrete applications, which can 
be found in the aforementioned article, Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. 
Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 194–200. 
653 Of particular relevance for this section, the work of Rajendra Prasad on values and in particular his critical 
interpretation of puruṣārtha based on the Sanskrit texts is an example of such activation and realization. While 
rooting his analysis in the presentation of the classical theory of puruṣārthas, he offers critical insights for 
demonstrating the historical background for organizing such a structure which needs to be socially, politically and 
philosophically reinterpreted in today’s context. See in particular the chapter ‘Classical Indian Theory of Human 
Value: Some Structural Features’, Rajendra Prasad, A Conceptual-Analytic Study of Classical Indian Philosophy 
of Morals, History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization Levels of Reality (CONSSAVY), 
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This can arise in an individually conducted analysis (and Daya Krishna often refers to Pandit 
Badrinath Shukla, a Nyāyāyika, for his capacity of doing so, see 3.3.1654). However, beyond 
one’s own capacities, in particular of crossing one’s philosophical horizon, such an activation 
rather operates in dialogues across traditions. The presuppositions entailed in each position 
influenced by the śāstric knowledge are then called into question by the counter-positions one 
has to answer to. This (ideally) results in the generation of new knowledge. Such a ‘motion’ is 
enabled by the individuality of each thinker, but moreover, by the intersubjectivity of the 
dialogue itself that exceeds the individual positions. 655  Daya Krishna reminds us of this 
continuous operation that is invisibly happening in all discussions, which is felt in the most 
dissatisfying way in the disagreement of the other participants and in our felt frustration in view 
of his/her counter-positions. As mentioned in the preceeding chapter (5.3), while we are 
intuitively driven into thinking that the disagreement is limited to the communicational level 
(“s/he did not understand my point”), we refuse to admit that we have ourselves operated in 
terms of agreement/disagreement with another position in order to be able to communicate our 
position. In other words: in order to articulate a position, we have been beforehand in direct or 
indirect (via the reading of other texts) communication with others, with whom we agreed or 
disagreed. This beginningless view of dialogue thus refutes the contention of invidual and 
                                                 
Centre for Studies in Civilizations. General ed. D. P. Chattopadhyaya; Vol. 12 Pt. 1 (New Delhi: Concept, 2008), 
205–27. 
654 Besides numerous mentions in his letters, references to the creativity of Pandit Badrinath Shukla can be found 
in Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 
151–55; “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy”; Daya Krishna, Indian 
Philosophy, 1997, 4. See notably: “Both the Śatślokī and lecture on dehātmavāda show a great original mind 
steeped in the philosophical traditions of India yet, struggling to get out of the settled modes of classical Indian 
thought. But, it is equally clear that he is not able to throw out the metaphysical baggage which every traditional 
Indian thinker carries with him so as to address himself to the pure philosophical problem that he is dealing with. 
The creative possibilities that lie within the domains of the classical tradition of Indian philosophical thought are 
exhibited here as also how if those who are steeped in that tradition when challenged to think anew can do so. It 
may be remembered in this context that Paṇḍit Badrinath Shukla had not only participated in the Rege experiment 
which has been documented and published as Samavāya, but was also the guiding spirit therein. He also had 
provided the leadership in the convening of the conference on Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Kashmir Śaivism in which 
an attempt was made to give a new direction to traditional thought in these systems. It is difficult to say how this 
continuous interaction with persons steeped in the western philosophical tradition contributed to the innovative 
experiments he made in the Śatślokī and the dehātmavāda lecture but there can be little doubt that the philosophical 
atmosphere he breathed in must have had something to do with it.” Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian 
Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 155. Moreover, besides Daya Krishna’s 
appreciation, see Badrinath Shukla’s paper as well as Srinivasa Rao’s response to it, Badrinath Shukla, 
“Dehātmavāda or the Body as Soul: Exploration of a Possibility within Nyāya Thought.,” trans. Mukund Lath, 
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 5, no. 3 (1988): 1–17; Srinivasa Rao, “The Possibility of 
Dehātmavāda: A Critique of Pandit Badrinath Shukla.,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 25, 
no. 1 (2008): 129–40., as well as his contribution written as a reaction to the Pune experiment, published in the 
same volume Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, 191–213. 
Reproduced with further developments in Matilal and Chakrabarti, Knowing from Words. 
655 This intersubjectivity touches on all the realms of consciousness for Daya Krishna: “Man “thinks” as if 
“knowledge” and “action” were not essentially dependent on others who are as much “subjects” and self-conscious 
selves as oneself. Knowledge and actions are both inter-subjective, collective entreprises, but the philosophical 
reflection on them systematically ignores this aspect, for if it were to do so, it would encounter a foundational 
“insufficiency” in the self which it is not prepared to entertain as its own self-consciousness denies it.” Daya 
Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 139. 
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radical (atomistic656) novelty of ideas, since any new insight is the outcome of a refutation or 
modification of a previous position, i.e. an intersubjective realization. 
Now, this constitution of knowledge is ‘human’657 in the sense exposed above, since, although 
objective, it is emerging from the intersubjectivity. This intersubjectivity is itself the result of 
epistemological subjects who are also persons, i.e. ‘seekers’ of truth, knowledge and reason 
(see 6.2). They are however embodied and finite in a world composed of others, in which the 
meaning of knowledge, truth and reason and the significance that is conferred to them, is also 
structured by values. Values presuppose the śāstric knowledge (as the knowledge of value-
theories, whether these theories are retrieved from the Indian, Western or any other tradition), 
the reasoning of the values’ proponents or opponents, as well as the knower who is seeking to 
know them. Thus, dialogues are made of ‘seekers’ for truth(s), which includes another 
dimension than the epistemological one analyzed above (5): the axiological or ‘valuational’ 
dimension that irremediably characterizes knowledge (of particular relevance for knowledge in 
dialogue). Indeed, for Daya Krishna it is the “character of ‘seeking’ that characterizes the 
consciousness that apprehends a value”.658 This entails another variable: not only the systematic 
knowledge understood as śāstra, but the larger cultural Weltanschauung in which it is 
embedded play a role in the constitution of our knowledge, which happen furthermore in the 
activity of the seeker for knowledge.659 G. C. Pande, a long-time friend and colleague of Daya 
Krishna in Jaipur, defines Weltanschauung in relation to values as follows:  
                                                 
656  See Arindam Chakrabarti’s on novelty in philosophy, commenting on Daya Krishna’s approach: “In 
philosophy, as Peter Strawson said, if there are no new truths to be discovered, there are the old truths to be 
rediscovered. Strawson’s favorite E. M. Forster quote was “Only connect!”. Coming to recognize the perennial in 
the new is the best creativity that meta-conceptual thinking is capable of. Suggesting new mappings of one set of 
problems onto another, illuminating connections never perceived before are the creative heights that our best 
original thinkers can reach, effortlessly, somewhat rarely, and often surprisingly to themselves. Unexpected 
connections and rediscoveries of the same old issues in a different garb and context are the new stuff which 
philosophical creativity is made of. “There is always more pleasure to be gained from combinations than from 
simplicity,” says Thomas Aquinas, in his Commentary on De Anima. Recombinations of old concepts so that one 
can unravel one tangle in order to discover yet another one (this-tangled-string-with-an-unfindable-end metaphor 
is taken by Daya Krishna from Mirza Ghalib, his favorite Urdu poet), is the essence of philosophical creativity.” 
Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” 22. 
657 The anthropocentric character of knowledge, already analyzed in the last chapter, is furthermore commented 
on by S. S. Barlingay in his article ‘Value, Values and Value Systems’: “What I am interested in pointing out is 
that in the ‘value-object’ complex, this valuational element, which makes the object valuable or values is itself 
anthropocentric in character, that the anthropocentric objects themselves are further subjected to valuation, which, 
in its turn, is anthropocentric, that the anthropocentricity itself operates at different levels and the ‘objects’ are 
peculiarly modified, more than once, by the phenomenon of anthropocentricity.” Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, 
“Value, Values and Value Systems,” in Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, 6 (Pune: Indian Philosophical Quarterly 
Publications, 1983), 173–74. 
658 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 262. 
659 G. C. Pande is perhaps, among Daya Krishna’s peers, the one who emphasizes the most the interrelation 
between cultures and values: “Values are immediate objects of self-conscious individual experience. The means 
to such experience and their knowledge as also reflections over the process may also be called values in a secondary 
sense. The knowledge and experience of the individual enter social communication and tradition in the form of 
symbols. In this sense the world of culture is a world of symbols expressive of knowledge and experience evolved 
in the process of value-seeking. Culture emerges as a revelation in the individual psyche and enters social tradition 
creatively as a symbol. The determinants of culture thus lie not only in the diverse ‘vehicles’ in terms of which 
consciousness attains self-consciousness, but in the dialectical interplay of seeking, experiencing, reflection, 
symbolizing and communication. The understanding of culture involves understanding the working of ideal 
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“As an operative idea of life as a whole it [Weltanschauung] enters into the making and 
working of institutions. As faith it guides the individual person’s quest for what is right and 
authentic, what constitutes excellence and the ultimate good. As a fragmentary glimpse of 
cosmology and anthropology, a metaphysic, essential but without formal definitions and 
system, it functions as the matrix of fundamental suppositions for the thinkers of the age. This 
basic faith or Weltanschauung itself springs from an intuitive vision or revelation of an 
essentially spiritual character which is inseparable from praxis and being expressed 
symbolically enters into the social tradition. Vision (vidyā), praxis (sādhana), tradition 
(āgama), structure of norms and principles of practice (dharma and nīti) constitute the 
underlying basis of a culture or a distinctive macro-society.”660 
Weltanschauung thus defined emphasizes the relation between knowledge of values, values and 
their context. This relation is not conceived in terms of causality nor historical relevance661 
between śāstra and puruṣārtha, but as an interrelation in which one cannot be separated from 
the other. This implies recognizing the “ever making himself”662 dimension of man, i.e. the lack 
of finality of his consciousness and what this consciousness apprehends, as well as the nexus 
of values constituting the direction and orientation (or in Chubb’s terms, the criterion) through 
which s/he is ‘becoming’ and ‘knowing’ further:  
“Man is, perhaps like everything else, in the process of ‘becoming’, but this ‘becoming’ is 
unique as it is determined not so much by conditioning and causal factors around him, but by 
the way and the direction he wants them to ‘become’ and ‘change into’.”663 
So conceived, ‘seeking’ knowledge is both a necessary feature for dialogue (understood as 
motivation to ‘enter’ in dialogue for its participants) and a reason for its unendingness 
(positively formulated as the open-ended character of dialogues, since ‘seeking’ disaffirms 
‘reaching’; negatively formulated as the reason for fallibility and revision, since ‘seeking’ 
introduces something that is not actualized and can thus not be said to be ‘true’). In Sanskrit 
terms, it translates what Daya Krishna interprets of the concept puruṣārtha, introduced in 4.2 
as a pole in tension with śāstras. While śāstras are characterized as ‘thought’, i.e. definite body 
of systematized knowledge, puruṣārtha as goal of life and value, indicates the ‘seeking’ towards 
something beyond, something that ‘ought to be’ and is, however, not. It is not ‘yet’, but this 
moreover implies that even when it is realized, it will not become what it was thought to be, 
since ‘seeking’ precisely indicates something unfulfilled. Thus, what ‘ought to be’ does not 
reach conformity with what ‘what is’. This tension pushes the dialogue forward as a quest for 
truth and collective knowledge-enterprise, generated by the fact that what is around us in reality 
                                                 
processes of human self-realisation within a historically given context of symbols and meanings.” Govind Chandra 
Pande, Consciousness, Value, Culture, 1st ed (Allahabad: Raka Prakashan, 2006), 13. 
660 Pande, “Culture and Cultures,” 42. 
661 “To understand a causal sequence, you always have to move backwards. Some thing which comes after is 
explained fully by some thing which preceded. The alternative to causation is chance. In nature we have chance 
or cause. On the other hand, living experience calls for an end, for destiny. The spiritual activity, the activity of 
the mind, is intent on the realization of some ideals which is not actual at all. Here the apprehension of actualities 
is sought to be brought into some relationship with what is non-actual, ideal. For the human psyche the ideal is the 
proper clue to the real, far more than the actual. If the actual falls short of the ideal, that is not a defect of the ideal, 
but of the actual. In seeking the real, man seeks the ideal, seeks to somehow bring it into the world of actuality, to 
understand the actual in terms of the ideal. This means that the life of the spirit constitutes an evolving process, 
which has an orientation.” Pande, Consciousness, Value, Culture, 25. 
662 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 263. 
663 Daya Krishna, 251. 
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is not (at least not completely) what it ought to be, and/or what we apprehended it to be. This 
gap between reality and value and between intellectual apprehension and empirical realization 
is what I called dissatisfaction and expresses the potential dynamic of dialogue at study in this 
chapter. The dissatisfactions arising from this gap further indicate the inner relation between 
the axiological and the epistemological levels. To take in consideration knowledge as the result 
of these interractions between śāstras and puruṣārtha is necessary for Daya Krishna on the one 
hand to underline the dynamic of knowledge, which renders knowledge inconclusive, and on 
the other hand to signify the plurality of contexts in which knowledge is created, which can 
enable simultaneous contradictory and yet ‘equally valid’ knowledge theories. Both these 
aspects, namely the lack of finality and the multiple truth-statements, are crucial to think 
knowledge elaborated in dialogues across philosophical traditions. 
Such a conception has implications for conceiving participants of a dialogue as ‘seeker of 
knowledge’ rather than ‘beholders’ of it with the potential creativity that it opens to explore 
further questions (6.2). Indeed, values are relevant insofar as they ‘orientate’ the participants 
towards the significance to which their argumentations are bound, as well as towards the 
definition of the criteria, dimension and horizon in which the ideas and argumentations arise. 
Furthermore, values also impact the participants’ dialogical engagement in providing 
motivations for participating, and also in influencing the way they ‘seek’ for knowledge. 
Broadly conceived, values define the modality and attitude of the participants with which the 
arguments are made. Moreover, values also imply that we can conceive of dialogue itself as a 
tension between apprehension and realization. Indeed, the theory entailed in the apprehension 
and the practice implied in the realization reciprocally create the dynamics of its open-
endedness (6.3). Such a tension explains a certain ‘ideality’ latent in each theory of dialogue in 
contradistinction to the limits, and sometimes the failures encountered in the case of concretely 
organized ‘dialogues’, which, although carefully planned, can leave the feeling of a missed 
encounter, a non-dialogue that reached nowhere (see the example Derrida and Gadamer’s 
encounters in 1.1.2, which although probably planned as ‘dialogue’, turned out not to be one). 
These different aspects, i.e. first the valuational conception of participants of a dialogue as 
seekers of knowledge and the implication of such a conception to understand knowledge, and 
second the intermingling of theory and practice understood as the confrontation of the 
valuational dimension of the ‘ought to’ with regard to the concrete ‘is’ with regard to dialogue, 
will be studied in the following two sections. But this tension between apprehension and 
realization has first an effect for conceiving ‘values’ (as puruṣārtha) themselves. Values can be 
also the object of reflection of dialogue, in which case the participants as ‘seekers’ in the 
dialogue (defined as valuational enterprise) reflect on what values mean. At all these levels, the 
same ‘dissatisfying’ tension applies between apprehension and realization, although with 
different (interconnected) implications. 
To define values first, let us start by considering values as objects of knowledge and how far 
engaging in dialogues is possible and needed to think values. The gap between apprehension 
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and realizations originates from the paradoxical dissociation between values and realities, 
which are intrinsically related:664  
“The term ‘real’ arises only because we find ourselves in situations where we find that things 
are not as we had taken them to be and that this discrepancy matters to us in some way or other. 
It is then that the distinction between the real and the unreal arises and we tend to feel that we 
should get away from that which is unreal and seek or find the real alone.”665 
The problem can be analyzed with the assimilation of their antonyms, namely ‘unreal’ and 
‘unvaluational’, i.e. what is not real has no value. In consequence, the ‘highest’ reality 
corresponds to the ‘highest’ value, for which one ‘ought’ to free herself/himself from māyā and 
illusion.666 In Daya Krishna’s words:  
“The distinction between real and unreal, drawn in whatever terms, usually involves the 
imperative that one ought to seek the one and avoid the other. The linkage with value at this 
point seems obvious. The unreal, however, is not just non-existent and thus has to be ascribed 
some sort of reality. This, in various ways, is the central headache of all metaphysics, and its 
intellectual insolubility is designated by the term māyā in Indian thought. However, whatever 
may be the being of the unreal, or whatever the ontological status we ascribe to it, it is usually 
considered as less valuational or even positively disvaluational in comparison with that which 
is regarded as real. The ideas of value and reality are thus closely associated.”667 
In classical Indian terms, this implies that puruṣārthas understood as ‘goal of life’, or “what is 
desired by man”668 are universal and can be found in any societies.669 Following Hiriyanna,670 
they are defined as higher values for a self-reflecting subject. They are what allows us to 
distinguish both the self-perfection of man as opposed to other creatures and at the same time 
man’s sense of ‘ought’ as opposed to what he ‘is’. However, for Daya Krishna, the contents of 
                                                 
664 See the chapter ‘Reality and Value’ (1952) and the article ‘Value and Reality’ (1965)  respectively in Daya 
Krishna, Nature of Philosophy., 109–50; Daya Krishna, The Art of the Conceptual, 179–86. 
665 Daya Krishna, “Value and Reality,” in The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze over 
Three Decades (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1989), 179. 
666 N. V. Banerjee (Daya Krishna’s supervisor) also conceives our way to approach duty and obligation (the 
axiological domain) in negative terms, which he retrieves from the Indian classical traditions and summarizes as 
follows: “The problem as stated above indicates that the highest aim of man’s empirical life is the undoing of 
thing, viz., the effect of Ignorance rather than the doing of anything. In other words, it is negative rather than 
positive.” Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, Concerning Human Understanding. Essays on the Common-Sense 
Background of Philosophy (London: George Allen And Unwin Ltd., 1958), 261–62. 
667 Daya Krishna, “Value and Reality,” 179. 
668 Mysore Hiriyanna, Indian Conception of Values (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1975), 6. 
669 See also Rajendra Prasad: “The Sanskrit word for an object of a human being’s desire is puruṣārtha. In fact, 
puruṣārtha, as Dharmottara analyses it in his Nyāyabindutīkā, means puruṣasya arthaḥ, artha of a human being. 
Artha from the root arth means in it an object of arthanā. Arthanā means a desire, wish, intention, etc. Thus 
puruṣārtha literally or etymologically, means an object of a desire, an objective, a goal, i.e. that which a human 
being aims at, wants or desires to have, a urpose he wants to fulfill, etc. In its linguistic meaning, therefore, there 
is no restriction on the concept of an object, or on that of a desire, or on that of a person or human being an object 
of whose desire it is. Obviously, then, puruṣārtha means any object of any desire of any human being.” Rajendra 
Prasad develops then further to the semantical signification into the historical subtle developments of the idea; 
nevertheless, it is helpful to begin with the general definition and overarching structure to understand Daya Krishna 
- and Rajendra Prasad himself - argumentation for an open-texture of the different puruṣārthas included in the 
theory. Prasad, A Conceptual-Analytic Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals, 206. 
670 Hiriyanna, Indian Conception of Values, 6–8. 
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what one sees as ‘value’ (puruṣārtha671), and in particular the hierarchies and orders between 
different contents, are specific and subject to changes.672 This sense of hierarchy is typically 
                                                 
671 Daya Krishna provocatively entitled his main contribution to the classical Indian theory of puruṣārtha ‘The 
Myth of the Puruṣārtha’ in continuation of his exposition of the presuppositions contained in the interpretations of 
classical Indian philosophies (‘Three Myths about Indian Philosophy’; ‘The Myth of the Prasthāna Trayī’). He 
aimed to bring attention to the fixation of the tradition that led to ‘blindly’ accept presuppositions as immutable 
axioms. Rajendra Prasad, who agrees on the general undertaking of this project and on the necessity to creatively 
critique the traditions, nevertheless suggests not to misunderstand Daya Krishna’s title ‘Myth of the Puruṣārtha’: 
“‘Puruṣārtha’ being a word of ordinary language and therefore a word in current usage, meaning in virtue of its 
sheer grammar an object of desire, the concept of a puruṣārtha cannot be a myth. It cannot be, because the concept 
of an object of desire, which it means, is not a myth. It is not, because there are, in fact, a large number of things 
which are objects of human desires. DK entitles his essay in the book ‘The Myth of Puruṣārtha’ which implies 
that for him puruṣārtha-s, objects of desire, are mythical. But this is palpably false. To attribute to a philosopher 
of his calibre this kind of error may appear unfair. Therefore, I have suggested that he intends to call the theory of 
puruṣārtha-s, and not the concept of a puruṣārtha, a myth.” Rajendra Prasad, “Daya Krishna’s Therapy for Myths 
of Indian Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 32, no. 3 (December 2015): 368, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-015-0018-6. 
672 The contestation of the commonly seen hierarchy between the different contents of the puruṣārthas as well as 
their modifications according to the contexts is a crucial critique of the contemporary reinterpretations, in which 
Indian philosophers manifest the relevance of the theory for thinking values today, if and only if the theory can be 
adapted to these different contexts. Philosophers and colleagues of Daya Krishna such as K. J. Shah and R. Sundara 
Rajan thus consider the necessary interrelations of the four puruṣārthas for constituting human life, and Sundara 
Rajan emphasizes a conception of puruṣārtha as a transcendental a priori framework within which the contents 
must be subject to changes. See K. J. Shah on the hierarchy: “Our discussion of the sciences has taken their goals 
to be interactional, not hierarchical. Is there a mistake here, or does the hiarchy of the traditional four goals need 
to be understood differently from what is usual? I think that the latter is the case. We must realise that artha will 
not be a puruṣārtha unless it is in accord with kāma, dharma and mokṣa; kāma in turn will not be kāma unless it is 
in accord with dharma and mokṣa. Equally mokṣa will not be mokṣa without the content of dharma; dharma will 
not be dharma without the content of kāma and artha. The four goals, therefore, constitute one single goal, though 
in the lives of individuals the elements may get varying emphasis for various reasons.” K. J. Shah, “Of Artha and 
the Arthaśāstra,” in Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer ; Essays in Honour of Louis Dumont, ed. Triloki 
N. Madan, New ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), 59. See also Sundara Rajan, who prefers articulating the 
hierarchy and variability through a Kantian systematic expression: “What they [the puruṣārthas] define is the 
transcendental a priori framework of human life and to this extent, considered purely in their purely a priori or 
‘formal’ aspect, they have a universality and necessity about them. (…) But this does not mean that the particular 
content or significance which goes into them the specific ‘material’ interpretation of this framework also must be 
necessary and invariant. Indeed, the content is variable and relative contingent upon a host of other historically 
determined factors, social, cultural and temperamental.” R. Sundara Rajan, “The Purusharthas in the Light of 
Critical Theory,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly 7, no. 3 (1979): 342–43. Mention of the appreciation of their 
interpretations by Daya Krishna can be found in Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 4–5. Furthermore, it 
seems to be a possible point of concordance between contemporary Indian philosophers and Western Indologists 
(South Asian Studies), at least if we consider W. Halbfass as epitomizing this tendency is his appreciation of Daya 
Krishna’s critique, which concludes his analysis on ‘Being Human and Goals of Life’ (‘Menschsein und 
Lebensziele’): “Daya Krishna hat den “Mythos der puruṣārthas” kritisiert und bemängelt, daß die traditionellen 
Listen des trivarga und des caturvarga unvollständig seien und namentlich “dem eigenständigen Leben der 
Vernunft” (“the independent life of reason”) nicht den gebührenden Platz und Wert einräumen. Dies mag in der 
Tat der Fall sein. Andere Einteilungen, andere Wertsetzungen sind nicht nur möglich, sondern auch, außerhalb der 
indischen Tradition, historisch bezeugt. (…) So viel jedenfalls ist klar, daß die indische Lehre von den 
Lebenszielen bzw. den Entwurfshorizonten der menschlichen Existenz nicht nur ein Phänomen von erheblichen 
kultur- und geistesgeschichtlichen Rang ist, sondern uns zugleich auch auf grundsätzliche menschliche 
Existenzmöglichkeiten hinweist und nach wie vor zum philosophischen Nachdenken und Weiterdenken einlädt.“ 
Original Text. My translation: „Daya Krishna assailed the “myth of the puruṣārthas” and criticized that the 
traditional lists of the trivarga and the caturvarga would be incomplete and not acknowledge the place and the 
value of the independent life of reason. This might indeed be the case. Other classifications, other sets of values 
are not only possible, but also, beyond the Indian tradition, historically indicated. (…) In any case, it is evident 
that the Indian doctrine of the aims in life and accordingly of the projecting horizons [Entwurfshorizonte] of the 
human existence is not only a phenomenon of considerable value for cultural and intellectual history. At the same 
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manifested in terms of ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ values, which is exemplified in the classical Indian 
context by the significance of mokṣa (self-perfection) with regard to the three other values, 
namely artha (wealth), kāma (erotic desire, by extension desire in general), and dharma 
(virtue).673 The hierarchy indicates also conflicting conceptual relations between the different 
contents since they display different ‘dimensions’ of human life. Of particular relevance in this 
context is the combination between the ‘highest’ consideration of mokṣa and the denial of the 
implications that it implies for the other values. Indeed, in Daya Krishna’s interpretation,674 
“the addition of mokṣa as the fourth and final end of human seeking and striving was  not  a  
fulfilment  of  the  original  three,  but ultimately  their  denial  or  negation”.675 This is easily 
understandable since mokṣa is defined as the ultimate reality and the liberation from illusion 
(that is, from the worldly reality, or vyavahāra in Daya Krishna’s use676). From this follows 
that mokṣa is precisely the absolute union between reality and ideality. However, rather than 
negation or completion (in a unity), Daya Krishna emphasizes the reciprocity of this ideality 
                                                 
time, it also makes us aware of fundamental human possibilities of existence and still invites us to philosophical 
reflection.” Wilhelm Halbfass, “Menschsein Und Lebensziele. Beobachtungen Zu Den Puruṣārthas,” in 
Hermeneutics of Encounter: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, 
ed. Francis X. D’Sa and Mesquita Roque, Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 20 (Vienna: Gerold & 
Co - Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 134–35.  
673 This does not deny any modification throughout the history of Indian philosophy, to which also Daya Krishna 
refers Daya Krishna, “The Myth of the Puruṣārthas,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 4, no. 
1 (Autumn 1986). It rather underlines the wide acceptance and relevance that they occasioned. It therefore 
questions “whether, if the Indian tradition is to be believed, they comprehend meaningfully all the goals that men 
pursue or ought to pursue in their lives.” Daya Krishna, 1. 
674 Daya Krishna’s views on mokṣa in particular and on the spirituality of Indian philosophy in general have been 
responded to from different perspectives in various reviews of Indian Philosophy. A Counter Perspective and 
articles challenging his interpretation of the traditions. I do not focus here on the impact of his reinterpretation of 
classical Indian philosophy and of mokṣa in particular. Instead, I connect his criticisms of the theory of puruṣārtha 
to his larger analysis of values, which emphasizes a creative development of any valuational structure. I understand 
his critique of the Indian traditions from the wider perspective of a need to dialogically engage any tradition. For 
more particular critique, see R. Balasubramanian, “Daya Krishna’s Retrospective Illusion,” Journal of Indian 
Council of Philosophical Research 14, no. 1 (December 1996): 137–56; Karl Potter, “Indian Philosophy’s Alleged 
Religious Orientation,” Philosophic Exchange 3, no. 1 (1972); Potter, “Are All Indian Philosophers Indian 
Philosophers?” as well as N. S. Dravid, ‘Spiritual Orientation of Philosophy’, J. N. Mohanty, ‘Some Thoughts on 
Daya Krishna’s ‘Three Myths’’, and Harsh Narain, ‘Daya Krishna on Indian Philosophy’ in Chandel and Sharma, 
The Philosophy of Daya Krishna. For reviews: Eliot Deutsch, “Indian Philosophy: A Counter-Perspective by Daya 
Krishna,” Philosophy East and West 42, no. 4 (October 1992): 665–68; Mrinal Miri, “Daya Krishna, Indian 
Philosophy: A Counter Perspective, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, Pp. 217.,” Journal of Indian 
Council of Philosophical Research 11, no. 2 (n.d.): 145–50; Arvind Sharma, “Competing Perspectives on Indian 
Philosophy, Indian Philosophy – A Counter Perspective by Daya Krishna,” Philosophy East and West 49, no. 2 
(April 1999): 194–206. 
675 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006, 7. 
676 See Daya Krishna’s invitation to actively engage in ‘today’s world’: “To end, I think that as a civilization, we 
are suffering from nostalgia. We are thinking of the past, of the Golden Age of India, when the ṛṣis walked around 
and meditated, when the Ātman was sought and the Ātman-Brahman identity was taught, when the bhaktas were 
singing their songs and engaged in kīrtan, when people were talking of sāmarasya between Śiva and Śakti. We 
live in a private world; we live in a nostalgic world. We live in a world that is very strange. When I talk to people, 
they seem to be unaware of what is going on. They know something of what economics is doing, they know 
something of what politics is doing, but they do not believe in the reality of politics and economics. For them, 
these realms are unreal or belong merely to the vyavahāric realm. Imagine! With this one word, vyavahāra, one 
may reject everything. But after all, the vyavahāra matters!” Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 114–15. See also Daniel 
Raveh’s section ‘”Twisted and perverted to suit narrow sectarian caste-interests of a society”’ in Daniel Raveh, 
“Daya Krishna on Social Philosophy [Forthcoming],” in Social Theorizing in Contemporary India: Critique, 
Creativity and Transformations (New York: Springer, 2019).  
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with the common reality: reality is not simply opposed to ideality, and facts and actions opposed 
to values, but what we consider as values is affected by this tension, as well as what we realize. 
In that sense, values are real and unreal, for once they become real, they stop being values and 
become ‘acts’ that never correspond to the expectations that were set in their ideal conception:  
“The postulation of the reality of values arises from the enterprise of human action, which 
seeks at a self-conscious reflective level ideals which perpetually question that which is 
present. The dilemma which the postulation faces is the simultaneous ascription of reality and 
unreality to the value which exercises such a continuing formative influence on action and yet 
exercises this just because it is not actual. The question whether a value when actualized is 
actual is equally difficult to answer either way. In an obvious sense, if it is really actualized, it 
should be called ‘actual’ - for, what else could the term ‘actualization’ mean? Still, it is equally 
clear that what actually exists is the things or the events or the states of affairs and not the value 
in any residual sense of the term. Also, nothing seems to be added to the valueness of the value 
by the fact that it exists also - whatever may be meant by the term ‘exists’ when applied to 
value.”677 
Rather than postulating a dichotomy between values and reality, one should conceive values as 
a bridge between what is and what ought to be, since they are the direction and orientation 
between reality and ideality. In Sanskrit terms, it could be related to the difference between 
siddha (what  is  already  there  – something  already  accomplished)  and  sadhya (what has to 
be realized – something to be caused in the future).678 Thus, while mokṣa seems to ‘resolve’ the 
problem in uniting reality and ideality, Daya Krishna is, once again, not ready to ‘solve’ the 
issue, but rather to question the presupposition that this ‘solution’ entails, and in particular, to 
explore this tension as an opportunity for engaging again in the debates offered by the traditions 
and further in the political consequences that remain unquestioned by the positions within this 
debate.  
While mokṣa could be ‘one’ possible value, the sense of absoluteness in the prevalence given 
to liberation remains highly problematic insofar as it denies the worldly dimension of human’s 
life. Thus, Daya Krishna criticizes the hidden consequences of such a solution, in particular the 
above quoted denial of the worldly others in this ‘ideal reality’. In the division between artha, 
kāma, dharma and mokṣa, the first two are embedded into a social context. In Daya Krishna’s 
definition,  
“desire or kāma may thus be taken as the generalized term for all that man may aim for, except 
the desire to get rid of all desires, or rather, of the act of desiring itself. But artha, then, may 
be thought of as all that which in a generalized way is the means of satisfying kāma, that is, 
whatever man may desire.”679  
The other pair, namely dharma (virtue) and mokṣa (self-perfection) were extensively 
commented on and analyzed throughout Indian philosophy.  In general, the former literally 
                                                 
677 Daya Krishna, “Value and Reality,” 180. 
678 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 254–55. 
679 Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and 
Polity, 55. See also Rajendra Prasad’s criticism of Daya Krishna specific interpretation of artha and kāma in 
Prasad, “Daya Krishna’s Therapy for Myths of Indian Philosophy,” 367. 
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means “what holds together”680 and composes the basis of the social and moral order, while the 
latter is, as already seen, rather preoccupied with self-realization and self-perfection. While the 
interpretation of how the other is exactly integrated into the dharmic order remains open for 
discussion681, the presence of the other within dharma is not discussed: “Dharma, even in the 
most minimal sense, involves some awareness of the ‘other’ and his or her claims on oneself. 
This invariably not only takes one away from oneself, but also disturbs the equanimity and 
equipoise of one’s being, even to the little extent that one may have it.”682 Thus, the prevalence 
of mokṣa over the three further values lessens in particular the significance of others, notably 
duties towards others entailed in dharma.683  Notwithstanding the complex and variegated 
internal developments of these concepts, they overall delineate a classification of particular 
contents elevated into a commonly accepted general division of values. Thus, what he 
denounces is not the selection of these particular values as ‘values’, that is, what they singularly 
mean, nor even the delimitation entailed in the division, but the prevalence and the hierarchy 
of such an organization of value-contents. In other words, he sees a confusion between value-
structure and value-contents, i.e. to consider first puruṣārtha to be composed of the exclusive 
addition of artha, kāma, dharma and mokṣa, and secondly within this combination, to 
commonly restrict mokṣa as the ‘highest’ of all. This exhorts Daya Krishna to carefully examine 
the hierarchy (and the powers) at stake in the organization of values provided in the classical 
systems of Indian philosophies in the consequence that they imply for thinking the social reality 
today - that is, how relevant they can still be.684 
                                                 
680 Hiriyanna, Indian Conception of Values, 153. 
681 Although dharma (virtue, duty) is supposed to imply the moral perspective and with it, the normative aspect of 
conducting action towards others, Daya Krishna offers however a critical insight regarding its conception. He 
points at the paradoxical self-construction underlying the assumed other-directed normativity. Dharma means in 
his interpretation less an other-centric concept than a conscious-ness-centric concept focusing on the effects of 
one’s actions, rather than on the actions of the other, or on the way of acting towards the other. “Thus, instead of 
being concerned with the ‘consciousness’ and ‘self-consciousness’ of others and how one’s actions affect them, 
one begins to be concerned with the effects that actions have on one’s own consciousness.” Daya Krishna, The 
Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and Polity, 27–28.Daya 
Krishna grounds his argument on the Gītā in this text following the above quote (op. cit.,, p.28): “The Gītā is the 
classic example of this. The discussion of action contained in the Gītā seems to suggest that the consequences of 
one’s actions on others are irrelevant if they do not adversely affect one’s own state of consciousness. And, if per 
chance one has achieved a state of consciousness either through God’s grace or personal sādhanā or past karmas 
or all of these together, it does not matter what one does or how it affects others.  See also on this topic Daya 
Krishna, “The Myth of the Puruṣārthas,” 7–8; Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of 
Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and Polity, 58–61.  
682 Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and 
Polity, 59. 
683 I have analyzed this idea more precisely in Coquereau, “Seeking Values in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy.” 
684 Daya Krishna’s ‘Shimla lectures’ are the most eloquent for formulating this concern: “Let me conclude with 
the following observation: we think that the so-called sakshatkara or anubhava, or the realization of the saints, the 
self-realized souls, is the ultimate thing about consciousness. I would like to suggest that this is a result of our 
conditioning. We were born in this civilization, so this is our belief. However, it is not true! The self-realizations 
of the past, in different civilizations - after all, mysticism is not confined to India alone - are not completely 
irrelevant, but they’ve totally lost their monopoly. The past should not hold one. One should learn from the past, 
get inspiration from the past; the past should be used, valued and respected, not rejected like in the West [a theme 
developed in the next chapter], but let one not be identified with the past. Let one not say that everything that has 
to be achieved in the field of consciousness has already been achieved. The future is open!” Daya Krishna, 
Civilizations, 88–89. 
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The fixity of these value-contents elevated as universal and timeless values raises two 
interconnected problems of relevance for dialogue, which I want to elucidate now. The first 
consists in the immutable ‘authority’ of their establishment that hinders the possibility of critical 
discussions. The second concerns the political organization that results from the authority of a 
single value-structure.685 In view of my previous discussion on the foundation of positions, a 
dialogue is defined as an investigation into the unquestioned presuppositions of knowledge with 
the task of witnessing their origins and exposing alternatives. In this context, while ‘tradition’ 
is seen as a resource and the ‘traditional’ concepts and viewpoints considered as necessary and 
actively being part of the dialogue, they cannot do so ‘authoritatively’, in which case no 
discussion would even be possible. It then becomes a simple transmission (which does not mean 
that transmission has no part in dialogue, but in Daya Krishna’s view, it operates via a critical 
engagement). For values, this difference is of greater importance, because the closeness of 
tradition raises the problem of the adequacy of values that are inherited from a particular 
tradition and further applied to different contexts in different times. This asynchronous state 
between historical conception and actual realization of values results in the problem of how to 
ground values on historically fixed theories, in particular if theories and practices are 
reciprocally influencing each other.686 
                                                 
685 Daya Krishna sees the combination of both these problems in the mokṣa-debate, if mokṣa is essentially related 
to the definition of ‘Indian philosophy’ (in general) since posing such a relation a priori impedes any debate on 
whether mokṣa can be equated with the goal of Indian philosophy in general or not. This, a posteriori, is a reason 
of exclusion of Indian philosophy outside India where philosophy is defined differently, in particular without such 
a goal: “The first and foremost question that has engaged all those who have been seriously concerned with the 
so-called ‘philosophical’ tradition in India relates to the issue as to how it can be regarded as ‘philosophy’ proper 
when it is supposed to be primarily concerned with mokṣa, i.e., liberation from the very possibility of suffering, 
which is a practical end par excellence and has hardly anything theoretical about it. To this is added the 
consideration as to how any cognitive tradition can be regarded as genuinely philosophical that accepts the 
authority of revelation or of some super human authority that is supposed to have an over-riding authority over 
both reason and experience. In fact, the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies officially underwrites the necessary 
relationship of Indian philosophy with mokṣa, and maintains that the former cannot be understood without the 
latter. It is then no wonder that Indian philosophy is not taught in the departments of philosophy of most Western 
universities, for neither the students nor the teachers in these departments are presumably seeking mokṣa. The 
relegation of Indian philosophy to departments of Indology and its effective segregation from all active 
philosophical concerns of the day speaks for itself. The other side of the same coin is attested to by the so-called 
revival of interest in Indian philosophy on Western campuses in the wake of interest in such subjects as 
Transcendental Meditation, Yoga, etc.” Daya Krishna, “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to 
Be,” 2011, 61. 
686 G. C. Pande considers that the “basic determinants of identity have to be sought in their systems of values and 
symbols”, which include religion and social ethics (primary value) and language, ritual and art as their symbolic 
systems. Interestingly, communication plays the major role in distinguishing and relating cultures thus defined, 
and he immediately continues arguing in favor of “creative continuation” of the tradition: “Cultural identity in this 
sense tends to be circumscribed by the barriers of communication. The Arabs, for example, had no difficulty in 
learning science from the Greeks and Hindus, but there was an obvious barrier as far as communication in the 
sphere of religion was concerned. It is easy to multiply such examples. The contact of India with the West since 
the nineteenth century is itself illustrative of the difference in communication between different levels of culture. 
In fact, the awareness of Indian culture in the modern sense arose from the encounter. Different approaches to the 
discovery and exposition of Indian culture arose naturally and the present crisis of cultural identity in India may 
itself be traced to the continued effort to distinguish the essential from the inessential in the cultural tradition so 
that it may be understood as a creative continuation with contemporary relevance rather than as a dead burden on 
its way to the scrap heap of time.” Pande, “Culture and Cultures,” 58. 
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For Daya Krishna, it is the challenging task of critical dialogue to ‘map’687 the values that are 
present at a particular time in a particular civilization and to expose their unquestioned 
‘legitimacy’ and ‘sovereignty’ which are, in fact grounded in ‘beliefs’ and presuppositions. This 
task of critical engagement is not restrictive to classical Indian systems, although Daya Krishna 
considers their authorless, beginningless revelatory character as an obstacle for dialogue. In the 
next section (6.2),  the ‘attitude’ that one adopts when regarding texts of a certain traditions as 
perfect and final is discussed in contradistinction to the attitude of ‘seeking’ knowledge from 
the point of view of individual participants in dialogue. From a structural perspective of values, 
critical discussions have a crucial role to actualize the classical texts into contemporary 
resources, which can be further used for grounding certain values into political institutions.  
Thus, critical discussions on values can be useful for political sciences and philosophy in 
general if we take as a starting point the dissatisfaction felt between the political realizations 
and the intellectual apprehensions which orientate the former. Questioning the discrepancy 
between concrete institutions and theories can lead to a critical investigation of the values 
themselves which direct the theories. As Daya Krishna notices, the political sciences and 
philosophy have rather been preoccupied with analyzing the foundations of sovereignty and the 
legitimacy of the law, rather than unveiling the immanent values to cultures. These values, 
however, actually ground the orientation for establishing particular forms of political regimes 
and are expressed in singular laws. Thus, political sciences have been rather concerned with 
legitimizing already existing institutions relying on a set of ‘given’ values rather than 
questioning how they at first emerged according to these immanent values, confirming them 
rather than questioning them. In doing so, however, we are exposed to defend ‘our’ values 
against others (of a different time or a different culture) rather than communicate the structural 
nexus that enables them at the first place. He thus writes on political analysis: 
“Political science was first preoccupied with the theoretical analysis of the concept of 
sovereignty, it was first devoted to describing the different forms through which intermediate 
this sovereignty can be or has been exercised. Since Aristotle, thinkers did not stop wondering 
about the foundation of the sovereignty and the law - if there are some - of the transition from 
one political form to another. But if the problem of power takes precedence over political 
thought, the one of the legitimate ratification of the exercise of this power was never far away. 
Whether this legitimate ratification was founded in a ‘divine right’, a ‘general will’ or a ‘social 
contract’, the question was always the one of the axiological foundation, of the justification of 
the plain fact of a coercive power. (…) However, the nature of values in politics has been so 
rarely specified that the comparison between different regimes, as well as the one between the 
different forms taken by a same regime at different times, has been hindered by the absence of 
a clear notion of the variables at stake, variables which would enable to express these 
variations. Of course, we can ask ourselves, if, from a practical point of view, this is really 
necessary: but it would be asking the question wrongly. Indeed, the question is not to arbitrarily 
pose some ‘set’ of values and to judge all societies according to them, but to draw the values 
                                                 
687 This expression refers to Daya Krishna’s second chapter, ‘Mapping the Field: Illusions, Temptations and 
Possibilities in the Enterprise of Understanding Civilizations’, of Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future 
Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 87–158. 
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that are already effectually present, immanent to the domain of political thought, of which it is 
important that researchers become aware.”688 
In this sense, the traditions present a resourceful ‘starting point’ to start ‘mapping’ the different 
values, but they cannot draw the legitimacy of the political instances in which they were located 
nor the authority that these political instances or the social forms that lived in these instances 
granted them from the values they propound. Rather, the idea of these values must be 
investigated to explain the existence of these political instances and their social forms. To avoid 
absolutizing any given legitimacy and authority, analogously as to avoid absolutizing one form 
of knowledge by those who have more power in the epistemological realm, a critical discussion 
must here also involve alternative viewpoints who do not belong to the legitimated and 
authoritative tradition.  
Thus, the necessity of critical discussions more generally matters in Daya Krishna’s context 
where the ideas of subjection and alienation to other imposed values operates to such an extent 
that the very idea of a traditional reception is disrupted. Which values and which hierarchy of 
values are legitimate, and which set of values generated in such postcolonial societies? The desi 
ones only? But what do they even signify in postcolonial societies689? The political strategy 
hiding between such delimitation and legitimacy-claims shows how such questions can easily 
degenerate into ‘using’ one’s Weltanschauung in order to legitimize one’s personal views by 
turning them into ‘value-contents’, contradicting the very meaning of values while giving them 
the appearances of the name. Given the far-reaching consequences of such strategies, it is 
nevertheless necessary to mention deviated uses of the idea of ‘values’. Roughly formulated, 
the tension is epistemologically the same in the case of values and of presuppositions (see 
chapter 5). Our apprehensions are determined by beliefs that we however involuntarily consider 
as certain and absolutely determined. In Daya Krishna’s words: 
“Social reality is the sort of reality where ‘beliefs’ in varying degrees are an integral part of the 
reality itself. They may constitute it wholly or partially, but there can hardly be any social 
reality in the making of which beliefs do not play any role at all. (…) Socio-cultural reality is 
                                                 
688 My translation. The text is issued from a French translation of Daya Krishna’s paper, the original version of 
which could not be located. French version: “La science politique s’est préoccupée au premier chef de l’analyse 
théorique du concept de souveraineté, elle s’est attachée à décrire les différentes formes par l’intermédiaire 
desquelles cette souveraineté peut être ou a été exercée. Depuis Aristote, les penseurs n’ont cessé de s’interroger 
sur le fondement de la souveraineté et sur la loi - s’il en existe - du passage d’une forme politique à une autre. Mais 
si le problème du pouvoir a tenu la première place dans la pensée politique, celui de la sanction légitime de 
l’exercice de ce pouvoir n’était jamais bien loin. Que celle-ci se fonde sur un « droit divin », une « volonté 
générale » ou un « contrat social », la question posée était toujours celle du fondement axiologique, de la 
justification du fait brut d’un pouvoir coercitif. (…) Toutefois, la nature des valeurs en politique a rarement été 
précisée, si bien que la comparaison entre les différents régimes, de même que celle entre les différentes formes 
prises par un même régime à différentes époques, ont toujours été entravées par l’absence d’une notion claire des 
variables en jeu, variables qui permettraient d’exprimer ces variations. Certes, on peut se demander si, du point de 
vue pratique, cela est bien nécessaire ; mais ce serait mal poser la question. En effet, il ne s’agit pas de poser 
arbitrairement quelque ensemble de valeurs et de juger toutes les sociétés en fonction de celui-ci, mais de dégager 
les valeurs déjà effectivement présentes, immanentes au domaine de la pensée politique, et dont il importe que des 
chercheurs prennent conscience.ˮ Daya Krishna, “Des Coefficients Politiques,” Contract Social 2, no. 5 
(September 1958): 299. 
689 See 2.2.1.1 on the emergence of the idea of specific Indian values as a postcolonial reaction, and the already 
quoted interpretation of it by Bhushan and Garfield, Minds without Fear, 37. 
 
244 
 
equally the result of what men believed and the action they undertook consequent upon those 
beliefs. […] The radical difference between truth and falsehood is replaced [at the social 
domain] by the dynamic difference between what is believed to be true and what is not so 
believed.”690 
In so doing, our beliefs constitute the ground for our ways of evaluating other assumptions 
according to which the latter can be seen as ‘true’ or ‘wrong’, or ‘higher’ or ‘lower’, i.e. ‘ought 
to be pursued’ or not. However, the close connection of values with reality makes the passage 
from the former to the latter possibly affected by political ideological manipulations. In other 
words, our apprehensions, when they are turned into actuality, tend to also concretize our 
particular beliefs into normative rules which are supposed to be ‘valid for all’. Thus, neglecting 
the epistemological presuppositions of values entails much empirical consequences, which can 
have a substantial effect in the political realm or in the realm of discourse. This explains Daya 
Krishna’s plea against the fixity of the four puruṣārthas. The acceptance and hierarchy of the 
values under this name do not historically simply testify of an axiological philosophico-
religious debate but are also motivated by political issues, in particular regarding the exclusion 
of those who neither ‘belong’ to the realm of spiritual liberation nor to the one of the dharmic 
and social order, for instance the śūdra (so-called lower caste) or women.691At a different level, 
this problem also explains why Daya Krishna insisted on including the diversity of participants 
above described, trained in different education systems, so as to prevent the normative rules of 
discourse to remain prevalently those of western-trained Indian scholars who have the 
monopoly of the Indian academia today, as described in 2.1.2, 2.2 and 3.692 Both levels do not 
                                                 
690 Quoted in Raveh, “Daya Krishna on Social Philosophy [Forthcoming].”, section ‘Interpreter of Maladies’. 
Originally from Daya Krishna, ‘Philosophical Theory and Social reality’, in Philosophical Theory and Social 
Reality, Ed. Ravinder Kumar, Asia Book Corp of Amer, 1984. 
691 Daya Krishna notices the interweaving of the different puruṣārthas with socio-political realms, in particular 
regarding the conflict between dharma and mokṣa. He sees the conflict between values as representing a socio-
political conflict, the consequences of which however still in return characterize the concept of values. In the 
wrong assimilation of the two, he notes the exclusion of labour (śūdra): “The conflicting relations between 
knowledge, power and wealth have not been explored in their psychological, social, political and institutional 
aspects to the extent needed.  Still, it is strange that the sheer dependence on the labour of a vast number of others 
has never evoked the ambivalence or the type of feelings that the relation-ship amongst those who wield power or 
possess knowledge or wealth usually evokes. The śūdra has been out of the picture, even though on him or rather 
his function everyone depends more basically.  This absence of the feeling of dependence in a situation where 
dependence is so obviously pre-sent may perhaps be attributed to the fact that one takes it for granted as a part of 
life. It is analogous to one’s dependence on the body on which one becomes aware during sickness, and that too 
only for a short while till one gets accustomed to the constraints and limitations imposed by the illness. The body 
is itself seen as a bondage in the context of certain perspectives of ‘freedom’ which are well known in the Indian 
tradition, and one who seeks freedom does try to minimize the needs of the body which make him de-pendent on 
others. The valuational hierarchy of those times has come down to us and all attempt by thinkers, reformers and 
revolutionaries to put labour at the centre of things or even bring it on par with other values in soci-ety have not 
been successful.” Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about 
Man, Society, and Polity, 68–69.See further details in Coquereau, “Seeking Values in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy,” 
132–34. 
692 “This is the community of pandits or Śāstris. But they were never counted as philosophers. The role which 
western-trained Indian philosophers in their scheme of things had assigned to them was that of repositories of the 
knowledge of traditional thought.” Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical 
Traditions, xx–xxi. Rege, in the Preface of the Pune experiment, presents the point of view of the paṇḍits, namely 
their exclusion from the realm of philosophy. Beginning the first session of the Bhakti dialogue, Daya Krishna 
presents the other side of the same exclusion, namely the alienation felt by the western-trained philosophers: “The 
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exclude each other, although their combination adds further problems, which Daya Krishna did 
not seem to be able to resolve in practice. Indeed, the paṇḍits included in the dialogues 
constitute the minority excluded from the larger postcolonial academic discourse, but they also 
form the intellectual majority of the Brahmanical tradition of which the śūdra is the minority693. 
Nevertheless, Daya Krishna was not unaware of this problem, due to which he also emphasized 
the necessity to re-read the texts from the Brahmanical traditions critically, and publicly 
denunciated the exclusions operated within.694 
 ‘Ideology’695 is the political expression of a confusion between value-apprehension and value-
realization, as the projected political ideal whose reality becomes dubious once ‘en-acted’ in 
                                                 
first thing I would like to talk about is the background of this dialogue. This is a dialogue between the traditions 
of India and our modern intellectual life. We have to understand this difference because unless we understand it, 
we will not be able to see the contemporary situation as it now prevails in this country. All of us who have been 
trained and educated in institutions of formal learning in this country have developed a whole western-centered 
way of looking at the world. (…) To realize that this has been deeply implanted in us through a foreign system of 
education imposed in this country for historical reasons, is to become aware that what we take for granted can be 
questioned. Similarly, to realize that India has a rich traditions of knowledge in various fields, rich intellectual 
traditions, traditions rooted in evidence and argument and reasoning, and traditions differentiated with respect to 
different fields of knowledge, and that these traditions have had at least more than two millenia of historical 
continuity and development, is to become aware that somehow we have ourselves been cut off from our own 
intellectual past. How this has happened is a matter of history. But how to overcome it after one has become aware 
of it is the challenge before all of us.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 1–
2. This challenge grounds the initiative of the Bhakti experiment and the larger framework of the saṃvāda, 
pleading for the need of integrating different worldviews to realize what we intellectually take for granted. Finally, 
in another dialogue, Daya Krishna begins on the gap between the number of talks on ‘indigenization’ or for that 
matter on decolonization and the much lesser number of actual practices of it. This denunciation justifies again the 
saṃvāda experiment, as an attempt at ‘doing’ contemporary, postcolonial and cross-cultural philosophy rather 
than lamenting the historical facts that led to such an intellectual situation. See the details on the Jaipur experiments 
in 3.1, and Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, ix. 
693 Daya Krishna vividly expressed his incomprehension of the exclusion of women and śūdra from the Vedic 
sacrifice during his Shimla lecture. He acutely does not formulate it as the expression of his political views, but 
rather questions the consistency of the idea in order to criticize its political realizations: “The common consent 
regarding the Vedic tradition is that its central concern is located in the yajña, the Vedic sacrifice. Let me state 
here that I do not agree with it, but well, it is the common consent. If the Vedic tradition is indeed centred in the 
yajña, how can we claim to uphold universal values? And we do claim to universality; without it, we cannot be a 
civilization. And this civilization raises the following question: are the śūdra and women entitled to yajña or not? 
What a question! Anybody who can even raise such a question has ceased to be a human being. I am more than 
serious. If one excludes women, one has excluded half of humanity. Then how is it possible to speak of 
universality? And if a large class - and the śūdra form the largest class in the society - is excluded, one has excluded 
the majority. If this is the case, let me ask here: where is the so-called Vedic consciousness? Why do we suppress 
this from our minds? We have to reflect on it. If this is not the original sin, it is the original guilt of Hinduism or 
the Indian civilization.” Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 98. 
694 Daniel Raveh reminds us of one of Daya Krishna’s ‘awakening provocation’, conceived as an invitation for 
critically investigating the values endorsed by one’s traditions: “In a Q&A session following one of DK’s lectures 
in Shimla, which focused as the whole series did on a ‘new philosophy’ for a ‘new world’, one of the listeners, a 
‘classical pandit’, was trying to protect the familiar and the known, quoting at length from the Mahābhārata and 
drawing extensively on Bhīṣma. ‘Why don’t we forget about Mr Bhīṣma,’ DK told him, ‘and concentrate on 
contemporary physics, technology, cloning, internet etc.?’ His response and especially the phrase ‘Mr Bhīṣma’ 
shocked quite a few listeners. DK (…) was not ‘anti-traditional’ as some of his listeners might have thought. 
Instead, he wanted to awaken his listeners and readers, in Shimla and elsewhere, from their ‘dogmatic slumber’ 
and make them think anew. ‘Mr Bhīṣma’was a speech act intended to free his listeners from the bonds of the past.” 
Daniel Raveh, “Introduction,” in Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia, by Daya Krishna (Shimla : Los Angeles: 
Indian Institute of Advanced Study ; SAGE, 2012), xviii–xix. 
695 Alienation could be located on the other end of the same scale as indicating the forced assimilations to values 
which are not felt to be one’s own. Quite differently from Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya and philosophers from 
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the world. An ideology is discovered to be ideological once it is actualized in a particular 
political context. Then it finds its limitation, its inadequacy, or even its contradiction with the 
contemplated ideal. This difficulty is described as the “dialectical relationship between a value 
apprehension and a value realization.”696 The very nature of value-realization seems to lie in 
the dissatisfaction that we feel once we actualize values. In Daya Krishna’s words: 
“The dissatisfaction with any actualized value does not usually emanate from the fact that we 
have encountered or apprehended a value which we regard or consider as more truly or really 
a value than the one we actualized, more or less successfully, earlier. Rather, it is the felt 
dissatisfaction that makes us doubt the reality of the value we had actualized and, however 
much of a fact it may be, we wish to get rid of it, the sooner the better. In a sense, the falsity 
or inadequacy of a value is revealed or apprehended only when it begins to be actualized. That 
is one reason why so many of the ideals of man which seem so alluringly attractive when 
abstractly conceived turn into nightmares or, in other cases, just boring actualities when 
concretely realized. The concept of real value or of a value that is really such is, thus, not the 
result of a direct apprehension, but merely the shadowy counterpart of the real dissatisfaction 
which we have with values as they are actualized. It is the dissatisfaction which makes us aware 
that the value which we had thought to be real and genuine is not really so. The criterion of 
the reality of a value, thus, is not its conformity with some real values in an ideal sphere or 
even its coherence with other values in any meaningful valuational sense of the term, but rather 
the deep, inner fulfilment which its realization gives to the actual living human person.”697  
Ideologies express the ‘reality’ of values in the sense that they have been realized. However, in 
their realization arises their discordance with the ideality that we apprehended before. In 
contrast, the criterion for the reality of a value in its ideal apprehension is not its capacity to be 
realized but the deep fulfillment that it provides in the actual life. This means, in other words, 
how meaningful values became or remained once they were actualized, or on the contrary, how 
deceptive they turned out to be. Seen in the light of the political implications explained above, 
such a conception of the reality of values implies that the institutions and norms cannot be 
justified by their efficiency (how easily or how powerfully realized they are), but rather by how 
meaningfully they are experienced. This entails that the inner fulfilment is not reserved to a 
majority that the institutions and norms validate, but that the realizations of values that 
legitimate their position can be questioned by those who feel them to be dissatisfying. Critical 
                                                 
the colonial period, Daya Krishna does not limit ‘alienation’ to a negative term. Or more exactly: as for 
dissatisfaction, which connotes a negative evaluation, he sees a creative potential through the negativity. He thus 
starts by defining alienation is the same nonconformity of the ‘is’ vis-à-vis the ‘ought’: “The term “alienation” 
also has a negative overtone which cannot be ignored. It suggests that what is ought not to be, or at least is felt as 
what should not be. If “alienation” defines the structure of the human situation, then this means that at its very 
heart is the feeling that the situation ought not to be as it is. In other words, human reality is such that it is 
intrinsically realized or felt to be that which ought not ot be.”Daya Krishna, “Alienation, Positive and Negative,” 
Diogenes 18, no. 72 (1970): 42. Nevertheless, or more exactly, due to this realization that the ‘is’ is not conform 
to the ‘ought’, there is a potential tension which can enhance further creativity in the dissatisfaction, which makes 
Daya Krishna also attribute a positive definition to alienation: “But even those who are perhaps not so blind do 
not quite see that civilization itself is a creative response to alienation, and that the differences between civilizations 
derive from the diversity in the type of creative response made to the same alienation, or from the fact that the 
alienation which has been creatively met is itself different in character.” Daya Krishna, 43. Seen in the larger 
context of postcolonial Anglophone Indian philosophy, it leaves room to articulate the creativity of the hybrid and 
cosmopolitan generations of philosophers ‘reacting’ to the British colonization or ‘cultural subjection’ (developed 
in 2.2.1.1) as this form of ‘positive alienation’.  
696 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 19. 
697 Daya Krishna, “Value and Reality,” 182. 
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discussion thus enables to challenge the deceptive realizations of values and the privileges of 
the majority thqt is in a position to realize them.  
Bringing awareness to the privileges and to one being privileged to acknowledge and take the 
‘risk’ of engaging in dialogue, revising her/his position, exploring her/his presuppositions, and 
possibly, recognizing their privileges, is no easy task. It is up to the participants to take upon 
themselves the duty of de-identification and detachment, of listening and accepting alternatives: 
thus, the epistemological dimension studied in the previous chapter is motivated by a 
valuational attitude to dialoguing. Since we have seen that the valuational is fused with ideality, 
this program admittedly entails an ‘ideal’ view. However, since the ideal is also a vector that 
pushes forward the imperfect realization, a commitment to the ideal is a requirement for the 
actual life.  
Daya Krishna expresses the difficulty of bringing participants into a dialogue if these 
participants are favored by a context that provides them with a legitimacy and an authority 
which are not questioned. In his critique of authority, he gives the example of what the qualifies 
as the postmodern attitude of “destroying everything” which acts against philosophy itself. This 
constitutes furthermore the gesture of privileged philosophers who, in a way, seem to be able 
to ‘afford’ such a destruction:698 
“Richard Rorty is one of the most gentle, urbane, ironic, and complacent examples of such an 
attitude [of "taking a holiday from rationality itself"], not even seeking to engage in any real 
dispute, for to do so would be to accept the conditions of a rational debate and discussion which 
to him seem unacceptable in principle. He prefers to engage in 'conversation', mostly with 
himself, for 'to converse' with 'others' would be to 'listen' to them and be prepared to change 
his personal opinion, not because of the rhetorical power of the other, but because of the 
counter-argument made or the counter-evidence provided. He therefore bids good-bye to 
philosophy and opts for literature, and that too in its ironic mode. Rorty thinks that this is the 
best of all possible worlds, and it is easy for him to subscribe to this belief as he happens to be 
an American philosopher. He is thus able to see the world from the vantage point of the global 
dominance that such a position confers not only in terms of power and wealth, but also in those 
of knowledge and culture, which lend an aura of self-evident unquestionableness to such a 
view of looking at things.” 699 
The problem is endemic beyond this singular example and could be extended to different social 
classes of the same society or different cultures in the power-relation between them. What could 
anyone’s motivation be to enter in a dialogue, if s/he is resting on her/his privileged position in 
her/his society or the world, to engage on critical discussions on the ‘values’ that reflect or 
legitimate the very society which grants her/him/ her/his privileges? One answer would be the 
awareness itself that s/he is privileged, combined with a sense of rightness to admit that his/her 
                                                 
698 “Postmodernism has destroyed everything. These people have destroyed everything. They have destroyed their 
own house, their own foundations; now they are looking around, complaining at the debris that surrounds them. It 
is the strangest situation, where man has self-consciously and gradually committed suicide, and then he asks, ‘What 
is happening to me?’”Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 80. On Daya Krishna’s “postmodern philosophical battle”, see 
Miller, “Reading Derrida with Daya Krishna: Postmodern Trends in Contemporary Indian Philosophy”; Raveh, 
“Knowledge as a Way of Living,” 432., and the preface by Raveh of Daya Krishna, Civilizations. 
699 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 227. 
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position hinders other potential participants of the same society to the right to speak. Daya 
Krishna asserts this duty to the intellectual who  
 “are supposed to be the conscience keepers of the world and vigilant critics of those who are 
in power. (…) The ‘brahmanical’ function of the intellectual class vis-à-vis those who exercise 
the ruling function in any society or polity is one of the crucial factors in restraining those who 
rule from departing too much from the path of ‘dharma’ or righteousness. To be an intellectual 
means just this: that one is not completely governed by considerations of wealth and power, 
hence not afraid of displeasing those who may withhold patronage because of their 
overwhelming power. (…) If freedom has any intellectual content, then the acts of the mighty 
and the powerful have to be scrutinized on the bar of rightness which itself, of course, is not 
easy to determine.”700 
Regardless of the difficulty and resistance of the realizations, the a priori conceptual 
requirement remains to maintain the possibility of change: of change of the values’ contents, 
order and structure, and to contemplate the gap between realization and apprehension.  Daya 
Krishna did not consider Max Scheler’s Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of 
Values701. Scheler, however, shares with him a critique of the formalism of values contained in 
the Kantian imperative and in general, in the abstractness of the ‘ought’. As a reaction, like 
Daya Krishna, Scheler also lays importance to considering values in the differences of social, 
cultural and historical contexts, taking in consideration on the other hand the risk of a total 
relativism that would remove any meaning from values. While both are careful as to avoid the 
binary division between universalism/relativism - which is a necessary condition for dialoguing 
on values, for there can be no discussion if values are entirely dependent on each speaker’s 
definition, as well as if the speakers consider their own values indisputably valid for all -, their 
account nevertheless differs enough to raise further problems for dialoguing on values.  
An important distinction between the two raises limits of the reflectivity entailed in dialoguing 
based on argumentations and counter-argumentations. For Scheler, although values are 
structurally organized around a personal experience relative to communities, cultures and 
                                                 
700 Quoted in Daniel Raveh’s ‘Daya Krishna and Social Philosophy’ (section ‘The Conscience Keepers and Other-
centricity’) with his further comment: “DK used to write regularly not just hardcore philosophical papers for 
hardcore philosophical journals, but also articles for venues that appeal to a broader readership, such as Quest (we 
have seen above) and the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW). The activist in him refused to be confined to the 
academic Ivory Tower.” Raveh, “Daya Krishna on Social Philosophy [Forthcoming].” 
701 He does mention Scheler’s Nature of Sympathy, without however developing further in ‘Substance’ Daya 
Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 105. 
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histories (which he names ‘ethos’702), the order703 of these values lies in their essence, not in 
their conception by a seeker. In that sense, the hierarchy of these values is invariable704 and 
independent of any preference.705 In so doing, he implies that we feel values as higher or 
lower 706  intuitively, i.e. without cognitive mediation, outside any reflective judgment or 
deliberation. 
Taking the words relative and absolute in this sense [i.e. values are relative to the types and 
functions that belongs to the experience of these values, so that the  value of the agreeable does 
not exist for non-sensitive being; on the contrary, absolute values are those that exist in ‘pure’ 
feeling, independently of the nature of sensibility, such as moral values], I assert it to be an 
essential interconnection that values given in immediate intuition ‘as higher’ are values that 
are given as nearer to absolute values in feeling and preferring (and not by way of 
deliberation). Entirely outside the sphere of ‘judgment’ or ‘deliberation’ there is an immediate 
feeling of the ‘relativity’ of a value. And for this feeling the variability of a relative value in 
comparison with the concomitant constancy of a less ‘relative’ value […] is a confirmation, 
but not a proof. (…) Such a value is also quite independent of an estimative deliberation about 
the permanence of such beauty or truth with regard to the ‘experiences of life,’ which tend 
more to detract us from true absolute values than to bring us nearer to them. (…) Implicit in 
the very kind of the given value experience there is a guarantee (and not a ‘conclusion’) that 
there is here an absolute value. This evidence of an absolute value stems neither from an 
estimative deliberation about the permanence it may have in practical life nor from the 
universality of a judgment which holds that ‘this value is absolute in all moments of our 
lives’.”707 
                                                 
702 Defined as “the experiential structure of values and their immanent rules of preferring, which lie behind both 
the morality and the ethics of a people (primarily those of larger racial groups)”. Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics 
and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, 5th rev. ed., 
Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1973), 302. “The ethos lives in the structure of this historical life-reality itself and is therefore not an 
adaptation to this reality. It serves as the basis of this reality and has also guided the construction of the non-
arbitrary form of its structure. (…) Nevertheless, this most radical relativity of moral values-estimations gives us 
no reason to assume a relativism of moral values themselves and their order of ranks. One can only say that a 
complete and adequate experience of the cosmos of values and its order of ranks, and, with this, the representation 
of the moral sense of the world, is essentially connected with the co-operation of the different forms of ethos which 
unfold historically according to its laws. It is precisely a correctly understood absolute ethics that strictly requires 
these differences - this value-perspectivism of values among peoples and their times and this openness in the 
formative stages of the ethos.” Scheler, 303–4. 
703 Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, 86. 
704 While the values are in essentia invariable, Scheler acknowledges different sorts of variations: “variations in 
feeling (i.e., “cognizing”) the values and the structure of preferring values (ethos); the judgment in assessing values 
and their ranks in actions (ethics); the types of unity of institutions, i.e. in Daya Krishna’s terms, the realization of 
values in a given society according to the normative interpretation of values by specific institutions; practical 
morality, i.e. the realization of values by comportment of particular individualities; mores and customs, i.e. cultural 
variations in the realization of values. Scheler, 299–300. 
705 Scheler, 87. 
706 Scheler, 90. Concretely, this implies an order from the lowest ‘agreeable’ to the ‘vital’ to the ‘spiritual’ to the 
highest ‘holy’: “As we have stated, these modalities have their own a priori order of ranks that precedes their series 
of qualities. This order of value-ranks is valid for the goods of correlative values because it is valid for the values 
of goods. The order is this: the modality of vital values is higher than that of the agreeable and the disagreeable; 
the modality of spiritual values is higher than that of vital values; the modality of the holy is higher than that of 
spiritual values.” Scheler, 110. 
707 Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, 98–99. 
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Scheler’s insistence on the immediacy of feeling value independently of our second-order 
judgment, deliberation or conclusion from an argumentation, brings a valuable restriction of 
dialogue to the realm of values. We can indeed discuss ‘values’ as objects of reflection, but 
which consequences do these discussions have for values which are characterized by an 
immediacy and a feeling outside the realm of ‘logos’? Thus, what is the use of dialogue for 
feeling values, or even more for transforming them creatively, which is the purpose of Daya 
Krishna’s critique of the Indian classification? Can we be ‘convinced’ or even ‘persuaded’ of 
the ‘value’ of other values? What is the function of the mediation of language and 
communication for the immediate feeling of values? This is not totally distinct from our 
discussion of presupposition (see 5), insofar as, as we saw, the ‘beliefs’ contained in 
presuppositions also escape the epistemological outlook of the rational argumentations that 
contain them: because of this, dialogue is a tool to unveil them.  
Daya Krishna’s investigation of the traditional puruṣārthas operates in the same way, since 
what he aims to do is to unveil the political, sociological and philosophical presuppositions that 
underlie values appearing as ‘given’ and ‘invariable’. But can this have an effect on the way 
these values are felt by persons who would relate to such a classification? There is no guarantee 
of the effect of dialogues on participants, neither in the epistemological realm, nor in the 
valuational which is depending on the person and individual will. Nevertheless, the lack of 
guarantee, or in other terms, the fallibility of the process points also at the possibility of changes 
and transformations which lies in the very feeling of dissatisfaction at the core of our felt 
experience of values. While dissatisfaction remains for Scheler a negative term connected to 
feeling such as resentments708, for Daya Krishna it is precisely in these feelings that the potential 
creativity of consciousness for values is expressed: 
“The transformation of the given, or even its denial, seems to be the essence of consciousness, 
and as consciousness itself is ‘given’ to self-consciousness, its transformation or even denial 
seems to be the task set by self-consciousness to itself. (…) Consciousness is not a passive, 
reflexive, mirroring activity whose task is to know, but rather, something which apprehends 
something which is aesthetically or morally in need of improvement. The same obtains when 
consciousness itself becomes an ‘object’ to self-consciousness. Consciousness is found to be 
that which it should not be, or even ‘ought’ not to be, and hence the dissatisfaction it feels is 
                                                 
708 “But apart from the above kind of variation in the growth of the ethos, i.e., the variation in which a disclosure 
of the realm of objective values and their order occurs, there are also in history all those forms of value-deceptions 
and deceptions in preferring, as well as falsifications and overthrows which are founded on such deceptions and 
which pertain to earlier forms of ethical assessment and standards that had conformed to the objective ranks of 
values. I discovered one such deception in my study of ressentiment. Only a systematic study of these kinds of 
emotional deceptions will teach us to observe also those which lie in the history of the ethos and to distinguish 
falsifications of values from mere false ideas about their bearers, as well as from practical immorality. Principles 
of value-judgment in an age, in the sense of a dominant or acknowledged ‘ethics’ can rest on such deceptions; and 
they can be overtaken and judged accordingly by those whose ethos did not fall victim to such deceptions. It is 
important, therefore, to investigate not only the genealogy of deceptions but also the forms of their dispersion. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between attitudes toward values themselves and attitudes toward the 
contemporary historical reality, i.e., between attitudes toward the factual bearer of values and attitudes toward the 
world of goods. Let us consider the example of the relations between vital values and values of utility. Norms that 
come from vital values alone undoubtedly require in principle an aristocratic structure of society, i.e., a structure 
in which noble blood and character-values of heredity belonging to such noble blood possess political 
prerogatives.” Scheler, 306. 
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not in respect of objects that consciousness apprehends, or even in respect of the relationship 
between them, but with regard to consciousness itself and the way it reacts to the world it 
apprehends. (…) 
Values, norms and ideals implicit in the dissatisfactions that consciousness feels in respect of 
the world of objects themselves become objects of questioning when consciousness becomes 
an ‘object’ to self-consciousness. And, once values, norms and ideals get questioned, one does 
not know where the questioning will end. This provides a new dynamism to the story of man’s 
diverse enterprises as it is unending in principle.”709 
Dissatisfaction is not ‘simply’ a negative feeling belonging to the realm of values, which would 
be negatively related to ‘satisfaction’, itself probably included among ‘kāma’ as a desire. For 
Daya Krishna, it is rather constitutive for our relation to the world, as a creative possibility that 
pushes us forward, between realization and apprehension: a feeling of incompletion of the 
former and the ideality of the latter that is not resolved in a transcendental unity of reality and 
ideality, but in dialoguing on the potentialities of the latter vis-à-vis the actualizations of the 
former. In this va et vient between action (will), apprehension (knowledge) and the way we 
experience them lies the chance of engaging in dialogue to explore the gaps and unquestioned 
assumptions of these realms and their interrelations.  
 “The realm of values is disclosed to man by a perpetual dissatisfaction with things as they are, 
accompanied by the feeling that they can and ought to be different. These ‘things’ with respect 
to which continuous dissatisfaction is felt include one’s own self, other persons, and both 
natural and social states of affairs. The dissatisfaction provides the dynamics for change, 
exploration and experimentation.”710 
To me it sems that this deceptive dimension of values constitutes the core of Daya Krishna’s 
critical reinterpretation of the classical Sanskrit concept of puruṣārtha, and a critique of the lack 
of productive uses of the idea in Western theories (in particular Hartmann and Moore711). 
Furthermore, I consider dissatisfaction to be a potential central concept for analyzing the 
particularity of the ‘ideality’ entailed in dialogue. Indeed, philosophies of dialogue - at least it 
is my contention - often provide us with theories the application of which is hard to grasp. The 
exigent models they offer seem to contradict the realization they imply. The reason, I believe, 
lies in the ideality contained in the predicament they proffer, i.e. one hardly sees how it could 
be applicable in the world we live in, which is more often than not characterized by 
disagreements or even strong conflicts than harmonious relations. In contrary, I contemplate 
the advantage of Daya Krishna’s understanding of puruṣārtha as the ‘highest goal’ one seeks, 
which can be interpreted as the ideality necessary for orienting dialogue, however experienced 
in its deceptive dimension. Furthermore, it is precisely this deceptive dimension that enables 
the dynamism of dialogue, for dialogue then becomes a seeking the highest, the dissatisfaction 
                                                 
709 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 144–45. 
710 Daya Krishna, The Art of the Conceptual, 211. 
711 Daya Krishna’s acknowledged forerunner in this attempt at considering values within plurality of realms are N. 
Hartmann and Moore. However, the perspective of the philosophers seems to differ in the use of this “map of the 
realm of values” as Daya Krishna does not seek any ordering of these realms into first or second order values. See 
Daya Krishna, Nature of Philosophy., 124–27; Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental 
Illusions, 50; Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 105. 
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of which in the reality of a ‘it is not yet realized’ provides the ‘push’ to look further and try 
differently.  
The seeking that characterizes values is what ‘evaporates’ when we actually try to bring them 
to concretion. It operates in a sense like a mirage, as something that deceptively turns out to be 
different in reality than what it intellectually seemed to be. In a similar way as the disjunction 
and the negation in the realm of knowledge incite a minimal doubt that prevents the 
absoluteness of one’s position in favor of a pluralistic epistemology, the dissatisfaction negates 
the completeness of reality. In the realm of action and feeling it reveals the incompleteness of 
our actions with regards to our apprehension, and the mutual influences of the one on the other: 
the “valuational indeterminacy” is what “provides the dynamics for change, exploration and 
experimentation” (op. cit.) in defining an orientation for ‘seeking’ which is not existing and yet 
already in process as a further potentiality to be realized (however remaining unfulfilled).  
“The basic point is that the cycles of cultural creativity in a civilization are embedded in the 
biological cycle of generations. This, however, is only one dimension of the problem. The 
other relates to the fact that the concept, the image, or the value which demands to be explored 
is full of such unknown implications and possibilities that it may take even generations or 
millennia to exhaust what is contained in them. The innovation and creativity may thus consist 
in the exploration of the possibilities that have not yet been seen or apprehended in them. It 
may also consist in the creation of a new concept or image or value which then may interact 
with the old or even start a new cycle of its own in term of the unfolding of the possibilities 
inherent in them. Furthermore, as we usually do not have just a single concept or image or 
value, but rather a cluster of them, it is the interactional possibilities between them that may 
be explored by successive generations in a culture or civilization. Even here, the innovation 
may lie in what concept or image or value is treated as dominant or central in the cluster, and 
what are regarded as subsidiary or peripheral in nature.”712 
Daya Krishna attributes great significance to terms that are perceived as negative, such as 
presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions (as well as alienation). He does acknowledge the 
consequences of these terms (unquestioned, unrealized, deceptive, uncertain, fallible) but in so 
doing, he refused to limit them to their ‘negative’ attributes. Or in other words, he refuses to 
see their negativity as an impediment, but rather as a creative possibility. He thus rather enjoys 
thinking the uncertainty entailed in these concepts viewed as ‘chances’ and ‘potentialities’. He 
was not aiming at an ideal, formal and systematic theory of dialogue and of philosophy in 
general (see also 7.3). He rather saw more opportunities in the imaginative force to think 
further, to turn the felt dissatisfactions into an occasion of critical analysising the origins of 
these dissatisfactions, and to engage in difficult and dissatisfying dialogues with very different 
traditions, than in the comfortable self-made tower of one’s own systematic thinking. While 
this does not lessen the political and historical problems above described concerning the 
realization of ethical norms, it also prevents the closure of the discussion. However, the 
discussion does not simply rely on a description of value-contents and value-structures such as 
the one I have drawn here. It requires that participants are ready to deceptively feel the 
inconsistencies of their particular value-apprehensions and their realizations, and to question 
                                                 
712 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 143. 
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them. In other words, it implies to participate not only for discussing values, but to recognize 
that we are also as participants engaged in value-structures, i.e. ‘seekers’.  
 
6.2. Participants as Jijñāsu: On Seeking to Know in Dialogue 
6.2.1. On the Advantage of Being Ignorant 
 
Dissatisfaction appears first as what relates values and reality in the negative experience of their 
being felt: between value-apprehension and value-realization lies a gap expressed in the form 
‘what ought to be and is not’. The actualization of values does not solve this inherent gap, since 
values, once realized, turn out to be finite actions that have no measure to our initial 
apprehension. In other terms: the ‘ought’ is never caught up by the ‘is now’. The gap is also a 
creative dynamic, since we seek the ‘ought’, for which imagination is required, as well as the 
critical assessment of the apprehension imagined which transforms the ideas into judgments to 
be discussed. In the previous section, I have articulated this dissatisfaction in structural terms, 
as the dynamic of creation and evaluation of certain sets of values with regard to their generation 
and actualization, in particular in (but not limited to) the classical theory of the puruṣārthas. 
However, underlining this structural tension is not in itself sufficient: this already appeared in 
the political consequences of value-realizations which demand to be critically discussed. Indeed, 
dialogues originate from persons who not only reflect on values but are engaged in a valuational 
seeking. Consequently, the structure of values, although integrated to their Weltanschauung, is 
further in tension with their ‘human’ attitudes in dialogues. This connects the anthropological 
dimension of the epistemological presuppositions with the valuational dimension of knowledge. 
In the previous section, I mentioned the difficulty of critically discussing this value-structure 
by those who would belong to societies or part of societies which legitimate their privileged 
access to a discourse.  
The implications of persons in dialogues point at another valuational dimension, i.e. the 
particular lived apprehension of this value-structure by ‘seeker for knowledge’, the translation 
used by Daya Krishna of the desiderative form jijñāsu. By ‘seeker’, he means someone who is 
living in such an internalized and experienced value-structure, who orientate her/his actions and 
knowledge (both seen in interactions) towards such a perspective. Hence, it is as a seeker for 
knowledge that one enters in dialogue, which brings further two important points. First, how 
do these attitudes reveal an interpretation of the texts? More specifically, how do the śruti, the 
authority of texts in view of their revelatory character (intrinsic to the traditions) is manifested 
as an attitude and what are the consequences for dialoguing? Second, this implies to also 
embody the dissatisfaction presented above as being part of one’s consciousness, which shape 
our very apprehension of knowledge (6.2.2). This, in turn, helps us to understand, in the last 
section of this chapter (6.2.3), freedom in communicational contexts, that is the freedom to 
participate and withdraw from dialogue without being forced, but by being invited to engage 
into the dialogue by seeking knowledge. 
To see ‘knowers’ as ‘seekers’ means to consider the realm of knowledge itself to be composed 
by values and oriented by puruṣārtha. The consequences of such a shift can appear to be trivial, 
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since it simply begins with the consideration that ‘knowers’ do not know everything, and that 
the humility to accept the possibility of not knowing something is in itself a sufficient condition 
to be ready to listen to others and participate in a dialogue. This apparently simple statement, if 
not understood as an ethical formal prescription713, entails a complex set of questions: where 
does this ‘humility’ originate from and what would be the causal relation between not-knowing-
something and ‘be-ready-to-listen’? Many a times, we encounter in dialogue participants who 
- from our perspective - do not ‘know’ (something) either by omission, errors or because they 
do not see the connection with another problem. In spite of our best will to communicate to 
them our ‘dissatisfactions’, these participants continue repeating their statements in different 
words, and ‘reply’ (rather than answer) from the knowledge they have already established 
without taking in consideration counter-positions and alternatives. This does not arise from a 
lack of ‘knowledge’ available (in terms of theories and organized śāstric knowledge), but - if it 
is granted that their goal is not simple sophistry or vitaṇḍic destruction of the other - from a 
valuational dimension of knowledge and I argue, from the insufficient consideration of 
puruṣārtha as knowledge. This can explain the importance Daya Krishna attributes to those 
who do not know in dialogue when he reacted during the dialogue organized at the venue of 
Maurice Friedman: 
“There is a third element in a dialogue which in my experience often shows that the more 
information and knowledge one has, the more one is in a disadvantaged position to say 
something really significant and new as opposed to a person with less information and less 
knowledge who is fresh, so to say, not a clean slate but who has an open mind though he 
doesn’t know much about the subject. He can always come up with something startlingly new. 
But it’s only with seeing in this sense by a person who has less information that something 
new emerges, which often he himself may not quite see. But all this cannot be grasped by a 
person who already has that knowledge, so there is this comparative advantage and 
disadvantage of the person who knows a lot. Because his mind works on established questions, 
he takes the terms as stated in the usual manner of the person whose knowledge comes out 
                                                 
713 Across Daya Krishna’s contemporaries, a critique of the formality of the Kantian imperative in the moral realm 
seems to pervade. Their approaches are to be distinguished from comments or interpretations on Kant (which can 
also be found during the times of encounter as a ‘Western’ dialogical partner to the idealist philosophies of classical 
Indian traditions): in ethics/moral philosophy, the Kantian formalism constitutes rather a starting-point and a 
pūrvapakṣa that gives rise to a creative re-thinking of values and the moral ought. Delving into the details of these 
relations would be the purpose of another study, for their responses are variegated. However, specifically for 
thinking the ‘ought’ and its relation to morality, we can consider N. V. Banerjee’s description of the general 
problem for thinking the Kantian imperative in a contemporary Indian philosophical context: “The fundamental 
difficulty of Kant’s doctrine of the categorical imperative lies in his ascription to the moral ought (that is, moral 
obligation or moral responsibility) the characteristic of unconditionality as opposed to conditionality. And, as we 
shall immediately see, it is especially brought out through his interpretation of the supposed unconditionality of 
the moral ought as signifying human freedom.” Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, Knowledge, Reason and Human 
Autonomy. An Essay in Philosophical Reconstruction., Somaiya Publications (Mumbai, 1985), 98. Daya Krishna’s 
‘ought’ indeed articulates the possibility of thinking the unconditionality of values (as value-structures) in relation 
with its conditionality (as value-contents) further complicated by the integration of values as seeking ‘here and 
now’ embodied by seekers already engaged in a value-structure characterized by particular value-contents. This 
entails a specific and creative redefinition of freedom, which I explore later in this section in the context of 
dialogue, quite opposed to the Kantian one. Further to Daya Krishna, this Kantian starting point of the moral 
critique is also an influence on the moral philosophy of (between others) Sundara Rajan, N. K. Devaraja, G. C. 
Pande, S. S. Barlingay and D. P. Chattopadhyaya, who I have used in this work as interlocutors. 
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with something totally fresh, but its freshness can be grasped only by such a person who is 
listening with an other-centered conscience.”714  
Daya Krishna does not advocate ignorance in general here. What he points out is the advantage 
of participants genuinely seeking knowledge for engaging with specialists on a given topic, who, 
despite of having at their disposal a tremendous amount of ‘knowledge’, may not have the 
ability to ‘seek’ novelty in their knowledge. Or in other words: their knowledge, when too much 
rooted in the confortable habit of a certain established way of thinking, might not generate 
novelty, since they lack the disturbing ‘shock’ and the sense of dissatisfaction with their own 
way of seeing. In this sense, the collaboration of not-knowing-seekers with knowledgeable 
seekers, might prove fertile for creative thinking. Moreover, it is here the collaboration that 
enables novel creation, since the ‘fresh’ non-knowing-seekers are per definitionem not able to 
recognize alone and elaborate on the ‘freshness’ of their questions, and the knowledgeable 
seekers are not (anymore) able to generate ‘fresh’ insights on their own long-acquired 
knowledge. The creativity originates from the combination of ‘not-(yet)-knowing’ with ‘not-
(yet)-thinking-anew’ which together can turn into the initial ‘wonder’ that has shaped 
philosophy from the negation of given knowledge by taking a startling new look at it. This need 
not to be a Cartesian tabula rasa, it can also emerge from a contemplative detachment from the 
givenness, from the hybridity of crossing traditions, or simply from the emulation of a particular 
encounter. While the ways can be diverse, I believe that for Daya Krishna, creativity in 
knowledge is fundamentally connected to the tension between not-knowing and yet-wanting-
to-know - and that this reciprocal movement back and forth is the one operating in dialogue.  
However, the tension cannot operate unidirectionally, since the one who does not know and the 
one who knows vary and the question of ‘how’, ‘in which may’, ‘through which conceptual 
structures do we know’ depends on cultures and contexts. Thus, the dialogue cannot follow the 
form of delivering a lecture and being questioned by ‘less-knowledgeable-students’ (i.e. people 
considered to be lower in the hierarchy of having-knowledge), or guru-śiṣya-paramparā in the 
Indian context,715 which amounts to a redistribution of a specific knowledge. It is rather in an 
oscillation between persons who are both ignorant and seeking to know, in different realms of 
knowledges, conceptual frameworks and variations of expressions. This corresponds to what 
Daya Krishna defines as ‘comparative philosophy’: 
“Conceptual structures may be seen as tools for the organization of experience and for giving 
it meaning and significance. Each available conceptual structure thus shows the limitations of 
                                                 
714 Daya Krishna, in ‘Dialogue’, Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 193. 
715 See Arindam Chakrabarti’s comment: “Although he did a lot to revive the Navya Nyāya and other scholastic 
traditions of debate and dialectic in Sanskrit, Daya Krishna had a rather fraught relationship with the Guru-śiṣya-
paramparā or didactic-lineage system - what he called “master-disciple syndrome” which is prevalent in the Indian 
intellectual culture for millennia. He thought of it as a theological hang-over of the age of dogmatic-cliques where 
any kind of heterodoxy would be not just discouraged, but punished. Such a stronghold of textual traditional-
groupism stymies all creativity according to him, Yet, he saw more originality of thinking within the so-called 
Sanskrit-speaking, text-gloss-writing, traditional, un-Westernized, lineage-bound scholars whom he came to know 
in the last quarter of his life rather intimately, than among the individualistic academic Westernized professors 
who swear by their individual originality.” Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” 9. While Daya Krishna could never accept 
the ‘blind’ acceptance to the guru which renders a dialogue impossible, the ‘individualism’ creates the problem of 
the ‘monopoly’ of truth and knowledge by oneself, which also transforms a dialogue into a monologue. 
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the others and suggests an alternative possibility unexplored by them. Also, they may be seen 
as drawing our attention to those facts of our experience, which have been neglected in other 
perspectives, and to ways of organizing and patterning experiences that were not seen by them. 
(…) Concepts can never be simply images or symbols and are hardly ever a matter of just 
feelings and emotions. The questions of truth and falsity can never be allowed to remain absent 
for long, even though they may be intractable in nature. Yet, what we should remember is that 
the cognitive enterprise is as unending as any other enterprise, and that though the truth-claim 
has inevitably to be made, it is equally certain that it shall remain unfulfilled. The future shall 
always be there to show us not only the limitations of our knowledge and the falsity of our 
claims, but also to bring to our notice a new horizon, undreamt of before.”716  
The dissatisfaction is a key concept of cross-cultural, inter/transcultural or comparative 
philosophies originating from a sense of one’s ‘limitations’, what ‘has been neglected’, and 
what ‘was not seen’. These limitations point out the specificity of each argumentation and 
positions, which, in being specific, are limited. The ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’, the ‘conceptual 
structure’, ‘organization of experience’, ‘meaning and significance’, the ‘alternative possibility 
unexplored’ form in relation with each other the ‘seeking’ in which participants are distinctively 
but collectively engaged. The result is, in Daya Krishna terms, quite nuanced. On the one hand, 
he sees the positive encounter as a ‘bringing to our notice a new horizon, undreamt of before’. 
On the other hand, the horizon again points at a direction expressed in the seeking, something 
that itself is subject to further ‘unfulfillment’ and ‘falsity’ to be revealed in the future, once this 
horizon is concretely realized into new propositions which will be themselves limited. Rather 
than the promises of an utopian, ‘startling new’, revelation of a new ‘truth’, he sees comparative, 
inter/tran/cross-cultural philosophizing as an imperfect exploration which can orientate the 
participants to the unforeseen in the direction of an ‘ought’ subject to the ever-continuing 
dissatisfaction of the ‘is’. In the context of intercultural philosophy (broadly conceived), in view 
of the dilemma between careful exegesis and free creative use (see 5.2.1), i.e. between the risk 
of sterile repetitions and reductive distortions, I find such a conception relevant. It avoids 
absolutizing an idea of truth (which configurates the dilemma between exactitude and novelty). 
Thus, it envisions alternatives as potential discoveries, while at the same time remains aware of 
the provisional and tentative way towards these discoveries. The carefulness is displaced from 
the object of study (the exegetic material) to the creativity itself (contemplating it as a limited 
attempt). Furthermore, it is the tension between the limits of a ‘not-knowing’ and the seeking 
for knowing, as a subject to dissatisfactions, which allows these discoveries, which means that 
it is a part of the ‘knowledge-enterprise’. 
In the same dialogue with Maurice Friedman, Daya Krishna thus continues and goes so far as 
to determine the success of dialogue as depending on this tension, i.e. including ignorance as a 
condition, combined with a seeking that can enhance new knowledges. 
“I think we can call anything a dialogue we choose to. But how does it illumine or help us? 
After all, a term can be extended widely or narrowed according to one’s own convenience and 
cognitive purpose. I suggest that any significant encounter is not necessarily a dialogue. One 
can call it so if one so likes. To my mind it is perhaps the more useful if we confine the term 
initially to an interaction between persons who are finite and ignorant. They may have different 
levels of knowledge or information or understanding, but each of them, when they enter into a 
                                                 
716 ‘Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought To Be’, in Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 65. 
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dialogue assume, at least provisionally, that they do not know. That whatever each one knows, 
or thinks one knows, may possibly be wrong – that one is prepared to learn from the others 
who are participating in the dialogue. The initial proposition is certainly jigyasa, curiosity of 
knowledge. But all of us are curious, isn’t it? One of the tests of a successful dialogue, 
recognition, is when each person feels something new has occurred which one did not know 
before. That is, something new has occurred, and each person after the dialogue feels enriched 
primarily in the realm of recognition and understanding, and of course related to feeling which 
is to that something significant has occurred.  
Therefore, I suggest, that the ideal of a dialogue between omniscient beings or between one 
omniscient being and a non-omniscient being – or, for example, between me and nature, 
between me and art is encountering. But I can show why it is that when there is a dialogue with 
the text that it is an entirely different kind of thing. A dialogue between, let me call finite, 
ignorant, desirous of knowing, human beings, who get together with the presupposition that 
they know, but do they really know? Their knowledge is incomplete, partial. Each one 
contributes to it. This is the whole thing. So many good points have been made around the 
table, but they have not been taken up. They have not been developed. Their significance has 
not been seen as complimentary to each other, leading to a deeper depth of understanding the 
issue.  
I further suggest, that though it is true, we can always widen it or narrow it down, but for the 
present context, it would be more useful if we accept that a dialogue is between finite ignorant 
beings desirous of knowing, desirous of learning, sharing a common experience, an endeavor 
and seeking, where each contributes and each learns from the other.”717 
Disagreeing with the intrinsic relation of dialogue with knowledge presented here, Maurice 
Friedman responded to Daya Krishna by designating this definition in Buberian terms as 
“technical dialogue” (thus, qualifying dialogue in such a view as purely informative and lacking 
the sense of ‘between’ of the I and Thou). He interpreted it as a limitation of dialogue per se to 
the realm of knowledge. It is interesting to note here that Friedman’s rather critical and (as felt 
by the other participants) abrupt answer (see 6.3 for a longer analysis) to Daya Krishna’s stance 
seems to have hindered the dialogue in which Daya Krishna was explicating the ‘success’ of 
dialogue, to the extent that Friedman in a postscript, characterizes the dialogue as “as much of 
a mismeeting as a meeting”.718 This constitutes in my view an example of the dissatisfaction 
between apprehension and realization of dialogues themselves, the more concrete occurences 
of which will be studied in the next section (6.3). Values are structurally deceptive, the tension 
between persons as seekers faces dissatisfactions of her/his knowledge, and dialogues 
themselves as a mode of encounter are subject to the same dissatisfying tension. Focusing at 
the moment on what Daya Krishna actually attempted to delineate in the above quote, I want to 
question the rather contra-intuitive idea that ignorance of the participants can be part of 
characterizing dialogue as ‘successful’. Participants for a dialogue are above defined as “finite 
ignorant beings desirous of knowing, desirous of learning, sharing a common experience, an 
endeavor and seeking”: the tension between the ideality of reaching a completeness is 
immediately and intrinsically connected to the reality of our finitude, from where the 
dissatisfaction as mainspring for engaging in dialogue operates.  
                                                 
717 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 240–41. 
718 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 284. 
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Furthermore, Friedman, probably unaware of Daya Krishna’s wide and unconventional use of 
‘knowledge’, misunderstood the broader sense implied here due to which he designated the 
definition as ‘technical dialogue’ operating as a cognitive exchange of information. In Daya 
Krishna’s terms, ‘desirous of knowing’ entails ‘desire’ and an ‘endeavor’ which respectively 
imply feeling (which is also the “feeling which is to that something significant has occurred” 
for characterizing its success) and action. This term encompasses the actions of engaging, 
communicating, debating, discussing, dialoguing made conjointly by all participants. The result 
of this subtle operation unveils (this time, formulated in positive terms) the ‘success’ of a 
dialogue, when something new emerges. It is easy to see that ‘success’ does not stand far away 
from ‘dissatisfaction’, since the participants, even together, will not reach this ‘complete’ 
knowledge towards which they strive and are thus bound to be dissatisfied with their findings 
and feel the urge to question them again. Thus, even a successful dialogue remains limited by 
the ideal dimension of ‘ought to’ in comparison to what it is. But the success, as momentary as 
it ought to be, caught up by the puruṣārtha of knowledge, is qualified exclusively in terms of 
novelty. Of course, the first question to arise is how to determine novelty and success, in 
particular in Daya Krishna’s context of dialogues between traditions and disciplines. In such a 
context, novelty and success cannot be defined quantitatively, i.e. they cannot be measured, and 
they cannot be logically deduced from the setting of the dialogue, i.e. they are not predictable. 
On the contrary, they both are ‘felt’ and belong to the same valuational desire. This makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine externally of the success and novelty of a certain 
dialogue, except in the sense of what it brings about for the participants and the further readers 
of their transcriptions. But similarly, it relativizes criticisms such as Halbfass (see 3.4) claiming 
that no significative change can (ever? in all cases?) be brought by the setting of the saṃvāda 
experiments. The notion of ‘success’ will rather depend on the answer each participant would 
make to the questions: ‘Did I learn anything? Did I make a meaningful encounter? Do I think 
anything differently?’  
There seems to be no definite evaluation possible of the regulative idea entailed in puruṣārtha 
and no ‘objective’ criteria to assert the results. The only possible criteria that I can imagine 
would be to see whether the dialogue reflects the intentions and seekings that initiated it at the 
first place. Again, the answer might vary according to different participants, but in practice, this 
could thwart the ‘lectures’ that are given under the name of dialogue when the participants 
rather transmit their knowledge than question it with the other participants. In that sense, the 
preparations and post-reflections are necessary for the dialogue itself, as a kind of possible 
intersubjective evaluation on the gains and the gap between apprehension-realization (and 
further apprehensions). I will come back on these phases on dialogue in 6.3.  What such a view 
in general outlines is the necessity of relating dialogue-theory to a praxis in emphasizing the 
subjective feeling of its seekers (de facto, it also happens that some participants will be 
‘satisfied’ while others will not). Thus, I could agree with the view that Daya Krishna’s 
definition of knowledge is purely cognitive (with the limits that it implies) if and only if 
‘cognitive’ is itself understood in an encompassing way including knowledge as a puruṣārtha 
and composed by questions rather than śāstric knowledge.   
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6.2.2. Seeking Knowledge: Personal Attitudes and Transcendental Orientation 
 
The ‘ignorance’ or more broadly formulated, the incompleteness of knowledge has another 
advantage which is crucial for dialoguing and of high relevance for Daya Krishna: the 
possibility to ‘question’. A genuine question - one that is neither raised to expose one’s own 
research or vastness of knowledge, nor to diminish the other’s position - expresses both the 
limits of one’s knowledge (I ask for further clarifications) and my seeking for knowledge (I am 
genuinely interested in thinking further such a problem). It locates my ignorance as well as 
ideally results in a possible realm for exploring what I don’t know yet. Thus, the 
epistemological limits open a desire and a will. In Daya Krishna’s texts, we always meet these 
dimensions together. Unlike most academic philosophers, Daya Krishna’s writings rarely 
appear as a ‘complete’ work. We do not encounter a definite and achieved ‘research program’, 
a list of classifications and definitions which would categorize the realm studied, a systematic 
approach encompassing all resources on a topic, a language that would be so carefully 
composed or poetic enough to be self-relying, or a ‘conclusion’ which would summarize and 
close the investigation. On the contrary, each work could be ‘criticized’ for its incompleteness, 
further references could be added, the language could also sometimes be sharpened, the topic 
‘rounded’ and systematized, and the question ‘answered’.719 But that, precisely, would hinder 
the dialogue with Daya Krishna’s text. This is not an excuse to try to legitimate an ‘insufficient’ 
work. But saying that Daya Krishna’s work is not ‘complete’ or even not ‘perfect’ highlights 
the necessity to question why we expect a work to be ‘perfect’ by appearing ‘complete’ in the 
sense above described. Is a ‘perfect’ work not imperfect in a dialogical perspective, since in the 
painstaking entreprise to look perfect, it would simply try to hide the momentary stage of the 
knowledge it contains and prevent further questions? Is the outlook of perfectness not an 
indirect way to avoid exposing one’s presuppositions? Daya Krishna’s texts are ‘achieved’ in 
that they have reached a certain state of completion, which aims at satisfying enough research 
                                                 
719 Daya Krishna continuously ‘asks’ questions to which he either tries to provide an attempted answer, or that he 
underlines ‘for further research’ and ‘for further dialogical partners’. The formulations are diverse, such as ‘nobody 
has seen’, ‘it should be asked’, ‘what if’, ‘the question should be raised’, etc. It is impossible here to list all the 
variations and references, but I want to give an example that fits the discussion on values (emphasis is mine): “That 
knowledge, whatever be its source or nature, provides a basis for living and should have raised the question of the 
relation between sense-organs (jnānendriyas) and motor-organs (karmendriyas). But epistemological reflection on 
the problem of knowledge has, for some reason, failed to come to grips with the problem in spite of the fact that 
pravṛtti-sāmarthya (the capacity of knowledge to lead to successful action) and the relation of knowledge (jnāna) 
to liberation (mokṣa) have played a significant role in Indian thinking on the subject just as the centrality of “cash-
value” of ideas on the operational theory of meaning has done in the western tradition. 
But whether it be pravṛtti-sāmarthya, “cash value of ideas”, or the operational theory of meaning, they all (…) 
surreptitiously give a direction to the enterprise of knowledge which it would not have had otherwise. Besides this, 
it also thrives on the unasked question as to how such a formulation would avoid the fallacy of “affirming the 
consequent”, even if one accepts that the notion of success can be defined in such a way as to suggest that the 
knowledge on which it was based was true. Perhaps, the insight involved in these formulations has to be 
disengaged from the notions of success or cash value, and seen in a different way. The crucial question perhaps 
is whether the idea of knowledge can even be thought of without involving some sort of activity intrinsic to it and 
varies with the type of knowledge that it is.” Daya Krishna, “Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of 
Knowledge,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and 
Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 146. 
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to have thought a certain topic anew and have outlined the ‘further research to be done’.720 The 
distinction might be difficult to trace sharply. But I find it significant to underline the horizontal 
values of a work in terms of its ‘wideness’, i.e. the openness that “comprise agenda for further 
research” as Daya Krishna formulates it.721 This means understanding a work as a (serious) 
occasion to engage with a certain discourse without closing it at the same time.  
Thus, besides Daya Krishna’s own way of writing/thinking, the capacity to ‘question’ originates 
from a sense of wonder and doubts and must necessarily go beyond the given systematic 
knowledge to be able to interrogate its premises, its beliefs and its postulates, which is precisely 
easier when one faces an external perspective in dialogue. But besides the epistemological 
externality, this capacity also originates from a genuine ‘desire’ for knowledge, i.e. from a 
valuational seeking, expressed above by Daya Krishna in terms of ‘open minds’ and ‘other-
consciousness’. This implies a basic awareness of the other as a potential knower, as an 
‘opportunity’722 for thinking further which belong to the neglected but deciding ‘surroundings’ 
and ethos of dialogue. In other words: although the context and conditions for dialoguing are 
usually seen as philosophically irrelevant, the attitude of a seeker constitutes the conditions of 
possibility for new questions to occur (as analyzed in the concrete cases of the saṃvāda 
experiments in 2.2.2). More explicitly in Daya Krishna’s own terms: 
“The roots of creativity in all fields, including that of thinking, are unknown and perhaps 
unknowable in principle, at least in the usual sense in which ‘knowing’ is generally used. Yet, 
one of the preconditions for creativity to manifest itself is the giving up of the mistaken belief 
that it is confined only to certain persons, or periods, or countries, or civilizations, and that the 
rest are only doomed to repeat or approximate what they have achieved. The belief that every 
human being is capable of entertaining a new thought, of asking a new question, of seeking a 
new problem is almost an a priori condition for fostering creativity and letting it emerge in the 
life of the mind. This means that people have to be encouraged to ask questions, to see 
problems and to attempt solutions, and that what they attempt in this regard it treated with 
genuine respect. 
Many a time, the person who asks the questions, sees the problem and attempts a solution does 
not know the significance of what he has asked or seen or attempted. It is, or should be, the 
function of those who can see a little farther ahead, to see the potential directions for thought 
that are implicit in them. But such a situation can only emerge when the people who pose 
questions, formulate problems, and attempt solutions are not afraid of making themselves 
appear foolish or ridiculous or ignorant. This, however, depends on an atmosphere that is just 
                                                 
720  Several of Daya Krishna’s monographs end with such a proposition, such as ‘Problems and Issues still 
remaining to be explored in Intellectual History from Eighteenth Century upto the Present Time,’ in Daya Krishna, 
Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western. ; ‘The Possible 
Extension of the Methodology for the Understanding of Other Texts in the Indian Tradition’, followed by 
‘Conclusion’ and ‘The Text of the Nyāya Sūtras: Some Problems’, in Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras. 
721 I refer here to a posthumous publication edited by R. S. Bhatnagar, which collected the questions, agenda for 
research and topics evoked in the Journal of Indian Philosophical Research when Daya Krishna edited it. These 
agendas are not part of his own monographs but show the extent of Daya Krishna’s commitment for provoking 
further research rather than relying on (his) already-accomplished works. Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, Agenda 
for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy. 
722 Daya Krishna, “Thinking versus Thought: Strategies for Conceptual Creativity,” 33. 
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the opposite of what normally obtains in most institutions devoted to the fostering and 
development of intellectual life today.”723 
It is interesting to notice that “the roots of creativity of thinking are unknowable” and at the 
same time, that an a priori condition for it lies in a ‘belief’ in the capability of creativity. Is this 
belief a presupposition or an evaluation? I think it should be postulated as an epistemological 
presupposition to engage in dialogue, but the act of postulating a human capability to generate 
new questions is in itself related to the intrinsic ideal tension of the ‘ought’ and the desire to 
seek knowledge. But what do we ‘ought’ to know, and what is the ‘ought’ of knowledge? The 
impossibility for Daya Krishna to accept a fixed classification of ‘ought’ is significant here, 
since closing the discussion on what we ‘ought’ to know is also closing the dialogue. The first 
section (6.1) showed how the ‘ought’ itself ‘ought’ to be discussed not to become dogmatic. 
Does that mean that there are no criteria for determining who to engage with, on which topic 
and in which way? Not all suggestions, orientations and argumentations will be fruitful in 
dialogue, for the criteria lie in the ability to ‘respond’ that is given to it. ‘Desiring’, ‘seeking’ to 
know and seeing knowledge as value does not mean to jettison intransigence or intellectual 
rigor, as it might appear first for those who associate knowledge with a quest for absolute 
objectivity: dialoguing does not mean compromising with knowledge, but conceiving 
knowledge as a collective creation:724   
“If we accept the notions of action and thinking, we’re also going to accept notions of what we 
call relevant delimitation of the field. If I’m acting in a particular domain, then certain things 
are relevant and certain things are irrelevant. Similarly in the realm of thought – certain 
questions simply don’t make sense. What I’m suggesting is that this notion of the delimitation 
or segregation of relevant and irrelevant which belongs both to the realms of action and 
thought, has to be distinguished from the concept of wholeness or the partialness of the self 
from which it flows. This capacity which we choose to delimit or segregate is the heart of the 
matter with which we are concerned. If we take this into account, then when do we describe 
the action as moral? The world of action is where the world consciousness is other-centered, 
and the other happens to be a living being whatever one believes.”725  
I understand ‘relevant’ here in the sense of being able to create responses and reactions rather 
than in terms of truth or validity, i.e. rather in terms of collective implications than in objective 
qualifications. Thus, rather than an a priori norm or a universally applicable validity of the 
arguments, the criteria are seen in terms of ‘effectivity’ and ‘creativity’ which both refer to the 
realm of action and realization above presented. Daya Krishna therefore shifts the constitution 
                                                 
723 Daya Krishna, 32. 
724 I would like to add a linguistic remark here: in English, French and German, a ‘compromise’ (un compromis, 
ein Kompromiss) indicates a rather positively connoted term of coming to an agreement after a dispute with 
conflicting opinions by mutual concessions. One ‘reaches’ a ‘compromise’ in the intellectual engagement with 
others (which is, however, not Daya Krishna’s objective since it concludes the dialogue). However, the same 
substantive acquires a rather pejorative connotation as a verb ‘to compromise’ (compromettre, kompromittieren) 
where the meaning of reaching a compromise is doubled by the nuance of lowering one’s expectation in order to 
settle down an issue (or refusing to lower them), and even by possible meaning of bringing someone into danger. 
In Hindi, samjhauta (compromise) can have the same connotations. This, as a linguistic example, shows the 
difficulty of seeing the act of engaging into a dispute, discussion or dialogue as an epistemological gain and as a 
‘positive’ model for constituting knowledge. It also outlines how counter-intuitive it is to consider the benefit of 
others for thinking in dialogue and for accepting the idea of ‘intersubjective knowledge’.  
725 Daya Krishna, ‘Dialogue’, in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 211. 
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of knowledge from an extrinsic and objective approach to an intrinsic approach, insisting on 
the subjects and persons constituting knowledge. In including a seeking of knowledge, he 
underlines the agents creating knowledge. He therefore includes action in the constitution of 
knowledge. These actions are not pure acts, they are also influenced by feelings (desires) which 
ground their motives. Seeking for knowledge involves therefore these three dimensions of 
consciousness: the subject acting towards knowledge and the feeling originating the desire for 
knowledge.   
“The crucial question perhaps is whether the idea of ‘knowledge’ can even be thought of 
without involving some sort of ‘activity’ which is intrinsic to it and varies with the type of 
knowledge that it is. ‘Knowledge’ surely is not of one type, and the difference in this must 
affect not only the way it is acquired or comes into being, but also that which it inevitably must 
give rise to, as ‘effectivity’ of some sort is generally supposed to be one of the characteristic 
of reality, besides others. Knowledge always requires some sort of ‘activity’, even if it be only 
of ‘attending’ which is minimally required in any ‘knowing’ or ‘learning’ process, as it itself 
is a part of the process, a resultant of some previous activity of knowing and giving rise, in its 
own turn, to further knowing and thus engendering a chain which may be broken at any 
moment, but which is unending in principle. And, strangely, even ‘knowledge’ has to be known, 
understood, interpreted, disputed, debated and discussed, not only by others but even by 
oneself as the entreprise of knowledge is as unending as all other enterprises, both for oneself 
and everybody else.”726 
Daya Krishna’s insistence on seeking knowledge as something unfulfilled is obvious 
throughout his work. Fallibility, unpredictability, dissatisfaction, indeterminacy, uncertainty are 
concepts grounding his approach. It also at the same time deprives anybody the privilege of 
knowledge, also tackling in so doing the traditional exclusion of ‘Indian philosophy’ from the 
rational ‘philosophy’ (originating in the Western hemisphere) and the exclusion of any caste or 
gender from the knowledge-entreprise: 
“Knowledge does not belong to anybody, even though one says, ‘I know’ and philosophers 
make a distinction between ‘knower’, ‘known’ and ‘knowledge’ or, as they say in Sanskrit 
jñātā, jñeya and jñāna. Those who made the distinction forgot that knowledge was a collective, 
cumulative affair of humankind, and if it had to be regarded as ‘belonging’ to anybody, it 
would be to the humankind as such, and not to this or that ‘I.’ But humankind includes not 
only those who lived in the past, but those who will live in the future also. (…) Knowledge is 
an ongoing human enterprise, a collective puruṣārtha of humankind. But if it is so, it throws a 
light on the other puruṣārthas, the number of which is indefinitely large and not just four as 
enumerated in the Indian tradition, for if it were so ‘knowledge’ could not be a puruṣārtha as 
it has not been mentioned amongst them. A puruṣārtha is a matter of seeking, perennial 
seeking, as perennial as time itself, and hence not something that can be possessed, or meant 
to be possessed. But man does not seek just one thing; nor does he know what he seeks. Had 
he known this, he would not have been almost always dissatisfied, or even disappointed with 
the success that his ‘seeking’ temporarily results in.”727 
                                                 
726 Daya Krishna, “Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of Knowledge,” March 2005, 79. 
727 Daya Krishna, “Knowledge: Whose Is It, What Is It, and Why Has It to Be ‘True’’?,’” 185. See also Daniel 
Raveh’s comments in Daniel Raveh, “Thinking Dialogically about Dialogue with Martin Buber and Daya 
Krishna.,” Confluence: Journal of World Philosophie 4 (November 2016): 8–32. and further on what he calls 
‘knowledge-without-certainty’ in Daya Krishna Raveh, “Philosophical Miscellanea,” 497–503. While I agree with 
 
263 
 
Daya Krishna points here at the complex intermingling of time and space for knowledge and 
the tensions resulting from it: (śāstric) knowledge originates from a particular nexus that allows 
different conceptual structures and arguments, but it cannot be restricted to the context that 
enables its creation. Moreover, it is to be used and discussed by different historical and cultural 
generations of scholars, in which sense it cannot be owned by a single one. For this reason, 
considering the context in its different possibilities and variations, offers itself as a necessary 
resource (to avoid misunderstandings on the one hand, but even more to make the ideas in 
different contexts ‘usable’ for thinking further) but not as an invariable ‘truth’ that depends only 
on its context. Knowledge is thus transcendent and immanent at the same time. It originates 
from an individuality that characterizes it, which we can transcend (for example by writing in 
another language or on another culture, or by moving elsewhere to get influenced by another 
context). This does not mean that in doing so we abolish all limits, but these limits can be shifted: 
one experiences it for instance in writing in a foreign language, where we carry our own idioms 
and yet discover also other possibilities to express ourselves. Similarly, writing on other 
cultures does not erase our own cultural traces, but it enables us to question our own conceptual 
framework as well as the one we study. It is the intermingling of these two dimensions that 
prevents ownership. The independence/dependence of a concept to its conceptual nexus also 
explains the necessary intersubjectivity for Daya Krishna, which does not mean a rational 
agreement by all on a concept, but further effectuations or uses of the concepts. This questions 
what one ‘does’ with an idea, in particular as a reinterpretation into one’s own realm of ideas, 
which can question the initial realm and ‘ought’ to be further questioned by others in return.   
It is now easy to understand how incompatible such an account of knowledge is with the concept 
of śruti or the revelatory authority from the foundational texts of a tradition. Exposing times 
and again the danger of authority for creative thinking728 - authority producing an exegetic 
limitation of interpretation, which can become dogmatic at times -, Daya Krishna extends the 
concept of śruti to all traditions. He analyzes how inconsistent the consequences of such an 
attitude are in his article ‘Is the Doctrine of Arthavāda Compatible with the Idea of Śruti? The 
Basic Dilemma for the Revelatory Texts of Any Tradition’ (emphasis is mine). What is relevant 
here for the present context are the implications that the concept entails for dialogue, since all 
philosophical traditions relate to foundational texts on which participants of dialogue draw their 
own argumentation. Thus, the authority of these texts constitutes a concrete hindrance to 
                                                 
Raveh on his account of knowledge-without-certainty, I prefer here to relate knowledge with the dynamic of the 
dissatisfaction that connects it to the realm of value (as puruṣārtha), thus knowledge without certainty the creativity 
of which originates from the valuational dissatisfaction we encounter in reality when we actualize knowledge.  
728 “There is, in fact, no problem the discussion of which does not end across the boundaries of a traditionally 
demarcated system. Yet, even though the fact is well known, its radical implications for the understanding, 
comprehension and presentation of philosophical thinking in India has not been seen. It is not the problems and 
the issues that are seen as central and the siddhantas of the so-called schools as peripheral, but instead the latter 
are viewed as central and the forms as peripheral. This is because the self-identification of the thinker is treated as 
more important than the problem he is concerned with. But, philosophically viewed, it is the latter that is important 
and not the former. The question, for example, of what is meant by ‘śruti’ and what is regarded as such is more 
important than the specific answer that a Mīmāmsaka or a Vedāntika or a Naiyāyika or even a Buddhist or a Jain 
thinker gives to it. Once the situation is seen in this way, the distinction between the so-called ‘agāma’ and the 
‘śruti’ will be seen as relating to the specificities of what is to be regarded as the foundational, authoritative text 
for a tradition.” Daya Krishna, “Towards a Field Theory of Indian Philosophy: Suggestions for a New Way of 
Looking at Indian Philosophy,” 20. See also 5.2.1. 
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philosophical dialogues since it prevents further ‘uses’ and delimits the meaning to the realm 
in which it occurs (for which then the question of truth is rather a question of correspondence 
to the text and the original context). 
In that sense, it is first crucial to notice the importance of the “any tradition”. While the concept 
śruti has its own commentatorial tradition,729  it is first noticeable that in Daya Krishna’s 
extension of the concept, such a reverential attitude is not ‘religious’ in character: ‘religious’ in 
this sense would mean accepting the authority of a text, may it be via an oral revelatory tradition 
or a transmitted canon in view of one’s own belief into or of one’s belonging to the tradition in 
which it is proclaimed as authority.730 Thus in such a view, for example, a Heideggerian, a 
Kantian or even a ‘Daya Krishnian’ can share the same attitude towards their referential texts 
as a devout Christian to the Bible. Furthermore, and most importantly, this extension points at 
the relevance of the ‘attitude’ to the śruti. In other words, the problem does not lie in the 
revelatory character, in the orality or writtenness of the transmission, nor even in the historical 
context of the foundational text, or in the sacredness of the object itself, but in the way the 
exegetic attitude regards these texts and how their attitude influences their interpretation. The 
problem thus lies in the person, and more precisely, on the valuational determinacy that is 
enforced on the texts: 
“It is thus the attitude that creates the śruti; once the attitude changes and the so-called śruti is 
regarded as human creation, it no longer carries an aura of infallibility about it. It is seen for 
what it is, something full of inconsistencies, incoherences, contradictions, vain claims to truth 
that can easily been controverted by reference to counterevidence and fallacies inherent in the 
arguments given in support of it. It is not that one does not see the positive achievements and 
admire the insights or wonder at the skill displayed in the construction of the ‘Houses of Reason’ 
that the master built. 
                                                 
729 Notably discussed by Daya Krishna in the following article of the same collection with reference to the 
Mīnāṃsā tradition, “The Mīmāṃsāka versus the Yājñika : Some Further Problems in the Interpretation of Śruti 
Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 228–44., also published together with further articles on the topic ‘Mīnāṃsā 
before Jaimini: Some Problems in the Interpretation of Rule in the Indian Tradition’ and Śyena yāga: The Achilles 
Heel of Śruti in the Indian Tradition, in Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, 69–126. 
730 “The notion of a ‘secular śruti’ may appear to be a contradiction-in-terms. After all, it is only in the context of 
some infallible authority, whether divine or superhuman or even human beings who had attained perfection such 
as the Mahāvīra and the Buddha that we normally speak of śruti. Ultimately, it is the attitude of the believers that 
determines what is to be regarded as śruti, and not the source from which it is supposed to emerge. After all, even 
the authority of God has not been able to convince the believers in the rival traditions of revelations as the Jewish, 
Christian, Islamic worlds, or those that have occurred in the Indian tradition. 
There is, thus, no basic difference between the nonsecular śrutis and the secular śrutis except perhaps in the fact 
that the latter have generally not had the comprehensiveness and the coercion of the former, at least till recent 
times. (…) Marx, however, stands only midway between the two extreme poles of śruti, which may be called the 
‘sacred’ and the ‘secular’, as he is too closely associated with the coercive power of the state and the prophetic 
mode of thinking, which is so common with those streams of the śruti that derive from the Hebrew tradition. The 
secular version becomes more apparent in the attitude displayed by those who call themselves Wittgensteinians, 
Kantians, Hegelians, or the many other varieties of them, as there is no question here either of using of coercive 
power of the state to persecute or convert those who do not agree with the way one understand the ‘master’.” Daya 
Krishna, “Is the Doctrine of Arthavāda Compatible with the Idea of Śruti ? The Basic Dilemma for the Revelatory 
Texts of Any Tradition,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. 
Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 220. 
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One cannot read a Plato or Kant or any other great thinker without these feelings at every step, 
but once one sees all texts as human creations the attitude remains the same, appreciative and 
critical at the same time. One is prepared to learn and learns all the time. But one is also 
dissatisfied at every page and turn of the argument. One sees through the little tricks that the 
master has played and, though one excuses them, one is not taken in by them. 
The same thing happens to the Vedas, Upaniṣads, the Gītā or the Qur’an, the Bible, the Torah 
or any of the other innumerable texts reversed as revelation by the devotees or the disciples 
who can not bear to treat or think them otherwise. It is true that the attitude to these is built-in 
almost from the moment of one’s birth, as one is always born into a family and a community 
that treats them as such and thus, one can hardly even think of treating them otherwise. (…) 
But most members of such communities are aware, however dimly, that there are persons 
belonging to other communities who do not regard those sacred texts in the same way. And 
they obviously do not see these sacred texts of other communities in the same manner as the 
members of that community do. Paradoxically each sees the holes in the other’s claim but 
somehow fails to see them in one’s own.”731 
This ‘attitude’ is of utmost importance in a dialogue, for it is here that the epistemological 
consideration of presuppositions and knowledge remains insufficient if understood as the sole 
component of a dialogue - that is, if we restrict dialogue to the level of argumentation. 
Knowledge and its presuppositions are communicated via a certain attitude from which 
possibilities and hindrances arise. A reverential attitude to a given tradition is certainly the most 
difficult obstacle, for it cannot be changed externally by way of argumentations. It is only 
concerned with an embodied internal self-consciousness which acts according to certain values. 
On the other hand, the ‘reverential’ attitude hides another mechanism of evaluation commonly 
understood as ‘epistemic authority’: in the reverence to the foundational text, one actually bows 
to the authority carried by the ‘author’ or the authorless revelation which is either granted 
absolute truth, or at least of a higher reliability and higher truth.732 By referring to and holding 
to such an authority, one aims to associate her/his own statements wih the general and 
encompassing truth-claim of the reference. This, naturally, impedes the dialogue, since it all 
happens as if the statement of the speaker cannot be questioned due to the epistemic authority 
contained in the reference (which the speaker might well interpret in her/his own way for the 
sake of the argument).  
                                                 
731 Daya Krishna, 219. 
732 See the example given by Ralph Weber, who considers the variations of authority granted to the statement 
“Swiss chocolate is no longer produced in Switzerland”, claimed either 1) by “someone”, by 2) “many”, by 3) 
“Ralph” or 4) by “the press officer of Chocosuisse, the Association of Swiss Chocolate Manufacturers”. Besides 
the difference granted according to ‘quantity’ between 1 and 2, he notes regarding 3 that “if, however, the New 
York café goer utters the third statement (…), you perhaps would be inclined to believe this person if you knew 
that I was from Switzerland and was generally considered to be a very trustworthy epistemic authority regarding 
Switzerland. If you did not know Ralph, the person could as well have said that “someone” has said that… But if 
you did know him, I hope that the epistemic authority of that speaker would be increased qualitatively, as if many 
more people were saying what she is saying. If you think my authority in this domain to be at best questionable, 
then think of how many in philosophy cringe at somebody replying: “but Confucius himself said that” or 
“Immanuel Kant has said that”: is that not as if a thousand people standing on the speaker’s shoulders were 
shouting at you? (…) It is not a higher number that caries (mistakenly or not) authority, but that one and same 
number might be invested with different levels of authority.” Ralph Weber, “Authority: Of German Rhinos and 
Chinese Tigers,” in Comparative Philosophy without Borders, ed. Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber 
(London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 163–64. 
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However, ‘epistemic’ authority can be a misleading expression. ‘Epistemic’ refers here to the 
external reference in the realm of knowledge to which we grant authority. The operation 
through which this authority is generated is, however, valuational in character and precisely 
outlines how the generation of epistemic knowledge is intermingled with a valuational 
judgment. The other side of the same coin outlines the prejudices related to someone’s academic 
‘rank’ (i.e. the authority associated to a certain social hierarchy), cultural or social origins, or 
gender. The reverential attitude is thus not limited to textual acknowledged resources but 
stratifies the academic environment in the sense of subtle and yet prevalent authority-claims, 
granted differently to the participants. While the authority can qualitatively increase according 
to one’s reference, it can also immediately (i.e. non-reflectively based on socially ‘given’ 
assumptions) decrease on the basis of the ‘persons’ in dialogue. Here the ‘epistemic’ authority 
includes the institutional dimension of values as discussed above, i.e. the apparition of deceptive 
social realities having their roots in the given values of a society. For dialogue and debates, the 
‘name’ (including her/his ‘fame’) can influence the motivation to participate in the first place, 
as does the engagement in terms of the sincerity and honesty of the responses in ‘taking 
seriously’ the other. It can also lead again to a bare closure of the discussion refusing to engage 
with X or Y. The difficulty referred to by M. P. Rege to convince some paṇḍits to participate 
in a dialogue with philosophers trained in the Western traditions733 reminds us of the very 
concrete consequences of such a sense of epistemic authority, as does the more widely 
acknowledged difficulty to include traditional Indian philosophers in Western institutions. The 
valuational assumptions lying at the core of epistemic authority justifies speaking instead of 
“epistemic injustice”734. In an article on this topic, Ralph Weber uses the example of the 
encounter between Wittgenstein and Russell while the latter was already an acknowledged 
professor and the former, an “unknown German (…), speaking very little English (…) [who] 
turned out to be a man who had learned engineering at Charlottenburg.”735 (Russell’s own 
description). This was enough reason to refuse to take Wittgenstein’s philosophical position 
seriously. It is unfortunately obvious enough to extend the example to various prejudicial cases, 
but it is even more interesting to consider that this example can retrospectively easily denounce 
Russell’s attitude, because Wittgenstein has now himself acquired a status of ‘epistemic 
authority’ so that ‘Wittgenstein said that’ is an authoritative-claim equating to thousand people 
shouting at you (as described in the preceeding footnote). This make the case easy to decipher, 
the prejudice easy to locate, and Russell’s reticence easily dismissable (later by himself too). 
But what about the countless others who have been and will be refused authority or access to 
dialogue because of a lack of a posteriori granted recognition? How to account for their 
authority hic et nunc? Weber engages in an ethics of dialogue, which I believe was not Daya 
Krishna’s theoretical concern. He indeed was voluntarily trying to integrate different 
                                                 
733 In introducing the saṃvāda experiment of Pune, M. P. Rege gives an overview of the philosophical situation 
of India, focusing in particular on the exclusion of paṇḍits from the Indian academia and the lack of discussion 
between isolated philosophical communities. He also notes the responsibility incumbing to paṇḍits in this process, 
leading to a partial self-exclusion from the realm of discourse: “One must recognize that this geographical isolation 
was itself partly the result of the mental isolation into which the Brahmins had retreated owing to pride based on 
ignorance. They, perhaps, took unduly seriously the boast of the Mahābhārata that in matters of dharma, artha, 
kāma and mokṣa what is not here is not to be found elsewhere.” Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between 
Two Philosophical Traditions, xxiii. 
734 Weber, “Authority: Of German Rhinos and Chinese Tigers,” 156. 
735 Weber, 155. 
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philosophical communities to the practical experiments that he conducted. However, he refused 
to offer an a priori normative framework which would be subject to the same dissatisfaction 
once it is fixed into a set of rules to automatically apply in all contexts. Daya Krishna rather 
emphasizes the ‘encounter’ or the meeting of the person than a proper ethic, for the living person 
can relativize the authority of the texts: 
“The presence of the person, in a sense, transcends all that he has written and, to a certain 
extent, even negates it. But that is not what we are interested in here. Rather, it is the person 
actually thinking before us, and the relation of this to his finished thought that we read earlier 
in his writings, that I am interested in for the present. And the contrast here is almost as great 
as between the person and the thought that he thinks or the action that he does. Seeing the 
thought arising, so to say, before our very eyes is to see it in a different way than when one 
finds it finished, frozen, congealed between the covers of a book. The latter appearance is 
deceptive, but its deceptiveness is grasped more easily if one has the thinker thinking before 
oneself, even if it be only for a little while. After one has experienced it, everything becomes 
fluid once again – tentative, hesitant, provisional – subject to revision and counter-revision.”736 
This of course cannot answer the problem of the prejudices that would prevent these persons to 
have at first a right to speak, or to come to speak. It only considers how the presence relativizes 
the authority once s/he is already ‘speaking’. Other strategies have to be developed to tackle 
this problem, which I believe was his practical concern in the saṃvāda experiments, and for 
which I do not find an explicit theoretical answer in his writings. On the other hand, it also 
shows the limits of any systematic theory of dialogue or ethics of dialogue which would aim at 
providing a normative framework for all dialogues. This uncertainty and the dissatisfaction that 
is bound to occur are an intrinsic part of any dialogue. It is for this reason that I consider it to 
be crucial to consider theories of dialogue concurrently with practical dialogical forms, and in 
particular to conceive of every settings and framework ‘step by step’ and experience by 
experience, since they need to be re-thought after their being experience. This ‘unready-made’ 
aspect of dialogue is another locus for its creative potential, for it can be re-imagined at every 
instance, and will turn out to be differently (even if always deceptively). It also shows how 
values differ in a dialogical context: neither as a priori set-up values (the most extreme form of 
which would be the Platonic ideas), nor as a formal systematic theory, not even in terms of 
virtues or normativity (à la Habermas). Rather, Daya Krishna accentuates the movements and 
valuational processes. He proceeds by describing the dynamic underlying the coming into 
existence of such prejudices while tackling them practically by organizing further dialogues, 
truthful to the dynamic itself between apprehension and realization.  
This can explain, I think, the difference of the relevance of authority for dialogue that Weber 
specifies when he analyzes that “the issue, however, runs deeper.” He continues: 
“On the one hand, epistemic authority as conscious and voluntary renunciation of any and all 
opposition seems to preclude any dialogue, and certainly any debate. Dialogue and debate are 
all about reacting. On the other hand, epistemic authority as that which should be granted to 
                                                 
736 Daya Krishna, “Thinking versus Thought: Strategies for Conceptual Creativity,” 28–29. 
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any interlocutor understood in his or her capacity as a potential knower, seems to be a condition 
of any dialogue and debate.”737 
Interpreting Daya Krishna freely, I would hypothesize that he would rather refute the second 
term, or maybe modify it into ‘epistemic trust’.  Authority immediately brings about an unequal 
condition while ‘trusting’ that someone can know, can think, can ask a question (even if s/he 
does not know) might create some new insights and open new directions toward which the 
dialogue can lead. Thus, for Daya Krishna, ‘bracketing’ the authority or rejecting one’s own 
and other’s authorities for taking the risk of trusting the other’s ability to reflect, seems more 
adequate to his ‘human’ epistemic account. Attitudes also shape dialogues. because of this, the 
external normative influence to be exercised on attitudes to internally transform them is very 
limited. The normativity is rather imposed on the participants in a certain setting. Such a 
normativity cannot be detached from the particular setting in which it is established, nor 
universally settled. It is subject to the same dissatisfaction and uncertainty.  
This uncertainty characterizes the dialogue, according to which a meeting can become fruitful 
(everybody can remember ‘meeting’ someone in a dialogue whose open-mindedness was 
pleasantly fertile for thinking a problem anew), and of course, can turn into dogmatic repetition 
of a certain orthodoxy impeding any dialogue. Between these two poles lie most of the concrete 
dialogues in which an implicit agreement is established to ‘tolerate’ certain attitudes. Beyond 
the obvious (like violence and personal offenses), who and what determines what can be 
‘tolerated’ or not in a dialogue, how to address someone or not, what can be said and what 
cannot? Answering this would imply a common understanding upon which to agree. How to 
create an ‘understanding’ between attitudes which precisely fall out of the cognitive 
hermeneutics, i.e. a non-verbal and non-cognitive understanding of the attitudes and of their 
interactions? Can there be a hermeutics in the realm of actions and values? Daya Krishna raises 
further problems in this regard: 
“Comprehension, however, presupposes that there is something preexistent which is to be 
understood or comprehended. It, thus, commits oneself to a metaphysics or ontology which 
gives primacy to the idea of Being. On the other hand, the idea of possible effectuation through 
a conceptualisation which is both creative and critical at the same time brings not ‘Being’ but 
that which 'ought-to-be' into the centre of thought. It, thus commits one to a thinking which 
gives primacy to the idea of value or the good which, in this context, mean the same thing.”738 
Comprehension and understanding thus presuppose a common rational normative framework 
preexisting for all participants. It presupposes to share the same conceptual structure rooted in 
similar philosophical traditions, or to sufficiently master the intellectual pre-requirements of a 
tradition to understand the coming-into-being of a certain way of thinking. For instance, to 
understand a philosophical conference on Heidegger’s philosophy requires some philosophical 
knowledge on Heidegger, but even more importantly the broader context of his philosophy, 
implying Greek philosophy. The implicit amount of pre-required knowledge (which is also 
                                                 
737 Weber, “Authority: Of German Rhinos and Chinese Tigers,” 160. 
738 Daya Krishna, “Philosophy: Influence of Theory on Practice,” in Philosophy: Theory and Pratice. Proceedings 
of the International Seminar on World Philosophy. Madras, December 7-17, 1970., ed. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The 
Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras (Madras, 1974), 313–14. 
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unequal, since as Daya Krishna elsewhere notices, nobody is “embarrassed”739 of not knowing 
K. C. Bhattacharyya, while knowledge of Heidegger and his context belongs to the presupposed 
‘philosophical’ culture) concretely explains M. P. Rege’s comment when introducing the Pune 
experiment (already quoted in 3.3.1). There he justifies the choice of Russell as a starting point: 
“I selected Russell’s theory of the nature of proposition as presented in his Principles of 
Mathematics as the subject of the dialogue because it represents something like an attempt to 
make a new beginning in philosophical analysis by turning one’s back on what has gone on 
before. I thought that it would therefore be comparatively easier to put the theory across to 
pandits as its exposition would not demand many references to the tenets and arguments of 
earlier schools and thinkers, and the points of agreement and disagreement between them. Also 
Russell’s realistic and analytical approach has an obvious affinity with that of Nyāya and 
Mīmāṃsā.”740 
Furthermore, the prerequirements of knowledge in such an academic context also include the 
general rules of conducting a lecture in the context in which the lecture is delivered. This 
includes formal aspects such as the logical progression and the structure of the presentation. It 
thus rests on preexisting knowledge in the broad sense, which differs across philosophical 
traditions. I highlighted for instance the dialectic implied in the idea of counter-position 
(pūrvapakṣa) (in 2.1.1 and 5.2), which can remind us of the Greek dialectic. However, this 
differs from the dogma of innovation of our contemporary academia, where the singularity of 
the idea is emphasized. To avoid remaining implicitly committed to the standards through 
which we have been trained, Daya Krishna shifts the relevance of understanding to the one of 
effectuating. This shift emphasizes less the (lone) mastering of what the understanding 
presupposes, than the possibility of intersubjectively achieving something different on the basis 
of various understandings. This possibility refers again to an ideality to be actualized. He does 
not mention dialogue at this place, but the practical relevance of philosophers in general. 
However, I believe this shift is also crucial for dialogue. Considering thinking and knowledge 
as a puruṣārtha thus has the advantage of shifting our attention from preexisting categories of 
thinking and normative models to the uncertainty and the possibility of the ‘ought-to-be’. 
Within this idea of possible effectuation, comprehension plays a role without exclusively 
determining dialogue at the same time. 
Thus, conceiving dialogue as a nexus of values, feelings and knowledge enables us to observe 
the constitution of knowledge itself as a result of its contextuality 741  that implies the 
intersubjectivity forming it. For Daya Krishna, this is again not simply a question of personal 
taste or an empty label to define those who seek knowledge. The attitude of a seeker is also 
                                                 
739 Daya Krishna, “Encounters between Civilizations: The Question of the Centre and the Periphery.” 
740 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xxv. 
741 See Prasenjit Biswas’ comment: “More than establishing a first-order relationship between action and its 
immediate context, Daya Krishna examines the contextuality of such an act by positing how feeling, judging, 
telling, responding and such other acts take a ‘self-referential’ turn. Contextuality of an act lies in showing how 
the very act is a necessary part of the ‘context’. This, Daya Krishna poses contra-Kant, against the indispensability 
of a priori forms of intuition that transcend all the contexts of activity that spring from it.” Prasenjit Biswas, “Daya 
Krishna’s ‘Presuppositionless Philosophy’: Sublimity as the Source of Value and Knowledge,” in Philosophy as 
Saṃvāda and Svarāj: Dialogical Meditations on Daya Krishna and Ramchandra Gandhi, ed. Shail Mayaram 
(New Delhi: SAGE, 2014), 140. 
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what determines knowledge, like the way philosophers think and use the texts determines 
knowledge and bears a mark on the particular culture in which such knowledge is produced. In 
the valuational conception of knowledge and in the correlation between apprehension and 
realization, knowledge is itself composed by the facts, actions and participants of knowledge, 
in which sense the attitude is an integral part of knowledge itself.  
“What exactly is the role played by the ‘inner sense’ [in the Kantian sense] in relation to the 
seeking of knowledge, is the question that does not seem to have been raised in epistemological 
literature, which has dealt with the problem of knowledge. (…) These [the contents of the inner 
sense742], strangely, are not supposed to be of any relevance or significance to what is called 
‘knowledge’ at the human level and its claim to be ‘true’. Yet sincerity, honesty, and objectivity 
are accepted by everybody to be the necessary prerequisites for any one engaging in the 
‘knowledge entreprise’ or staking the claim that what he ‘claims’ to know is ‘true’. (…) 
Knowledge, thus, is essentially a ‘human’ achievement and depends, in a strange sense, on a 
‘belief’ in the veracity and the trustworthiness of those who claim to know. Such a belief is a 
necessary prerequisite for knowledge and unless we try to understand what this belief is and 
what it presupposes or implies, we cannot understand what knowledge consists of. In other 
words, unless we understand what is meant to be ‘sincere’, ‘objective’, ‘truthful’ and 
‘trustworthy’ we cannot understand what it means to know at the human level. Besides these, 
there has to be assumed a desire to impart the knowledge that one has, not to be secretive, to 
help others through knowledge for the good of mankind.”743 
First, let me note here that a ‘belief in the veracity and trustworthiness of those who claim to 
know’ is not formulated in terms of ‘authority’, even if it bears the implications outlined by 
Ralph Weber above, i.e. the basic recognition that a seeker has something to say which is 
potentially true and an opportunity to think further. It is devoid of authority in the sense of being 
forced to accept the other’s thesis, but rather thought in terms of ‘trusting’ that there is 
something ‘valuable’ worthy of understanding, reacting upon and thinking ‘with’. While it 
might appear to be a simple variation of expression, it should not be so: Daya Krishna explicitly 
relates (in an omitted passage within this quote) to Śabda744 Pramāṇa745 in the context of the 
Nyāya Sūtra. While thinking what being a seeker means from (and beyond) this tradition, Daya 
Krishna vehemently refuses at the same time the ‘authority’ that is prescripted to the text.746 He 
                                                 
742  They “comprise such items as desires, feelings, emotions, imaginings, hopes, fears and all the other 
paraphernelia which constitute the human situations.” Op. Cit.  
743 Daya Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth,” 136–37. 
744 The problem concerning the definition of śabda is introduced elsewhere in the following terms: “Śabda as a 
pramāṇa is defined as the upādeśa of an āptapuruṣa, but much of the discussion in the text does not seem to have 
any connection with this definition. The problem of eternity or non-eternity of śabda, for example, seems 
completely irrelevant to the definition offered by Gautama in the text. Thus, one has to find whether the term śabda 
means sound in general or word as spoken, or as the advice of a trustworthy person (āpta) for the well-being of 
the person concerned.” Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras, 18. 
745 “Yet sincerity, honesty, and objectivity are accepted by everybody to be the necessary prerequesites for any 
one engaging in the ‘knowledge entreprise’ or staking the claim that what he ‘claims’ to know is ‘true’. The Indians 
called this Śabda Pramāṇa which has generally been dismissed by all ‘serious’ philosophers as being totally 
unphilosophical in nature. Yet all knowledge at the human level has to be necessary ‘human’ by definition and 
this involves someone’s claim that he knows about ‘something’. And such a claim is accepted if one has no reason 
to disbelieve or doubt what is said.” Op. Cit. 
746 In his study The Nyāya Sūtras: A New Commentary on an Old Text, Daya Krishna attempts to show the 
contradictions that the commentatorial tradition brought in the text by restricting knowledge in view of certain 
authoritative prescriptions or addresses, subsequently relating āpta-puruṣa to the Vedas, to the Āyurveda and to 
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rejects the Vedic authority to which the text refers while at the same time exploring further how 
the idea of śabda could contribute to the discussion. He sees in particular an important insight 
in this concept in the notion of reliability of the source of the word that it brings, i.e. as 
trustfulness or trustworthiness.747 He thus continues as follows:  
“But what does it mean to be Jijñāsu or seeker of knowledge or truth? The tradition has 
interestingly brought in the notion of adhikāra [competence, right to knowledge748] in this 
connection. The term is so ambiguous and varied that it is not easy to pinpoint its exact meaning. 
There are examples of those who have interpreted it in the context of the Śruti in the Indian 
tradition and viewed the ‘right’ for the pursuit of ‘knowledge’ contained in it, that is of the 
Vedas in particular and the Vedic Corpus in general. The women and the sūdras were explicitly 
excluded from the right to pursue this knowledge. (…) In fact, the idea of adhikāra-bheda [the 
barrier between the privileged (those who have the right to know) and the subaltern (who are 
doomed not to be taught] has been carried to extremes and whenever one does not wish to 
impart one’s knowledge to someone, one can always legitimize it by bringing in this notion 
into the picture, forgetting that ultimately it is the desire to know and learn which is the only 
thing one can demand of one who has come to learn from someone.”749 
Thus, for Daya Krishna, trustfulness belongs to knowledge, in particular in (spoken) dialogical 
knowledge, irrespective of one’s community. Secondly, the whole valuational dimension of 
attitudes seem to converge in both the responsibility for the realization of knowledge and in the 
creativity for generating knowledge itself, understood as the dynamic and anthropological 
constitution of knowledge. After this careful critique, Daya Krishna elaborates on the relevance 
of thinking jijñāsu (seeker of knowledge) for a ‘valuational epistemology’: 
“The definitions given in the Nyāya Sūtra point out explicitly to a dimension of knowledge 
and truth which has not been noticed and paid attention to even by Indian commentators on the 
text. The term upadeśa [helpful advice] points to someone else, someone other than the person 
who knows and has been designated as āpta because of the fact that he knows. The ‘other’ in 
the definition is one who is desirous of knowing, one who wants to know or rather one who is 
a seeker of knowledge and truth. This is usually conveyed in the Indian texts by the terms 
Jijñāsā and Jijñāsu (…). But, there is a dimension of the term ‘seeker’ of knowledge and truth 
which has not been understood, for if it had been understood, the concept of āptapuruṣa [a 
trustworthy person750] would not have been understood the way it has been in the tradition751. 
                                                 
Īśwara (Lord) in order to safeguard knowledge from its ‘human’ variations. See the details of the analysis in Daya 
Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras, 27-35;180-181;196-197. 
747 See Daya Krishna, 27. 
748 The Sanskrit translations of the quotes from this article are those provided by the editors in the reedition of this 
article in Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 165–77. 
749 Daya Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth,” 138. 
750 The editors add “in the context of the article, someone who knows that only through sharing knowledge is 
knowledge possible”. Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 177. 
751 This relates to the critique evoked above. The problem is further expanded in his commentary on the Nyāya 
Sūtra: “However, one of the basic problem with respect to both upamāna and śabda does not seem to have been 
noticed and it is that the notions of ‘similarity’ and ‘reliability’ or ‘trustworthiness’ are fundamental to all 
knowledge as it is inconceivable without them. (…) As for śabda, one has to accept reliability and trustworthiness 
of even one’s own memory, let alone of that which is said by someone else. Knowledge is a collective entreprise 
and, in case it is so, śabda pramāṇa will have to be regarded as the most foundational in its acquisition. (…) 
Vācaspati Miśra introduces the notion of Īśwara in the context of śabda pramāṇa and in doing so destroys the 
notion of the “āpta puruṣa” in terms of which the śabda pramāṇa was defined by the author of the N.S. If Īśwara 
alone can be an āpta puruṣa then obviously there can be no other person or persons who can be given that 
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To put the point in another way, one may ask the question ‘Is one who “knows” not desirous 
of knowledge and truth?’ In other words, is the āptapuruṣa not a Jijñāsu and if he is not, how 
can he be an āptapuruṣa at all. The distinction between one who knows or claims to know and 
one who is desirous to know is after all a relative one. One who has ceased or stopped seeking 
truth or knowledge has already given up the puruṣārtha in which he was engaged as a human 
being, which, in a sense, defined him at least in respect of this dimension. The seeking for truth 
and knowledge is one of the puruṣārthas or ends of human life which defines what being 
human means, and if one has ceased to pursue this end, then, to that extent, one has ceased to 
be human.”752 
The distinction pointed out by Daya Krishna’s reading of the Nyāya Sūtra appears to me an 
(underestimated) crux of the matter: can ‘knowing’ be ‘achieved’ without ‘desiring to know’? 
What would even be the ‘achievement’ of knowledge, if not a transitory self-reflective 
organized conception of knowledge ready to be further completed and questioned? Can an 
expert, i.e. a knower of a field, in a ‘state’ of knowledge be without seeking this knowledge at 
the first place? And furthermore, can one be a knower, i.e. have achieved a ‘state’ of knowledge? 
What is even a ‘state’ of knowledge but the self-reflective analysis of what one has 
retrospectively learned and thought until now, necessarily unfulfilled in regard of future 
findings? In which case, does the word ‘expert’ even make a sense, and are our conceptions of 
expertise in today’s academic context adequate to consider the knowledge-entreprise? If Daya 
Krishna’s conception is accepted (which might not be the case since it would question our entire 
conception of productive/rentable academic knowledge), is an expert not an ignorant seeking 
to know, desirous to question? Such an attitude could be coined as ‘epistemological humility’ 
which would convey an entry of the valuational realm into the epistemological.  
I believe that Daya Krishna’s conception would encompass and admit the necessity of such a 
quality among what makes one āpta, but I think it bears further implications. Such an 
epistemological humility would be restricted to an ethical view of knowledge in which the 
virtue of dialogue relies on each participant. The ethical would be conditioned by the 
epistemological: one would need to act ethically with humility in order for knowledge to be 
open-minded and equal. However, in Daya Krishna’s reading of the Nyāya Sūtra, the 
epistemological depends on the valuational and vice versa. Knowledge is firstly produced 
because one is desirous to know, and this desire proves to be unfulfilled in reality which 
produces in return more seeking, which enhances more knowledge, etc. Secondly, ‘seeking’ is 
not restricted to one personal attitude but is part of the human consciousness. As Daya Krishna 
states, “if one has ceased to pursue this end, one has ceased to be human.” (op. cit.). By 
connecting knowledge itself to the vital force of human, i.e. to the very dynamic of 
fulfillment/unfulfillment of life, Daya Krishna makes of knowledge as a puruṣārtha a universal 
quest (with infinite forms) which grows from the particular limits of each individual engaged 
                                                 
appellation. (…) The sutra 2.1.68 explicitly refers to Āyurveda as example to support the contention that there is 
such a thing as śabda pramāṇa but then Āyurveda will have to be regarded as the word of Īśwara and hence final 
in respect to what it deals with. This obviously will be difficult to maintain in face of the fact that the texts known 
as Āyurveda show unmistakable signs of additions and alterations even at the time when Vācaspati and Udayana 
were writing their commentaries.” Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras, 196. 
752 Daya Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth,” 137–38. 
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in the collectivity of the universal desire.753 Desire is again here regulative. It does not exclude 
that some will refuse to listen or reject other’s positions. It is nevertheless grounded in the 
reflective nature of ‘humans’ and in their intersubjective process, as also analyzed by Prasenjit 
Biswas commenting on Daya Krishna: 
“Value is created in terms of the Puruṣārthas without ascribing them to persons but to reflexive 
nature of being of humans that ‘mediates’ between oneself and another. Values are not 
subjective, they are a part of the ongoing process of subject’s domain of relationality and in 
this sense they are ‘objectifiable’ in the possibilities of relationship with the other. Daya 
Krishna explores this pregnant domain of values not in the sense of where ‘I’ resides, but in 
the sense of extending the capacities of the subject that gives it ‘freedom’ to ‘will’ and ‘imagine’ 
that can ‘re-live the fact [that] the other is also the center of his world’.”754 
I think that it is not possible to understand this ‘ongoing process’ without positing a regulative 
ideal of knowledge and truth, which is how I would understand ‘vāda’ in Daya Krishna’s 
dialogical perspective. The motivation to engage in dialogue originates at first from a belief that 
a ‘higher’ truth or knowledge or reality could be reached. However, this sense of truth entailed 
in vāda remains regulative, in the sense that it is the puruṣārtha dimension of knowledge that 
is emphasized. Secondly, there is no ‘liberation’ or ‘enlightenment’ to attain, except as a 
regulative ‘improvement’ understood as efficiency and creativity in generating new findings. 
Knowledge consists in succession of clarifications being questioned and clarified again. What 
is important here is rather the description of a certain path for knowledge and of knowledge, a 
desire which is universally conceivable and existentially realizable by each seeker. It goes much 
further than any ethical or moral depiction:  
“But the realm of values is not exhausted by the moral or the ethical distinction alone; it pursues 
one relentlessly, questioning and asking if what is, is as it should be, for if it could be otherwise, 
it might not only be different but also more satisfying to oneself and others in more ways than 
one. Dr Mukund Lath has called this aucitya-bodha, meaning thereby that the inalienable and 
intrinsic property of self-consciousness which sees all that it is aware of in terms of what it is 
not, detached from the pleasantness or unpleasantness or even the neutral feeling that all 
consciousness-qua-consciousness usually has towards it. The term aucitya does not convey the 
negative centrality of this aspect of self-consciousness which finds itself perpetually 
dissatisfied with whatever is even if what is has been brought into being by its own activity. 
                                                 
753 I articulated elsewhere this productive tension between universal/local in the epistemology of counter-positions: 
“In this sense, the method of pūrvapakṣa rests on the tension between the concept itself and its incarnation, and 
between a will of conceptual universalisation implied in methodological counterpositions and the consciousness 
of its limitation implied by the other three dimensions. Without will of conceptual universalisation, 
counterpositions constitute unrelated philosophical alternative modes of thinking: alternatives to different 
philosophies, different philosophical traditions, or different philosophers/ opponents. These do not have to be 
correlated to assert some truth-values. Without existential limitation and empirical practice, there is a risk of 
reducing every philosophy, tradition, or concept to a universally and eternally applicable “essence”, a risk that 
Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda averts. The method of pūrvapakṣa enables therefore to think the relation between, on the 
one hand, conceptual universalisation and, on the other hand, its constant experience of its limits, inadequacy, or 
dissatisfaction, begetting thus the need to conceptualise anew through reciprocal reflection and modification. This 
tension constitutes the condition for alternative, critical, and creative pūrvapakṣas, which, being renewable in 
concrete dialogues, engage thereby further the significance and concept of saṃvāda itself.” Freschi, Coquereau, 
and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 199. 
754 Biswas, “Daya Krishna’s ‘Presuppositionless Philosophy’: Sublimity as the Source of Value and Knowledge,” 
151. 
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This is what gives rise to that Angst or alienation or Entfremdung or being banished from the 
Garden of Eden, about which existentialists and some other modem thinkers have spoken. But 
though there has been much talk about it, it has not been adequately appreciated that intrinsic 
negation involved in self-consciousness not only gives rise to that dialectic, about which Hegel 
and Marx spoke in recent times, but also to this nagging, perpetual doubt about one’s own 
authenticity, honesty, and sincerity in talking about it all. One is never even sure whether one 
has done all that one could to meet the challenge posed by this awareness that something should 
be or ought to be and the obligations that it imposes on oneself to realize it or bring it into 
being.”755 
This sense of obligation is an existential one, one that we face in our own realization of 
incompleteness. It is related to all consciousness in the tension between being and becoming. 
Authenticity, honesty and sincerity are in this view not defined by an a priori rational and ethical 
framework imposed on a society or culture but belong to the consciousness’ sense of ‘ought’. 
Dialogues are an expression of this seeking for knowledge and the readiness to engage with 
others that results from this sense of ‘ought’.  
 
6.2.3. The Freedom to Engage, the Freedom to Withdraw 
 
The sense of obligation and the regulative ideal originating from the ‘ought’ of values are 
related to the concrete dissatisfactions of the experience from where the above described 
Entfremdung, Angst and alienation756 arise. Thus, the tension between the reality as it ought to 
be and the reality as it is creates two contradictory reactions. It gives rise simultaneously to a 
seeking liberation from the negativity of dissatisfaction by reaching a transcendental state that 
would equate the regulative ideal posited, and to the worldly feelings of Angst and alienation 
that originate from the confrontation of the dissatisfactions with the empirical world. This 
creates two directions, one ‘away’ from the contradictions of the world into a transcendental 
reunion of all broken identities and one ‘back’ to the world through the dissatisfactions of reality 
vis-à-vis the ideal. These two movements imply a different conception of time which is derived 
from a sense of ‘values’. The detachment from the worldly is an abstraction away from the 
distinctions or sequences of time, while the engagement in the world alternate between past, 
                                                 
755 Daya Krishna, “Freedom, Reason, Ethics and Aesthetics,” 7. 
756 See Daya Krishna’s definition of alienation: “What constitutes the ‘other’ is primarily the realm of persons with 
whom one comes in direct contact of some sort or other and who help, obstruct, fulfil or frustrate one, in the realm 
of feelings or of action or both, and who are thus objects of concern on the part of most persons most of the time. 
The realm of the Personal, then, to use a phrase of N. V. Banerjee, constitutes par excellence the realm of the 
‘other’. This is the realm where one finds one’s heaven or hell, where one feels at home or alienated. The ‘other’, 
however, is not a bare ‘other’, but is socially structured at least in the first instance. One is born not merely into 
the world but into a world that is always socially structured and, to a large extent, socially interpreted. Yet, 
whatever structuring and interpretation there may already be, one has to restructure and reinterpret it once again 
in one’s own individual way. One is born, or as the existentialists say, thrown into the world, not just as a person 
but with a particular body, into a particular family, in a specific culture at a unique period of its historical 
development, and in a society which already has a fairly determinate system of role-expectations with a coordinate 
system of rewards and punishments. Each individual encounter these and has to come to terms with them and 
transcend them in his own way. The coming to terms never ceases nor, for that matter, does the need for 
transcendence. Between the alienation and the over-coming of alienation lies the eternal dialectic of man, at all 
levels and in all dimensions.” Daya Krishna, “Alienation, Positive and Negative,” 40–41. 
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present and future.757  Dissatisfactions are also the realization of the insufficiencies of the 
present and the unfulfillment of the past with regard to the infinite possibilities of the future. 
The ‘significance’ and the ‘meaning’ in particular associated with values as puruṣārthas are 
derived both from a retrospective understanding of the past’s transmitted knowledge and its 
present reinterpretation with regard to the errors and lacks to be revised and the enhancement 
of future knowledge. For Daya Krishna, these characteristics are also those of freedom: 
“But, then, this prior question will have to be asked as to what is this ‘freedom’, or ‘liberation’, 
about which we are thinking in the human context, and whether it is so central as we tend to 
assume, or is just one value among others with which it has to be reconciled, as without that it 
itself may become meaningless, or stale758 and futile. 
Perhaps the answer lies not in denying the practical or applied aspect of every ideal value that 
man pursues, but in ‘seeing’ that this aspect neither exhausts nor is essential to that with makes 
human life meaningful in itself in the context of temporality, which whatever one may say, is 
‘felt’ by one as extending indefinitely into the future. Human life 759  may only be given 
significance and meaning through the pursuit of something that is not only intrinsically 
unrealizable in time, but which is capable of being perceived as developing both quantitatively 
and qualitatively when seen retrospectively from the constantly moving vantage point of the 
present. The moment of retrospection appears far off from the ‘ideal’ as it ever was, and is 
‘felt’ to be so760. 
Freedom shares both these characteristics, as it seems to be an ‘ideal’ value to be realized 
through action both at the individual and the collective level. However, it is also presupposed 
by any and every pursuit that man engages in, challenging us to ‘think’ about something that, 
though already achieved, is yet still to be achieved, and in that sense is never achieved, or can 
even possibly be achieved.”761 
Out of socio-political reasons,762 out of revolt against the prevalent ‘mokṣa-centricity’ of Indian 
philosophy (which he sees as an escape from the worldly), but also out of philosophical belief 
                                                 
757 “Time is not now a form of inner sensibility as Kant said, but a form of human action where the ‘future’ forms 
an immanent ingredient of the ‘present’ shaping it in the direction of that which is ‘desired’ and hence is regarded 
as ‘desirable’. The fallacy involved is necessary, as without this illusion action at the human level just can not be. 
(…) Time is now that in which purposes can be realized and ‘freedom’ shows its power to bend causality to achieve 
its ends which would have been dismissed as unreal by a consciousness that was confined to the immediacy of the 
present, and to that only.” Daya Krishna, “Possible Worlds,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 
XVIII, no. 2 (June 2001): 186. 
758 The published version of the article says ‘steele’ instead of ‘stale’ (which I assume is a mistake of the edition). 
I follow the original unpublished manuscript, available at https://www.dayakrishna.org/c (p.22 of the unpublished 
document). 
759 Similarly, the published version omits ‘human life’ and relates the end of the sentence to the previous one. I 
here also follow the original manuscript. 
760 The published version varies: “though capable of being seen as developing, both quantitatively and qualitatively 
when seen retrospectively from the constantly moving vantage point of the present, yet appears as far off from the 
‘ideal’ as it ever was, and is ‘felt’ to be so”. Daya Krishna, “The Cosmic, Biological, the Cultural Conditionings 
and the Seeking of Freedom,” 144–45. There are further minor grammatical variations in the quote, which however 
do not modify the meaning.  
761 Daya Krishna, 144–45. (for the published version); p.22-23 for the online unpublished version.  
762 This refers to the caste and gender exclusion that operated in reserving ascetism (conceived as withdrawal from 
the world) as mentioned in relation to mokṣa in the Brahmanical tradition in 6.1. See: “There is, in fact, another 
dimension to this problem of asceticism and its relation to freedom. Asceticism, at least historically, has been 
primarily a ‘male’ phenomenon. Women, by and large, have been ignored as the possible ‘subjects’ to pursue the 
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into the activity of consciousness and its relation to other-consciousnesses (explained in more 
details in chapter 7),763 and the openness of the future, Daya Krishna is a strong defender of the 
movement ‘back’ to the world through dissatisfactions rather than away from them.764 This 
does not deny the withdrawal from the world, away and into oneself either: as a movement, the 
direction ‘back’ or into the world is an oscillation that implies its other pole. Epistemologically 
seen, the intellectual detachment above analyzed (in 5.2.1) necessitates first a position to be 
able to move away from it through the counter-position or the other’s position for modifying 
one’s position accordingly. But the intellectual detachment is not an absolute detachment from 
the world or a quest for transcendental unity, it rather implies engagement, a movement back 
and forth. Here as in the case of the analysis of mokṣa, Daya Krishna’s critique is not directed 
at the ‘withdrawal’ or ‘liberation’ conceived in these terms per se, but at its prevalence or 
hierarchy vis-à-vis other forms of freedoms. Applying the dynamic to his own philosophy, it is 
thanks to such ‘liberation as withdrawal’ that Daya Krishna can posit a ‘liberation as 
engagement’ as counter-position at the first place, which means that without the former idea, 
his own articulation would also be impossible. Such differentiations are not only necessary 
within his philosophy, they constitute for him the foundation of freedom in the plurality of 
perspectives that it opens and the dynamic in the deceptive realizations that it enables. Thus, 
freedom as the choice between alternatives, as the open-ended realizations and the expression 
of differences ground the intellectual pluralism and the dynamic tension between past and 
future.765 On the contrary for Daya Krishna, conceiving freedom solely as transcendental unity 
denies such a freedom and the potential deceptive realization within the world: 
                                                 
ascetic ideal. (…) But, if it is so, then asceticism or renunciation cannot be the ‘truth’ of human beings, or the 
ideal, as it, almost deliberately, excludes half of humanity. (…) It is surprising that neither the Advaitin nor the 
Sankhyan has seen this elementary problem which contradicts its own basic metaphysical insights.” Daya Krishna, 
Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 152–53. 
763 See Daya Krishna’s strong critique of the idea of freedom involved in renunciation (the critique of the exclusion 
of women follows this quote): “The freedom is both evidenced and realized in the act of withdrawal of attention. 
This activity of consciousness which stops the flow of the activity of desiring is the foundation of what is generally 
known as ‘asceticism’ in different religions and civilizations. But those who have emphasized this have forgotten 
that in its capacity to withdraw from what it attends, the ascetic, in fact, is not a free person at all, for he is ‘bound’ 
to the fact of ‘withdrawal’ to which he is obsessively committed and from which he cannot withdraw as he thinks 
that therein alone lies his alleged freedom.” Daya Krishna, 152. 
764 This again, is not only a theoretical principle for Daya Krishna but bears concrete implications. See his letter, 
dated 29.08.04, (unpublished, p.31): “’Sannyasa’ [ascetic renunciation of the world] is not good for anybody least 
of all for an intellectual like you. I am glad that you have returned back to the ‘world’ which needs us more as 
those who have a little detachment will alone have that other centered consciousness which not only is a prime 
condition for engaging in the knowledge-enterprise, but also for making the world a little better to live in both for 
oneself and others.” 
765 Showing again how Daya Krishna ‘embodies’ his own philosophical principles, Bhuvan Chandel and K. L. 
Sharma point out that Daya Krishna’s commitment to pluralism is thus related to the relevance he ascribes to such 
a sense of freedom: “His [Daya Krishna’s] interest lies elsewhere; to find out why a thinker expresses 
himself/herself in one particular way rather than another. He situates a thinker in his cultural background and then 
tries to understand and interpret him. The western culture and thinkers draw his pointed attention. This approach 
has a positive outcome. It leads to a type of cultural and intellectual pluralism. It is no surprise that Daya Krishna 
is a consistent and vigorous pluralist. His method of critical dialogue is not intended to demolish or even distort 
other’s point of view. In this conceptual articulation one is pleased to find that self and others are engaged in a 
continuous dialogue providing best possible freedom to both. This form of philosophizing is born of Daya’s deep 
commitment to freedom as value.” ‘Preface’, in Chandel and Sharma, The Philosophy of Daya Krishna, viii. 
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“Those who have asserted the reality of identity or its superiority to difference have done so 
only at the cost of denying all reality and value to the world we live in and the diverse 
experiences that we go through in it. The Advaita Vedantins are the best known protagonists 
of this denial of the reality of all difference and they have treated the whole world as māyā. 
The cost is too great and, in any case, unacceptable to anyone who cherishes or values the 
immense diversity at every level of being which is found in the world. Not only this, it denies 
also the very notion of ‘possibility’ which opens horizons for man’s effort at attaining what is 
not yet achieved and thus what is ‘different’ from it. The notion of an ‘ideal’ itself involves a 
difference from actuality, and without ideals, life is not worth living. Thus the reality of 
difference is that which makes one move and without acknowledging its reality one would be 
dead.”766 
Daya Krishna’s conception is indeed directed against mokṣa-centered philosophical systems or 
any kind of renunciation or asceticism that overemphasizes withdrawal as the ‘highest’ freedom, 
which incites him to argue for a freedom that remains conditioned by one’s embodied 
limitations (corporal, socio-cultural, historical, etc.) and by others, thanks to whom it originates 
in the first place. ‘Conditioning’ freedom as ‘freedom’, i.e. as the freedom to evolve further, is 
thus Daya Krishna’s first necessity when inquiring on freedom, which avoids at the same time 
the ‘temptation’ to ‘free’ oneself from freedom itself, or to be attached to the illusions of I-
centricity freedom (the topic of which constitutes the next chapter, 7).  
“It is true that conditions within which freedom is exercised condition its exercise, but the 
direction that this exercise takes and the way it is exercised create those very conditions that 
retard or enhance it in an essential way. The facilitating or obstructing situations are at least 
partly created by oneself and, at another level, by the fact whether the exercise of freedom by 
oneself has enhanced the freedom of others, or at least not affected it adversely. Freedom, thus, 
is not what the existentialists, postmodernists, or even the mokṣa-seekers have thought it to be. 
It is embedded in a plurality of interactive beings, living and human, where there is no such 
thing as freedom given for once and for all time, but something that is continuously lost and 
gained by the dynamic interplay of the interacting constituents of the dynamics.”767 
While I develop the consequences of the others for thinking freedom in terms of relationality at 
the level of consciousness itself (7.3), I want to outline here the relevance of such a worldly 
account of freedom for thinking the dynamic of values which, in Daya Krishna’s account, 
depend on it. This implies to consider freedom as subjected to conditions and dissatisfactions. 
For Daya Krishna, freedom is for embodied agents, which means that it is delimited by the 
actions of others and by one’s own limits. More specifically, it is by reinterpreting the freedom 
to withdraw and to engage with others in the context of dialogue, which Daya Krishna thought 
of as an opposition between a social existential account of freedom and an ascetic or 
contemplative one, that I want to suggest some further views for justifying the lack of normative 
ethical prescriptions by Daya Krishna studied above. I am trying to outline a way to understand 
the motivations to engage in dialogue in relation to the freedom to engage and to withdraw. The 
freedom to engage and withdraw implies first an awareness of its fragility which is correlated 
to dissatisfactions in the limitations of its exercise: 
                                                 
766 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 104. 
767 Daya Krishna, “Freedom, Reason, Ethics and Aesthetics,” 11. 
278 
 
“The freedom to withdraw, as we said earlier, is always there, but only temporarily so, as one 
has to return, unless one chooses to exercise the freedom, in order to destroy the very center of 
freedom at the human level itself. To talk of freedom in the context of death seems 
meaningless, just as one does not know where would freedom be if one were not born as a 
human being. Within these two opposed but interrelated limits, freedom at the human level has 
its being, and only by its human exercise can a realm of freedom be built by individual and 
collective effort of each in the consciousness that itself is freedom centered and knows that its 
freedom is fragile and dependent not only on others, but on the universe itself, or that which 
constitutes its being a reality.” 768 
This fragility is itself correlated to its intersubjective origin, which implies a dependency on 
others upon which, precisely, one has no control over their ‘engagement’ and ‘withdrawal’. 
Interestingly for thinking dialogue, the otherness of these others is not abstract, since the 
engagement of the other is visible in the common dialogue in which all consciousnesses are 
engaged. This avoids aggregating the others in one general category, which otherwise can lead 
to binary conception such as Indian/Western, and instead rather focuses on the outcome of 
concrete participations. 
 “It is the other ‘selves’ or consciousnesses which play an essential role in creating those 
standards of validation which, however tentative in character, determine the standards of 
quality and validity of what one experiences oneself. One’s experience is neither isolated nor 
confined to oneself alone as the usual analysis suggests. The ‘other’, in fact, in its indefinite 
multiplicity, is an essential constituent of the consciousness itself. (…) This, of course, only 
provides the metaphysical foundation for one’s freedom and not the achievement of it in 
actuality.”769 
Although the others can be indefinitely multiple, it is in the collectivity of the engagement in 
dialogue that s/he is experienced, not as subjectivity over which I have no control, but as 
subjectivity related to me. This operation has reciprocal influences and transforms both 
consciousnesses. The engagement and withdrawal, seen from this intersubjective perspective, 
also influences knowledge as an open-ended entreprise by seekers of knowledge in dialogue. 
They thus determine the criteria of validation and the settings for dialoguing which are affected 
by the same fragility and bondages vis-à-vis others. At the level of consciousness, this 
engagement and withdrawal also define the orientation of ‘seekers’ who, unlike for instance 
Advaitin conceptions as criticized above by Daya Krishna, are not detached from reality but 
bound by their action of ‘seeking’ knowledge:  
“’Human freedom’ is limited, fundamentally as also radically, by the ‘freedom’ of other beings, 
without which it would neither be conceivable, nor have any meaning. The requirement of 
‘inter-subjective understanding’ of the notion of freedom at least at one level which, if not the 
most fundamental, is at least one of those that has to be regarded as fundamental.  
For some strange reason, however, this ‘freedom to build or not to build’, ‘to create or not to 
create’, ‘to want or not to want’ has not only been seen as the very definition of ‘freedom’, but 
also identified with only one of its fundamental ‘choices’, i.e., the choice of ‘not wanting 
anything at all’ as that alone can be the state of freedom, the other, or, rather, ‘others’, seen 
                                                 
768 Daya Krishna, 11. 
769 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 147. 
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only as ‘bondage’ or ‘bondages’ of different kinds. This is the classical position of Indian 
thinking on the subject where nivrtti [movement of the introversion of consciousness within 
itself770] alone is seen as ‘freedom’, ‘real freedom’ and, by this simple twist, all enterprises of 
man in the field of knowledge or art or morals or the realization of other values are seen as 
signs of bondage, rooted in some fundamental mistake or error called avidyā or mithyājñāna 
[erroneous (or mundane, worldly) knowledge], as the Nyāya Sūtra calls it (…). 
But the distinction between mithyājñāna and jijñāsā is presupposed, just as that between vidyā 
and avidyā [knowledge and ignorance771], and the jijñāsā to ‘know’ the one and pursue the 
puruṣārthā needed to ‘realise’ it. But ‘knowledge’ is a strange thing and if some ‘action’ is 
needed to ‘realise’ something or bring it into being, then it cannot already be there and, what 
is worse, shall, when realised or actualized, be a correlate of, or relative to, the ‘type’ of action 
undertaken to achieve it.” 772 
Thus, if knowledge is made of actions conducted in the intersubjective valuation and common 
creation, it is related to this freedom ‘to create or not to create’, ‘to engage or to withdraw’. 
This freedom is a freedom of choice, to act or not, to think or not, to participate or not in the 
dialogue, to listen or not, etc. The choice between alternations is related to individual freedom, 
but this freedom is already engaged with other self-consciousnesses in the world, which 
enhances and hinders one’s individual freedom at the same time. Although participation and 
engagement in the world can thus not be forced, the awareness of freedom as relational indicates 
that freedom is already constituted by our de facto presence in the world. For Daya Krishna, we 
can withdraw only momentarily if we wish to remain free in the sense of being able to choose 
to attend or withdraw. In other words: freedom consists of the oscillation between engaging and 
withdrawing. We are free not to participate in a particular dialogue or to withdraw from the 
worldly for a time. However, a total disengagement from the world is a denial of one’s own 
freedom, since it takes away our very possibility to choose.  
“Freedom, therefore, does not lie in the acceptance or rejection of this or that, but in the very 
fact of self-conscious choice of either. However, as the self-conscious choice is always made 
within a perspective and as the perspective forming the framework is generally accepted, all 
persons feel free most of the time. But, as we said earlier, the strange possibility of questioning, 
not this or that perspective, but the whole notion of perspective as such, is open to man. What 
one chooses in the face of this ultimate possibility, is not our concern. (…) Yet, even at this 
point, the ‘Either, or’ of Man is not taken from him and he stands before his ultimate Freedom-
to Be or not to Be.”773 
 
6.3. Saṃvāda Apprehended, Saṃvāda Realized and the Gap in Between 
 
                                                 
770 The Sanskrit translations of the quotes from this article are those provided by the editors in the reedition of this 
article, in Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 306. The editors add for nivṛtti: Ingoing, reversal movement of 
consciousness, away from objects, from the world; a movement of introversion of consciousness within itself. 
771 Knowledge and ignorance, or ‘science and nescience’ in the antagonistic relation: in this context Daya Krishna 
insists on the negative prefix ‘a’ that intrinsically relates knowledge and ignorance with each other. 
772 Daya Krishna, “Freedom, Reason, Ethics and Aesthetics,” 4. 
773 Daya Krishna, “An Attempted Analysis of the Concept of Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 12, no. 4 (1952): 556, https://doi.org/10.2307/2103615. 
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Before proceeding further to defining the intersubjective relationality, I want to connect the 
apprehension-realization dimension of values with the saṃvāda experiments themselves. In 
particular, given the relevance of action for creating knowledge and the mutual influence of 
theory and practice in dialogical contexts, I want to suggest an analysis of some difficulties 
encountered in the experiments with regard to values as elicited in the previous sections. More 
precisely, I am interested in the appearing ‘failures’ and critiques of the saṃvādas or related 
experiments. I now want to confront why, in view of the regulative ideal of values above 
described, the practice seems to have been subjected to dissatisfactions, and how to interpret 
them in concrete contexts. With dissatisfactions, we touch on the empirical realization of 
dialogue, however seen from a theoretical point of view. This precisely outlines the connection 
between the theoretical apprehension and the practical realization.  
Theoretically, the first difficulty which I believe has been insufficiently taken in consideration 
by Daya Krishna is the following question: how to merge different values and desires? Daya 
Krishna insists indeed on their ‘objectivity’ that would arise from the intersubjectivity itself, 
but he does not explain the process of such an intersubjective objectivity. There is in Daya 
Krishna’s account no objectivity which can be a priori imposed, but there is also no pure 
subjectivity, for a self-consciousness tends to ‘objectify’ everything in the act of reflectivity.774 
This objectivity is not final, but continuously formed in intersubjective processes. It applies to 
the outcome of the reflexivity of self-consciousness. When we self-consciously reflect on a 
concept, we make it independent of our own consciousness and communicable to others, for 
whom the concept is not felt as a part of my consciousness, but as a common object of reflection. 
It is on this basis that we can begin a philosophical dialogue. The same could be exemplified 
with a painting, which is not only the artist’s expression, but an object that overcomes the 
subjectivity of its author to ‘speak to all.’ It is furthermore the other’s appreciations and 
comments that gives this concept or painting its meaning and that, in a sense, confers its 
existence to this object via reactions and discussions. In this regard, the concept or painting is 
not subjective, but it is objectified in the intersubjective processes of reception and 
communication. This implies the transformations that the other’s interpretations bring about to 
the initial concept or the understanding of the painting. Daya Krishna extends this idea to all 
the ‘worlds’ that we create together: 
“Whatever be the structure of consciousness, it gets modified in a way that is difficult to 
specify, when it is accompanied by, or becomes, an ‘object’ of self-consciousness. There is 
some sort of flexibility introduced in its structure, a plasticity that allows ‘freedom’ to emerge 
in a way that was not earlier available when consciousness alone happened to function. (…) 
This awareness or rather revelation of the hidden power of consciousness has a ‘creative’ 
aspect in it in the sense that it can bring into being ‘worlds’ whose reality consists in the fact 
                                                 
774 “The point is that self-consciousness, because of its very constitution, cannot be ‘subjective’ in character. It has 
to try to be objective as ‘to be objective’ is merely another name for being self-conscious. Objectivity is not 
something given once and for all, but has to be achieved anew, continually depending not only on the nature of 
the object concerned or the activity one wants to pursue, but also on the sort of person one wants to become as the 
personality that tries to seek objectivity is itself changing over time due to many factors which include among 
them the desire to be as objective as possible.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental 
Illusions, 129–30. 
 
281 
 
that they can become objects not only to the consciousness which has created them but also to 
others for whom they are as ‘objective’ as to the consciousness that has created them.”775 
Daya Krishna continues describing this creative power of imagination of consciousness as what 
“forms and transforms that spoken world into something ‘inter-subjective’ capable of creating 
a world of meanings, which, in turn, modifies and shapes both the consciousness that has 
created it and the consciousness which encounters it.”776 I agree with thinking consciousness as 
active in its reciprocal dimension (with others, with the world, etc.) of influencing and being 
influenced at the same time. However, this still does not answer the question of how to 
accommodate for contradictory values and feelings which are not only in dissatisfying tension 
but which are in conflict, because of which precisely the ‘creation of a common world’ is so 
difficult.777 How to account for the times when a dialogue is interrupted because the participants 
cannot respond to the concepts presented by others, i.e. when the concepts cannot be objectified 
by them? Or how to account for the mismeetings when participants seem to speak about 
different things because they mean with the same word two totally different ideas? 
In my present analysis, I understand objectivity as the common base upon which the arguments 
can be discussed. It is understood that this common base and the arguments produced are not 
strictly cognitive, but also contain the feelings and values of the participants, which constitute 
their presuppositions. Feelings and values are part of this intersubjective process, but as we 
have seen, values also entail a regulative ideal subjected to dissatisfactions. What happens then 
if the desires do not concur, if the ideal values seem to be contradictory or insatisfying in the 
realizations of a dialogue? If we consider participants of dialogues as seekers of knowledge, the 
desire for knowledge lies at the core of the dialogical constitutions. But in Daya Krishna’s 
perspective, this cannot remain a singular desire. Like for values, the contents of these desires 
differ. While desires can be in harmony, or grow and decrease together, it also simply happens 
that they do not. Let us illustrate this point with academic examples: One person might seek 
philosophical knowledge of aesthetics (what does beauty mean?), another the techniques of 
architecture (how to build a mausoleum?), a third the historical knowledge of the same 
mausoleum (how is the Mughal conception of beauty represented in the Taj Mahal?). One might 
                                                 
775 Daya Krishna, 168–69. Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 168–69. 
776 Daya Krishna, 169. 
777 Daya Krishna is not unaware of the difficulty that such question entails, and defends a pluralistic idea of 
‘objectivity’ itself that could accommodate different objectivities according to the different fields, but he 
nevertheless does not seem to consider the consequences of intersubjectively not reaching a common objectivity: 
“The impulse to objectivity and the desire for it is an integral part of the activity of self-consciousness itself and is 
generally denoted by such terms as ‘integrity’ and ‘honesty’. What else can these terms mean except that one tries 
one’s best to be as ‘true’ to that which one is trying to achieve in the realm of either knowledge, feeling or action? 
It has been a mistake to understand the term ‘objectivity’ in the context of knowledge alone and think that no 
realms which are constituted primarily by feelings or emotions on the one hand, and action on the other, need them 
for an adequate description of the reality concerned and constituted by them. In the realm of action the seeking for 
‘objectivity’ is usually designated by the term morality, on the one hand, and efficiency on the other. (…) The 
search for ‘objectivity’ in the realm of feelings is something that may appear prima facie to be a contradiction in 
terms, as it is the one realm which is supposed to be ‘subjective’ almost by definition. How can one be objective 
about something so subjective as feelings and emotions, and yet the same self-consciousness which seeks 
objectivity in the realm of knowledge and actions, also ‘demands’ that one ‘seek’ objectivity in this realm as well?” 
Daya Krishna, 128–29. 
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only refer to philological studies of manuscripts of a certain period, another to contemporary 
sociological analyzes, and so on. One might also consider that his or her duty as a scholar is to 
acurately transmit the knowledge he or she has inherited, while another might want to break out 
completely with the traditions. It is assumed that all these scholars ‘seek’ to know, for which 
reason they want to dialogue with other scholars, as it happened for instance in an unrecorded 
dialogue on architecture “bringing traditional persons who deal with architecture both 
theoretically and practically and modern architecture”778 . Nevertheless, the tools that they 
develop and furthermore the directions that their studies take vary and might even be opposed 
in forms or results. This concretely leads to much academic quarrels between conflicting 
methods reflecting the different seekings that motivate how inquiries are pursued. Although 
Daya Krishna seems to take for granted the objective intersubjective process leading to the 
creation of common worlds, or at least although he does not theoretically comment on the 
difficulties of this process, he does indicate some issues that he encountered when this 
intersubjective process involved scholars of different trainings. In his study on the development 
of Indian philosophies since the eighteenth century onwards, he took help of scholars working 
in different media and kinds of institutions, including paṇḍits, and admits in the introduction of 
his work the difficulty of proceeding as such: 
“Our initial survey of developments in various fields of knowledge before the eighteenth 
century had revealed that their centre was around key controversies which had occurred earlier 
and were carried into the period that we were concerned with. The whole material thus had to 
be seen from the perspective of these debates and discussions. Unless there was a clear 
awareness of the stage that the controversy had reached before the dawn of the eighteenth 
century, subsequent developments in the debate could not be properly understood or assessed. 
This, however, was not the perspective from which the scholars viewed their own disciplines. 
Thus the questions that we asked appeared both new and inconvenient, as they had to 
reorganize their whole knowledge in the context of the way in which we were trying to look at 
material which was familiar to them but which they had not seen from this perspective. 
Scholars are generally as conservative in their intellectual habits and ways of looking at things 
as are most of us, and thus it was not easy to find persons who had both the ability and the 
willingness to look at familiar texts in a new way.”779 
The possibility that these collaborations can be innovative and open new ways of thinking 
history and philosophy is surely what motivated his endeavor. But they are admittedly difficult 
to create 780 , not only because of the ‘ability’ that he mentions, but also because of the 
                                                 
778 Daya Krishna mentions this dialogue while presenting his larger saṃvāda project in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 
Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 164–65. I quoted his presentation at length while introducing the 
saṃvāda experiments in 2.1. 
779 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 
8. 
780 Although indirectly, it is possible that the problem lies also here in divergent ‘desires’: “His [Daya Krishna’s] 
early work Planning, Power and Welfare (1959) consists of a dialogue between DK, then at the department of 
philosophy, Sagar University, and economists Vu Quoc Thuc of the University of Saigon and Nurul Islam of the 
University of Dhaka. This is an intra-Asian dialogue between three scholars from the non-West, attempting to 
decolonize (the phrase is mine) the concept of welfare. DK’s later motto, “when people gather together, something 
new emerges” (1988, 54), captures the incentive behind this dialogue. But a dialogue, or saṃvād, is no easy 
“business”, especially when the participants belong not just to different countries and cultures, but even disciplines. 
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‘willingness’ of scholars. The willingness, in my interpretation, does not simply refer to whether 
they agree or not to contribute. It accounts for accepting to merge one’s desire to know with the 
other’s desire, i.e. to look in the same direction, even from different standpoints.  
Academic divergences are a rather common object of interdisciplinary and intercultural 
misunderstandings, quarrels or simply of mutual avoidances which turn into a mutual exclusion. 
However, what is significant here is less how recurrent and well-spread these quarrels are, but 
rather the reasons of their occurrences. These quarrels are less due to divergences in the 
scientific approaches themselves (e.g. philology versus philosophy) or the tools used for 
analyzing (e.g. empirical versus theoretical studies), i.e. any epistemological differences. The 
reasons lie in the differences of ethoses and desires. Interestingly enough, this dimension is 
rarely admitted in academic discussions. The valuational differences can be ‘hidden’ in 
methodological and objective terms (for example in dismissing another scholar’s approach or 
training). However, at the core of one’s objectives lies one’s specific desire to know, i.e. a 
certain orientation towards a particular kind of knowledge (which also explains that these 
quarrels cannot be solved by epistemological arguments). It is also to be noted that these desires 
and values are influenced by cultural, social and historical contexts, which influence one’s 
desire to know and play a role in determining which approach to adopt (i.e. which one is 
considered ‘the best’ by one’s scholarly community). This dimension of desires and values lies 
at the core of knowledge-acquisition. Although it is absent from the explicit academic 
discourse, it seems to be the cause of much indifference (interdisciplinary and intercultural) as 
well as academic failures in dialoguing.  
Furthermore, this aspect is difficult to realize from within a dialogue. Once we are engaged in 
a dialogue, we seem to be more concerned about the argumentation itself, which however 
depends on the initial desires, a dimension we neglect while discussing the arguments. Thus, 
many a times, the feeling of dissatisfaction of a dialogue originates from the divergences of 
ethoses and the disrupted desires. At the epistemological level, however, it is difficult to 
influence this feeling from within by responding to an argument. Only a retrospective look, or 
closer to Daya Krishna’s philosophical terms, the ‘withdrawal’ of consciousness back to itself, 
seems to enable such an awareness. This explains why it is so difficult to re-orientate or to 
efficiently blend conflicting desires within the dialogue. Thus, the dissatisfactions are also the 
causes of defects in the realization of a dialogue. While theories of dialogue such as the ones 
discussed here can suggest ideal and regulative dialogical models encompassing all 
actualizations, the moment one turns to dialogues such as the saṃvāda experiments, some 
unforeseen difficulties, impossibilities, limits or simply modifications of the principles will be 
encountered. This explains the criticism of the saṃvāda experiments by several proponents, 
who generally underline the insufficiency of inclusion of a specific types of philosophies and 
scholars, for example, contemporary Indian philosophy as propounded by Raghuramaraju (3.4). 
It could also invoke particular arguments that were not properly understood or reacted upon. 
The singularity, the spontaneity of the orality and the dependency to the persons participating 
                                                 
DK, the publisher notes, “is not a professional economist (that may perhaps be the reason why he is able to 
approach the subject from a fresh angle)” (1959, 4). But what appeals to the publisher as “fresh” is not necessarily 
perceived as such by the economists.” Raveh, “Daya Krishna on Social Philosophy [Forthcoming].” 
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are factors of the unpredictability that already renders the systematization of the theory 
obsolete: correspondingly, they also generate the unforeseen.  
In this context, I want to come back to two problems experienced by Daya Krishna in dialogues, 
the origin of which seems to me to lie in these conflicting seekings to know. The first one has 
been already mentioned in the unpublished saṃvāda experiments (3.3.3), felt in the Kashmiri 
dialogue including Pandit Laxman Joo (1.1.4) and narrated in particular by Bettina Bäumer. 
This does not mean that she was the only participant to have felt this dialogue ‘unsuccessful’ 
or that other experiments did not provoke the same dissatisfaction. Quite the contrary, I can 
only suspect that other experiments which were mentioned in the pages of this work (in 
particular the unpublished experiments, 3.3.3), suffer from the same limits. I also want to come 
back on the problems above mentioned of the dialogue with Maurice Friedman, in which Daya 
Krishna participated.  
I had mentioned at the beginning of this work the regret that Bettina Bäumer formulated after 
having participated to the saṃvāda with Pandit Laxman Joo about which she expresses 
reservation 781  (1.1.4). The purely rational approach of scholars such as Daya Krishna to 
question the tradition of Kashmiri Saivism was felt inadequate to reach its spiritual core, from 
which only it could be ‘understood’, which in this context rather means experienced and felt 
for these two participants.782 Since Daya Krishna’s endeavor has been much explicated in this 
work, let us turn in contradistinction to Bäumer’s own idea of an interreligious dialogue 
(independently of the Kashmiri dialogue) in her own words: 
“Let me mention the areas and levels in which dialogue happens and is meaningful, and how 
they are related and interconnected. There is always a twofold movement: from the inner to 
the outer, and from the outer to the inner. The innermost level of any interreligious dialogue is 
certainly a spiritual one. I immediately confess that this is where I am most at home. Let me 
therefore elaborate a bit what we mean by a spiritual dialogue. Spirituality - more specifically 
may be even mysticism - is at the core of any religion. It is not only when we have experienced 
that core in our own religion that we can be open to other traditions and spiritualities. (…) To 
give only two examples of the medieval saints in India, we can take Saint Kabir of Banaras 
                                                 
781 The critique and context have been presented in 1.1.4. Bäumer writes: “The seminar was an exploration of 
Kashmir Śaivism, a relatively new discovery for Indian philosophers. Dayaji discovered it for himself, and was 
also viewing it critically. It was more the fact of meeting and discussing the issues involved, than a real contribution 
to the research on Kashmir Śaivism. In a sense historic, the meeting with the last and powerful representative of 
the living tradition, Swami Lakshman Joo, at the Guptaganga Hall in Ishbar, near his Ishvar Ashram, did not result 
in a satisfying dialogue, because the levels were too different: the merely intellectual approach of the scholars and 
the lived experience of the master.” Bäumer, “‘Falling in Love with a Civilization’: A Tribute to Daya Krishna, 
the Thinker,” 35. 
782 The metaphysical position may be summarized in the following way: “The Word at its highest level and pure 
Consciousness are not different. Differentiation in both, Word and Consciousness, amounts to a descent, a gradual 
manifestation which is, however, never cut off from its original source. Communication at any level requires 
differentiation into speaker, spoken to, word and meaning. Only an ideal pair of speaker and listener can be 
instruments of revelation, where the question, coming from a slightly lower level than the answer, is a part of the 
total manifestation of the Word, and the answer, coming from the respectively higher level, assumes the question 
in itself. It is the fact of the unity of Word and Consciousness which makes that, in the words of Abhinavagupta, 
‘‘there is no speech which does not reach the heart directly.’’”, Bettina Bäumer, “Vāc as Saṃvāda,” in 
Hermeneutics of Encounter: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, 
ed. Francis X. D’Sa and Mesquita Roque, Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 20 (Vienna: Gerold & 
Co - Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 18. 
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and Lal Ded (Lalla) of Kashmir. Both were mystics, both became bridgers, by heir own deep 
experience, between Hinduism and Islam, to put it in very general terms.”783 
The spiritual dimension is indeed absent from the saṃvāda experiments in the sense described 
by Bettina Bäumer, i.e. as providing a platform or a framework for an encounter between 
different levels of consciousness. For instance, the spiritual dimension of the bhakti dialogue is 
an object to be reflected upon rather than a way of practicing or motivating the dialogue itself. 
As she mentioned to me concerning the dialogue in Kashmir,784 the ‘levels’ were too different 
to be fruitful, in the sense that the conceptual-critical approach (of Daya Krishna in particular) 
could not grasp the specificities of or the differences with a more spiritual or religious level of 
experiencing. For her, this level was not apt to convey the ‘essence’ of Kashmir Saivism, an 
interesting term that also connotes the valuational dimension of a philosophy. In that sense, the 
dialogue did not lead to an intersubjective creation of a common meaningful world, because the 
expectations projected into the dialogues did not match in practice. In other words, the 
orientation of the seekings for knowledge were too diverging, since seeking for knowledge did 
not mean a critical and conceptual inquiry for her, but an immersion into the philosophy itself 
by spiritual experience. 
As mentioned in the previous section (6.2.2), another ‘misunderstanding’ and a divergence 
occured among the participants of the dialogue at the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the 
Arts. This concerned the reflection on dialogue concerning finite, ignorant and yet desirous to 
know participants by Daya Krishna785 in the dialogue with Maurice Friedman. The problem 
cannot be here strictly defined as a problem of interreligious communication, since it is not as 
a spiritual seeker, as a believer or as a religious man that Friedman reacted (although he is 
influenced by Jewish thought). It is, nevertheless, a difficulty of ‘levels’ grounded in a certain 
spiritual interpretation of Buber’s dialogical conception of ‘I and Thou’, in particular of the 
realm of the between. According to Friedman, this realm was not included in Daya Krishna’s 
account of dialogue in his use of the terms knowledge and ‘seeking of knowledge’. Besides 
what I believe was a misunderstanding of what Daya Krishna meant with ‘knowledge’ (i.e. its 
reduction to an epistemological conception), the participants of the dialogue interestingly do 
not seem to have been able to ‘clear’ this misunderstanding. Even more interestingly, ‘dialogue’ 
was here not only the form but also the content, so that it is on the object of dialogue that the 
participants - as subjects - felt the dissatisfying tension between their ‘idea’ of dialogue and 
how the dialogue itself drifted in a ‘non-dialogical’ way.  
                                                 
783 Bäumer, “Interreligious Dialogue,” 60–61. 
784 Personal communication, Abhinavagupta Research Library, Varanasi (23. 01. 2017) 
785 For the reader’s convenience, I quote here again a smaller portion of his statement quoted in 6.2.2, which I 
think, describes the basis of the divergence: “They [the participants] may have different levels of knowledge or 
information or understanding, but each of them, when they enter into a dialogue assume, at least provisionally, 
that they do not know. That whatever each one knows, or thinks one knows, may possibly be wrong – that one is 
prepared to learn from the others who are participating in the dialogue.” Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural 
Dialogue and the Human Image, 240. 
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From the readings of the transcription of the dialogue,786 different hints can be suggested to 
outline the problems. Some are of practical nature, such as the fact that, as usual in academic 
contexts, the communication was ‘managed’ through the invited speaker via an act of 
moderation, which might have been felt as impeding spontaneous communication and equal 
distribution of speech.787 Being not only a mediator, Friedman appears to be (maybe in spite of 
his own will) the main speaker and authority of the dialogue. Furthermore, Friedman’s response 
was felt to have been “rather unkindly”788 and he later on concedes that “I get the impression 
that many of you are disturbed because I spoke directly to the Professor.”789 It is of course, 
impossible to reconstruct and determine how much of the communication problems are related 
to the feeling of offense (whether by Daya Krishna himself or by the other participants), how 
much of it could have been a sensitive overreaction, and how much resulted in a 
misunderstanding of the intention of what Daya Krishna or Friedman tried to express. There 
also could have been a philosophical disagreement on what dialogue means. This highlights the 
impossible separation of the different dimensions operating in dialogue, which in this case leads 
to dissatisfaction. Conceptually however, the disagreement occurs in the response given by 
Friedman to Daya Krishna’s conception of dialogue as an engagement of seeker for knowledge: 
“What Prof. Daya Krishna has described was by and large what Martin Buber has called 
‘technical dialogue’. Basically what we have here is an exchange between someone who wants 
to know and someone who has information to impart, but that is still, by and large, technical 
dialogue. Within it, of course, something else may happen. (…) It is only dialogue in Buber’s 
and in my sense of the term when it goes beyond the exchange of information to some sort of 
actual meeting of person and person - the between.”790 
In the context of this work, it would be easy to a posteriori reflectively counter-argue with Daya 
Krishna’s philosophy on the reasons why ‘seeking knowledge’ is not limited to the cognitive, 
what I emphasized in the preceding section. It is, on the other hand, more complex to understand 
why, although argumentatively it clarifies the respective positions, such an exchange disrupted 
                                                 
786 Having neither access to the recordings nor to the history of the transcription, I cannot affirm whether the 
transcription is a complete and exact retranscription of the whole recording or not. My analysis is thus solely based 
on the published text. 
787 Stated by Rekha Jhanji: “Starting from the point that you made that dialogue happens. It’s grace, as you say. I 
agree, we can’t contrive anything. But there are certain things we can, at least, try to create so that there may be a 
possibility of a dialogue. I feel that the way we are sitting and the way we are interacting, we are at least not totally 
frozen. I haven’t really come out of myself at all in this situation (the ongoing seminar or dialogue) and I think this 
must be happening to many others. The reason for me, we have no way of interacting with one another - but the 
only way we interact is through you. And I think this is a very artificial way. It really is not conductive to the 
possibility of dialogue.” Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 236.  
788  Mrinal Miri: “I just wanted to say a word in defense of Prof. Daya Krishna because I think he’s been 
misunderstood and rather unkindly. Maurice Friedman: I didn’t mean to be unkind. Mrinal Miri: Well, it sounded 
unkind. I don’t think he was talking about exchange of information at all. I think he was trying, you must correct 
me if I’m wrong, to suggest that there are many varieties that have come out in the discussion, that there may be 
varieties of dialogue in that sense, and a flash of understanding may be a dialogue. A moment of recognition is a 
dialogue, a meeting of minds may be a dialogue. And the real giving of a cup of tea and real accepting of a cup of 
tea may be a dialogue. I thought he was talking about a variety of dialogue, which is very important and in which 
we are hoping to be involved, and that I would characterize as a cognitive dialogue. As a result of which, you see 
there is a progressive unfolding of a problem and a progressive insight into things. The real giving and accepting 
of a cup of tea I don’t think leads to progressive unfolding of problem.” Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 247–48. 
789 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 248. 
790 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 241. 
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the dialogue. As for the Kashmiri dialogue above mentioned, both examples seem to point at 
the same basic problem: a misunderstanding, the origin of which is not located in the intellectual 
dimension of ‘understanding’, but in a difference of approach to a concept. In other words, this 
misunderstanding does not occur at the linguistic or argumentative level, but as the difficulty 
to communicate at the same level. The first Kashmiri dialogue mainly entailed the difference 
between inter-traditional philosophical and interreligious dialogues, while the dialogue with 
Friedman concerned the limits of the intellectual versus the spiritual (Friedman arguing from a 
Buberian perspective). In both cases, the problem seems to outline the limitations of the 
‘intellectual’ dimension of the dialogues, which was felt not to be encompassing enough to 
accommodate other (more spiritual) dimensions of the studied traditions. This difference shows 
that the feeling of ‘failure’ does not result from the lack of knowledge or the impossibility to 
express or defend one’s position, not even to articulate counter-positions. It rather results from 
the dissatisfactions of the apprehended expectations which were felt as not corresponding with 
the realizations because of an impossible communication or understanding of non-intellectual 
feelings, seekings and attitudes. This aspect does not seem to have been solved in either case, 
and I could not find a reflection on the divergence of desires and expectations when dialoguing. 
Friedman concludes his postface by coming back on this dissatisfaction, which led him to 
qualify the dialogue as a whole as not a ‘genuine dialogue’: 
 “There was often mismeeting and meeting - enough so that half way through I declared that 
the seminar was not what I would call a genuine dialogue. Rereading the discussion centering 
around this point in the transcripts was painful to me. Many of the participants seemed to be 
offended by my calling one participants’ attempt to limit dialogue to the cognitive “technical 
dialogue”. This is an issue which never seemed to get properly resolved in the course of the 
seminar. To that extent I would judge it to be as much of a mismeeting as a meeting. Yet when 
I think of all the richness of thought and experience that did enter into these days I cannot 
maintain this judgment. Even our disagreement about what we meant by dialogue was itself a 
meaningful part of our dialogue, coming as we did from many intellectual fields and 
geographical and cultural backgrounds, including very different understandings of what is 
optimal philosophical discussion, these in turn probably influenced by the tension between 
East and West. Aside from the fact that a group of people from different backgrounds, many 
of whom have just met for the first time, cannot simply will to have ‘genuine dialogue’ in the 
full meaning of that term, our conflict was also an integral part of that tension between 
understanding and misunderstanding, agreement and disagreement which, as Buber points out, 
belongs to even the finest manifestations of ‘the word that is spoken’.”791 
It is tempting to classify the lines of this postface as a diplomatic conclusion rather than a sincere 
evaluation of the ‘mismeeting’. It is possible that Friedman could not express any 
disappointment freely at such a place. It is also likely that he could not explain in detail that he 
had further concerns concerning this miscommunication, or that he was plainly disappointed. 
The fact that he concludes the whole book by referring to this ‘miscommunication’ already 
indicates his unease with how the dialogue proceeded at such a point and how unresolved it 
remained. Nevertheless, if we accept to take his words seriously, they also indicate the creative 
dynamics originating from the dissatisfaction itself, and the intermingling between theory and 
practice, when he writes that for instance that “‘our conflict was also an integral part of that 
                                                 
791 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 284. 
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tension between understanding and misunderstanding, agreement and disagreement which, as 
Buber points out, belongs to even the finest manifestations of ‘the word that is spoken.’”  
Indeed, the conclusion of a particular instance of dialoguing does not mean the end of dialogue. 
Mismeetings, dissatisfactions, miscommunications and misunderstandings are in the practice, 
often concretely impeding a dialogue. Far from always generating creative insights (unlike 
Daya Krishna’s own emphasis on this aspect), they also sometimes cannot be resolved in the 
course of a dialogue. This is a dimension which I believe is important to accept in order to avoid 
understanding dialogue as an ideal form which can absorb all differences. It is however through 
these dissatisfactions, or in Friedman’s words, “even our disagreement (…) was itself a 
meaningful part of our dialogue” that the dialogue evolves, both in theory and for the 
forthcoming practices. This explains the nature of the prefaces to the published experiments 
that analyze what happened, how far the dialogue could go, and what remains to be done, 
improved or thought of792. While the transcribed dialogues are philosophically instructive and 
testify of a dialogical practice, it is mainly in the memories of the participants that they had a 
lasting impact. As Daya Krishna writes in a letter to Arindam Chakrabarti, one of the main 
parner of the saṃvādas, referring the dialogues that occurred in these respective places, “the 
past recollection still linger. Kashmir, or Benaras or Tirupati, or Pune or Delhi or Bangalore; 
they all are with us.”793 For the readers afterwards, I find the post-reflective traces794 around 
the dialogues even more relevant (these having been used as material and developed in chapter 
3), since they indicate further concrete possibilities to be realized, prospective attitudes 
reflecting on what has been achieved and what should come, and an important relating of theory 
and practice. To me it seems that this ‘unfulfilledness’, i.e. what Daya Krishna refers to 
elsewhere as ‘agenda for further research’ is the most promising for the reader.795 
                                                 
792 For the Pune experiment: “In all these meetings, discussion was organized around issues previously formulated 
and circulated in Sanskrit to the potential participants, the last session always devoted to the question as to what 
are the deficiencies in the system as handed down to us and how should we try to develop it further. (…) These 
have not been the only spin-offs of the Poona seminar. There have been others, and they are worth mentioning 
also. One has been the extension of the dialogue to areas other than the strictly philosophical and to traditions other 
than the Sanskritic. The first was done in the field of linguistics where a dialogue between traditional pandits and 
modern linguists was held on ‘Current Issues in Linguistics.’ (…) As for the movement outside the Sanskritic 
tradition, it was triggered off by a chance remark of Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty as to why the dialogue with the 
tradition be confined to Sanskrit pandits alone. This led to another path-breaking initiative (…) and resulted in the 
organization of a dialogue on philosophical problems with the Ulema, the Arabic Scholars representing the West 
Asian philosophical tradition in India.” Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical 
Traditions, XIII–XIV. 
793 Letter from Daya Krishna to Arindam Chakrabarti, 10th April 2005. I thank Arindam Chakrabarti and Daniel 
Raveh for providing me the letter. 
794 See the Introduction and Preface of Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical 
Traditions; Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion; Daya Krishna, India’s 
Intellectual Traditions; Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy.” 
795 This refers to the already mentioned Daya Krishna, Agenda for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy, 
ed. R. S. Bhatnagar, First edition (Jaipur: UGC, ASIHSS Programme, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan 
and Literary Circle, 2013). In the previous 6.2.2, I mentioned Daya Krishna’s usual way of concluding by opening 
the discussion to further problems to be explored, as for instance: ‘Problems and Issues still remaining to be 
explored in Intellectual History from Eighteenth Century upto the Present Time,’ in Daya Krishna, Developments 
in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western. ; ‘The Possible Extension of the 
Methodology for the Understanding of Other Texts in the Indian Tradition’, followed by ‘Conclusion’ and ‘The 
Text of the Nyāya Sūtras: Some Problems’, in Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras. 
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The tension between the two dimensions - felt as dissatisfaction in the insufficiency of one 
particular realization - can lead to the incentive to organize further dialogue. Thus, for example, 
he begins the preface of the second edition of India’s Intellectual Traditions: Attempts at 
Conceptual Reconstructions, by painfully looking back at the ‘loss’ of the Jaipur experiments 
and with a critical consideration of the entreprise fifteen years later:  
“To read about the ‘Jaipur experiment’ and the interdisciplinary group which started meeting 
sometime in the early eighties seems to ‘enter’ some prehistoric past whose ‘reality’ is difficult 
to retrieve. (…) Where have all the friends ‘gone’, and why was the ‘enthusiasm’ evaporated? 
Have the ‘sceptics’ been proved right? Was the ‘entreprise’ unmeaningful, even impassible, 
just a waste of time as some had warned.”796 
Yet, after some pages analyzing the different ‘enterprises’ that occurred after the beginning of 
the Jaipur experiments, notably the different saṃvādas, Daya Krishna continues: 
“The Jaipur experiment (…) has, thus, not been entirely fruitless. Some of the persons 
associated with it are now no more. Their absence is a loss, both personal and otherwise, though 
it is difficult to say whether they fully shared the belief in the feasibility or desirability, or even 
in the worthwhileness of the of the project. The ‘understanding’ and articulation of the 
conceptual structure of India’s intellectual enterprises in different fields of knowledge is one 
thing; their internalization and utilization for understanding of the same phenomena in modern 
times, another. Without the latter, the former is meaningless.”797 
Daya Krishna’s view is not idealistic but very aware of the difficult task and the challenging 
limitations of his endeavor and of the larger context in which it was pursued. He is aware that 
actions, wills and feelings are painstakingly entailed in the puruṣārtha of knowledge and in 
spite of the regulative ideal in which they are embodied, of their difficult realizations. This also 
explains why he does not strive for a ‘perfect’ achieved work, which would contradict the reality 
of the experiments in which he was at the same time engaged in, and terminate the project itself. 
His philosophy also reflects the practice, which explains why he sees more potentiality in future 
realizations or in terms such as ‘dissatisfaction’ and ‘illusion’. These leave room for 
improvement and change, and reciprocally necessitate to consider the imperfectness and 
incompleteness of the practice itself. This way of doing ‘human’ philosophy is concretely the 
only possible way for someone actually engaged in dialoguing rather than systematically 
theorize the ideality of dialogue. The former opens up other conceptual possibilities to think 
dialogue in the first place. Formulated in more theoretical terms, Daya Krishna explicates the 
relation between theories and practices of philosophizing as the oscillation between the ‘is’ and 
the ‘ought’:  
“Philosophical practice is what philosophical theory tries to articulate, though through this 
articulation it begins to influence philosophical practice itself. Thus, philosophy as practiced 
does not remain unaffected by what philosophy is conceived to be even though, in the first 
instance, the conception itself is supposed to be the result of a reflection upon the way 
philosophy is actually practiced and an articulation thereof. The ‘is’ of philosophical practice 
                                                 
 
796 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, IX. 
797 Daya Krishna, XIII. 
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turns into an ‘ought’ for future philosophizing when mediated by a reflective articulation 
concerning the practice itself.”798 
More concretely for dialogue, I think this reciprocity implies that we recognize the significance 
of the place (I insisted on the location in Vrindavan and the significance of the Govindadeva 
temple for the Bhakti dialogue in 3.3.2) and of the participants as individuals. I also believe that 
this is what singularizes and enables intercultural plurality. It explains why the delimitations 
disscussed in the introduction (1.1) between the different forms of communication are 
insufficient if taken alone. Although I consider them necessary to begin clarifying what 
dialogue means by contradistinctions with each other, the practice (as also already mentioned 
in the same introduction, 1.1.5) necessarily shows the impossibility of separating each of these 
forms. Furthermore, these forms of communication themselves evolve in the practice, so that 
each definition will be challenged in a certain dialogue, blurring its limits and some of its 
characteristics. While I can understand the temptation to jettison the practice to reach a more 
formal definition encompassing all actualities, I argue here with Daya Krishna that this would 
also suppress the creative dynamic at stake in the reciprocal influence between theory and 
practice. Furthermore, in doing so, I think there is a risk of assimilating the ideality entailed in 
the theory to the definition itself, i.e. to consider that the dialogue is limited to the regulative 
ideal of the theory - which I believe is insufficient to define dialogue itself. Finally, although 
the practice might seem less ‘reliable’ due to the importance of uncertainty and unpredictability, 
considering this dimension also avoids the risk of thinking an ‘other’ understood in a binary 
exclusion or distinction (either as the alter or as the ‘beyond’ myself) to myself. In the end, this 
‘empties’ the other of any other characteristics than being the Other of myself (see my critique 
in 1.2.2).  
In that sense, dissatisfactions indicate the processual character, ongoing and endless venture of 
dialogues. Felt negatively as disappointment of the actual impossibility of realizing the idea(l), 
they nevertheless constitute a necessary experience. This tension can clarify a certain tendency 
in writings on dialogue trying to convey the impossibility-yet-necessity of dialoguing. We 
already found such a tendency for instance in the first statement of Wilhelm Halbfass with 
which I opened this work: “With all these questions in mind, I still have to listen and to speak 
to the other. Whatever the problems with ‘dialogue and understanding’ may be - these are 
channels that have to be kept open.”799. And more specifically related to Daya Krishna, by 
Daniel Raveh:  
“It is not the metaphysical experience which occupies him, but the possibility of a dialogue, a 
saṃvāda, between ‘worldly’ thinking human beings. If Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak agrees 
with Derrida that “in every possible way translation is impossible but necessary,” then for DK 
it is saṃvāda that in every possible way is impossible but necessary. Every saṃvāda, in fact, 
involves an act of translation, not necessarily between languages but rather between mindsets 
and across inner worlds.”800 
                                                 
798 Daya Krishna, “Philosophy: Influence of Theory on Practice,” 313. 
799 Halbfass, in Franco and Preisendanz, Beyond Orientalism, 142. 
800 Raveh, “Philosophical Miscellanea,” 493. 
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Thus, dialoguing is, in my interpretation of Daya Krishna both as a ‘writing philosopher’ and 
as a ‘practicing philosopher’, the interface of these two dimensions, which can be qualified as 
‘experimentations and explorations’ as follows:  
“Dharma or Nomos depends entirely on man, while the latter, i.e. Logos, is supposed to be 
independent of him, and totally unaffected by what man does or does not do. (…) Logos and Nomos 
are, thus, at odds with each other, and man is a victim of the conflict between the two, neither of 
which he can give up as one is required for ‘knowledge’ and the other for ‘action’. The primacy 
given to the one or the other determines the direction which the attempts at a solution take place 
within a culture or even in an individual who is self-reflective and becomes aware of the problem. 
The conflict is between the ‘True’ and the ‘Good’, and as both are values, which is treated as 
primary and whoch as secondary, or which as subservient and instrumental to the other, becomes 
the central question both for individuals and cultures alike.  
The problem is further complicated by the fact that both arise within a human context and because 
of the fact that one has become self-conscious for some reason and thus is aware of these opposite 
values which, though ‘given’ in a certain sense, have to be ‘sought’ and realized within the human 
situation as ‘lived’ by one and ‘known’ or ‘discovered’ through this seeking. There is no such thing 
as the Truth or the Good, given and found for once and all and, what is perhaps even worse is that 
even among the ‘known’ or the ‘discovered’ at any time or place, there always are many ‘truths’ 
and many ‘goods’ pertaining to diverse fields, and that there is a conflict of opinion about them or 
difference about the importance or the primacy one should accord them. This, though disheartening 
to those who want certainty and finality of ‘faith’ in these realms is, however, the basis of that 
continuous exploration and experimentation that lies at the heart of human enterprise, both in the 
field of knowledge and action. Exploration and experimentation, however, require some ‘base’ to 
start from which itself has to be incomplete and inadequate to permit, or even require, an ‘open-
ended’ challenge for its further construction, correction, emendation, addition along with the 
enthusiasm, the energy, the elan and the thirst for novelty that creates the dissatisfaction with what 
is there or has been achieved and the ‘impulse’ that urges man to seek something else, whatever it 
be.” 801   
  
                                                 
801 Daya Krishna, “Eros, Nomos and Logos,” 175–76. 
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7. Illusions: Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Other-Consciousnesses in 
Dialogue 
 
 “The real creative power of consciousness in the process of imagining is revealed when it 
forms and transforms that spoken word into something ‘inter-subjective’ capable of creating a 
world of meanings which, in turn, modifies and shapes both the consciousness that has created 
it and the consciousness which encounters it.”802 
  
                                                 
802 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 169. 
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7.1. From Presuppositions and Dissatisfactions to the Illusions of their Distinction 
 
Although presuppositions and dissatisfactions are not defined as opposites in Daya Krishna’s 
writing, I interpreted his use of these terms as applying to different, and yet interconnected 
realms of consciousness. With ‘presuppositions’, I explored the beliefs, postulates, prejudices 
and criteria that initiate and ground our ‘knowledges’. With ‘dissatisfactions’, I showed how 
the constitution of these knowledges are directed by valuational seekings. There are immanent 
to human life and transcend the realizations that result from our knowledges towards something 
‘beyond’ which drives our collective efforts. The ‘beyond’ needs not to point at a beyond the 
world (as in liberation from the world) but implies a ‘beyond the reality as it is given to us’ 
which indicates an ideality and a potentiality to imagine how the world ‘ought to be’. It calls 
for further transformations and realizations which are themselves affected by cultural, social, 
political and historical conceptions of the world. Presuppositions are thus embedded into 
epistemological intuitions, and dissatisfactions into values that are experienced in the deceptive 
actualizations of our knowledges. I hypothesized that one way to unveil presuppositions and to 
‘realize’ the nature of our dissatisfactions is dialoguing with others, who by their differences 
(of conceptual structures, influenced by cultural and socio-political factors) can reflect our own 
presuppositions and dissatisfactions. Reciprocally, the practice of dialoguing is influenced by 
these presuppositions and dissatisfactions, and in general by the collective others participating, 
so that the movement between realizing our presuppositions and dissatisfactions is itself 
modifying them as well as the dialogue itself. There is therefore no static conception of what 
forms our positions in dialogue, but a movement back and forth between theory and practice, 
my position and the other’s position, and so on.  
In Daya Krishna’s writings, another concept is often used in correlations with presuppositions 
or dissatisfactions: ‘illusions’. In general, it is more difficult to determine a specific realm to 
which it applies in distinction to the formers. Furthermore, like for the term ‘seeking’, the 
conception of which is strongly influenced by his understanding of puruṣārtha, however 
reinterpreted in a broader contemporary philosophical context, ‘illusions’ refer in particular  to 
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the Sanskrit term ‘māyā’803 and the Kantian use of illusion.804 Knowing how constitutive the 
tripartite conception of consciousness is for Daya Krishna, who often refers to ‘knowledge, will 
and feeling’ (influenced  by the Kantian distinction of his three Critiques) or in its Sanskrit 
counterpart, to jñāna, karma and bhakti 805  (in reference to the traditions but also to 
contemporary developments, in particular those of K. C. Bhattacharyya 806 ), it would be 
expected that ‘illusions’ apply to the realm of feelings. Indeed, since ‘presuppositions’ are the 
‘illusions’ of knowledge and ‘dissatisfactions’ the ‘illusions’ provoked by the ‘act’-ualizations 
of knowledge (with regard to our concepts), should not the ‘illusions’ of feeling be the ‘illusions’ 
themselves? Although feelings play an important role here, in particular when the sense of 
‘illusoriness’ of the illusions is felt, I believe however that illusions overcome this division. 
They are located prior to any distinction and they thus encompass both the epistemological and 
valuational dimensions. They are, so to say, the ‘illusions’ generated by the very tripartite 
separation of consciousness and thus apply at a more fundamental ‘metaphysical’ or 
‘ontological’ level.  
I will investigate in this chapter how these illusions of consciousness further complicate the 
understanding of the human condition. In particular, I want to concentrate on the difficulties 
that these illusions bring for conceiving a dialogue with others whose consciousnesses are also 
subjected to illusions. Indeed, the beliefs of knowledge are grounded into values, which are 
unquestionable from within a knowledge-system. The presuppositions can be unveiled in the 
activity of debating and dialoguing when the limits become visible, i.e. when knowledge is 
                                                 
803 “Reason or Logos, thus, has brought us to an absurdity which is refuted every time anyone acts, whether he is 
a genius or not. Man is the living refutation and the constant questioner of that which the Logos proclaims as 
‘Truth’, truth with a capital ‘T’, as people are fond of saying. The truth of Logos is overcome or transcended or 
negated by the truth of freedom self-consciously felt and experienced by every human being when he intends and 
wills and makes the physical and mental effort to act and, if this be an illusion as Logos insists, then we can only 
say that it is an effective illusion, an effectiveness that is a sign of something being real and not a Nothing, or 
absolute non-Being which the Logos itself thinks of and characterizes as such. Traditional thought in India saw 
the dilemma and formulated the concept of sadasadvilakṣaṇa and called it māyā, that is, something which could 
neither be characterized as being or nonbeing, as it was unreal to thought, but still causally effective, and through 
that efficaciousness creating a world which was the source of joy and sorrow and thus leading one to ever renewed 
action to get more of the one and less of the other, if one could not get rid of it altogether. But if this is the way 
one looks at things, then one will have two opposed and conflicting ideals or puruṣārthas to realize, the one 
immanent in the notion of reason or Logos or knowledge, and the other immanent in will or action. The former 
will see the latter as based on a foundational illusion or ignorance or avidyā that believes or thinks that the Real 
can never be other than what it is and has always been, something timeless and eternal and unchanging.” Daya 
Krishna, “Eros, Nomos, Logos,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay 
L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 313. 
804  See in particular the ‘Introduction’, Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental 
Illusions, 1–73.  
805  In another paper, I relate the illusion of I-centricity to the prevalence of the mode of consciousness of 
knowledge, where the epistemological subject is distinguished from the agent and the feeling person. Such a 
conception of knowledge results in the impossibility of reaching the others as subjects, since they are objects of 
my knowledge. In conceiving these three modes of consciousness in interrelation, however, it becomes possible 
to integrate others to the process of constituting knowledge, as agents in the activity of knowledge and as feeling 
person whose feelings relate us in the intimacy of our subjectivities. Although working closely with this idea, I 
proceed here differently in order to investigate the relational role of dialogue in overcoming metaphysical I-
centricity. Coquereau, “Relational Consciousness: Subjectivity and Otherness in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy,” 
310–22. 
806 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 97–101.  
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actualized and perceived as inadequate (false, incomplete, etc.). The human constitution of 
knowledge is unveiled in the dissatisfactions that it generates and in the differences that are 
encountered with confronting different knowledge-theories. These dissatisfactions point at the 
cultural, social and historical boundaries of these knowledge-theories that are elaborated within 
specific contexts. Illusions, however, operate prior to this realization: they constitute the 
unquestionability of beliefs. This in return, denotes the human condition since all humans are 
subjected to illusions and are as such limited. The illusions operate differently in the three 
realms of consciousness (knowledge, will and feeling). It is however in the intermingling of 
these realms and in the interrelationships of the different illusions that they generate that Daya 
Krishna defines the human condition: 
 “Consciousness thus has almost opposed dimensions, the presuppositions of which are 
diametrically different from one another. The knowing consciousness cannot but treat the 
object as ‘given’, while consciousness as involved in action can only see it as something to be 
changed or transformed in the direction of what it considers to be ‘better’. At the level of 
feeling it is neither concerned with knowing the object as it is or in changing it in any specific 
way except when it sees it as producing a state of feeling which one considers to be unwelcome. 
The object is seen here purely instrumentally; what matters is the state of feeling itself. 
However, this instrumentality of the object in the context of feeling transforms human action 
and gives a radically different direction to action from the one it takes when it seeks a value 
which essentially involves the other. The diverse relationships with the object that 
consciousness has in its modalities of what are usually called ‘knowing’, ‘feeling’, and 
‘willing’, and the transcendental presuppositions and structures that are involved in these 
different relationships along with the interrelationships between them, defines the human 
condition in both its transcendent and immanent aspects. The complexity that this introduces 
into the human situation is literally unimaginable.”807  
In my interpretation of this citation, the ‘transcendental presuppositions and structures’ signify 
illusions. These are firstly involved in the different relationships with these three realms of 
consciousness, secondly in their ‘interrelationships’, and thirdly in relation with the other’s 
consciousness similarly constituted. Illusions are manifold, but Daya Krishna distinguishes 
between two general kinds, the ‘structural’ and the ‘transcendental’ ones. The transcendental 
illusions are understood in the Kantian sense, namely “something that is transcendentally 
presupposed is treated as phenomenally given”.808 However, in Daya Krishna’s reinterpretation, 
the transcendental illusions can be extended, including to reason itself. Thus, he adds that  “the 
transcendental illusion, then, would be the result of a projection of not only the generalized 
category of causality to each of the products of the activity, but also of the specific category 
which differentiates the modality of the activity from all other exercises of itself.”809 Drawing 
on the Kantian arising of antinomies that occur when space and time are seen as given rather 
than transcendentally constituted, Daya Krishna introduces from a classical example of a stick 
bent under water the perceptual illusions that are generated by the very structure of our 
cognition. 
                                                 
807 Daya Krishna, 97. 
808 Daya Krishna, 15. 
809 Daya Krishna, 22. 
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 “The criterion of a transcendental illusion would, then, be that it arises from the fact that 
something which is transcendentally presupposed is treated as phenomenally given, and that 
this gives rise to insoluble antinomies for thought which get dissolved or resolved when the 
mistake is realized. A ‘structural illusion’, on the other hand, arises when the structure of the 
cognizing mechanism itself creates the illusion whose ‘illusoriness’ is realized because of the 
incoherence which such an apprehension produces in respect of the object which appears to be 
different under other conditions. The well-known example of the stick which is perceived to 
be bent under water illustrates this kind of illusion almost perfectly.”810 
The concepts of ‘transcendental’ and ‘structural’ illusions hint at the different directions in 
which an illusion is constituted. For Daya Krishna, the problem does not only concern the 
relation between mundane and transcendental realms, i.e. between the given that we experience 
in the world and the transcendental a priori, a realm to which we have no access. Illusions 
operate also in the mundane world. Even what is transcendentally presupposed is subjected to 
the illusions of our own structure for conceiving it. These structures are biological, cultural, 
social, historical, etc. They are not specific to reason only, but also shows that reason functions 
within certain embodied contexts and groups. Furthermore, conceiving transcendental 
presuppositions influences our experience of the given and the structural illusions that we 
perceive. In this sense, as Daya Krishna suggests, it is impossible to bracket the structure 
through which we experience and conceive the world since there is no faculty escaping this 
existential structure of human beings: 
 “The deeper problem, however, is how one can ever know that what is transcendentally 
presupposed is not ‘really’ given for in case it is transcendentally presupposed, it shall always 
appear as given. There can simply be no way of becoming aware of the illusoriness of the given 
unless one has some faculty other than the one the structure of which is involved in the 
experience concerned. The point is that experience will always appear as ‘structured’ and one 
can never, in principle, come to ‘know’ that the structure does not belong to the experience but 
is the very precondition of its appearing as such.” 811 
The structural illusions, however, are not necessarily limited to our perception of the world as 
in the case of the stick bent in water. They originate from the commonality of the human 
structure of consciousness, which renders the illusions intersubjectively objective since we 
cannot detect their illusoriness. Their objectivity is determined by the intersubjective 
community sharing the same structure, which makes a content appear as object of an all-
consciousness in such a (determined) way. Thus, a stick appears bent in water to everybody 
sharing the same perceptual cognitive structure. We can theoretically ‘correct’ this illusion by 
‘knowing’ that the stick is straight, although our perception of it will remain ‘bent’. Furthermore, 
as Daya Krishna adds: “if, for some reason, we lived in a world where we were dealing with 
sticks under water most of the time, it is extremely probable that we would have opted for the 
view that sticks are really bent and that their appearance as being straight outside water was 
illusory.”812 Thus, structural illusions are not perceptual deficiencies per se or optical illusions. 
Rather, they refer to an objective, in the sense of intersubjectively shared and thus not 
                                                 
810 Daya Krishna, 15. 
811 Daya Krishna, 43–44. 
812 Daya Krishna, 16. 
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depending on our individuality, ‘way of seeing’ the world in a certain manner that we cannot 
question, since we cannot perceive it differently. In the absence of a ‘higher’ faculty that could 
unveil the illusions, we are doomed to experience the illusion, in spite of all our faculties, being 
also structurally defined.813 I thus interpret the given example of a stick in a metaphorical way 
with further consequences than proper perceptual applications, qualifying the structural 
illusions as a shared ‘certain way of seeing’ the world. While analyzing history and 
historiography, Daya Krishna refers back to this concept of structural illusions, where he applies 
it to ‘historical knowledge’ showing how far structural illusions operate and how multifold 
consequences they can have: 
 “The transcendental conditions of historical knowledge, therefore, would result in the 
historical illusion or illusions, or rather in structural illusions belonging to the domain of 
historical knowledge only when they are seen not as being its transcendental conditions, but as 
being the object or objects discovered by the historical consciousness or provided to it. Perhaps, 
the structural illusion in the case of history arises from the fact that the historian inevitably 
projects his own cultural mentality into that which he is trying to study and finds it objectively 
displayed therein by the evidence that he chooses to marshal in its support.”814 
The illusions of different realms of knowledge are thus generated when we treat as object 
something that is a transcendental precondition. They occur when we treat axioms and 
postulates that are inherent conditions of our knowledge as the objects of this knowledge, 
holding these axioms, postulates and beliefs to be ‘true’ (although the ‘truth’ is simply a 
consequence of our conditions).  
The example that Daya Krishna chooses is especially relevant for inter- or cross-cultural studies 
and can be easily extended to philosophy in the way we select, interpret and relate concepts 
between traditions. The very way we form ‘comparisons’, the way we evaluate what is ‘proper’ 
(philosophy, or proper method such as philological analysis versus philosophical expansion), 
what we integrate and what we omit in an analysis, the texts and concepts that we receive and 
those which fall into oblivion, depend on our structural situation (historical, cultural, social, 
etc.). This situation produces structural illusions when we refuse to see that the situation, 
structurally ordered, creates transcendental conditions for the production of our philosophical 
knowledge. Although these conditions are shared by all those who are located in the same 
situation and share the same structure, they are not universal. However, they are also necessary 
to create a particular discourse, which at the same time indicates the possibility of other 
alternative discourses. These discourses have their own structures within which ‘truth’ can be 
evaluated and might be contradictory to the truths elaborated in another discourse. This 
                                                 
813 Daya Krishna justifies the impossibility for reason to ‘correct’ its own illusions as follows: “Normally it is 
‘reason’ that is supposed to expose the illusoriness of such an appearance even when it is shared by everybody and 
continues to appear in the same way after reason has pronounced it to be illusory. The correction, therefore, is only 
a theoretical correction and does not affect the perceptual experience in any substantial way. But if perception can 
have structural illusions whose illusory character cannot be realized at the level of perception, can ‘reason’ not 
have such structural illusions of its own? Kant tried to suggest that it has and used a transcendental critique to 
expose the illusory nature of those seemingly objective realities brought into being by reason itself. Kant however 
did not discuss as to how reason could possibly expose its own illusions even by a transcendental critique, if they 
were the result of the very structure of reason itself.”Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography 
of Cultures and Civilizations, 117.  
814 Daya Krishna, 118. 
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possibility can be creatively used in dialogue to realize the specificity of our conditions for 
producing knowledge and exploring other’s knowledge, which is basically Daya Krishna’s plea. 
However, if the illusoriness is not realized, i.e. if we consider these conditions as objective 
productions of knowledge having a claiming universal validity, the illusions become an 
impediment to creative knowledge and dialogue. In other words: the illusions, when realized as 
such, can motivate a dialogue, while when they are not recognized, they create obstacle for 
dialoguing. The proofs that we have produced on the basis of this knowledge might be verifiable, 
but the structural framework from which they were produced (which thus condition them) is 
not. Thus, our epistemological assertions are ‘presuppositions’ which themselves originate 
from structural and transcendental illusion. The illusions of ‘truth’815, ‘finality’816, ‘authority’817, 
‘beginning and end’818 (of a text, of thinking, of knowledge) which we have earlier mentioned 
are instantiations of these structural illusions. In Foucauldian terms, structural illusions are what 
make something appear to be ‘true’ although it is only situated ‘within the truth’819, i.e. within 
a contingent and limited (historically, socially, culturally) structural nexus from which truth and 
false can be attributed.  
Dissatisfactions originate when we encounter the limits of this ‘within’ the truth, i.e. when the 
practical experience is insufficient with regard to what our consciousness had apprehended. 
While the illusions of knowledge occur from the denial of the specificity of our structures, the 
illusions of values arise from the denial of the limited reality of our ideals. For consciousness, 
reality is conceived of as encompassing all the existing possibilities. In the experience of the 
incompleteness of reality in our actions, however, the illusion is being revealed and points at 
                                                 
815 “The terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ will then be seen to be systematically misleading as they generate the 
illusion that there is or can be such a thing as knowledge that unifies all knowledges ithin itself and thus is that 
which alone may be regarded as preeminently true.” Daya Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination, and the Problem of 
Truth,” 173. 
816 “The illusion that this unendingness is ‘illusory’ is generated by that view of consciousness which sees it as 
cognitive in character, whose sole function consists in knowing ‘what is real’ and whose sole function consists in 
knowing ‘what is real’ and whose sole value consists in its being ‘true’ to the nature of that which is real. There is 
no reality; if consciousness is real and if self-consciousness is real, then also there can be no such thing as ‘truth’ 
or finality not only in the realm of knowledge, but in all other realms also.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of 
Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 145. 
817 “Knowledge, it should be remembered, is usually knowledge of what someone else has said or a repetition of 
what is habitually accepted as true by practitioners in a certain domain. The first is just information that may be 
useful in certain contexts. As for the second, a closer look at the field will always reveal dissidents who are 
anathema to the establishment. Thus, the distinction between those who know and those who do not is not only 
relative but also misleading if it is construed as a relationship of authority in which the latters have necessarily to 
accept what the formers say, as they are a disadvantaged group in the situation. This illusion of authority is 
generated by the child’s relation of multifarious dependence on adults, and is later strengthened by the schooling 
system where the teacher is supposed to know and the student to learn.” Daya Krishna, “Thinking versus Thought: 
Strategies for Conceptual Creativity,” 29. 
818 “The text, in other words, is to be seen as the thought product of someone’s thinking and thus having all those 
characteristics that any product of one’s own thinking usually has: tentativeness, incompleteness, provisionality, 
lack of finality, etc. But this would destroy the illusion created by the appearance of the beginning and the end 
within a finite number of pages securely bound within the confines of a book. (…) But, once the illusion of the 
beginning and the end are realized, the revelatory attitude to texts will cease also. One can easily see the absurdity 
of this attitude in the context of the so-called revealed texts of other religions but seldom in that of one’s own. And 
those who have seen through the revelatory pretensions of religions are seldom able to see through their almost 
universal prevalence in secular contexts also. The tribes of Marxians, Freudians, Fregeans, Wittgensteinians, 
Husserlians, Chomskians are legion (…). The disciples proudly proclaim the final findings of the master, little 
realizing that each of them has been rejected as untenable by followers of the other group.” Daya Krishna, 31–32. 
819 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language, 224. See also 5.1. 
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the discrepancy between reality and ideality. This is again correlated with the finality of truth 
which appears concomitant to objective ‘reality’. But in fact it is contradicted by the 
fragmentary, imperfect and dubitable existence of this reality in our actions, which renders the 
finality of truth suspiciously illusory. In Daya Krishna’s words: 
 “There is a generally unquestioned acceptance of the view that what is real must be so. It is 
assumed that this is the case because it must be of such a nature that there is not even the 
possibility of anything being added to it. That is, it cannot, in itself, stand in a necessary 
relationship to anything else, including human consciousness. This view derives, not from 
anything in the concept of reality itself, but instead from the structure of human consciousness.  
Kant tried to uncover and articulate this structural presupposition of the act of knowing but he 
did not see that knowing was only one of the modulations of consciousness even in the context 
we call ‘cognitive’, and that for any real understanding of the human situation, man finds 
himself in trying to understand the structure of consciousness and self-consciousness involved 
in it. Consciousness, it should be remembered, cannot differentiate between the real and the 
imaginary, as both appear equally as appearances to it. As for self-consciousness, which is 
everywhere at the human level, everything that appears is equally dubitable and necessarily so. 
But by a strange twist, philosophical thinking, which occurs at the level of self-consciousness, 
sees the self or the sense of the I alone as indubitable and treats all the rest, including itself, as 
objectivity given and hence essentially dubitable, and that too in the sense that it is contingent 
in principle. It demands and requires that whatever appears as object, including itself, can only 
be regarded as real if and only if it has the same indubitability as self-consciousness or the I 
consciousness.  
But this is to suffer from an illusion generated by the fact of self-consciousness itself. Once 
the source of this illusion is realized, the dubitable character of all that is object and the 
indubitability of the self, that is, the subject, will disappear and philosophical thinking be freed 
from the delusion that has characterized it since its beginning, as it is the reflexive activity of 
self-consciousness in its purest from that we know at the human level.”820 
It is important to notice that for Daya Krishna, first, ‘realizing’ the illusoriness of the illusion is 
different than ‘correcting’ or ‘annihilating’ the illusions, which, belonging to the structure of 
consciousness itself, is almost impossible. It is also artificial, in the sense of a ‘theoretical 
correction’ that does not modify our experience of it. The ‘feeling’ of illusoriness thus does not 
disappear, but is only a posteriori theoretically realized. This leaves the question of the illusions 
of feeling open, which I think Daya Krishna himself did not respond to.821  Although he 
                                                 
820 Daya Krishna, “Madness, Reason and Truth,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. 
Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 159. 
821 “The relations between beings who are ‘self-conscious’ are, thus, structurally determined by the fact that each 
of them happens to be simultaneously a ‘subject’ and an ‘object’ to the other. This relationship, however, is itself 
differentiated radically in the dimensions of knowing, feeling and action, which seem so incommensurate that it is 
difficult to see how they can be reconciled in a unitary relationship which is demanded by the existential structure 
of the human reality itself. (…) The situation in the realm of feeling is far more complex and hence has hardly 
been paid any attention by thinkers as even those who have tried to think about this dimension of human reality 
have seen it primarily in terms of ‘understanding’, a task which is undertaken in the same way as one ‘understands’ 
other objects in the context of the entreprise of knowledge. But ‘feelings’ are not to be understood, at least in the 
same sense of ‘understanding’, as one does when the term is applied to inanimate matter, or a living being or even 
a cultural object which is a human creation. Feelings are ‘lived’ through, ‘felt’ and existentially experienced in a 
way that nothing else is.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 108–9. 
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articulates the illusions of knowledge and action, and the presuppositions and dissatisfactions, 
his account on feeling in general (not only confined to aesthetic feelings which he however 
usually epitomizes as feeling822) raises further questions.  
Some of these questions have been asked by Arindam Chakrabarti on his essay in honor of 
Daya Krishna, wondering whether he really ‘misses’ Dayaji after his decease, or ‘seems’ to 
miss it, i.e. whether feelings are subject to fallibility or whether, because we feel in a certain 
way, we cannot contradict how we feel.823 The possibility of deceiving myself in my feelings 
(as in blaming others for my feelings of being annoyed because they come late, while I am 
either actually annoyed at myself, or annoyed because I actually wished they had not come at 
all824) shows that feelings, in spite of the immediacy which seems to prevent any objective 
distance to assert truth or falsity, can also be subject to illusions. But are these illusions 
structural illusions? If we understand Daya Krishna’s definition in the intersubjective sense that 
structural illusions arise due to our common perceptual and cognitive limits, because of which 
the illusions are indecipherable, the problem is even more complex. On the one hand, the inner 
state of feelings is precisely what is ‘mine’ and not shared by others in its immediacy: I can 
express and communicate it, but nobody can have a direct access to my inner feelings. On the 
other hand, in spite of the diversity of feelings and the complexity of psychological structures, 
we all share ‘feelings’, i.e. we all feel some things, notwithstanding the indefinite variations in 
their nature and expressions. This means that if we consider the feeling structure in itself, the 
way we deceive ourselves with our feelings can be related to dissatisfactions. The content of 
feelings can vary, so as for values, but we all have a valuational structure - characterized as 
seeking - and feelings. One difference however is to be noted: dissatisfactions imply a contact 
with an external reality, an actualization of our ideal apprehensions. Feelings on the contrary 
need not to be confronted with an external reality and can originate from within ourselves (such 
as spiritual or religious feelings). If we consider that feelings are precisely this intimacy that 
escapes the structural sharedness - such that, paradoxically, our self-illusion can be detected by 
others using their own faculty to notice our hypocrisy - then the question of the structure of 
feelings is unresolved. But can we even speak of ‘structure’ in the case of feelings, which seem 
to contradict any idea of organized coherence? Or can we, again, conceive of ‘feeling’ at a level 
where the diversity and incoherencies are encompassed under a commonality of all humans 
‘feeling’ sadness and beauty and joy, even when the context of their arising might totally differ? 
                                                 
822 Daya Krishna, 87. 
823  Arindam Chakrabarti, “On Missing and Seeming to Miss: Some Philosophical Ramblings on the 
Subjective/Objective Distinction in Memory of Daya Krishna,” in Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj: Dialogical 
Meditations on Daya Krishna and Ramchandra Gandhi, ed. Shail Mayaram (New Delhi: SAGE, 2014), 177–98. 
824 “Yet we do, undeniably, make mistakes of different sorts in assessing our current mental, hedonic, somatic and 
proprioceptive states. When we are feeling lazy while trying to lift up a chair, we believe that a certain chair feels 
too heavy for us to lift when it really does not. We think - tell ourselves - that we are not annoyed when we are. 
We think that we are annoyed because some friend has arrived too late, whereas the fact-hard-to-acknowledge-is 
that we are annoyed because he showed up at all! (…) Thus, many different kinds of mistakes fall under the general 
category of ‘Errors about one’s current mental state’. Some inward or higher-order self-ascription of cognitive 
states’inherit’ the error of the outward judgement that it reflectively registers. While having the rope/snake illusion, 
as yet undetected, one could introspect: ‘I am seeing a snake now.’ The error of the outward judgement: ‘That is a 
snake, over there’ contaminates the introspective awareness ‘I am seeing a snake now’, rendering it erroneous in 
so far as the claim is taken as existentially qualified: ‘There is a snake which I am now seeing.’” Chakrabarti, 181. 
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Daya Krishna seems to favor the first alternative825, which still does not solve the issue whether 
structural illusions occur in the case of feelings, or whether feelings generate other kinds of 
illusions. Consequently, I would even ask whether feelings could constitute the forms of 
illusions (i.e. how we experience them), rather than their content (such as the illusions of 
knowledge). In the first alternative, ‘illusoriness’ designates the feeling due to which we 
become aware of the illusion, for example ‘being annoyed’ as the feeling that forces me to 
realize that I actually do not want to meet my friend. In the second alternative, illusoriness can 
be considered as the actual content of my feeling of being annoyed when my presumed friends 
come too late, if I deceive myself according to Chakrabarti. The unreliability of my own feeling 
gives rise to the illusion of my feeling which is felt as illusoriness when I realize that I was 
mistaking myself. It thus seems to me to alternate between the illusion of feeling (as content) 
and the feeling of the illusoriness of the feeling, once we realized - or have been made to realize 
- that we were mistaken. I hypothesize that both are related to each other, so that the feeling of 
illusoriness affects the feeling of being annoyed, and this feeling is also affected by its illusion. 
More importantly, ‘illusion’, like presupposition and dissatisfaction, is not simply a negative 
term ‘from’ which we should free ourselves. Freeing oneself from an illusion does not equate 
freedom from all illusions. Like with dissatisfactions, illusions might be experienced as 
deceptive. But it is precisely in the undecidedness of dissatisfactions and illusions, i.e. in their 
incompleteness, tentativeness and fallibility, that the potentiality for creation lies. Thus, the 
negativity is a condition for creative possibilities, however not in a dialectic way but in the 
reciprocity of an ever-going dynamic at all levels of consciousness and self-consciousness, as 
well as between consciousnesses. It is in this spirit that Daya Krishna concludes his 
posthumously published work Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions: 
“The structural and transcendental illusions that are thus revealed to be characteristic of human 
consciousness have, it should be remembered, both a positive and a negative aspect. In their 
positive forms they refer to that creativity that lies at the root of the world and which becomes 
manifest at a human level in all the myriad forms that surround him all around and have 
accompanied him in his historical journey through the ages. The negative aspect is revealed 
when he forgets the fact that this all is, to a large extent, his own creation, and when he falls in 
love with it, or is obsessed by it, or feels bound to it in such a way that he feels that he can 
never be freed from it. At a deeper level, the bondage may emanate from the fact that he takes 
for granted the ‘given-ness’ of the forms that this power of ‘creative illumining’ has taken in 
the past. ‘To be free’ from the forms that freedom has taken in the past is the real freedom 
which man forgets all the time. One can recover this freedom only by becoming aware of the 
roots from which these forms emanate and the source of this discovery perhaps lies in 
becoming aware of the illusions that are generated by the structure and transcendental character 
of consciousness at the human level.”826 
                                                 
825 “The realm of feelings, however, never attains and cannot, in fact, ever attain in principle the ‘definiteness’ and 
‘coherence’ which all knowledge attempts to attain and which action also tries to achieve, even if it never attains 
it completely. The inchoateness and indefiniteness which infects the world of feelings makes it thus impervious to 
both knowledge and action which continually try to affect and modify them in the light of what they consider as 
the ‘ideal norm’ of what they ‘should’, or even ‘ought’ to be.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and 
Transcendental Illusions, 109. 
826 Daya Krishna, 170. 
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These concluding lines constitute for me ‘guiding lines’ of Daya Krishna’s philosophical 
project which connect his otherwise multifold writings. They relate the positive aspect of 
illusions if used as a creative source for engaging further in discussions, if conceived as 
indefinite and containing possibilities for thinking and creating. The same dimension of 
illusions can also be seen negatively if the feeling of their illusoriness is lost, which also leads 
to a loss of the feeling of ‘wonder’ so crucial for philosophical thinking. It can also be seen 
negatively if the feelings of givenness that these illusions create corresponds for us with what 
reality is, in the singular, complete and absolute. Furthermore, if the ‘given-ness’ is ‘taken for 
granted’, the very questioning that is also at the core of the philosophical entreprise is negated 
and thus every dialogue is closed. Finally, these lines accentuate Daya Krishna’s pregnant view 
on freedom, a freedom that is not the liberation from māyā, but passes through illusions as a 
process of clarification and ‘illumination’ towards further illusions. 
Although Daya Krishna’s account of illusion is complex, it is rewarding to ‘illuminate’ the 
creative potentiality of dialogue. On the one hand, he emphasizes the mutuality and reciprocity 
of all dimensions of consciousness: of consciousness and self-consciousness, of I-
consciousness and other-consciousness, of these consciousnesses with their bodies, with nature 
and the world. He also insists on the difficulty that these relationships, all interconnected, create 
- which he defines as ‘the roots of creativity’. On the other hand, these mutual and reciprocal 
interrelationships at all levels do not merge into a complete unity, which would precisely negate 
the potentiality of creativity in such a diversity (this explains his critique against the Advaitin 
developed in 6.2.2).  
Daya Krishna is thus a philosopher of differences, more precisely of ‘identity-in-differences’, 
which can be defined as the ‘move’ from withdrawing into the unity and returning to the wordly 
differences. This move is what connects my consciousness, which tends to unify the diverse 
experiences into a single understanding or which seeks a transcendental unity, with others who 
embody the diversity of the world we share. In that sense this move is what enables a relation 
with other-consciousnesses. This question of the move that occurred in the relation between 
identity and difference is relevant at different levels. First it is relevant for Daya Krishna’s 
philosophy, since I believe it is the dynamic between identity and difference which describes at 
best his objective to unveil the presuppositions of philosophy. I think that he does so mostly by 
locating the impasse of philosophical thinking when it ‘stopped’ the ‘move’ as described above. 
It is in this sense not the presence of conflicting theories that creates a deadlock, but the lack of 
further perspectives from which these differences can be further discussed. This arises when 
one ‘falls in love’ with his theory or position, as Daya Krishna formulates it when he explains 
the negative aspects of illusions. In other terms, the impasse of differences arises when the 
different theories are considered as final and one refuses to reflect further on these differences. 
Secondly, the notion of move is important for dialogue and creativity in dialogue, which 
originate in such an ongoing multi-directional process between different dimensions of 
consciousness, self and others, etc. Thus, isolating one dimension of dialogue for a theory of 
dialogue (such as language, performative communication, or a normative ethics of 
communication) remains for me, interpreting Daya Krishna’s practice and theory, insufficient 
to explain the specificity of the dialogical creativity. This creativity is located in the ‘cracks of 
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certitude’ that differences enable, however together with identities which are equally needed to 
make dialogue possible. In his only unpublished article explicitly and entirely dedicated to the 
problem of dialogue, debate, discussion and conversation, Daya Krishna emphasizes the 
‘indeterminacy’ generating novel horizons, questions and problems by the presence and 
participation of the other, an other whose differences (of position, perspective, philosophical 
traditions) increases the potential creativity. Interestingly, the doubts that arise from this 
indeterminacy are provoking both identity and differences among the different positions hold 
in dialogue: 
“Whatever the strategy adopted, the seeds of ‘doubt’ and suspicion in respect of one’s position 
have been same in one’s mind and one ‘knows’ that one has to come to terms with it. Strangely 
and paradoxically the same thing happens to the other party also, specifically if one’s 
arguments had any strength and the evidence any validity. The respective positions thus827 get 
modified and subtly828 changed so the debate after lasting for centuries, or even millennia, 
seems to converge towards formations which though still different in appearance mainly due 
to difference in terminology, reveals an ‘underlying identity’ even though one continues to be 
wedded to the differences as it is supposed to give one the ‘identity’ which differentiates one 
from the other.”829 
The differences account for the change and modification of a position and are thus creating the 
movement of thinking in a dialogue. At the same time, they converge in a kind of ipse identity, 
if we reinterpret Ricoeur’s concept to philosophical debates for which the same philosophical 
concept or question can be interpreted and transformed in many ways - an identity through 
differences. Identities within dialogues tend to jeopardize the continuous movement of the 
dialogue. However, at another level of abstraction, they delineate ‘tendencies’, cross-points, 
similarities and overlaps. Although they form the battlefield of specialists arguing for the 
specificities of their own research, and although they can be used to reduce the other’s position 
to oneself, they enable the formation of a ground on which debate, discussion and dialogue (1.1) 
can take place. Thus, Daya Krishna’s battle is not exactly the one arguing against cultural 
reductions. There are bound to appear in any study looking for convergences of civilizations at 
a general level, such as the reduction of the idea of ‘India’ with regard to ‘Western’ philosophies 
or the reduction of the idea of the ‘West’ to India. What he rather criticizes is that such 
reductions are not able to foster new questions.830 In other words, his criticism focuses on the 
                                                 
827 T: they 
828 T: sub_ 
829 Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 7. The quote 
from this article is based on the unpublished transcript (T) typed by D. D. Mathur, which however has been 
corrected with the help of the original manuscript. The emendations are indicated above. 
830 Daya Krishna indeed does not hesitate to schematize ‘India’ and the ‘West’. He in particular analyzes social 
differences by contrasting the socio-centric predicament of Western thinking with the ātman-centric predicament 
of the Indian thought in his first Shimla lecture entitled ‘Social Philosophy: Past and Future.’ This opposition has 
been criticized, for instance by Ronald Moore and Yashdev Shalya for instance (Ronald M. Moore, “Reviewed 
Work: Social Philosophy (Past and Future) by Daya Krishna,” Philosophy East and West 20, no. 3 (1970): 323–
24, https://doi.org/10.2307/1398314; Yashdev Shalya, “Social Philosophy: Past and Future,” in The Philosophy of 
Daya Krishna, ed. Bhuvan Chandel and K. L. Sharma (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research : 
Distributed by Indian Book Centre, 1996), 192–220). However, this opposition was not meant as a reduction of 
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fact that identities get fixed into epithets such as ‘India is spiritual’, ‘the West is rational’, which 
reduces the debate itself to already-known alternatives. In order to tackle such a problem, the 
‘underlying identity’ above mentioned that delineates civilizations should form a ground to 
investigate and to be confronted with alternative identities, different models or methodologies 
and various traditions. Thirdly, the question of the relation between identity and difference 
underlines the intercultural dimension of dialogue. This is not only because Daya Krishna’s 
insights originate from a criticism of the Kantian and Advaitin idealisms at the same time. It is 
also because such a conception of relational ‘identity in differences and differences in 
identity’831 has the advantage to take us away from the binarity of ‘identity versus differences’ 
in intercultural discourses.832 It furthermore does not justify the ‘reciprocity’ or ‘mutuality’ in 
formal ethical and normative terms, but articulates them at a more fundamental level, i.e. at the 
core of consciousness itself, which is effectuated by the ‘awareness’ of it and of its limitations 
rather than by an external pre-established framework.  
Thus, identity alone runs the risk of becoming ‘obsessive’833, while differences create the 
illusions of independent and separated positions which give us the impression of finality and 
                                                 
India and the West to these qualifications. He on the contrary wanted to make his listeners aware of the need of 
reconfiguring them. In that sense, it is an invitation to engage in further dialogues and debates on these 
qualifications. Daya Krishna comes back on these predicaments in his second Shimla Lectures and adds: “I 
suggested that Western thinking is primarily socio-centric. It sees man primarily as a socio-political being, as a 
‘socio-political animal’. After all, in ancient Greece, unless one was a citizen, one was not considered to be a 
human being. I have further contrasted it with the Indian perspective, which I have referred to as Ātman-centric. 
The Indian thought about man has seen him neither as a biological, socio-cultural or political, nor even as a rational 
being. It has seen him primarily as asocial, apolitical and trans-rational. This was what I meant when I spoke of 
the Ātman-centric perspective. Now, what about civilizations? (…) Does ‘understanding’ grasp the essence of a 
civilization? Can we intuit this essence, and if so, how? How shall we intuit the subjectivity of a civilization? In 
the same way as we do it with a human being: through what he did, what he created over a long period of time. Is 
it a real enfoldment? Do not new factors come in? Do not accidents occur? These are some of the questions that 
arise in this context. The story of civilization has yet to be written, and there is not one narrative; there are different 
narratives. They have to be told, these stories of man and his collectivity. (…) We cannot grasp the full picture. It 
will take time. But it has to be written. The Indian civilization cannot be understood, and no other civilization can 
be understood merely by getting articles written by different people. (…) I am suggesting this here as an invitation 
to all my readers to write their own story. I invite everyone to rethink, not only in terms of their own specialization, 
but to get out of their specializations, and on that basis, to build something.” Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 106–7. 
831 For identity in relation to civilizations, see Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of 
Cultures and Civilizations, 159–216.; for identity in the context of comparative philosophy, see Daya Krishna, 
“Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be,” 2011. 
832  In intercultural philosophy, the issue of developing an intercultural method (by drawing on German 
phenomenology and hermeneutical discourses) which would resist reducing the Other to the same in my 
‘understanding’ of him enabled a discussion of models of ‘identity’ versus ‘difference’. In this context (and unlike 
the Advaitin inspiration of postcolonial Indian models), the ‘difference’ models were often preferred, usually either 
navigating between identity and difference to avoid the extremes of both, or suggesting hermeneutic or 
phenomenological differential accounts that can be adapted to intercultural contexts. See Weidtmann, 
Interkulturelle Philosophie, 76–98; Georg Stenger, “Differenz: Unterscheidungen, Differenzierungen, 
Dimensionen,” in Die Interkulturalitätsdebatte - Leit- Und Streitbegriffe. Intercultural Discourse - Key and 
Contested Concepts (Freiburg - München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2012), 45–55.  
833 “Any identification with a group thus tends to jeopardize the realization of value at the deepest level just as 
one’s own identification with one’s empirical self tends to do when it is conceived in such a way as to exclude 
others. This may occur even at the transcendental level where one aspires to de-identify oneself with all that is 
given to consciousness as the ‘other’. The only way out of the dilemma,at least at the theoretical level is to conceive 
of oneself, at every level of its identification as subserving the interests and values of the ‘other’ or, at least as not 
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indubitability. 834  While we cannot escape the movement towards identification (with our 
bodies, our cultures, our academic field and so on), the isolation of differentiated positions can 
create the impression that these are too far away to be related. Thus, it is only in the relation of 
identity and difference, in the movement of identifying what is which implies what is not, that 
we can remain aware of the illusions above-mentioned:  
“Whatever a man may be, he has a body, and he is conscious and he is also conscious of the 
fact that he is conscious. Not only this, he also inevitably draws the distinction between truth 
and falsity, good and bad, right or wrong, and what appears to him as pleasant and unpleasant, 
or beautiful and ugly. (…) The distinctions are embedded in consciousness and when one 
becomes aware of them, one feels the obligation and the challenge to remove them through 
one’s own effort, which has been called puruṣārtha in the Indian tradition. But if man is to be 
defined or understood in terms of what we call the human effort to realize something that is 
not there including what is truth, then he himself will have to be seen in a different way and 
the question asked, ‘where does falsity exist’? The only answer that can be given to this 
question is that it is in the very being of consciousness that makes the distinction. To be 
conscious is to bring into being something that is ontologically impossible, for it 
simultaneously has the character of being both ‘is’ and ‘is not.’ If it were just not there, one 
could not be even aware of it and if it were there then the question of bringing about any change 
would not arise. But to be conscious at the human level is to be just this and the history of man 
cannot be understood without this radical transformation of the notions of reality and truth, 
which are closely related to each other.”835 
Thus, definitions imply distinctions which necessarily relate to their opposite. This is easy to 
understand in the example of ‘India’ and the ‘West’, which are negatively defined by what they 
are not, rather than by any substantial content of what they are. The problem occurs when we 
lose sight of the relations implied and begin to attribute to one of these poles a higher value 
such as ‘good’ or ‘superior’ or ‘true/truer’. The illusions thus operate to give us the ‘feeling’ of 
an objective validity without making us see that the arguments for this truth lie in particular 
structural conditions. Positively seen, this awareness enables the opportunity to question the 
truth of these oppositions, how well-founded their definitions are, how the questions can be 
asked differently, from which other perspective they could be explored, etc. Thus, identity and 
difference remain intrinsically connected, and it is their relation that forms the core of the 
creative dynamic: 
                                                 
harming them in any essential manner.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental 
Illusions, 96.  
834 “Distinguishing, discriminating, and evaluating awareness is present and active at all these levels, and yet is 
not treated as knowledge, even though it also changes and grows and stagnates and perhaps has a history of its 
own just as knowledge is supposed to have. The latter, however, seems to have a cumulative character which the 
former lacks. In most cases, the latter is better or more reliable than that which has been superseded by it. This 
results in that ambivalent relationship which makes all that is not accepted and certified as true by the reason-
centered enterprise of knowledge as superstitious belief or faith, which only the ignorant and the irrational can 
cherish or live.” Daya Krishna, “Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of Knowledge,” 2011, 151. 
835 Daya Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination, and the Problem of Truth,” 166. 
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“The debate between those who have opted for identity alone as real and the ones who asserted 
the reality of difference is unmeaning, for one has to accept the reality of both as without such 
an acceptance, one cannot either meaningfully speak of, or make sense of, one’s experience. 
The assertion of difference does not deny the possibility of relation or even of similarity 
between those that are different. Thus, similarity, relatedness and difference are three aspects 
of one and the same phenomenon, the other name of which is self-consciousness. Similarity 
assumes both identity and difference, and relatedness is the overcoming of the illusoriness of 
the absoluteness of difference, while still preserving its reality itself. It is ‘relatedness’, 
therefore, that is at the heart of the matter and the exploration of the diverse forms that it takes 
or may take, in its pursuits, has to be seen, so that one may understand human life as it finds 
itself in this world.”836 
The intellectual detachment that was discussed in 5.2.1, as well as the process of identification 
with and deidentification from a culture, a history, a position, appear to be crucial for 
constituting knowledge in dialogue. Furthermore, the ability to relate to others is a condition 
for any moral order, and the seeking of knowledge and truth is embedded into this matrix of 
identification and deidentification, for it challenges what ‘is’ in terms of what ‘ought’. The 
plurality that the differences let emerge is also a condition for dialogues in general, and of 
intercultural dialogues in particular. Relationality, which is at the core of the awareness of the 
illusoriness of the illusions (i.e. their theoretical corrections) enables the dynamic between the 
different spheres of (self-)consciousness. 
 
7.2. The Demand of Consciousness for Dialogue 
 
In an unpublished article with the intriguing title ‘’Thinking’ without ‘Things’: without Identity, 
without Non-contradiction, and yet ‘Thinking’ still’837, Daya Krishna asks whether a ‘problem’ 
is a ‘thing’ and if it is not, what are philosophers thinking about when they think about 
‘thinking’. In other words, he discusses the relation between ‘thinking’ and ‘problems’ to the 
objects of self-consciousness. The most interesting case for him appears when the ‘things’ are 
incompatible with each other, since it creates the ‘problem’ of their simultaneous contradictory 
‘reality’. Thus, in my reflective self-consciousness, if thinking is an object of my inquiry and if 
that implies contradictions and paradoxes - which we know are the foundation of any 
philosophical problem upon which philosophy is developed -, can thinking and the different 
objects of my thinking be simultaneously real? He suggests that defining a thing requires the 
simultaneous negation of what the thing is not: to be defined, the thing is at the same time 
something and not its contradiction. The conclusion of his argumentation is very useful at this 
point, since he connects this logical question of the ‘law’ of contradiction to the ‘law’ of ethical 
                                                 
836 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 104–5. 
837 This unpublished article is available at https://www.dayakrishna.org/t in its original handwriting version and a 
transcription typed by D. D. Mathur, Daya Krishna’s personal assistant and scribe of many of his later writings. 
The quote from this article is based on the transcript (T), which however has been corrected with the help of the 
original manuscript (M). The emendations are indicated below. 
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injunction. In so doing, he shows the similarity of the question of objectivation of ‘things’ to 
create identities upon which only we can reflect with the one of ethical norms that objectify 
values. He furthermore points at the problem of their simultaneous contradictory reality in both 
cases. Thus, while the logical ‘alternatives’ of Kalidas Bhattacharyya (5.3.2) could appear to 
be enough of a solution to solve the problem of simultaneous logical contradictory appearances, 
from the perspective of ethical norms it remains insufficient. Indeed, simultaneously applying 
ethical norms and rules that are contradictory would appear as ‘self-defeating’, or in other words, 
contraproductive. Even more interestingly, Daya Krishna points here at the efficiency of 
intersubjective discussion and living together for unveiling the illusoriness of the structural 
illusions of such ‘laws’ that are generated from the appearing stability of the identities of the 
contradictory things. Thus, it appears as if these contradictions must be solved in order for the 
identities to be simultaneously safeguarded, productive and valid. However, it is actually in the 
dynamic modifications taking place in discussions and living together that we can see the 
illusoriness of these stable identities and realize that their dynamics is their identity through 
contradictions. In Daya Krishna’s words: 
 “The purely abstract notion of ‘identity’ as symbolized by Aristotle is, thus838, not only empty 
but meaningless (…). The current reformulation of the law839 on which the notion of a ‘thing’ 
rests does not fare any better. It shifts the problem from the ‘referent’ of a word 840 to its 
‘meaning’, and sees meaning in terms of the ‘use’ of the word, and understands the law as a 
stipulative imperative to keep ‘use’ of the ‘word’ or the ‘term’ unchanged in a particular 
cognitive discourse841 as the discussion about what is claimed as ‘knowledge’ would become 
‘self-defeating’ if the normative injunction were not observed. 
The reformation shifts the problem to the identity of ‘discourse’842 or ‘context’ and makes the 
law ‘normative’ in a way whose far 843-reaching implications have not been seen. Logic 
becomes something like ‘ethics’, an a priori conditional pre-requirement of the possibility of 
inter-subjective discussion and argumentation amongst human beings, just as the latter may be 
understood as an a priori conditional prerequirement for ‘living together’ as ‘human beings’ 
amongst human beings. 
But what is overlooked by those who argue like this is that whether it be ‘discussion and 
argumentation’ or ‘living together’ each, in its own way, not only involves but demands a 
continuous re-shifting modification and change in the ‘illusory identity’ of each and all of the 
linguistic and behavioural signs or signals844 that are transmitted, reflected back in converse 
transmission amongst participants who are continuously in motion intellectually and 
emotionally.”845 
                                                 
838 T: this 
839 T: low 
840 T: world 
841 T: discomic 
842 T: discomic 
843 T: par-reaching 
844 T: signed 
845 Daya Krishna, “‘Thinking’ without’Things’ : Without Identity, without Non-Contradiction, and yet ‘Thinking’ 
Still.” (Manuscript, n.d.), https://www.dayakrishna.org/t., p. 5 (T), p. 9 (M). 
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The parallel between the identity of a thing and the normative injunction that is derived from 
this stable identity is interesting for understanding why Daya Krishna refused to engage in a 
normative and prescriptive ethical theory of discourse or dialogue, and why he rather refered to 
the universality of ‘seeking’ as an existential orientation for human beings, insisting however 
on the infinite plurality of seekings. The logical and normative ‘laws’ express the identities that 
are supposed to (illusorily) be recognized by all, unifying our conceptual frameworks based on 
the consensus of these meanings and uses, upon which we can debate and discuss the ‘thing’. 
But precisely, what if these laws were illusory because the identities on which they rest are not 
fixed and harmoniously determined by simple exclusion and negation of others, but related by 
their contradictions which form their existence? What if these laws are the structural illusions 
of all who are located in the same discourse, within the same ‘truth’? How to unveil these 
illusions, or at least reveal their illusoriness? Furthermore, Daya Krishna adds a level of 
complexity in relating these logical laws of identity to the ethical normativity responsible not 
only for the formal identities but also for the behaviours and utterances of those who discuss on 
the basis of these identities. Ethics as an a priori pre-requirement for participating in a 
discussion remains illusory given the same impossibility to extricate ourselves out of the 
specific discourse in which we are located, which however, dictates what we can say and how 
we can say it. The solution out of the realm of these illusions cannot be to ‘replace’ one truth 
by another, one discourse by another, or one ethical model by another: it must articulate a 
different way of ‘seeing’ the problem. This, however, is the core of structural illusions when 
we all share a way of ‘seeing’ the problem. This view enforces Daya Krishna’s belief that 
dialogues across philosophical traditions are necessary for breaking out of these illusions.  
Proceeding from his account to an intercultural theory, intercultural dialogues are not simply 
‘good’ or ‘valuable’ because it is ethically more just to include diverse participants according 
to the current normative necessities of our societies. They are not only epistemologically 
contributing to maximizing knowledge by adding different philosophical theories, or even by 
crossing them for novel insights by mutual introspection. They are, so to say, a metaphysical 
reaction to the illusions of consciousness, or at least a way to realize their illusoriness. If we 
consider, following Daya Krishna, that “discussion and argumentation or living together not 
only involves but demands a continuous re-shifting modification and change in the illusory 
identity”, then it follows that the dynamic of identities-in-transformative-differences are 
revealed to consciousnesses in dialogue. In other words: our self-consciousness creates ‘things’ 
by reflecting, which need to be thought by contradistinction and negation of what they are not 
in order to reach a stable identity. This stability is itself necessary to be ‘thought about’, i.e. 
reflected upon in terms of definitions, classifications, systematizations, etc. However, the 
process of reflection creates the stability, which implies that it is never acquired and given, but 
in ever-changing qualifications, definitions, exclusions by differentiation. Thus, in order to be 
able not to perceive this identity as finite, Daya Krishna points at the ‘demands’ originating 
from discussion, argumentation and living together. But what exactly does ‘demand’ mean, and 
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how can intersubjective discussion, argumentation and living together ‘demand’ the continuous 
differences operating within identities?  
‘Demand’ is another recurrent term in Daya Krishna’s writings,846 in particular in relation with 
illusions, creating a tension akin to dissatisfaction. It designates the conflict between a reality 
that ‘is’ but which ‘ought’ to be different or which ‘is’ not really, or not yet, etc. Often in relation 
with consciousness or self-consciousness, a ‘demand’ expresses the feeling produced by the 
given experience of reality in contradiction with reality itself, either as transcendental reality, 
or at least as the reality we believe ‘ought to be’. However, while dissatisfaction designates the 
external contradiction of our actions with regard to our apprehensions or planning, the ‘demand’ 
expresses a metaphysical reaction within consciousness.847 The contradiction here is the one of 
our inner experience with our apprehension of reality, or between our subjective and objective 
attitudes within consciousness. Thus, while in the case of dissatisfaction, a possible momentary 
resolution consists in ‘changing’ or adapting our actions - i.e. for example, to reorganize the 
setting of the next dialogue in view of the difficulties experienced in the previous one -, the 
transformation ‘demanded’ by consciousness implies to modify my way of experiencing itself 
                                                 
846 I consider the following quote as paradigmatic of his use of the term, articulating the ‘demand’ from a subject 
to know an object, i.e. the separation that is effectuated in the act of knowledge - a separation which creates 
illusions. The formulation of the problem of defining objects as a subject, which means as an object for self-
consciousness, reflects Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s influence on Daya Krishna: “The problem [of the idea 
of ‘definition’], however, is a deeper one and infects classical, modern and post-modern thinkers alike on the 
subject concerned. It assumes not only the notion of an object, but that all objects are of one kind as, whatever be 
the differences between them, there are objects of knowledge both in the epistemological and the ontic sense of 
the term. In the former sense, they are all objects of consciousness, provided one accepts that there is such, whereas 
in the case of the latter they enjoy an independent reality of their own, and it is because of this that they become 
the objects of knowledge. The glaring contradiction between the two senses has either not been seen or has just 
been glossed over. In the former sense, all that is there is already there, there is nothing to be known as the 
presentation exhausts what there is without any residuum whatsoever. In the latter case, the object is never 
exhausted by any of its appearances and thus demands to be known, a demand that is insatiable and inexhaustible 
and which thus set the enterprise of knowledge on its unending course whose possible finality is nurtured only by 
the illusion that the so-called presentation has no ontic reality of its own, independent of the facticity of its being 
known. The illusion, as should be obvious from the history of the knowledge-enterprise of man, creates the 
delusion that the object is not only constituted by the acts of the knowing consciousness, as in Husserl, but also 
that ultimately it is as definitional in nature as in mathematics.” Daya Krishna, “Definition, Deception and the 
Enterprise of Knowledge,” 2011, 145. 
847 The distinction between these two levels is clearly effectuated by Kalidas Bhattacharyya, who is not only 
Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s son, but also an illuminating reader of his father’s philosophy: “Pure 
consciousness is thus intrinsically real, although as pure it is above empirical reals. (…) Above the level of 
objective idealities, then, there is pure subjectivity which is intrinsically real, and the reality that is demanded by 
objective idealities is in the end the intrinsic reality of subjectivity. (…) Idealities necessarily demand reality, and 
it is this very demand that constitutes their ideality. From this point of view any ideality is a value, an ought-to-be. 
It is not yet is, it only demands to be. It is unnecessary, therefore, to distinguish between ideality and value. Ought-
to-be is not necessarily in the context of doing; what is in that context is ought-to-do which is not subsumed under 
ought-to-be. While the reality that is claimed in ought-to-do is that of empiricals, the moral value being realised in 
the world of empiricals, the claimed reality in ought-to-be is above the empirical level. The second reality is 
ultimately that of pure subjectivity.” Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “The Business of Philosophy,” in Philosophy, Logic 
and Language (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd, 1965), 32–33. 
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and my way of expressing and reordering reality.848 In Daya Krishna, the demand calls in 
particular for removing the illusoriness of the illusion by seeing the inherent dynamics operating 
in consciousness, the deceptive operation of which is summarized as follows: 
“The transformation of the given, or even its denial, seems to be the essence of consciousness, 
and as consciousness itself is ‘given’ to self-consciousness, its transformation or even denial 
seems to be the task set by self-consciousness to itself. Strangely this has not been seen or 
realized by those who have talked either of consciousness or of self-consciousness. 
Consciousness is not a passive, reflexive, mirroring activity whose task is to know, but rather, 
something which apprehends something which is aesthetically or morally in need of 
improvement. The same obtains when consciousness itself becomes an ‘object’ to self-
consciouness. Consciousness is found to be that which it should not be; or even ‘ought’ not to 
be, and hence the dissatisfaction it feels is not in respect of objects that consciousness 
apprehends, or even in respect of the relationships between them, but with regard to 
consciousness itself and the way it reacts to the world that it apprehends.”849 
In this case there is an activity, which is however not oriented outwards, and thus the 
dissatisfaction operates with respect to itself and to the relation that consciousness develops 
with the world. In my reading, the transformation of itself and its object in the apprehension of 
something which ‘ought to be’ expresses the impulse of the ‘demand’ originating in the 
deceptive activity of own apprehension. The denial of the given consists in ‘imagining’ other 
possibilities, from which creativity originates - not only in the critical apprehension of what is 
already realized, but also in denying any given of reality for unveiling alternative ‘worlds’.  
The concept of ‘demand’ remains, however, mostly unspecified in Daya Krishna’s works. It 
belongs to a certain common vocabulary of postcolonial Indian philosophers in India, the 
similarity and differences of its meanings having not yet been much explored. I will make use 
                                                 
848 Kalyan Kumar Bagchi explains Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s meaning of ‘demand’ accordingly: “In 
metaphysics, 'problems' are viewed in a peculiar sort of way: they are viewed as, what may be called, 'demands'. 
Metaphysics arises out of a kind of demand that the metaphysician has to ...  
"Has to 'what'?" - it may be asked. (…) The revolutionary, again, demands some practical solution to the ills of 
society. Now, the metaphysician differs both from the intellectualist or theoretician and the man in search of some 
practical solution. For him, to find a 'solution' is compelling from the very sort of the way he views experience. His 
demand is existential in the sense that he cannot rest content without settling account with what he genuinely finds. 
It is not the same with the intellectualist or the practical revolutionary. For an intellectualist is interested in 
conceptual clarity, ordering, re-arrangement, revision, enlargement etc. etc., and the practical revolutionary feels 
a compelling urge to remedy the situation he finds himself and his fellow-beings in. In the case of neither, however, 
is experience disturbed. This, however, is so in the case of the metaphysician. Something appears to him and he 
feels a demand that it must be realised: what such realisation involves is a re-ordering of ordinary experience, a 
recasting of the ordinary modes of thought which inhibit the grasp of what appears to the metaphysician. His 
demand, then, is to settle accounts with existing modes of thinking so that (i) what appears to him is not inhibited 
any longer and (ii) what inhibits (or inhibited) that appearance does not appear any longer. When, therefore, the 
demand is fulfilled consequent on the existing modes of thought being found to be inadequate to what appears to 
the metaphysician, or, what comes to the same thing, consequent on what appears as bringing about a re-vision or 
an abandonment of the existing modes of thought, his problem no longer appears. It would be more appropriate to 
say that the problem is resolved than it would be to say that it is solved.” K. Bagchi, “Towards a Metaphysic of  
Self: Perspectives on Professor Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s Unpublished Essay on ‘Mind and Matter,’” 
Journal of Indian Philosophy 9, no. 1 (1981): 22–23. 
849 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 144. 
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of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s conception850, as well as of N. V. Banerjee’s, whose 
influences on Daya Krishna’s philosophy have been already mentioned, and who are, for the 
remaining pages, our main interlocutors. The connection between the latter two is suggested by 
Margaret Chatterjee who also elucidates their uses of the term: 
 “K. C. Bhattacharyya had spoken of the ‘demands of experience’ and Kalidas too finds 
possibilities rather than ‘stoppers’ in experience. We shall come across the word ‘demand’ 
again in N. V. Banerjee’s thinking, although in a different sense. What is behind the various 
meanings of ‘demand’ presented by these thinkers is a challenging consideration, namely 
whether the main spur or leverage of metaphysics is the desire to know or the desire to be, 
‘desire’ of course being here used in the sense of metaphysical impulse (cf. Kant’s 
‘disposition’).”851 
In my analysis, the ‘desire to know’ (jijñāsā) or to be is another translation of Daya Krishna’s 
‘seeking for knowledge’, conceiving knowledge in motion by a valuational impulse as defined 
in the preceding chapter (6.2). This metaphysical seeking implies that we are what we know, or 
that knowledge is a realization of what we fundamentally are. But what are we that we know, 
or do we know who we are? Seeking to know implies thus also an implicit presupposition that 
the knowledge ‘ought’ to be in accordance with the reality, and that our self-knowledge ought 
to be the bridge between the two.  
The complexity originates in the ‘ought to’ (implying seeking/desire) which never corresponds 
to the ‘is’ - thus, the demand is never extinguished. This explains why for Daya Krishna, 
consciousness cannot be a ‘passive’ or ‘mirroring’ activity that simply absorbs or integrates 
external knowledge within itself, but a multidirectional and reflective force. The reflection does 
not mean in this case a mirror of the outside, but something that both modifies itself and the 
object reflected, as well as the relation between the two, and further the relation to the world in 
which it is located. On the other hand, for Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, the ‘ought’ of the 
demand points at an injunction,852 by which not only the tension between present reality and 
                                                 
850  Closely related, Bina Gupta comments: “The concept of ‘demand’ frequently appears in Bhattacharyya’s 
writings. He informs his readers that philosophy begins in reflective consciousness in which there exists a 
distinction between content and consciousness and a ‘demand’ for ‘supra-reflective consciousness’, i.e. a 
consciousness in which the distinction between content and consciousness is clearly visible. One wonders what is 
this demand? What kind of a consciousness is it? Is this consciousness not conscious of either a known or a willed 
or a felt content?” Bina Gupta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge, and 
Freedom (New York, NY and London: Routledge, 2012), 302. 
851 Chatterjee, “Indian Metaphysics,” 90. 
852 I am indebted to Pawel Odyniec for bringing to my attention a convincing Sanskrit subtext to Krishna Chandra 
Bhattacharyya’s concept of demand here, concerning the injunction contained in his use of the concept. For 
Odyniec, Bhattacharyya is here decontextualizing the religious context of a Vedāntic injunction to reinterpret it in 
a philosophical (non-religious) context. Attempting to abstract the Advaitin idea from its religious textual 
references, Bhattacharyya seems to reinterpret the gerundives (future participles of necessity) used in Vedāntic 
religious prescriptions, which express what ought to be done (ritual injunctions) into a philosophical demand. This 
demand retains the character of an injunction, however of a philosophical injunction originating within ourselves. 
In view of the inwardization, Odyniec relates the demand notably to the upanishadic injunction “ātmā vā are 
draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi / ātmano va are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānena 
idaṃ sarvaṃ viditam” (‘You see, Maitreyī, one should see and hear, think and meditate on the Self; for by seeing 
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future possibility is highlighted, but also the idea of a commitment or obligation. In Daya 
Krishna the commitment occurs in the tension itself, and such a commitment is emptied from 
prescriptive obligation. 
In distinction to the dissatisfactions of external actions, this tension furthermore signals the 
discrepancy between the object that ‘is’ for my self-consciousness, and ‘I’ as subject who ‘is’ 
a condition for the object to be (perceived, realized, experienced) and thus whose state of being 
cannot itself be externally confirmed nor objectively actualized. Chatterjee continues to define 
Banerjee’s sense of demand as follows: 
 “Philosophizing is not a linguistic exercise. It involves a grappling with the human 
predicament and an attempt to find a way out of the situation of bondage. All this is tied up 
with in-depth awareness of who and what we are and a reaching out which to some might seem 
speculative, but which Banerjee used to refer to through words like demand/vista/destiny. He 
was sufficiently appreciative of the ancient Indian insight that we cannot become other than 
what we are to see the central ‘adventure’ in the discovery of a realm from which, through our 
own ignorance, we have been in a state of exile. This is the “realm of persons.”853 
The refusal to limit the ‘demand’ to a linguistic or behavioral utterance, and in general to limit 
the realm of communication, of my being with others as well as the meaning of the very pronoun 
‘I’ to analytical linguistic, performative and pragmatic or cognitive functions, is common to the 
three authors.854 More importantly, it is crucial to elaborate on ‘dialogue’, which in no case can 
                                                 
and hearing, thinking and meditating on the Self this entire [world] is known’) (BṛhUp.2.4.5), which is a religious 
prescription for self-knowledge. Thus, the religious prescription becomes a philosophical demand for inwardizing 
self-knowledge: “Theoretic consciousness is embodied in science and philosophy. Science alone speaks in genuine 
judgments, the content of which is fact intelligible without reference to speaking and is alone actually known and 
literally thought. Philosophy deals with contents that are not literally thinkable and are not actually known, but are 
believed as demanding to be known without being thought. Such contents are understood as self-subsistent object, 
real subject and transcendental truth. We have accordingly three grades of philosophy which may be roughly called 
philosophy of the object, philosophy of the subject and philosophy of truth.” Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, “The 
Concept of Philosophy,” in Studies in Philosophy, ed. Gopinath Bhattacharyya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 
169. 
853 Chatterjee, “Indian Metaphysics,” 98. 
854 For Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, this constitutes a departure out of the Kantian influence to a more Advaitin 
stance; for N .V. Banerjee, a journey of elucidation and contradistinction to Descartes, Kant, Hume, Berkeley and 
later on Wittgenstein, on which he grounds by counter-position his concept of ‘I with Others=We’ and ‘the realm 
of persons’, which I will discuss; for Daya Krishna, also a Kantian reaction, which goes however for him together 
with rejecting the consequences of the Advaiting insights that Krishna Chandra Bhattacharryya concludes with 
(similarly, but differently, for N. V. Banerjee). See Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 15–26. 
Commenting on Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s ‘move’, Burch writes: “The second pillar of the first-phase 
philosophy [of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya] is the assertion of faith, not faith in revealed scripture but faith in 
the fulfillment of the demands presented by experience. It is by faith that we go beyond Kant to Vedanta. According 
to Kant the self is not real, though it demands to be real, since this demand is impotent. But Bhattacharya maintains 
that there is no evidence that this demand will not be actualized, and we have faith that it will be, not merely as an 
ideal of pure reason or postulate of practical reason but as known. To know the phenomenon is neither to know 
the reality nor not to know it, but to know it as unknown and demanding to be known. The absolute, although 
unknown, is believed not to be unknowable but as demanding to be known. The Vedanta doctrine of Brahman and 
illusion is the conceptual formulation of this demand, which is based on our feeling of the vanity of life and 
consequent unreality of the world. Unreality has meaning only in contrast with reality. The illusory object demands 
the real subject. The superstructure erected on these pillars is the dialectical system which Bhattacharya called 
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be limited to a linguistic analysis of the spoken content, even (less) in the case of plurilingual 
intercultural dialogues. The plurality and diversity of dialogues and cultural backgrounds that 
also shape our behaviors are indeed included in the way we express and conduct ourselves 
within dialogues, but cannot be isolated to constitute the ‘whole’ of it. In Banerjee’s term, the 
‘whole’ lies in realizing the ‘realm of persons’ essentially relating us, which is liberation, rather 
than in a following of normative injunctions, rhetoric rules and arguments. For Krishna Chandra 
Bhattacharyya, the ‘whole’ lies in spiritual freedom which is liberation from dissociation. Daya 
Krishna is closer to Banerjee, as for him dialogue, I believe, is freedom through bondage, 
unveiling the illusions created by our limits (to ourselves and to others) through which only and 
mutually with others we can realize a (limited and wordly) freedom. Thus, freedom lies rather 
in realizing our bondage and identification with the world, and with such a realization, we 
‘move’ forward to the next level of identification and bondage, never stopping the ‘move’ itself, 
the creative force of which means a limited freedom.855 In this stance he disagrees with K. C. 
Bhattacharyya’s Advaitin-inspired method:856 
 “K. C. Bhattacharyya has drawn attention to this fact [identification with the body] in his 
remarkable work entitled Subject as Freedom wherein he had built his whole philosophical 
edifice upon the notions of identification and deidentification and suggested that when one has 
identified one realizes that the prior identification must have been voluntarily in the sense that 
it need not have been there as there was no necessity about it. But he has not seen that the 
deidentification does not set one free as one relapses into the identification once more. The 
freedom was only momentary and even illusory as one does not become free of the 
                                                 
"transcendental psychology" and summarized in The Subject as Freedom as a sequence of grades of subjectivity.” 
(my emphasis) George Burch, “Contemporary Vedanta Philosophy, I,” Review of Metaphysics 9, no. 3 (1956): 
489, https://doi.org/10.2307/20123522. More generally, Daya Krishna notices regarding K. C. Bhattacharyya 
(concerning only the first volume of his Studies on Indian philosophies): “It may be interesting to note that the 
thinking of traditional Indian philosophy took its rise from an epistemological reflection on such phenomena as 
dream, sleep, illusion, repentance and pain while the current philosophical thinking in the West arises primarily 
from an epistemological reflection on science which is treated as the example par excellence of knowledge that 
we know of. A confrontation of the two reflections may possibly be helpful to the modern thinker, but I suspect 
that Bhattacharyya’s work would arouse more interest in the phenomenological existential circles than in the 
analytical-positivist ones.” Daya Krishna, “K. C. Bhattacharya on Indian Philosophy,” The Vivsa-Bharati 
Quarterly 26, no. 2 (1960): 7–8. More specifically and further on linguistic analysis, see Kalidas Bhattacharyya, 
“Is Philosophy Linguistic Analysis,” in Philosophy, Logic and Language (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd, 
1965), 1–18. 
855 “The illusions about the perfectibility or transformation of consciousness are as much illusory as those about 
the perfectibility or transformation of that which is the ‘object’ of consciousness, that is, the ‘world’ [in my 
interpretation, the latter are dissatisfactions]. It is not that change, even basic changes do not, or cannot, take place. 
(…) Beatitude, or the state of perpetual Bliss or Ānanda, or anything else which goes by similar names. Each step 
creates new problems which, then, have to be addressed and tackled anew. And, strangely, not only ‘problems’ 
that have been ‘solved’ cease to matter, but also that which has been achieved as it too ceases to matter just because 
it is there and has been achieved. It is that which is not, which alone matters, as it is not only indeterminate but 
something has to be done to bring it about, and it is this ‘doing’, this challenge that makes one ‘move’ and feel 
that one is ‘living’ and ‘alive’.” Daya Krishna, “Consciousness, Materiality and Spirituality: Issues, Dilemmas and 
the Future of Mankind,” in Indian Philosophy. A Counter Perspective, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 
310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006), 499. 
856  Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, “The Subject as Freedom,” in Studies in Philosophy, ed. Gopinath 
Bhattacharyya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 367–95. 
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identification and relapses into it again and again. In fact, it is an identification one cannot do 
without as it is the very condition of one’s being alive and living in the world.”857 
There is thus no ‘absolute freedom’ for Daya Krishna, and certainly no freedom that is ‘de-
individualised’ and ‘free from distinctness’,858 i.e. freedom for Daya Krishna is not to be ‘free 
of everything’ but to realize the illusoriness that gives us the feeling of being bound or of being 
free.  
A demand is thus also a desire (never to be fulfilled in Daya Krishna’s account) for 
reconciliation: of the consciousness with self-consciousness, of consciousness with the world, 
and of selves with others. It is furthermore in that sense that the demand cannot consist of a 
simple ‘linguistic exercise’, either of poetic description or of analytical analysis of 
communication in logical terms. It articulates the existential seeking for a metaphysical 
situation, which in a self-awareness reconciliates myself with the world. In that sense, the 
‘demand’ of dialogue implies a readiness to change within oneself in collaboration with others 
at the most fundamental level, rather than an external agreement on the thing discussed. It 
signals an impulse for a transcendental unity of consciousness, which however, for Daya 
Krishna operates as a regulative ideal through plurality, and for N. V. Banerjee, is to be realized 
but also in a plurality, a ‘We’. For K. C. and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, the plurality is a spoken 
manifestation of a reality that is unitary but that we have to see as consisting of alternatives.859 
Thus, I would say that for N. V. Banerjee and Daya Krishna the (ideal) unity is found in plurality, 
while for K. C. and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, the plurality is found in unity.  
Finally, the ‘demand’, according to Padmaja Sen (who is analyzing K. C. Bhattacharyya’s 
meaning of the term), “appears to be an inner force which continuously drives the subject 
towards the realization of its (absolute) freedom. It is the pre-condition of the self-realizing 
                                                 
857 Daya Krishna, “Can the Analysis of Adhyāsa Ever Lead to an Advaitic Conclusion,” in Contrary Thinking: 
Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 213. 
858 The Subject as Freedom ends as follows: “I am never positively conscious of my present individuality, being 
conscious of it only as what is or can be outgrown, only as I feel freeing myself from it and am free to the extent 
implied by such feeling. I do not know myself as free but I conceive that I can be free successively as body from 
the perceived object, as presentation from the body, as feeling from presentation and as introspective individuality 
but I am aware in my introspection into feeling that the self from which the feeling is distinguished may not 
actually introspect and may not even possibly introspect, that individual as it is as introspecting- individual or 
distinct freedom without being, it may be free even from this distinctness, may be freedom itself that is de-
individualised but not therefore indefinite - absolute freedom that is to be evident.” Bhattacharyya, “The Subject 
as Freedom,” 454. 
859 Chatterjee comments further on the critique by Banerjee to K. C. Bhattacharyya: “It is in this lecture [K. C. 
Bhattacharyya Memorial Lectures on The Concept of Philosophy delivered in the University of Calcutta in 1964] 
that Banerjee, to all intents and purposes, signals his agreement with K. C. Bhattacharyya’s tenets (1) I am 
unaccountably embodied (2) I am in personal relationship to other selves. But he dissociates himself from the 
further step taken by Bhattacharyya, namely, ‘I am in communion, or in the relation of identity-in-difference with 
the over-personal self.’ Banerjee’s whole critique of Advaita Vedānta is contained in the line ‘what I am insisting 
on is simply that philosophy has no means of building a road from the assertion ‘I am’ to the assertion ‘I am in 
communion with the over-personal self’.” Margaret Chatterjee, “Intersubjectivity and Essentiality,” in The 
Philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, ed. Margaret Chatterjee (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical 
Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1990), 95. 
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activity of the subject”860 (brackets added). In other words, a ‘demand’, like a seeking, creates 
the motion861, which for Daya Krishna operates both inwards on my own subjectivity, as well 
as outwards on the other conjointly engaging with me. Or with Banerjee: it creates an inward 
motion to realize that I am already and essentially, ‘with others’, in order to detach myself from 
the biological illusion of my separation from others as an individual (body).  
 “So existentialism’s preoccupation with the problem of the relation of the individual to what 
are others to him, as well as absolutism’s reduction of human existence to utter insignificance 
are but ways of escape from the actual human situation. Man is not a mere individual suffering 
insufficiency or deprivation which is incompatible with existence, but, as we have argued 
earlier, is a person held in the relation of essentiality to his fellows. And this points to the nature 
of human existence. To exist, strictly speaking, is to be sufficient, and to be sufficient is to be 
essential to one another as is signified by the concept of the person. Human existence thus 
understood is, however, another name for human liberation, for what else can our liberation 
mean except our essentiality to our fellows expressed in our love of others and our joy of 
living? But then, it is hard for man to remain what he really is and to live a liberated life. This 
is due to the fact that, on account of the inexplicable anomaly of his nature consequent upon 
his unavoidable biological birth, man is prone to be a victim of the illusory idea of himself as 
a mere individual and to suffer self-alienation. Hence there arises a problem, not the absurd 
problem of his becoming anything which he is not, but that of his return to himself as a 
participant in the universal plan for action, the resolution of his self-alienation, the undoing of 
what we have called the universal predicament of mankind.”862 
The problems to access and fulfill this demand are complex and varied, and I will come back 
in more details on the implications of the relation of essentiality for liberated existence (7.3), 
which means a realization of the realm of persons. The concepts that are used here anticipate 
Banerjee’s philosophical developments to reach his conclusion. But beginning with the 
conclusion shows that the demand cannot be resolved, but rather drives the subject towards the 
realm of the personal throughout the way. This way goes inwards in order to reach the other for 
Banerjee, or more exactly: in order to realize that the other was always there, and that I have 
                                                 
860 Padmaja Sen, “The Concept of Demand in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s Philosophy,” Journal of Indian 
Council of Philosophical Research 10, no. 1 (December 1992): 150. 
861 As a ‘motion’, it is thus oriented towards the ‘future’. Daya Krishna interestingly concludes his study into the 
conceptual structures of Indian classical thought first by opening the perspective to comparative approaches, before 
finishing by insisting on the ‘demand’ to develop these structures further: “As I have repeatedly insisted, the 
cognitive entreprises of the Indian civilization are not closed and their traditional formulation need not become an 
intellectual prison-house for us. We can use the insights gained in a creative way to meet the challenges of our 
own times, just as thinkers in past decades also did. One must distinguish between the use of a concept and talk 
about it. The latter has been the job of those who, to use a currently fashionable phrase from Foucault, do the 
archaelogy of knowledge. Such theorists comprise all those for whom other civilizations except the modern 
western one are dead and hence only a subject matter of historical study. But for those who treat these civilizations 
as still alive, their intellectual self-formulations are not just objects of study but theoretical and experiential insights 
which demand to be developed further. It is in this use of past conceptual structures that their living future lies.” 
Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and 
Polity, 192. This connects the ‘demand’ to Daya Krishna’s manifesto for classical Indian philosophies seen 
creatively and contemporarily as described in 2.1.2. 
862 Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 171. 
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been nothing but ‘with others’. For Daya Krishna, more radically critical of the Vedantin 
detachment of the worldly, the process is bidirectional863. The freedom to engage is as much a 
freedom as the freedom to withdraw (see 6.2.3), and the inward and outward movement that 
they provoke are themselves allowing the dynamic process of change of modification: 
“Consciousness as it moves outward thus encounters and experiences more and more of 
difference and enjoys it while as it ‘withdraws’ into itself, experiences an identity that is 
different at different stages of the ‘return journey’. But as the ‘return’ and the ‘withdrawal’ are 
only temporary, the ‘inward’ and the ‘outward’ journey alternates and while the self is 
constituted by both, it is only the philosopher who is taken in by it and argues for the one or 
the other, as is evidenced by the long debate between the advaitins and the non-advaitic 
Vedāntins on the one hand and the advaitins and the naiyāyikas, on the other.”864 
Dialoguing corresponds, I think, to the multidirectionality of the ‘demand’. Dialoguing is about 
defining one’s position, one’s knowledge and realizing (or witnessing, to use Chubb’s concept) 
the way this knowledge is constituted with others. Very concretely, I relate this ‘changing 
oneself’ in dialogue to Bettina Bäumer’s mention to me that Daya Krishna also organized the 
saṃvāda experiments for himself, for himself to learn from Indian traditions through dialoguing 
with paṇdits, with a growing openness and interest towards these traditions, the impact of which 
can be easily seen on his philosophical production, publishing more and more on Indian 
philosophies as the experiments were organized. Thus, the demand operates in an alternation 
of detachment and engagement, withdrawing in myself and engaging with others, and letting 
the others and myself modify my thinking. These, in turn, are not only epistemological, 
behavioral or linguistic modification, but touch upon the ‘human predicament’, i.e. thinking in 
the broader context of puruṣārtha. In that sense, the invitation to engage is also an invitation to 
recognize the essentiality of the others for my thinking.  
However, this realization that is demanded is itself impeded by different obstacles, which 
explains the difficulties of dialoguing much beyond the simple plurality of languages and 
diversity of attitudes in dialogue. Trying to keep the mutual relations of these problems and 
illusions, I want to formulate them as follows: the problems impeding freedom appear to be the 
external constraints by others, which is however revealed as the illusion of existentialism. The 
second correlated problem is the one of myself being a constraint to my own freedom, which 
Daya Krishna calls ‘I-centricity’, i.e. the impossibility to detach myself from my consciousness. 
In other words, this means the problem of not being able to reach other I-consciousnesses than 
                                                 
863 The connection between the inner and the outer world is interestingly connected to the fact that the world is an 
intersubjective creation for Daya Krishna: “But if the ‘human world’ is the creation of the ‘I’, ‘you,’, ‘he’, ‘she’ 
and ‘it’ in their innumerable variety and diversity, then the question has to be faced squarely as the ‘defect’ in the 
‘outer’ must reflect, at least to some extent, the ‘fault’ or ‘defect’ in the ‘inner’.” Daya Krishna, “Consciousness, 
Materiality and Spirituality: Issues, Dilemmas and the Future of Mankind,” 472. 
864 Given the mentioning of ‘alternates’ and the critique of Vedāntins, this also suggests a criticisms of the 
alternation propounded by K. C. Bhattacharyya, which is however an alternation oriented to my inward 
consciousness. Daya Krishna, “Identity, Difference and the Problem of Reflexivity and Explanation,” Journal of 
Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19, no. 1 (March 2002): 18. 
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my I-consciousness. This originates from a further and fundamental problem of consciousness 
which cannot but objectify all that is not itself, i.e. see the other as an object of my knowledge, 
emotion of action. Finally, this problem originates also if the attempted solution to escape the 
bondage of others on me consists in a dissolution of myself into an absolute, overarching God 
or an absolute unity of my consciousness865.  
While the modern Advaitin answer of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya lies in dissociation and 
detachment, for Daya Krishna, the ‘unrelatedness’ cannot be enough of a solution, for even if 
it allows one to reach a certain freedom (unbounded by others and the worldly state of affairs), 
such a freedom, emptied of all force and motion, becomes itsef a bondage: 
“But as the feeling of 'unrelatedness' is founded on the illusion created by the fact of 
withdrawal, which if reflected upon sufficiently, itself would show its illusoriness. 
‘Withdrawal’, obviously, is a withdrawal from ‘something’, and makes sense only in relation 
to it. (…) The problem of jīvanmukti, or ‘being completely liberated’ while one is ‘biologically 
alive’, tries to come to terms with this in the Indian tradition. But though one does achieve or 
realize some sort of freedom - freedom from all objectivity - one does not get the power to 
effectuate or transform, as there is nothing left to change or transform, and in any case, one 
does not want anything, as one is supposed to have given up ‘wanting’, having seen through 
the illusion of the bondage that it creates. Freedom without power, however, seems so empty 
thing, and one does not know what to do with it. (…) 
 Freedom, thus, has an ‘in-built’ illusion not only of omnipotence, but of the denial of 
even the possibility of there being any constraint or restriction on it, whether of reason, or 
morality, or law, or taste. In short, it wants to deny the very possibility of the ‘other’, any other, 
and yet it needs it all the time as without it, it finds no meaning either in the field of action, or 
knowing, or feeling the ‘worlds’ it wants to create and ‘live’ in.”866 
Thus, for Daya Krishna, ‘unrelatedness’ or ‘freedom from all objects’ does not make sense 
(except maybe as death), because it loses all efficiency.867 No matter how dissatisfying every 
                                                 
865 In Banerjee’s terms: “On the one hand, while absolutism surrenders the individual by conceiving him to be a 
part of, or else making him completely disappear in the Absolute, existentialism tends to make the individual 
himself absolute so as to reduce him to solitariness and insularity. On the other hand, existentialism, curiously 
enough, is characterized by the tendency to insist on the idea of human existence as contingent, the idea from 
which, among other things, absolutism derives its main thesis. The former tendency leads existentialism to affirm 
the freedom and responsibility of man. But the latter compels it to set limits to and even nullify the importance of 
man’s freedom and responsibility.” Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 170. 
866 Daya Krishna, “The Cosmic, Biological, the Cultural Conditionings and the Seeking of Freedom,” 147–48. 
867 Daya Krishna emphasizes in several places the importance of actions (in the forms of willing, desiring, seeking, 
attending) for consciousness, which cannot survive in withdrawing from all (the world, feelings, the body, etc). 
This is foremost a critique of all mokṣa-inspired traditions, but furthermore, in general, of the ones who attempt to 
detach themselves from the wordly state of affairs, among which some philosophers can be included: “The 
consciousness that results in ‘cultural creations’ and their ‘felt apprehension’ is close to the ‘lived’ life of man than 
the one embodied in theoretical knowledge and which always has an ‘abstraction’ about it that seems ‘lifeless’ to 
ordinary consciousness. This, though so obviously true, ignores the fact that the real feel of ‘reality’ at the human 
level occurs not in consciousness, as is generally thought, but in its power to make things happen through what is 
generally called ‘willing’ or ‘intending’ or ‘desiring’ to bring something about. Without this, consciousness is 
practically ‘nothing’, a helpless spectator of whatever happens, something that is found as common occurrence in 
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concrete dialogue is, for instance, the solution cannot be found in accepting that dialogue is an 
instrumental way to discover the inner freedom and truth, which leads us to negate the others 
at the end, thanks to whom we reached this discovery. Daya Krishna illustrates the contradiction 
of this negation with the example of mystic masters who deny the reality of the others through 
whom they have been trained in the discipline that led them to deny them.868 No matter how 
‘bounded’ I am in dialogue by certain social conventions, by language, by the freedom of others 
to participate and argue against my position, reaching out a supreme transcendental level of 
unity where they are excluded is a bare contradiction of the process itself. Thus, there cannot 
be an end to dialogues, but there is also no escape from its ambiguities, contradictions and limits. 
In other words: dialogues are not a way to reach a supra-level of knowledge or liberation, in 
which communication would not be necessary anymore. Dialogues do not lead to any revelation 
that make them obsolete, there is no transcending objective - but for Daya Krishna, there is also 
no other way without their imperfectness. On the other hand, a certain idea of ‘freedom’, ‘truth’ 
and ‘reason’ is necessary as a regulative ideal which can lead the dialogue to connect this 
infinite plurality of others. For, without a common ground first, but also without a certain 
seeking that motivates us to enter a dialogue in the first place, one risks also a disaggregation 
into unconnected differences. At the level of dialogue, this explains Daya Krishna’s suspicion 
against those who jettison reason altogether, even if he recognizes the fallibility and internal 
differences of reason(s): 
 “The debate on this [skepticism on reason] has been long in the Indian tradition, but the 
dialectical denial of reason has generally been in the service of some higher seeking of man 
which was supposed to be supra-rational. The Advaitins and the Śunyavādin Buddhists had 
been the chief protagonists of this view, but there were others also. However, the main 
philosophical stream never accepted this suicidal tendency [referring here to Derrida and 
Rorty] on the part of reason to abdicate its total responsibility as is involved in a withdrawal 
from any serious attempt to communicate with others on a basis which was grounded in some 
sort of universality the acknowledgement of which compelled one to refuse one’s opinion or 
contention if it was shown that one was wrong. Such an acknowledgement is a precondition 
not only for all cognitive pursuits and any fruitful discussion and debate about them, but also 
for meaningful human living if conflicts are to be resolved by argument and not by force. The                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
presupposition does not mean that any ready-made solutions are available either in the field of 
reason or of what is good or right, but it is seen as an immanent ideal involved in the activity 
itself which one tries to articulate to the best possible extent. Even if one agrees to disagree, 
the ‘agreement’ is based on the acceptance of the possible plurality of viewpoints or visions 
regarding the issue in question, and the hope that perhaps one would later come back to the 
exploration through mutual discussion and find a new alternative which was not apprehended 
                                                 
conditions that are known as ‘paralytic’.” Daya Krishna, “Consciousness, Materiality and Spirituality: Issues, 
Dilemmas and the Future of Mankind,” 461. 
868 “Yet, the fact is that the ‘mystic’ is not an isolated, self-enclosed monadic person but exists in a community of 
people, who are generally known as his disciples. The mystic master is himself based in tradition where he learned 
at the feet of another master from whom he is supposed to have received the discipline and the training which has 
led him to the experience which, paradoxically, denies ‘reality’; The denial of the ‘other’, both in terms of reality 
and value which lie at the heart of the ‘self-centric’ experience of the ‘I’, is an existential contradiction which the 
actual life of the so-called masters denies and contradicts at every step.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of 
Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 118. 
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by both the parties who had to close the discussion by ‘agreeing to disagree’. Reason itself is 
embedded in a larger human enterprise which is basically a pursuit of diverse ideals vaguely 
apprehended and which conjointly seek a meaningful human living together which has 
elements of joy and beauty, even though they have seldom been seen in such a way. The human 
world, of course, is a ‘creation’ based on ‘given’ materials the limits and possibilities of which 
are never clearly known.”869 
Thus, Daya Krishna’s relatedness has a pragmatic function for connecting us in dialogue, 
doubled by a metaphysical foundation, close to Banerjee’s. Similarly, the universality of 
‘seeking’ and the unity have a pragmatic role for realizing this relation, and the differences and 
singularity an existential acceptance of our human condition, as illusory as it is. To navigate 
between these two poles, at the worldly level, I believe, is made possible in dialogue. This 
appearently simple term of ‘demand’ entails deep metaphysical insights on identity and 
difference, self-consciousness and otherness, and subjective and objective attitudes to 
knowledge - and more importantly, on the relationality of all - which constitutes the endeavor 
of the following section. Nevertheless, the possibility to establish any relation depends on our 
ability to overcome the illusion of I-centricity, i.e. to be able to realize the other as another 
subject, with whom I can dialogue ‘on’ different objects of thinking. This implies on the one 
hand a de-centralization of myself as the absolute and unique ‘I’, and on the other hand, the 
possibility to shift out of the subject/object constellation that originates in I-consciousness. 
Realizing this illusion initiates the demand for resolving the metaphysical distinction between 
my I and ‘you’ (accusative) or for an immediate relation between I and You. The question of 
‘how’ to first realize the illusion and then to answer to this demand is raised as well as the 
question: are these relations between ‘I and you’ enough for dialogues? 
 
7.3. Relationality of Consciousnesses in Dialogue, I Dialoguing with Others = We 
 
To understand Daya Krishna’s context, or rather to think dialogue within his philosophy, 
Banerjee can be helpful. His sense of relation implied in freedom lies in a realization of the 
realm of the personal where I am located with others, which Daya Krishna himself 
acknowledges as a turning point of post-colonial Indian philosophy: 
                                                 
869 This is part of a longer argumentation from Daya Krishna denunciating the overemphasis on logo-centrism of 
Derrida, while for the former the problem rather consists in ‘any’ centrism through which we have to think. He 
consequently sees this overemphasis as jettisoning reason itself, which is not possible “if one makes a cognitive 
claim and wants others to accept what one says, not on the basis of the fact that one says it, but on some other 
grounds which are justifiable in some sense or other.” This applies to Derrida and Rorty. On the other hand, he 
also considers Nagarjuna and ‘the Upanisadic seers’ as opponents of reason in stating that “ultimate truth could 
not be comprehended by reason.” Consequently, the above quote refers to Advaitins and Śunyavādin Buddhists 
for whom “the dialectical denial of reason has generally been in the service of some higher seeking of man which 
was supposed to be supra-rational.” Daya Krishna, 59–60. 
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“The return to the temporal, historical, living world of the embodied being who is a member 
of society and polity and actively participates in the building up of a common inter-subjective 
world in cooperation with other human beings seems to be a common concern of most Indian 
philosophers who have written in the English language after their contact with the western 
world. But yet, while the emphasis in K. C. Bhttacharya’s thought was primarily on a return 
from the identifications of the self with each succeeding level of objectivity, seeing thereby the 
essential freedom of man as consisting in this de-identifiation, it is only in later thinkers starting 
from N. V. Banerjee that the isolated, de-identified self is understood not in terms of ‘freedom’ 
but as deprived and cut off from its relationship with the ‘others’ which constitute, according 
to him, the essential reality for the self, and in the fulfillment of this relational obligation lies 
its real freedom.”870  
Freely interpreting Daya Krishna’s philosophy, I hypothesize that this relational obligation lies 
more precisely in engaging and dialoguing with others, a relation which oscillates between 
essential connection and de-identification: in the ‘between’ lies the metaphysical ‘force’ of 
dialogue. Metaphilosophically, I think that the difference of direction is important to realize. 
For many European intercultural theories that have been evoked in this text, the relation 
between me and the Other is the one of outwardization. In other words, the project to relate 
requires reaching out to the Other, either to understand her/him or dialogue with her/him or 
simply to recognize his/her radical Otherness. For Banerjee, Daya Krishna and the                                                                                                                                                                 
Bhattacharyyas, the journey is rather inward. It fluctuates for Daya Krishna between realizing 
within ourselves the essentiality of the other beyond the illusory objectivation originating in 
self-consciousness, which separates ‘I’ as subject from the ‘we’ as objects, and engaging with 
them in the world in dialogue or other joint actions. The answers of these authors are not 
homogeneous and can range from realizing the unity of the I with the other (in the famous 
Advaitin reinterpretation of Ramchandra Gandhi, ‘I am Thou’871) to emphasize the difference 
yet relatedness with the other by Daya Krishna. This also means, in consequence, that for K. C. 
Bhattacharyya and N. V. Banerjee in particular, the ‘between’ is itself different, since it is not 
located outside you and I but within my consciousness in the movement between reaching out 
and coming back. Between you and I lies nothing but my own illusion of separatedness that 
originates from the objectivation of the other-consciousness. In so doing, ‘you’ are not located 
outside of any understanding or grasping, but in my own illusory and fragmentary 
understanding which must be overcome by the realization of the illusion. The attempts of the 
former to resolve it are multiple, either by realizing that I am thou, or with you: this realization 
is not the fact of an objective understanding of the other, but an inner awareness of the relation 
between the I and the other. I believe that Daya Krishna is also influenced by K. C. 
Bhattacharyya’s and N. V. Banerjee’s account, notably by the ‘illusion’ and ‘realization’ of the 
illusion, in spite of his more persisting emphasis on the joint empirical world in which we realize 
this illusion together. This focus provides a more concrete perspective on the withdrawal and 
                                                 
870 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 
317. 
871 Gandhi, I Am Thou: Meditation on the Truth of India. 
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engagement with others, due to which my lone realization of the relation is not enough to enable 
the concrete relation with others. Thus, I believe that dialogue entails for him the alternation of 
consciousness within me and my position, and towards your understanding, through which we 
realize that any position and thinking is actually the result of our interconnection. To justify this 
interpretation constitutes the purpose of this section.  
Before continuing this demonstration, I want to highlight the political connotations of this shift 
of orientation between the inside and the outside for thinking the relation with others. Indeed, 
while the postcolonial European project rather argues for an openness in order to de-centralize 
its own self by reaching out to the other (see 1.2.2 and 1.2.1), the postcolonial project of these 
Indian philosophers in India is best coined by K. C. Bhattacharyya’s svarāj (self-rule, auto-
nomy) in ideas (1929) (see also 2.1.2). Svarāj is indeed first a colonial resistance and expresses 
a wish for independence from the “slavery of the spirit”872 and cultural colonization. In so doing, 
it expresses furthermore a return to oneself to realize the presence of the other and the I in 
myself, the identity of which and the distinction in particular between the two being somewhat 
blurred by the postcolonial consequences of education, conceptual categories and their 
linguistic expressions. Interestingly, K. C. Bhattacharyya uses the same concept of ‘demand’ 
elucidated above with political implications in a way that seems quite anti-dialogical and ‘anti-
intercultural’ if not seen from its historical context, when he writes: “We speak also a little too 
readily of the demand for a synthesis of the ideals of the East and the West. (…) The ideals of 
a community spring from its past history and from the soil: they have not necessarily a universal 
application, and they are not always self-luminous to other communities.”873 (emphasis added) 
The content might be surprising to be used on elaborating on intercultural dialogues, but it 
indicates a less heard necessity than the plea for hybridity and cultural synthesis via intercultural 
or interreligious dialogue. Such a demand insists on the unusual ‘right to withdraw’ which I 
believe however necessarily implies by opposition the right to engage. Furthermore, in K. C. 
Bhattacharyya’s historical but moreover, philosophical context, this maybe today somewhat 
polemical view has its own reasons. If we relate this more political speech of him to his other 
philosophical texts, it tells us that the ‘demand’ for cultural synthesis cannot be imposed by 
external faculties or forces. The ‘demand’ - if we extend it to the demand for dialogues - is not 
a negotiation with external forces, nor even the need to reach a consensus on a setting that 
would enable a more inclusive global communication. In order to be dialogical, roughly 
formulated, the synthesis and the dialogue across traditions need ‘to make sense’ from within, 
to be ‘self-luminous’. This sense includes Daya Krishna’s significance and meaning contained 
in puruṣārtha (see 5.3 and 6), and the correlated knowledge which is a mixture of śāstric 
resources and creative thinking.874 In other words, it needs to reach a ‘self-luminuous’ state for 
                                                 
872 Bhattacharyya, “Svaraj in Ideas,” 383. 
873 Bhattacharyya, 389. 
874 In this politico-cultural sense, see ‘Encounters between Civilizations: The Question of the Centre and the 
Periphery’, where Daya Krishna argues for substituting thinking in terms of center/periphery to the idea of dynamic 
centers in different fields: “The whole panorama begins to take a new shape and a new meaning in one’s 
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the consciousness that apprehends the ideals of another cultural communities.875 For this matter, 
the relation cannot be limited to ‘reaching out’ to the Other, but also requires to ‘reach within’ 
in an interrelational process in Daya Krishna’s context. Thus, it is through the critical 
reinterpretation from within of knowledge and purusārthas originating from any culture, and 
their connections with other conceptual frameworks that cultural subjection can be turned into 
intercultural creativity. However, for Daya Krishna, this process of critical assimilation and 
creative exploration is made possible in directly engaging with these cultural others, which 
allows us to reformulate our own positions (rooted in one or several, but limited traditions) and 
get inspired by others. 
The latter’s reaction to such a concept of ‘svarāj in ideas’ is nevertheless mitigated, since for 
him, the problem rather lies in the question “how to foster that assimilation and creativity about 
which he [K. C. Bhattacharyya] has written in the article”.876 The Bhattacharyya from the 20ties 
is fearful and defensive, which is, under the British rule, admittedly necessary but insufficient 
in Daya Krishna’s later context. The latter thus plainly comments that “if each culture tries to 
preserve its own identity and accepts only that from other cultures which it can assimilate on 
its own terms, the situation will be desperate indeed.”877 It is now easier to understand the 
implications of his conclusion, evoked in 2.1.2, that “svarāj in ideas can only be achieved by a 
radical alteration in our attitude to both the traditions - the Indian and the Western. We have to 
de-identify with both and treat them only as take-off points for our own thinking which should 
be concerned with what we consider important.” 878                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The formulation seems almost trivial, but I understand it as the engagement and withdrawal of 
                                                 
consciousness the moment one sees it as a process, a process of seeking something which may be termed as the 
purushartha of a civilization. But, what is the purushartha of a civilization is never clear as it is unfolded gradually 
by a series of successive generations of masters who appear on the scene. If civilizations are seen in this way, then 
the encounter between them will be of a different order. It will be an encounter between the purusharthas of 
civilizations, between the shastras of civilizations. What is the relation between a purushartha and a shastra? I 
think a shastra gives a static form to a dynamic scene; in a sense, it is an ‘enemy’ of the purushartha.”Daya Krishna, 
“Encounters between Civilizations: The Question of the Centre and the Periphery,” 264. 
875 In contradistinction to Daya Krishna’s reluctance of the Advaitin traces contained in K. C. Bhattacharyya’s idea 
of svarāj, Ramchandra Gandhi reacts to the same text in engaging much more deeply with (his own) Advaitin 
interpretation of svarāj. “’Svaraj’ in politics or economics or in ideas or whatever is etymologically the kingdom 
or order or dispensation of ‘sva’, self, myself; consequently, in all seeking of svaraj I seek, ‘sva’ seeks, to be the 
ruler, centre, source of all things; and this seeking is wisdom and not paranoia, health, i.e. svāsthya or self-
situatedness, and not sickness, sarvodaya and not selfishness, only and through the truth of advaita, the truth that 
you and I are not other than one another. Thus the Gandhia struggle for svaraj (…) is always implicitly an advaitin 
struggle, a struggle for the kingdom of self or autonomy and identity as opposed to the delusion and chaos and 
dishonor of not-self or heternomy and divisiveness. British rule or modern industrial civilization and its 
imperialism and materialism, missionary Christianity and Islam and their soul-lust, the self-contradictoriness and 
shame of advaitin Hinduism’s practice of untouchability, etc., are symbols and powers of illusion of not-self, 
otherness, Māyā; and the historical struggles of metaphysical Indian civilization have always been, not excluding 
the modern period, attempted overcomings of all such Māyā so as to see God face to face in the truth of self-
realisation. Such alone is the svaraj of India, at least such.” Ramchandra Gandhi, “The Svaraj of India,” Indian 
Philosophical Quarterly Svaraj in Ideas (December 1984): 462–63.  
876 Daya Krishna, “Comments and Communication,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly Svaraj in Ideas (December 
1984): 563. 
877 Daya Krishna, 563. 
878 Daya Krishna, 565. 
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consciousness in de-identification, which, while using knowledge as śāstric resources to start 
thinking with, requires critical and imaginative creativity. This thinking is the activity of 
consciousness which is composed by knowledge and seekings, the valuation of which is 
expressed in the apparently insignificant expression of ‘what we consider important’. To go 
even a little bit further, I believe that to unveil the structural illusions of ‘what we consider 
important’ (constituted by certain values), we precisely need this de-identified engagement with 
others in dialogue, in this case in particular the others of different cultures. 
The political consequences of this demand further imply to question the unevenness of the 
‘between’ seen in cultural terms. Given the fact that the cultural synthesis has been imposed on 
certain cultures, the ‘between’ India and the West is not a neutral place (the consequences of 
which for the elaboration of comparative or cross-cultural studies have been analyzed in 1.2.1 
and 1.2.2). From this it follows that the absoluteness felt in the subjective ‘I’ does not operate 
only at the level of individuals, but immediately as individuals being already located within a 
culture. The hierarchy of which is what attributes different senses of the ‘importance’ and 
‘finality’ of this I. In other terms, the globalization has also as an effect that it configures one 
‘centre’ (the ‘West’, as insufficiently undefined as it can be) as the absolute ‘I’ around which 
‘peripheries’ gravitate as object of the I-consciousness, namely objects of study. It is also in 
these terms that Daya Krishna articulate his criticism of comparative philosophy when it ignores 
the a priori unevenness that is deep rooted in the consciousness of those who practice it: 
 “To adopt a well-known phrase from Sartre, all nonwestern cultures879 have been reduced to 
the status of ‘objects’ by being looked upon, that is, observed and studied by Western scholars 
in terms of Western concepts and categories that are treated not as culture-bound but universal 
in character. In a deep and radical sense, therefore, it is only the West that has subtly arrogated 
to itself the status of subject-hood in the cognitive enterprise and reduced all others to the status 
of objects.”880 
The politico-cultural ‘I/Youness’ or ‘subject/object attitude’ which has its correlate at the 
metaphysical level of consciousness, has however different effects in the political realm and in 
the metaphysical one. For the former is usually not limited to knowledge, in spite of K. C. 
Bhattacharyya’s emphasis on the ‘slavery of the spirit’ when he wanted to also highlight the 
invisible consequences of colonization due to the British presence on the Indian soil. It is 
combined with concrete political presence and actions, from where self-centricity brings about 
other consequences: 
 “The ‘self-centricity’ which occurs in self-consciousness in the context of knowledge now 
gets transferred to one in the context of power. If the former gives rise to the feeling that 
                                                 
879  This quote follows the reedited version of the article as referred to below. In the original publication 
‘nonwestern cultures’ is indicated, while in the reedited version, the editors wrote ‘Western’ cultures. In the context 
of the quote, I chose to follow the initial text at this place. Daya Krishna, “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is 
and What It Ought to Be,” 1989, 77. 
880 Daya Krishna, “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be,” 2011, 63. 
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everything is an ‘object’ to one and that one is the only unique ‘subject’ in the world, the 
second gives rise to the feeling that one is the centre of power that can effectuate anything in 
the world. Both are self-centric and give rise inevitably to ‘ego-centricity’ at the human level 
as whatever be the metaphysical or ontological reality of the self, at the empirical level it 
always occurs as the ego and is felt as such.”881 
Consequently, Daya Krishna notices that the movement of these self-centricities is itself 
contradictory, since the illusion of being the unique subject in the world leads to denying the 
reality of other I-consciousnesses when we believe that we can ‘free’ ourselves from them and 
the mundane world. On the other hand, the illusion of being the ‘centre’ of power creates the 
illusion of omnipotence, which makes our consciousness believes that it can “bring into being 
what it desires to be there.”882 Thus, it fluctuates between the illusion of lone freedom from 
others and absolute power on the others, or their domination. What is however common to both 
these illusions is the annihilation of the idea of the other-consciousnesses, which is 
consequently seen either as an object of my knowledge or a remote periphery that I can control, 
or at least which has no influence over my subjectivity. Thus, it does not deny the possibility 
of a ‘between’ as such, but gives the illusion that this between is my sole initiative, if I reach 
out to the other as object in order to understand her/him or to include her/him in a conversation 
that I lead in the first case. In the latter scenario, I see the other as a periphery, which can be, if 
I want to, integrated on the margins of my consciousness, exotically recognized as different 
(from me), which I can use if ‘I feel like it’. Thus, for example at an intellectual level, I can use 
and integrate some resources of her/his traditions that I integrate to my development as 
examples or concepts fitting my argumentation, leaving her/his resources unchanged (thus, not 
contributing to them) and my own position also unmodified. I simply use ‘her/him’ as 
philosophical object to make ‘my’ case stronger. In both cases, the other does not appear to be 
necessary for my I-consciousness but can be invited into my world to participate in a discussion 
under my own rules. Needless to say, this is the larger scenario within which academic ‘Western 
philosophy’ has ‘invited’ Indian philosophies to take part in a ‘global’ dialogue, as described 
earlier (1.2.2). As I concluded earlier also with Rada Ivekovic (1.2.2), this, however, looks more 
like a monologue than a dialogue.  
Thus, importantly enough, Daya Krishna does not remain ‘between’ the I and the Thou. 
Dialogue can be addressing You either in the Buberian or Ramchandra Gandhian way,883 but 
goes further a binary relation or identity. Daya Krishna’s ‘between’ implies a plurality which 
contributes to the creativity of dialogue in drawing a ‘world’ between us, rather than 
establishing a twofold relation, which in the scenario just described, necessarily brings 
unresolved question such as the tertium comparationis. Seeing the dialogue not in binary terms 
of the two poles that must be related, for example - as participants or as abstract ‘India’ and 
                                                 
881 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 138. 
882 Daya Krishna, 138. 
883 See Daniel Raveh’s contribution on the philosophical relations between Martin Buber, Ramchandra Gandhi 
and Daya Krishna’s way of dialoguing: Raveh, “Thinking Dialogically about Dialogue with Martin Buber and 
Daya Krishna.” 
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‘Europe’ - but as a collective creation of a world of philosophy emerging from us all, enables, 
I think, avoiding the fallacies of comparative philosophies (described in 1.2.1).  
It remains however difficult to decipher what exactly Daya Krishna means with ‘world’, which 
he uses in expressions such as ‘the world of art’, ‘of philosophy’, loka, the Leibnitzian world, 
etc. It might be the case that he loses a definite meaning in the undecipherable character of his 
wide use of the term. But precisely what attracts Daya Krishna to this concept is the infinite 
possibility of joint creations and re-creations of diverse worlds within the common cosmos. He 
thus begins his article ‘Possible Worlds’ with this idea: “A world, as Leibnitz pointed out long 
ago, involves the notion of ‘compossibility’ or, in other words, the possibility of different 
possibilities being ‘possible’ together.”884 Defining ‘what’ the world means would probably be 
counterproductive since it would finalize these possibilities into an actuality. In the indecisive 
use of ‘worlds’ hides thus the open form of all the contents that we can produce together, which 
potentially has no boundary nor definition, since it can be (and ‘ought to be’) modified in each 
encounter and dialogue. More specifically on the world of philosophy, which is the one that 
philosophical dialogues across traditions create, he thus comments elsewhere:  
“The world which philosophy creates is not only built on the basis of the questioning activity 
of consciousness and the doubts that it involves, but is itself constituted by the dynamic 
unfoldment of concepts in their inter-relationships where each step in the construction not only 
reveals the inadequacy and inner consistency of what has been conceptually realized, thus 
challenging to a further exploration which might overcome the inadequacies and the 
inconsistencies so revealed.”885 
If understood in the context of dialogues across traditions, such an account implies that the 
inter-relationships are foremost seen on the basis of the common activity of dialoguing that it 
creates. Here it is less the question of the I and the You that is focused on, but the dynamic 
unfolding of what originates from all the ‘I(s)’ and ‘you(s)’ who we can integrate in a dialogue. 
The relationship enables such a dynamic unfolding which happens on the ground of our being 
with each other and communicating with each other, seen however from the perspective of what 
it produces, i.e. the questioning, the doubts, the inadequacy and inner consistency and the 
further exploration. Thus, addressing each other or speaking to each other is only the necessary 
beginning of what the dialogue creates and the world of philosophy that it allows, which is the 
product of our intercommunication. 
It is perhaps for this reason, i.e. because of conceiving the relationship in terms of the creative 
effects that the dialogue enables, that Daya Krishna does not limit the ‘between’ you and me886, 
                                                 
884 Daya Krishna, “Possible Worlds,” 181. 
885 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 88. 
886 See Daniel Raveh’s comment, referring to Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the 
Problem of Knowledge,” 5. (Daya Krishna’s text is indicated in italics): ““Much has been said”, he [Daya Krishna] 
writes, “about the dialogical interchange between the ‘I’ and the ‘You’, or the ‘Thou’, or the other potential ‘I’, 
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but enlarges it to whoever we integrate in our ‘world’, whoever wants to participate in its 
creation. The relationality that he implies is not the one of me reaching your I-ness and you my 
I-ness, but consists in essentially realizing that our freedoms and creations originate from the 
space between yous and Is. This is what he reproaches to Murty’s account of the ‘realm of 
between’ in particular, and to Indian conceptions of conceiving transcendental relation in two-
way relationships only: 
 “The important thing, to my mind, is that the relationship of ‘between’ need not obtain only 
between three entities but that it may occur between a large number of entities and thus bring 
into being a far more complex and multiple world than the relationship would give rise to if 
conceived in a minimal manner only. A society or a community can only be conceived as the 
creative result of a plurality of ‘betweens’ and the conflict and the tensions within it will be 
because of the conflicting nature of these relationships between its different constituent units. 
The trouble with the model of the ‘between relation’, as usually formulated in the spiritual 
literature of the world, including India, seems to be that it conceives of the relation only 
between man and God rather than between God and an indefinite plurality of men and women 
or between all human beings or even the whole world of living beings which constitutes the 
Realm in which the relationship of ‘between’ may arise.”887 
Thus, for Daya Krishna, the ‘realm of between’ is the creation of an intersubjective world (and 
in his practice, a world across traditions and disciplines), the result of an inter-communication 
which depends on our will and desire to include many and diverse participants. In so doing, the 
question of the ‘between’ is relevant only if it does not focus on the identities that are connected, 
but on the complexity of the processes that take place simultaneously at different levels. 
Dialogue is for that matter a good illustration, since it does not focus on the individual 
participants but on the content that emerges from this between. These worlds are thus 
fundamentally human, in the limits that they create as well as in the potentiality that they allow. 
Thus, commenting on N. V. Banerjee’s conception of ‘I with Others’ = ‘We’, Daya Krishna 
qualifies his professor’s philosophy as “anthropocentric in the best sense of the term”.888 
Indeed, Banerjee clearly distinguishes between modes of relation to nature and the animal world 
and those with humans in view of the specific inter-communication that the latter allows. This 
                                                 
created by the increase in number of the ‘interacting’ variables is well known in physics, but here the ‘interaction’ 
is between beings who are ‘trying’ to ‘think’ in the context of what someone else has ‘thought’ and ‘said’. 
‘Surprise’ is the heart of this interaction, surprise at the ‘unthought-of’ possibility that suggests ‘new’ directions 
of thought, when one felt one was ‘stuck’ with the ‘old’ alternatives.” DK is interested in a multi-vocal interaction. 
(…) For DK, you, and even the manifold you, does not make me ‘complete’. DK is a master of the incomplete. 
Knowledge, we saw above, is according to him a matter of perennial seeking. This seeking takes place through 
thinking, which DK differentiates from ‘thought’. The latter is just a tentative ‘product’ of thinking as a collective 
process; a process that is both anādi and ananta, beginning-less and endless.” Raveh, “Thinking Dialogically about 
Dialogue with Martin Buber and Daya Krishna.,” 32. 
887 Daya Krishna, “The Realms of Between : Some Reflections on Murty’s The Realm of Between,” in The 
Philosophy of K. Satchidananda Murty, ed. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya and Ashok Vohra (New Delhi: Indian Council 
of Philosophical Research, 1965), 174. 
888 Daya Krishna, “Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy.,” in The Philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, 
ed. Margaret Chatterjee (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1990), 
191. 
 
327 
 
possibility to dialogue grounds a radical difference in terms of relation to the other humans, 
which Daya Krishna qualifies as follows:  
“The very starting point of Banerjee’s philosophical reflection is, thus, not the isolated 
Cartesian ‘cogito’, or the Husserlian ‘transcendental ego’ which has ‘bracketed’ the world, or 
the pure puruṣa of Samkhya who is the eternal subject which can never be an object to itself or 
know that there are other puruṣas in the world besides itself, or the Advaitic ātman which has 
no other or the non-Advaitic ātmans which have an essential relationship only with the Lord 
and which either have no knowledge of other selves or know them only as fellow-devotees 
who are totally immersed in some form or other of the bhakti of the divine. Rather, it is man 
in the plural - man not as ‘I’, but as ‘we’, the ‘we’s’ who alone may communicate and have a 
dialogue or rather a multi-logue between themselves.”889 
The humanness is thus grounded in our dialogical necessity. However, neither Banerjee nor 
Daya Krishna actually develop a theory of dialogue, neither from a linguistic perspective nor 
in examining how the communication between subjects or between myself and the others 
operate. This is remarkable for Daya Krishna in view of his practice of dialogue, and for 
Banerjee in view of his epistemological analysis, in particular in his work Language, Meaning, 
Persons in which the reader would expect such a theory. While it could be concluded that there 
is no theory of dialogue, I think that we can conceive dialogue as the realization of the inter-
relationality that they offer, and I thus would conceive with them dialogue differently, in terms 
of this essential inter-relation. In that sense, the spoken content of communication is only the 
linguistic external manifestation of the process that operates at a deeper level of each 
consciousness engaged. This process transforms both what is spoken of and our conceptual 
relations and behaviors. What does not appear is more encompassing than its linguistic 
expression, which is however needed as the connection between the participants. But how to 
qualify this encompassing relation if it goes beyond the spoken words in dialogue?  
I think that the relation can be understood via the problems that it raises, namely the appearance 
of the aforementioned I-centricity. Indeed, for Daya Krishna and for N. V. Banerjee, the relation 
is always-existing. We can withdraw from it and return to ourselves, but this happens on the 
background of a world that is already with others: it is, thus a denial of the relation, which does 
not erase its existence. The problem is consequently the awareness of this relation, i.e. how to 
realize that we are with others even when we are not actively engaged with them (when we are 
alone) or if we refuse to engage (when we consider others as impediment). The illusion of I-
centricity890 is located in this forgetfulness of our state of being with others which occurs from 
the difficulty of grasping the state of constant change that they bring about:    
                                                 
889 Daya Krishna, 191. 
890 I have analyzed the problem of I-centricity in Daya Krishna with a different emphasis, in particular in view of 
the articulation of the different realms of consciousness (knowledge, will, action) and absolutes with K. C. 
Bhattacharyya in the following article: Coquereau, “Relational Consciousness: Subjectivity and Otherness in Daya 
Krishna’s Philosophy.” While the views of these two investigations concord, I rather focus here on the 
consequences of I-centricity for dialogue and on the I-centricity vis-à-vis the constitution of a ‘We’. 
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“We are at the ‘mercy’ of others, just as they are on mine, and it is this fact of dynamic, ever-
changing interdependance that structures the human situation, even though in each individual 
self-consciousness it is mirrored in just the opposite way. For the individual self-consciousness 
that articulates itself as ‘I am’, the whole world, including its relationship to it, is contingent 
and hence unnecessary to the self-certifying certitude of its own being which alone is the 
witness to its absolute existential necessity that self-consciousness testifies and certifies at the 
same time.”891 
The illusion of I-centricity concentrates other illusions the were mentioned above (7.1): the 
impossibility to doubt the I results in indubitability and the illusions of beginninglessness and 
endlessness, since we cannot extract ourselves from our own existence. It also confers a finality 
to ourselves, which can only be questioned when consciousness reflects on itself, when the self 
becomes an object of consciousness in self-consciousness. From the objectivation of ourselves 
occurs the possibility to improve, change and modify ourselves but also our relations with 
others. It is here that Daya Krishna locates our seeking towards what ought to be, from the 
dilemma of the relation between the indubitable subjective I-consciousness and the dubitable 
objective self-consciousness. 892  For dialogues, this could explain the difficulty to doubt 
‘ourselves’ while we can on the other hand admit that ‘our arguments’ can be inconsistent or 
inadequate. We can recognize that our argument is defeated, but with much more difficulty that 
‘we are’ wrong or that ‘our’ belief upon which our position is grounded, with which we 
intimately identify is wrong. This explains Daya Krishna’s emphasis on intellectual detachment, 
so as to distinguish between the subjective indubitable I speaking in a debate from the reflected 
argumentation that we propound, which can be found inadequate. The difficulty to ‘realize’ this 
difference between the ‘I’ thinking and the ‘thought’ while debating grounds the complaints of 
                                                 
891 Daya Krishna, “Consciousness, Materiality and Spirituality: Issues, Dilemmas and the Future of Mankind,” 
502. 
892 If we interpret the following quote by Daya Krishna in a dialogical context, where assertion and judgement are 
included as part of the argumentation of each participant, the following quote illustrates the relation of dubitability 
of the arguments (including the ‘self’ when it becomes an object of the argument) and indubilitaty of the 
consciousness holding these arguments: “Self-consciousness, however is necessarily judgmental at the ordinary 
human level and in a judgement the categories are not only related to one another and brought into a ‘unity’, but 
there is also an element of ‘assertion’ which accompanies the act of judging and which Kant indicated by the 
phrase ‘I think’ or ‘I judge’ (Ich denke). This ‘act’ of ‘assertion’ is a psychic act involving the ‘owing’ of 
‘responsibility’ which implies that one is prepared to give grounds for one’s judgement and justify it on those 
grounds. To question the grounds is to question the judgement and it is this aspect of judgemental cognition which 
gives rise to man’s enterprise of rationality which consists in providing ‘reasons’ for what one says. But the 
‘reasons’ can always be found to be inadequate or shown to be inconsistent with what one holds on other grounds. 
There is, thus, an inherent ‘dubitability’ in the enterprise of rationality which ‘self-consciousness’ has inevitably 
to engage in just because it is self-consciousness. (…) It has seldom been seen that the elements of ‘reflexivity’ 
and ‘negativity’ arise in a pre-reflective consciousness that is neither reflexive nor negative in the sense in which 
‘self-consciousness’ appears in man. The ‘negativity’ is surrounded by a vast certitude which belongs to 
consciousness itself. And, reflexivity at this level is the self-certitude of consciousness as reflected in the 
indubitable self-certainty of the ‘I’ at the level of self-consciousness. The indubitability of ‘I’ and the dubitability 
of everything else thus provides the matrix of the drama of self-consciousness which man essentially is. (…) 
Consciousness, thus, is indubitable, even though at the level of self-consciousness it becomes dubitable as it too 
becomes an ‘object’ to itself, like all other objects. It is this ‘dubitability’ however which gives rise to that eternal 
seeking in respect of both the self and the world which finds them not as they could be and hence tries to make 
them ‘better’. The unending dynamism that this engenders defines the human situation.” Daya Krishna, “Possible 
Worlds” 188. 
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Daya Krishna and J. N. Chubb against philosophical debates which turn into ‘wrangling’ when 
both are confused, which compelled me to develop with them the notions of ‘alternative’ and 
‘detachment’ (see chapter 5). The difficulty is thus not simply to accept a plurality of rational 
truth-statements, but also to recognize this difference between the subjective I-consciousness 
and the self-reflected consciousness when debating. Precisely this difference cannot be 
rationally proven but has to be experienced from within via a practice of detachment which 
allows to feel the split between my ontological consciousness and its activity of knowledge as 
consciousness. It is now clear that this is not simply an intellectual, or rational and cognitive 
exercise, but also implies a metaphysical consideration on the constitution of consciousness.  
Within the rational framework of argumentation, a first step consists in recognizing that the 
many others participate in my thought. This implies to realize that the activity of knowledge is 
a joint activity with others without which my thoughts could not exist. This interrelatedness is 
located at the level of self-consciousness in the sense that the reflection on myself is permitted 
via the mediation of others without which this act could not be and could not make sense (see 
also 5.2.1 where I limited the quote to the intellectual dimension): 
 “The relation of conversation, Dialogue, Discussion and Debate to ‘thinking’ is so intimate, 
intertwined and complex that it is difficult, if not impossible, to unravel the contribution that 
each makes to the activity we call ‘thinking’ (…). But whatever the complexity, one thing is 
clear. The ‘other’, whether it be one or more than one, is necessarily involved at every level. 
One may at times be said to ‘converse’ or ‘discuss’ with oneself but, then one, not only treats 
oneself as the ‘other’ but soon finds the limitations of this and seeks the ‘real’ other, the other 
than oneself who may look at what893 one ‘thinks’ more objectively, critically without that lies, 
or prejudice, or ‘self-love’ that the inevitable ‘I-Centricity’ in ‘thinking’ always involves. The 
‘I’ in ‘I think’ is more important than ‘think’ or ‘thinking’ as the well-known examples of 
Śaṅkara, Descartes and Fichte, among many other, attest894. For the ‘other’ on the other hand, 
it is the ‘thinking’ or rather ‘thought’ which is its result, even if it be only contingently related 
to it, that is the heart of the matter. (…) This (dialogue including continuous questions and 
thoughts), most people forget, is the life of the Intellect or Reason in which knowledge, ‘human 
knowledge’, lives, takes shape, is formed and grows over spaces and times no one knows. (…) 
And, what is almost never understood or895 realized, is that its center is not the individual, 
however important he or she may seem, but the ‘interrelated’ and ‘interacting’ community, 
both visible and invisible, extending from the present into the indefinitely receding horizons 
of the past whose members ‘feel’ the ‘presence’, the persistent presence, of the other, the 
innumerable ‘other’ is the very ‘act’ of one’s thinking.”896  
The problem originates however in succeeding to connect these two poles by realizing that the 
others themselves are both ‘I’ and ‘thought’ and furthermore, that my I, their I and our thoughts 
are also interrelated. This means that although conceiving a split between ‘I’ and ‘thought’ or 
I-conciousness and self/other-consciousness can enable accepting criticism and detachment in 
                                                 
893 T: whom 
894 T: at least 
895 T: as 
896 The quote from this article is based on the unpublished transcript (T) typed by D. D. Mathur, which however 
has been corrected with the help of the original manuscript. The emendations are indicated above. 
Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 7–9. 
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dialogue, their separation is itself an illusion. For dialogue, the illusion of this separation points 
at a dilemma. On the one hand, it is necessary to distinguish me from my thoughts and even 
more you from your thoughts, so as to reach an apparently ‘objective’ ground where our 
thoughts can be debated, questioned and criticized. On the other hand, it is in reaction to your 
thoughts that mine can be elaborated, with ‘you’ that ‘I’ think, in our common language that 
we can communicate through the different intellectual backgrounds and conceptual frameworks 
that our creativity arises. It might be useful to remind the reader here that this communication 
is itself part of the creation of self-consciousnesses, thus subject to misunderstandings and 
ambiguities the uncertainty of which opens new potentialities for thinking together (as seen in 
5.1). Thus, the common elaboration does not merge into certainty but in the discoveries enabled 
by the common explorations of doubt and questions.897 Furthermore, ‘we’ in dialogue are not 
only our words, thoughts or self-consciousnesses but also ‘ourselves’ as different ‘Is’, which 
designates much more than the simple location or container of our thoughts. How to think a 
relatedness between us that also allows a distinction? 
It is difficult to answer this question with Daya Krishna, who on the one hand emphasizes the 
necessary critical distance and intellectual detachment to oneself and one’s tradition, which also 
implies the right to navigate between different traditions as one’s own. On the other hand, he 
also insists on our being with others, which creates this common intersubjective world in which 
we all live and think. Since this world is also created by our collective actions, the only 
possibility I could think of with Daya Krishna is to consider our collective actions of creation 
to arise from our engagement with others, i.e. out of our consciousness, while the critical faculty 
implied in the activity of knowledge contains an ‘inwardization’ to allow the intellectual 
detachment. In other words: creation occurs when we direct our consciousness outside to a 
world of togetherness, while criticisms are possible when we come back within our selves as 
self-consciousness and distinguish between subjective and objective activities. Can we split 
further to be I-consciousness and self-consciousness on the outside and I-consciousness and 
self-consciousness on the inside? Within ourselves, the distinction appears solely as self-
consciousness in distancing ourselves from our thought. Outside of ourselves, the distinction 
appears first in the created joint actions or explorations of which the I is the impulse without 
which our thoughts or actions would not be embodied. This articulation, however, does not 
solve the I-centricity of I-consciousness itself. It only shifts it further by observing the 
commonness of what emerges from it. In any case, Daya Krishna seems to distinguish between 
the cognitive independence and the existential relatedness - although he would probably agree 
                                                 
897 “Self-consciousness brings something into being as it questions everything including knowledge and action and 
communication. The question of truth and falsity, of right and wrong, of significance and insignificance, of 
meaningfulness and meaninglessness arise which had not risen before. (…) The Garden of Eden was there and it 
was self-consciousness that destroyed it for ever. But the fact that is has infected and vitiated communication itself 
and made it essentially ambiguous has not been seen even by those who have talked about the essential 
indeterminacy of the meaning and the text.”Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental 
Illusions, 141. 
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that our cognitive independence happens within our existential relatedness in the world here 
and now. Thus, for the realm of thinking, he writes: 
 “Philosophical enterprise is ‘cognitive’ in the sense that it is neither a matter of ‘feeling’ nor 
of ‘action’, but always involves argument and counter-argument concerning questions and 
problems that are primarily theoretical and arise mostly from what I have characterized as the 
‘conceptuality’ of the concepts. As for ‘independence’, these ‘questions’ and ‘problems’ are 
independent in the sense that once they have arisen, they become as ‘objective’ as anything 
else, not only to the mind that has encountered them, but to every other mind that can be 
interested in them. It should be remembered in this connection that even what is ‘constituted’ 
by belief gets independent of it after it has been constituted. This is the basic māyā of all human 
reality.”898 
Thus, in order to allow thinking an independence of the thoughts however in essential relation 
with my I-consciousness and the other-consciousnesses, I think we have to effectuate two 
further steps: while engaging and withdrawing are two directions that are possible for my I-
consciousness to connect with the world, I believe we have to consider that these actions happen 
on the background of an essential relatedness with each others, best expressed with N. V. 
Banerjee’s expression “realm of the personal” (in opposition to the individual subject implying 
the split with object). If we consider I-centricity in the sense of an impossibility of reaching 
other-consciousnesses as I-consciousness, there is a possibility to realize that we are 
nevertheless as I-consciousness essentially with Others. Indeed, it is not as consciousness in 
treating the other consciousnesses as object of my consciousness (i.e. as other-self-
consciousnesses) that we can ‘understand’ or ‘know’ that we are with them in the world. This 
knowledge ‘of’ the others, i.e. the others as objects, defines “basic otherness”899 in Banerjee’s 
terms. Knowledge is conceived “from outside” as externalization of my relation with others on 
the mode of my knowledge of nature.900 This mode is the one of the epistemology considered 
                                                 
898 Bhuvan Chandel and K. L. Sharma, eds., “Response to My Critics,” in The Philosophy of Daya Krishna (New 
Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research : Distributed by Indian Book Centre, 1996), 303. 
899 Banerjee, Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy. An Essay in Philosophical Reconstruction., 5–10. 
900 “Let us now try to ascertain the exact nature of the relation between the subject and the object, it being granted 
that the object is characterized by basic otherness. (…) One may admit the direct and immediate relationship 
between the subject and the object and yet may, under the influence of philosophical sophistication from which 
laymen are fortunately free, come to misunderstand the meaning of the word ‘object’. Such misunderstanding is 
prominently illustrated in the admission of the distinction between the object in itself and the object as known and 
the acceptance of the view that, whereas the latter is obviously held in a direct and immediate relation to the 
subject, the former, as held by the representationists in general headed by Descartes in modern times, is knowable 
indirectly and mediately by means of inference or else, as held by Kant, is absolutely unknown and unknowable. 
But both these views amount to understanding knowledge from outside and not, as should be appropriate, from 
within itself. And this goes to show that they are but attempts to substitute theories for a fact - the fact of knowledge. 
In particular, they are vitiated by the arbitrary and unwarrantable employment of the concept of causality in the 
understanding of the nature of knowledge.” Banerjee, 15–16. Daya Krishna also criticized the application of 
naturalistic causality to describe our relations with others. Interestingly, he uses the concept of ‘essentiality’ at this 
occasion, showing a possible influence of the term as used by Banerjee: “The relation with the other cannot be 
causal in the usual sense of the term, as it is not only mediated by norms but also leaves an essential, irreducible 
margin of indeterminacy both because of the other’s freedom and the intrinsic unpredictability of the response 
made by them.” (emphasis added). Daya Krishna, “Thinking with Causality about ‘Causality:’ Reflections on a 
‘Concept’ Determining All Thought about Action and Knowledge,” 55. However, Daya Krishna’s insistence on 
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in isolation from other realms, if I consider that I can know ‘your philosophical position’ by 
understanding the different points made in your argumentation. Debating on our differences, I 
can offer a counter-argument to your assertion. However, this (defined as the rational debate) 
remains an external knowledge of arguments that emanate from ‘you’ without this ‘you’ to be 
in essential relation to me.901 On the contrary, in the realm of the personal, the challenge is to 
realize that your position, as different from mine as it can be, is yet essentially related to you 
and me, since it is enabled by our inter-communication. It is ‘in reaction’ to me that you offer 
an argument, which is grounded on the one hand on the possibilities that are left open by my 
questions and those of your answer, and on the other hand on our belonging to one ‘world’ 
composed by valuational seekings or desires. The interrelation of these realms is what defines 
us as ‘human’, i.e. less our ability to conceive of ‘epistemology’ or ‘values’ than the fact that 
we are already located together in relation in a world composed of the intermingling of all these 
dimensions. However, due to our rational ability to distinguish and analyze, it seems to us that 
these realms are separated and that we are ourselves separated. As illusorous as these 
separations could be, they form our human condition and have thus a certain reality grounded 
in the biological fact of the separation of our bodies for Banerjee. He summarizes this dilemma 
as follows: 
“In the understanding of this relation the distance between one man and another as signified 
by the word ‘other’ or even by the words ‘each other’ should then be somehow or other 
overcome. And the only way in which this may be done seems to consist in conceiving man’s 
relation to his fellows to be that of his essentiality to them, expressible in the formula ‘I with 
others = we’. Here the use of the word ‘with’ before the word ‘others’, it is worthwhile to note, 
serves to indicate the undoing of the adverse effect that the word ‘other’ is apt to produce by 
itself alone or even with the word ‘each’ added to its prefix. 
Nevertheless, man’s relation to his fellows originally falls below the strict human level or, in 
other words, is not characterizable as essentially to one another. This is due to an original and 
inexplicable anomaly of human nature, which refers to man’s unavoidable biological birth. 
Viewed in the purely biological perspective, man is constituted by certain vital drives and as 
such is ordinarily a mere individual or an ego. And that being so, his relation to his fellows, 
equally biologically born, is analogous to his relation to nature, being that of others to him. 
But then, man’s relation to his fellows cannot be what we have called basic otherness. This is 
obviously due to the possibility of inter-communication between one man and another. It is 
precisely for this reason that the otherness in the case of the relation between man and man is 
really each-otherness which is another name for mutuality.”902 
                                                 
the indeterminacy brought by our essentiality with others is his own, which for dialogue is necessary. Indeed, 
although we are already with others, this state should also not be understood as a renunciation of communication 
because we would already have access to the otherness of the others. It is on the basis of this essentiality that we 
can communicate but the communication itself escapes any norm and remains indeterminate, i.e. possibly creative 
for Daya Krishna. 
901 This is what Friedman understood as ‘technical dialogue’ according to Buber’s philosophy when he responded 
to Daya Krishna in the dialogue about which I commented in 6.3. 
902 Banerjee, Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy. An Essay in Philosophical Reconstruction., 7–8. 
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Banerjee grounds the difference between basic otherness and essential each-otherness is the 
‘possibility of inter-communication’. It is indeed at this point very surprising to notice that he 
does not develop in consequence a concept of dialogue or a mode of communication 
corresponding to this essential relation with each other. I can only hypothesize that his 
reservation against linguistic analysis made him suspicious of such a concept, which could have 
been interpreted at a pure linguistic level of communication.903 Conversely, we could think 
dialogue as this essential inter-communication with each-other beyond linguistic analysis in 
applying his insight further. In so doing, dialogue can be understood as the ‘undoing’ of this 
original distance visible in our biological birth as described by Banerjee. Furthermore, dialogue 
would then be the mode of relating ‘with’ others as the realization of our essentiality to each 
other, which most obviously applies through language, but also in thinking (following Daya 
Krishna’s idea that our thinking is enabled by its acceptance and revision in front of others) and 
creating (a common world of desires, seeking and values).  
This being-with might not be continuously perceivable as a state of being where we are always 
situated and from which we cannot extract ourselves, thus having no possibility to reflect on it 
as self-consciousness. It should rather be explored as realization and awareness from within. It 
might also not give us access to the I-consciousness of the others, but it can constitute enough 
of a belief to engage in dialogue with others. It can make us confident that we all are I-
consciousnesses whose communication can be however only effectuated through the objectivity 
and distance of self-consciousnesses. In so doing, I think that we would avoid on the one hand 
the Advaitin unity, which for Daya Krishna runs the risk of nullifying the power of differences. 
On the other hand, we would keep the sense of inner-awareness of our essentiality to others 
against the illusion of omnipotence. Thus, this would mean that we are essentially related from 
within and different and distinct enough to enter in dialogue. But how are we ‘essentially’ 
related from within and what does that mean?  
                                                 
903 “Despite the fact that it is man’s own creation and is the most effective means of the expression of his thoughts, 
feelings, desires, hopes and fears as well as the medium of his communication with his fellows, language is, after 
all, a tool for him to use and as such is in a sense an ‘other’ to him.Thus language is of a dual nature, and this 
perhaps indicates that the importance of linguistic analysis in philosophical investigations is subject to a limitation. 
Its importance lies not only in bringing the problem of meaning to the forefront of philosophic thought but in 
insisting that meaning as such cannot be committed to the care of the verification principle - the principle which 
is of exclusive use in deciding between truth and falsity and the recognition of the all-importance of which in the 
field of philosophy is a way of liquidating philosophy or else leaving it in a state of slavery to science. (…) 
Philosophy, although in the fitness of things it embraces linguistic analysis, must go beyond, and in any case is not 
identifiable with, the latter. And, further, the bewitchment of our intelligence is due to a cause which lies deeper 
and is more comprehensive than the mere abuse of language as the protagonists of linguistic analysis may conceive 
it to be. Judged in this light, linguistic analysis, while providing for the awareness, of course vague and inadequate, 
of the proper business of philosophy, misses the chance of developing into philosophy; so that, if it must be 
associated with the name of philosophy, it may well be designated as still-born philosophy. And this is due to the 
failure on its part to comprehend the truth that the bewitchment of our intelligence is ultimately the effect of the 
illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals.” Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 167–68. 
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In his earlier presentation of the same problem of essentiality, in Language, Meaning, Persons 
(1963), Banerjee had formulated the issue in a more condensed way, notably in terms of 
‘demand’:  
“Essentially related to the point made above is the curious and yet the most fundamental fact 
about human existence, namely, that man, by birth, is of an anomalous nature, being both an 
individual and a person, and that, due to the peculiarity of his birth as a human being, this 
original anomaly of his nature is imbued with the demand for its own resolution.”904 
Thus, the dilemma demands to be solved according to the explication in the earlier section of 
the term of ‘demand’. Undoing the original distance is a human seeking905 (in Daya Krishna’s 
term) to feel again our essentiality with each other as persons, i.e. an inner struggle calling for 
mutuality. In his review of Banerjee’s later book (Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy, 
1985), Daya Krishna, in spite of his highly appreciation of Banerjee pleading for his readers to 
be “convinced that there is a thinker whose thought deserves to be paid serious critical attention 
by those who are genuinely interested in he creative philosophical thinking done recently in this 
country”906 (note the mentioning of ‘critical’ and ‘creative’ in Daya Krishna’s incentive to 
encourage further discussions on Banerjee’s philosophy), has a serious critique to make. His 
critique is to be taken seriously first because it raises a problem on the concept of essentiality, 
and second because, in my interpretation, the problem that he raises could bring dialogue at the 
core of the discussion. Daya Krishna writes:  
“First, it is not quite clear what is exactly meant by ‘essentiality to one another’. Surely, 
biological preconditions of living are far more ‘essential’ than other human beings, at least in 
one and perhaps most basic sense of ‘essential’. But even if one accepts that other human 
beings are ‘essential’ to one’s being a ‘human being’, it is not clear how each and all of them 
are equally ‘essential’. And what about people about whom I do not know anything at all, with 
whom I never come into contact. To put the same point differently, from ‘some human beings 
are essential to some one human being’ it does not follow that ‘all human beings are essential 
to every human being.’”907 
The first reserve expressed is indeed answered by Daya Krishna himself, namely that our 
biological condition can be seen to constitute our nature, but not our humanness. This does not 
                                                 
904 Banerjee, 161. 
905 Margaret Chatterjee further elucidates Banerjee’s ambiguity between man’s essential condition (what we are) 
and the task or seeking to become what we are: “Society is referred to by him as the realm of ‘I and others’. This 
additive notion falls short of ‘I with others’. The bringing into actuality of this latter realm is set us as a task. It 
concerns not the ‘what’ but the ‘how’ of living. When pressed on whether he held a theory of potentiality or not, 
Banerjee used to tread warily, and here I draw on personal discussions with him. He was sufficiently steeped in 
the Indian tradition to prefer a metaphysic of being to one of becoming. And yet there is clearly something to be 
done if man is to live in full mutuality of relationship with his fellows. He speaks in terms of the demand for the 
actualization of what man is destined to be. (…) Man bears within himself ‘the promise’ of a life lived in a new 
way. The idea of ‘promise’ seems to me to involve both ought and can. Essentiality is not an accomplished fact in 
respect of its full actualization. ‘Every man is destined to be human’. This is the task set before us.” Chatterjee, 
“Intersubjectivity and Essentiality,” 94. 
906 Daya Krishna, “Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy.,” 208. 
907 Daya Krishna, 209. 
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mean that we can overcome our nature. We remain embodied, but our bodily behavior is also 
insufficient to define how we ought to act or be. However, the second question is more 
interesting and brings attention to Banerjee’s formal constitution of essentiality. For Daya 
Krishna, whose vocabulary and views are more down to earth or more exactly, down in the 
world, such a general metaphysical idea of essentiality turns out to be suspicious. It requires to 
presuppose some kind of speculative view which also runs the risk of becoming absolute. In 
assuming that (all) human beings are essential to one another, he seems to fall in what Daya 
Krishna points out as a transcendental illusion, namely the fact that Banerjee sees our 
essentiality to each other as phenomenally given although it is transcendental. In other words, 
Banerjee replaces the transcendental ‘I’ by a kind of transcendentally influenced conception of 
a We. But what can justify presupposing as a fact that all human beings are essential to each 
other? What can explain in the worldly state of affairs an essentiality with each other that would 
necessarily and already signify our human condition? Can there be an a priori essentiality to 
each other which is grounded in our necessity to realize it rather than to actualize it? In other 
words, is Banerjee not replacing a kind of transcendental liberation by another kind, even if he 
implies an empirical liberation in this life?908  
This issue is further investigated by Daya Krishna’s second critique, which continues as 
follows: 
“And, what about ego-centricity? Is one human being different from another human being, or 
not? Banerjee eschews transcendent metaphysics, and, in fact, is totally against it. Being out-
and-out anthropocentrically-minded he cannot take recourse to some transcendent, non-
empirical, non-vyavāhāric identity as many Advaitins do. But at the empirical, vyavāhāric 
level, differences are what provide individuation and thus provide that richness and variety 
which is the spice of life. Not only this, at the empirical level we are not just human beings but 
belong to a particular sex, caste, race, religion, nation, language group, civilization, etc. All 
these define and restrict the field of those with whom I can meaningfully communicate. It is 
strange that while Banerjee has said so many interesting things about language and 
communication, he has not talked about the empirical fact of there being a plurality of 
languages along with the fact that most human beings are born into a particular community 
which restricts their communication-field primarily to those who can speak their language.”909 
I agree with Daya Krishna that there is a certain attraction for a transcendental orientation within 
the world in Banerjee’s account, which arises from his critique of the pāramārthika level in 
                                                 
908 Concluding on the necessity to enact humanizing principles of conduct as a spiritual activity and humanist 
education which should combine theory and practice to lead us to the realization of our essentiality with each other, 
Banerjee concludes his book The Future of Religion as follows: “If and when this happens, their original alienation 
from themselves and from their fellows is more likely than not to be eliminated and, consequently, they may be 
initiated into a new way of perfectly integrated life well marked by the prevalence of the joy of living (ānanda). 
Hence is indicated the Way-perhaps, the only Way, that would lead to the fulfilment of the destiny of man, 
consisting in his realization of liberation in this life (jīvan-mukti).” Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, The Future of 
Religion (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1981), 119. 
909 Daya Krishna, “Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy.,” 209. 
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general, and the Advaita Vedāntin doctrine of ātman in particular910. Attempting to oppose them 
a plurality of others at the empirical level, his counter-position does not escape the whole 
framework in which it is grounded. It rather seems to pose the ‘I with others’ contra the absolute 
I-subjectivity, and the empirical contra the transcendental. In doing so, his metaphysics remains 
deeply influenced by a transcendent perspective. What if, however, we consider the essentiality 
to each other not as a state of being (or a becoming what we are), but as something that requires 
a realization from within and a construction with others? In other words, this means to realize 
from within the possibility of being essentially with each other (however, not always, not with 
everybody, not a priori), which would motivate us to participate actively to an essential relation 
out in the world? Such a conception would implicate my desire and seeking originating from 
my inner consciousness, knowledge and will, which could concretize the relation.  
This brings me back to conceptualize dialogue as a way to realize the essentiality to each other. 
However, such a conception does not presuppose that we are already and necessarily with all 
others, but with ‘some’ colleagues, friends, scholars and thinkers who came to participate in a 
dialogue. The task or the demand for essentiality would then take a second, more concrete 
meaning: in view of the impossibility to realize a priori our essentiality with ‘all’ others, the 
task would rather consist in attempting to enlarge the dialogue with as many and diverse others 
as possible, through the plurality of languages, nations, civilizations, castes, genders, etc. Above 
(5.2) I had described that dialogue is theoretically possible with indefinite participants, while it 
is concretely limited to the actual others participating: this renders the essentiality with them 
concrete in the ‘here and now’. In so doing, we can integrate the second criticism of Daya 
Krishna, namely the one concerning the restrictions and individuations of the participants who 
provide the richness of plurality, whereas they generate at the same time the risk of an 
impossibility of dialoguing due to these differences. In particular the plurality of languages 
mentioned by Daya Krishna proves to be a very practical impediment to dialoguing, although 
the belonging to different groups might be a deeper and more complicated obstacle to tackle. 
This further points out Daya Krishna’s more general view, which I apply to dialogue, namely 
                                                 
910 See the following remarks of Chatterjee, for whom however the intermingling of the transcendent in the 
empirical does not seem to constitute a contradiction: “The state of illusion, it is important to note, is, for Banerjee 
not a cognitive deprivation. Rather it concerns the gulf between knowledge and performance which pertains to our 
ordinary actions the vyavāhārika level - except that I suspect that for Banerjee there is no meaning in speaking of 
a pāramārthika level. What is needed is to transcend both egoity and mere collectivity (I and others). (…) Banerjee 
now introduces his own view of liberation from bondage. It involves ‘expansion’, ‘entrance into the lives of 
others’, ‘love of himself in and through his love of others’ (p.153). This is what blessedness (ānanda) is. One must 
note the link between this and Banerjee’s main grouse against Advaita Vedānta (that it involves an unwarranted 
inflation of selfhood). Expansion suggests a welcoming of plurality, and all this without falling into any kind of 
ātman doctrine.” Chatterjee, “Intersubjectivity and Essentiality,” 92. She later also explains the background of 
Banerjee’s ‘K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Lecture’ by detecting the transcendental influences (via opposition) of 
his view: “Banerjee is concerned at the conclusion of his lectures both to criticize any kind of leap from ‘I am 
nothing’ to some form of absolutism, and to criticize on the other hand any sort of theory which stresses the insular 
subject, a tendency he detects in western philosophy from the time of Descartes onwards. Both absolutism and 
insular subjectivity are regarded by him as ‘a travesty of the human situation’. The ‘I with others’ which is his 
positive alternative suggestion is, however, ‘not the content of any mode of our consciousness’. Banerjee refers to 
it as transcendental (p.82) and maintains that there obtains a demand for its actualization. This is clearly a shift 
from a Kantian view of the transcendental as presupposition to something which is set as a task.” Chatterjee, 96. 
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that there is no final resolution of the illusion. It seems to be proven insofar as Banerjee, 
attempting to erase the illusion of ego-centricity, seems to fall in the transcendental illusion of 
the constitution of the We. Thus, unlike others, Daya Krishna does not see the solution in 
solving the problem of the illusions but in realizing them or using them as resources for further 
discussions (as investigated at a metaphysical level in 7.1, now used as practical resources for 
topics orienting dialogues).  
Thus, for Daya Krishna the plurality contained in the idea of ‘individuals’ is not to be erased, 
which would again tend towards a unity, even if at the empirical level this time. He rather 
contemplates the advantage to make use of the plurality in a common and joint entreprise led 
by ‘We’ essentially related to each other in the common entreprise itself. The We thus needs to 
be re-actualized, it can be transformed and modified throughout dialogues and silences, so that 
the force of differences also operate within me. For, if I am already with others, can others 
change me? How to explicate the changes of ideas, positions, discoveries, wonders but also 
doubts, errors, revisions and corrections otherwise? These movements are ‘essential’ to the flow 
of dialogue for Daya Krishna, they cannot be annihilated by any unity with others. The relation 
that is created is an essential bond with each other, but it requires a constant engagement. It 
runs the risk of disappearing or failing at each moment, and it can also integrate moments of 
withdrawal. It is the full scopes of these possibilities and fragilities that configure the dynamic 
of dialogue, the instability of which also highlights its potentialities. In Daya Krishna’s words, 
the dynamic is the one relating different consciousnesses as follows: 
“Consciousness has the threefold aspect with feeling as its core and awareness as its centre, 
the one looking inward or being inward, the other looking outward and becoming all that it is 
aware of in a sense which is difficult to specify but not difficult to understand. As for the third 
aspect, it is silent but ever-present, a possibility that can always turn into an actuality by a 
movement which no one understands. Awareness and feeling are always there but that which 
‘hides’, and by hiding or even desiring or attending or shifting the focus of attention brings 
about a change, no one understands. Yet, it is as palpably there as awareness and feeling are, 
and the moment it becomes active, it assumes a centrality in that it affects the other two 
radically. (…) The roots of identity and difference thus lie within these aspects of 
consciousness and their interrelationships along with the changes that self-consciousness 
introduces in them with the coming into being of what we have called the ‘I-consciousness’, 
‘the consciousness of the I’ and the interactive interrelationship between them. The identity 
and the difference that originate from these and percolate down to all the other levels and get 
differentiated and diversified in this process are radically affected by the almost a priori 
modalities which consciousness has in dimension of knowing, feeling and desiring or wanting 
or willing. Each of these has elements of the other but, inspite of this, seeks a purity and 
puruṣārtha of its own, unmixed or even uncontaminated by that which is immanently involved 
in the other.”911 
For realizing our essentiality with each other in Daya Krishna, I hypothesize that we need both 
the inward feeling of the others’ presence and the awareness for becoming what the feeling 
                                                 
911 Daya Krishna, “Identity, Difference and the Problem of Reflexivity and Explanation,” 16–17. 
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brings about. In other words, ‘realizing’ has both meaning of becoming internally aware and 
bringing something into actualization. The third aspect is not named, and I believe that in the 
context of dialogue, it can be understood as the element of uncertainty beyond the control or 
will of the participants which gives rise to the indescribable ‘click’ that opens up dialogue. This 
expression was used by Srivatsa Goswami in our meeting to describe the Bhakti dialogue (see 
3.3.2) and is used in the preface of the Pune experiment to describe its dialogical success, as 
already quoted in 2.2.3. Daya Krishna compliments there on the efforts of K. Satchidananda 
Murty’s earlier experiments, who influenced him (among others) to organize the saṃvāda, but 
remarks also that “yet, none of them had really clicked. They were good while they lasted. But 
they did not generate that feeling of discovery, enthusiasm and success which the Rege seminar 
did in Poona.”912 For indeed, there seems to be no immediate reason that would differentiate 
the earlier attempts and the enthusiasm generated by the Pune experiment, and conversely, 
nothing can guarantee afterwards that the next dialogue will generate the same enthusiasm. This 
constitutes the element of uncertainty, which for Daya Krishna is a condition of creativity, as 
the uncontrollable shock, surprise or wonder inherent to philosophizing, which may or may not 
be realized. Unlike feeling and awareness which are ‘always there’ but fluctuate in their 
realization and thus depend on our activation and reception, this silent possibility, although 
‘ever present’, cannot be self-activated and rather depends on the context (see for instance the 
relevance of the location in Vrindavan for the Bhakti dialogue in3.3.2), including coincidences 
emerging from the context. The dynamic creating dialogue originates from the intermingling 
of these dimensions within and outside my I-consciousness and essentially with others, however 
from the dilemmas of its contradictory movements, struggling to be detached from others.  
But how do these contradictory movements originate? If the essentiality with each other is part 
of our awareness and feeling, why does Daya Krishna describe a struggle away from the others 
towards “a purity and puruṣārtha of its own, unmixed or even uncontaminated by that which is 
immanently involved in the other”? For Banerjee, this is precisely the result of the illusion of 
I-centricity. N. V. Banerjee developed his conception over several works and applied it to 
different realms of consciousness, with consequences that go much further than my present 
investigation. I rather select here from his philosophy what I believe can be relevant to 
emphasize the ‘human’ (what Daya Krishna qualifies as ‘anthropocentric’), ‘essential’ dialogue 
with Daya Krishna’s philosophy, the metaphysical background of which remains - in my 
reading - implicit. In the former’s account, this I-centricity originates from our conception of 
ourselves as ‘individuals’ who require an external relation, for example ‘language’ in order to 
connect the I and the You or others. Indeed, even at a very ordinary level, solipsism and 
isolation are not always possible so that we need a common language in order to communicate 
‘to’ each other. In that sense also, my knowledge ‘of’ you as objectified is an external 
knowledge of what I perceive or even accept to share with you in the public realm. This even 
applies to ‘understanding’, which for Banerjee is indeed not egoistic and allows for mutual 
                                                 
912 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xi–xii. 
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cooperation for example in technology or science. Our collective efforts can produce new tools 
in these realms. But understanding remains of a social order of human beings on the model ‘I 
and Others’ in the externality of our engagement in order to create something which can be 
useful to both sides913.  
It is interesting that N. V. Banerjee overcomes this level towards the realm of the personal (in 
opposition to individuals) and I with others (in opposition to I and others) in the last chapter of 
Language, Meaning and Persons which is entitled ‘Of Human Liberation’, akin to Daya 
Krishna’s strong belief of freedom which cannot be achieved without others. They do not 
mention dialogue, neither as a way to reach this freedom, nor ‘as’ freedom. In particular, I 
understand ‘dialogue’ as a way to respond to N. V. Banerjee’s question (which I believe is 
shared by Daya Krishna): 
“For what else can human bondage be but another name for man’s inviduality, his ego-
centricity, his circumscriptions within the small world dominated by the interplay of his 
passions? And considering this, one obviously cannot come to conceive liberation except in 
terms of the conquest of individuality.”914 
The conquest of individuality is best epitomized in the engagement in dialogues with others, 
which, following the above limitation of understanding, is not understood as a social act in a 
public discourse (as in the sense of Habermas). Rather, I understand it as the realization that 
our knowledge, values, positions and beliefs are made with others on the ground of this essential 
dialogue, the task of which is to make us realize our own human constitution. In that sense, 
dialogue is not (only) where we meet and agree or disagree on arguments that we have prepared 
beforehand. Instead, it is where we realize that what we fundamentally are is the result of our 
‘being with others’, which we can realize in communication. This communication is just the 
external tool for expressing the transformations of our identities in the activity of dialogue, 
which is modifying our positions - themselves elaborated on the ground of a shared knowledge 
- and directed to values. In view of the transformative process operating at all levels (at least in 
Daya Krishna’s account), liberation is the ever-going realization of our humanness rather than 
an escape from it,915 which Banerjee also conceives as such when he continues: 
                                                 
913 Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 148. 
914 Banerjee, 153. 
915 See Shail Mayaram’s interpretation on Daya Krishna’s view of freedom: “In a letter to Bettina Bäumer, Daya 
Krishna wrote, “The realm of the spirit seeks ‘freedom’ from (…) any ‘externality’ to which it is essentially bound 
as it is what it [is and] wants to know in order to be ‘freed’ from it.” For Daya Krishna, freedom also had to be 
woven into the everyday. In conversations I had with him, he frequently emphasized the importance of distancing 
oneself from the lived world, from what one had read, from sensual experience. (…) It was that which put us in 
touch with the power of our own self-consciousness. Freedom for Daya Krishna, however, is not an I-centric 
consciousness focused on its own self-aggrandizement or possessive individualism. In ‘Eros, Nomos, Logos’, he 
writes both of Kant’s famous essay ‘Perpetual peace’ and the Gītā, articulating a vision of freedom involving 
responsibility, repeated effort, and the cultivation of an other-centric consciousness. It is only through nomos or 
dharma, he argues, that an ‘I can become truly human. The “structure of self-consciousness must involve an 
awareness of the ‘other,’ of multiple others, and an obligation towards them not to hurt or harm or injure [them] 
in any way whatsoever, if not help them to the extent one can, in becoming ‘freer,’ better, more ‘other-centered’ 
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“But then, one should not be so over-zealous as to construe liberation as contradictory to 
individuality, because individuality cannot be contradicted except by its own annihilation, 
which is absoluteness of a kind or else vacuity śūnya916, in either case conspicuous for its non 
human character, and because liberation is not worth the name unless it is not only not non-
human, but, on the contrary, is human, and human in the strictest sense.”917 
Thus, “liberation consists in the individual’s discovery of himself as a person” 918 . This 
discovery is further “solely and exclusively dependent upon the termination of an illusion, the 
illusory idea of oneself as a mere individual”919, which makes this discovery “unique” for 
Banerjee. In other words and closer to Daya Krishna: realizing the illusoriness of the illusion 
of I-centricity is a way towards liberation, which as we saw, unlike for Banerjee, is itself not 
realized but creates an interactive way between persons and individuals, I with others. Since we 
are “essentially persons” we cannot “become” persons920, which for Banerjee renders education 
negative since it simply un-does our original bondage rather than brings us to our original 
freedom. In contrast, he argues for a “re-education” “with a view to regeneration”921, i.e. a re-
                                                 
and ‘helpful’ in the best way one can.” This, he argues, is implied by the Gītā’s ideas of parasparam and śreyas, 
the former implying mutuality and a relation of perfect equality between self and other, whereas the latter bears 
connotations of universality and intersubjectivity.” Daya Krishna and Shail Mayaram, “Preface,” in Contrary 
Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), ix. 
916 vacuity, absolute non-existence: Banerjee’s condemnation is irrevocable and explicated in a footnote: “This 
refers to the boldest and yet the most absurd metaphysical speculation of the Mādhyamika Buddhists, which found 
in the concept of śūṇya the key to the understanding of the universe comprising the material world as well as 
human beings.” Ibid. For once, Daya Krishna has a more moderate interpretation of this vacuity, being part of the 
process, which becomes problematic only if one gets ‘stuck’ in it: “The two [identification and deidentification] 
are supposed to be diametrically opposed to each other, but a little reflection would show that each not only 
presupposes and involves the other, but that the so-called movement of ‘withdrawal’ or ‘turning away’ is there 
even in the awareness of the distinction between ‘this’ and ‘that’, or ‘I’ and ‘you’, or even ‘I’ and ‘me’. The 
capacity to ‘attend’ and to shift attention from one ‘object’ to another involves the deeper capacity of ‘withdrawal’ 
of attention, and is founded and rooted on it. On the other hand, the indefinite extensibility of distinction and 
differentiation creating the world of plurality is made possible only because there is what is formless and 
contentless, neither this nor that, the ultimate non-being, or śūnya or a-bhāva, which is encountered outside as 
‘emptiness’ that makes both plurality and motion possible, and within as ‘consciousness’ and ‘self-consciousness’ 
that make both ‘knowledge’ and ‘action’ possible at the human level. Freedom itself is only another name for this 
capacity, from ‘this’ to ‘that’, or from all that is ‘object’ and one’s relation to it, if one wishes to do so.” Daya 
Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 238–39. 
917 Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 153. 
918 Banerjee, 153–54. 
919 Banerjee, 154. 
920 Banerjee, 155. 
921 Banerjee, 162. 
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orientation of man on himself922 (in Banerjee’s words “on life and human affairs”923). However, 
I find Banerjee’s answers at this point unconvincing regarding the challenge that he addresses, 
his answer being formulated in terms of “principles of conduct” which are rather analyzed in 
his other word Knowledge, Reason and Autonomy. 924  Like Daya Krishna, he refuses to 
propound universal ethical norms which would contradict the different applications in various 
contexts, and rather conceives them as heuristic formulations, regulative for all human persons. 
This, in a way, is akin to values functioning as regulative ideals applicable to all but variable in 
contexts. Nevertheless, although we could dialogue about or within the regulative principles of 
conducts, they seem to contain a formal fixity which would be conterproductive for dialogues 
as elaborated here. I believe consequently that it is rather in the communication itself with others 
that Daya Krishna sees freedom instead of in any formal principle: 
“Yet, in spite of all these, consciousness proclaims its independence and freedom from them 
[bondages of all sorts created by the body and the mind] and an essential ‘joyfulness’, which 
nothing can suppress as unless it were there, there will be neither freedom nor joy in the world. 
The realizations that it is so, in spite of all the appearances to the contrary, is both a challenge 
and an opportunity to see that the world which is constituted by ‘consciousness-in-inter-
relationship’ should also be a world where freedom and joy should be realized to the maximum 
extent possible. 
The difficulties and the impediments in this realization emanate from two factors: one, that it 
is not sufficiently realized that what is involved in the acceptance of the reality of independent 
multiple centres of consciousness which are all, at the metaphysical level, equally ‘free’ and 
capable of peace, happiness and joy in both ‘aloneness’ and ‘relationship’. The second obstacle 
that stands in the way of the creation of such a world is the lack of realization, or even and 
[sic.] active denial, of the fact that both joy and freedom are dependent on and conditioned by 
the freedom and joy of the other. Consciousness, it should be remembered, are both 
interdependent and in essential communication with one another so that the condition of one 
affects to some extent at least, the condition of the others.”925 
However, Daya Krishna’s analysis suffers with regard to Banerjee’s of the opposite defect. 
Indeed, although Banerjee refuses to systematize rules of conducts or ethical norms providing 
                                                 
922 Chatterjee interprets this concept of regeneration in Banerjee from the point of view of another work, which 
also justifies his principles of conduct: “Here and there in his writings there is a suggestion that meditation on the 
principles of conduct might serve to humanize man. At the same time Banerjee’s humanistic metaphysic clearly 
concerns man as an agent, for to bring about a new worder is precisely what he conceives the task facing man to 
be. By the time we reach his book The Future of Religion (1981) it seems that the whole theme of the essentiality 
of man to his fellows is the theme of religion conceived in a humanist way, or alternatively expressed, it is the 
theme of liberation. Man bears the promise of being regenerated in this life. The exposition of the concept of 
essentiality in fact gives us a twentieth century version of the life of the jīvanmukta but though through in inter-
personal terms and with a ground theme of love which perhaps emerges as the key to or basis for the three 
humanizing principles mention of which recurs throughout his writings. As such it provides a valuable and 
distinctively Indian style of humanism which, for a change, does not lean on the usual historic pillars of rationality, 
science or individualism.” Chatterjee, “Intersubjectivity and Essentiality,” 98. 
923 Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 162. 
924 Banerjee, Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy. An Essay in Philosophical Reconstruction., 260. See also 
Daya Krishna’s comment in Daya Krishna, “Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy.,” 206–8. 
925 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 161. 
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guiding rules for essentially realizing our bound with each other, his regulative principles 
nevertheless provide a general framework within which rules of conduct can be empirically 
developed. On the contrary, Daya Krishna, by emphasizing on the potentiality of the complex 
dynamics and the possible elaboration of different worlds, and by leaving all possibilities open, 
also refuses to answer in a way. There is thus theoretically not only no way to ‘force’ the 
essential realization to each other, since this would contradict the meaning of the inward 
realization. Also, there is nothing to externally motivate our willingness to engage with others, 
or integrate a diversity of others.926 His practice, on the other hand, has concrete limits but offers 
a way which can be further applied, which justifies my choice to integrate both sides in my 
analysis.  
It is in view of this correlation between theory and practice that I want to add a last element in 
the encounter between Daya Krishna and Banerjee. In spite of the final difference between the 
principles of conduct and Daya Krishna’s ‘open-end’, one element still connects both 
philosophers. This element relates to the re-education which implies regeneration for Banerjee: 
“The undoing of the predicament regarded as the goal of education can have nothing else 
primarily to depend upon except the inner development of human nature in the manner of the 
conquest of man’s inveterate self-alienation by his self-integration. Such a development, it is 
needless to point out, may be brought about only by an activity of the human mind, indeed the 
highest and the most perfect of its kind, which is competent to synthesize the authority of the 
realm of the personal as borne by Imagination with the power of Understanding and, through 
the good offices of Understanding, with the power of the passions. (…) The synthetic activity 
of the human mind, the possibility of which is envisaged here, is then the dynamism of the 
whole being of man, as distinguished from his usual state of self-alienation.”927 
Banerjee describes the synthetic activity between understanding and imagination, or in Daya 
Krishna’s words, ‘critical and creative faculties’, in terms of ‘the dynamism of the whole being 
of man.’ This synthesis demands an inner development to bring us to realize the essentiality to 
                                                 
926 It could be fruitful to combine here Daya Krishna and N. V. Banerjee’s plurality in the foundation of an 
empirical We with the Advaitin-inspired and also rather wordly oriented approaches on the ‘address’ to the other 
developed by Ramchandra Gandhi, also touched upon by Kalidas Bhattacharyya and inspiring later philosophers 
such as Arindam Chakrabarti. Their approach (allowing myself to combine different insights) focuses on the non-
coercive freedom of addressing the you, which might further enforce the invitation to a dialogue. I choose to focus 
here on the collective creation of worlds rather than on the ‘I’ versus ‘You’ pole of communication, i.e. on what 
emerges from the dialogue rather than on the gesture of inviting or entering You in the same dialogue. Further 
studies could show whether it is possible to relate the two, in particular in view of the reluctance expressed by 
Daya Krishna and N. V. Banerjee alike of the Advaitin insights. However, in their contemporary reinterpretation, 
acquaintances or combination of the two could explore a way to relate the differences of the former with the unity 
that addresses create between us to make ‘us’ no other than what I and you are together. Gandhi, I Am Thou: 
Meditation on the Truth of India; Ramchandra Gandhi, Presuppositions of Human Communication (Bombay - 
Calcutta - Madras: Oxford University Press, 1974); Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “Self and Others,” in Philosophy, 
Logic and Language (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd, 1965), 130–42; Arindam Chakrabarti, “Troubles 
with a Second Self: The Problem of Other Minds in 11th Century Indian and 20th Century Western Philosophy,” 
Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1, no. 1 (2011): 23–36; Arindam Chakrabarti, “Now, Kali! I Shall Eat 
You Up’: On the Logic of the Vocative,” in Ramchandra Gandhi. The Man and His Philosophy., ed. A 
Raghuramaraju (London ; New Delhi: Routledge, 2013), 194–208. 
927 Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 162–63. 
 
343 
 
each other which is for Banerjee an inter-communication. I find that this inner development 
responds to Daya Krishna’s emphasis on lifelong learning (and we know with Bettina Bäumer 
that Daya Krishna was himself a continuous learner, see 2.2.2), the desiderative form of which 
is found in the description of jijñāsu given in the precedent chapter (6.2). It is thus not surprising 
to find the same terms of ‘critical’ and ‘creative’ defining what learning means in Daya 
Krishna’s philosophy: 
“Man, thus, is the creature who has to ‘learn’ to be himself and this process of ‘learning’ is, as 
everybody knows, unending. It continues from generation to generation, and each generation 
has to pass what it has ‘learnt’ to those who have just entered the process of learning. Learning, 
however, is not what most people seem to think. It is not a dull, monotonous, unending 
repetition of what someone else has said, or done, but a creative adaptation of it in the light of 
the critical consciousness that is simultaneously aware of the changed circumstances in which 
what one learns has to be applied, and the inner inadequacies and inconsistencies within that 
which one has learnt.”928 
Thus, for Daya Krishna, the demand of humanness or of our imperfect and fallible human 
condition seeking to be what we are not, is best expressed as a demand for learning, which is 
everything but a school examination. This learning, for Daya Krishna, cannot be effectuated 
alone: we might read texts alone, but these texts have been passed through generations and 
cultures of different writers.929 In our critical and creative reading, we dialogue with them, 
asking them questions, trying to find preliminary answers to be further challenged.930 This 
learning is also present in Daya Krishna’s philosophical life: as explained in 2.1.2 and 2.2.2, 
the first and foremost motivation for the saṃvāda experiment was to ‘learn’ directly and without 
mediation from those who were trained in different traditions and had thus, different insights, 
methods, questions and answers to offer and to respond to. This learning is not necessarily 
textual for Daya Krishna who used to recite his texts and enter in philosophical conversation 
with everybody. It has thus the dynamic of the oral dialogue, the spontaneity of thinking in 
movement, which was studied with the dialogical experiments described in 3.2 and 3.5. Such a 
learning also answers to K. C. Bhattacharyya’s svarāj in ideas in the ‘synthetic activity’ (to 
refer back to Banerjee’s term) which is a creative adaptation in the light of critical 
consciousness. The synthesis can operate between any tradition and time, but it requires indeed 
the engagement of both critical and creative faculties. Finally and most importantly, this 
                                                 
928 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 236. 
929 See also Mehta’s interpretation of K. C. Bhattacharyya’s project, who does not comment on the specific reserve 
expressed in Svarāj in Ideas but rather on Bhattacharyya’s own hermeneutic method: “In a modern thinker like 
Bhattacharyya, open to the highest reaches of the Western philosophical tradition, the demand springs from the 
awareness that ancient texts communicate truth to us only insofar as we are able to translate them and re-think 
what they say in the language and idiom of the present, that a truth, to be eternal, must be ceaselessly reinterpreted 
and reformulated and thus made to withstand the exigency of time. It springs, above all, from the need for a creative 
response to the encounter of two traditions, each speaking a different language, each constituting a world-horizon 
in its own right, and of which a certain degree of fusion can be brought about only by the faith that the utterance 
of one's own tradition can sustain itself and even find a more satisfying articulation in an alien medium, in an 
alienated age.” J. L. Mehta, “The Problem of Philosophical Reconception in the Thought of K. C. Bhattacharyya,” 
Philosophy East and West 24, no. 1 (1974): 68–69, https://doi.org/10.2307/1397603. 
930 Raveh, “Text as a Process: Thinking with Daya Krishna”; Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” 8–10. 
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learning is open-ended and endless. It is literally a life’s project and the puruṣārtha of cultures 
through generations, thanks to which śāstric knowledge is produced, and thanks to the critical 
and creative interpretation of which the śāstric knowledge does not lose its dynamic for the 
illusion of a finality. These different aspects have been explored in the second part (II) of the 
present work’s investigation of a possible dialogical method developed out of the concrete 
practice of saṃvāda. 
This proposition demonstrates Daya Krishna’s originality: his metaphysical insights in the 
dynamic of consciousness (I consciousness, consciousness of the I, self-consciousness) in inter-
relation with other-consciousness, with different realms of consciousness, and with the world 
around is extremely complex. However, at the end of such a journey through illusions, there is 
neither the attraction for a transcendental realization nor a translation into ethical norms nor 
into any other formal and systematic theory. ‘Learning’ as a process for unveiling the human 
predicament might sound trivial and almost ‘unphilosophical’ for academic philosophy. And 
yet, after meandering through the complexity of the dimensions of consciousness, it is the path 
that Daya Krishna suggests. He did not seek to reach an impressive systematic order nor to 
promise any liberation in this or another world. He was rather interested in the appearing most 
simple ‘things’ like thinking, learning and dialoguing. No matter how trivial they sound, they 
remain the most difficult to realize from within the fullness of our consciousness and in 
essentiality with others, whoever they might be, whatever they know and howsoever they can 
express it. Daya Krishna was an idealist in the faith he had in philosophically dialoguing and 
thinking, but he was not elitist, and preferred to offer the most simple terms we have at our 
disposal to lead us towards the most challenging path (which professional academic 
philosophers sometimes forget).  
Daya Krishna ends his review of N. V. Banerjee’s Knowledge, Reason and Autonomy as 
follows:  
“Had these issues been raised during the lifetime of Professor Banerjee, he might have replied 
to them or reformulated his position in their light. Unfortunately, this is a posthumous work, 
published after his death. But he wrote many other work prior to this in which some of the key 
ideas developed in this book were sketched and which were published during his lifetime. 
However, the tradition of taking our thinkers seriously has hardly flourished in contemporary 
India. Let us hope that the philosophical community of this country can revive the past tradition 
of pakṣa and pratipakṣa, argument and counter-argument, in an on-going debate which 
sometimes lasted many centuries, if not millennia.”931 
This conclusion by Daya Krishna is typical for his way of precisely not-concluding but opening 
the end of a text for further investigations and in particular, calling for further dialogues. He 
does so by manifesting his hope for future debates across generations and philosophical 
traditions, his plea for contemporary discussions, notably on those thinkers whose texts have 
not achieved the critical reception and visibility that they deserve in the past, and his belief in 
                                                 
931 Daya Krishna, “Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy.,” 210. 
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the creative philosophical force of saṃvāda. The two first qualifications characterize saṃvāda 
as a critical and creative contemporary dialogue for the future of philosophy across traditions, 
with as many and as diverse participants as one can possibly reach. This forms the ideal defining 
‘open dialogue’ as saṃvāda, both in terms of participation, content and form, and ongoing 
process. At the very end of my own exploration, I can only make his plea my own and apply it 
back to Daya Krishna’s philosophy. This means, like him, not focusing on the regret that he 
himself is no more to respond to this work, but rather with the hope that further philosophers of 
any traditions and cultures will undertake the task of responding to and questioning, not 
necessarily this work, but Daya Krishna’s philosophical project defined as an ‘art of the 
conceptual’.  This also means hoping that his way of living saṃvāda can inspire others for 
creatively thinking further today in dialogue with him, with his contemporary interlocutors in 
India, and with others to come. Maybe here lies his conception of ‘I with others = We’, less in 
a speculative condition of human beings, but rather as a potential constitution of a community 
of thinkers, ready to engage with each other in all rational seriousness but also in the human 
essentiality that connects whoever is willing to enter in dialogue.  
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Conclusion: Saṃvāda from Practice to Theory and (endlessly) Back Again.  
 
“But whatever be the disputes and differences, one thing is certain and that is that 
intersubjective communication is932 the heart of ‘human reality’ and that knowledge, like 
everything else, has to accommodate itself to 'this' 'necessity' which paradoxically makes 
'freedom' not only 'visible' and 'alive' but also be felt933 and seen as934 lying at the foundation 
of all the other enterprises of man, including those that are designated by such terms as 
'spirituality' and 'religion'. 
Conversation, dialogue, debate and discussion are thus everywhere, not just in935 knowledge, 
but in all that man does or seeks, as in these man finds and feels and discovers what ‘being 
human’ is.”936
  
                                                 
932 T: to 
933 T: fast 
934 T: of 
935 T: the 
936 Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 34. The quote 
from this article is based on the unpublished transcript (T) typed by D. D. Mathur, which however has been 
corrected with the help of the original manuscript. The emendations are indicated above. 
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This work pursued objectives of different natures. At a metaphilosophical level in today’s 
academical world, it was motivated by the will to introduce the understudied philosophy of 
Daya Krishna into the more acknowledged realm(s) of intercultural, transcultural, crosscultural 
cultural and postcolonial philosophies. This means firstly to make his corpus readable to readers 
unfamiliar with his philosophical and academical context by confronting the differences of the 
postcolonial problems of Anglophone Indian academia with intercultural research originating 
from Europe. It furthermore implies to connect his philosophical motivations with the 
contemporary concerns of his generation. Secondly, attempting at the same time to highlight 
Daya Krishna’s singularity and creative contributions to these fields, I also wanted to pave a 
way into his own project and wide-ranging analyses, even (more) when they appear to be 
iconoclastic or when they cannot be said to be representative of his larger Indian academic 
context. His philosophy could seem miscellaneous at first glance, for which reason I chose to 
relate different topics of his studies by organizing them around the question of dialoguing across 
philosophical traditions. This enabled me first to introduce another important part of his 
philosophical life, namely the organization of dialogical experiments between different and 
rather isolated philosophical communities within India, interrogating the resources from these 
traditions in a contemporary way. I chose to connect these experiments with a question which 
I think permeates the whole of his philosophy in spite of the diversity of the topics. The guiding 
line of his immense corpus seems to me to consist in the persisting project of unveiling the 
presuppositions of thinking. How best to unveil one’s own presuppositions of thinking if not 
by dialoguing with other philosophers, trained by different methods, and thinking from 
resources retrieved from different traditions?  
I chose to begin with the first objective, i.e. to introduce his philosophical context to a wider 
audience in order to clarify some specificities of postcolonial Anglophone Indian philosophies 
(chapters 1 and 2) that explain Daya Krishna’s motivations to organize dialogical experiments 
(referred to as saṃvādas). Assembling the material to which I could have access, I described 
the preparation, settings and some intentions of these multifold saṃvādas in order to gain some  
insights for thinking intercultural dialogues from their practice (chapter 3). This practice was 
further developed by Daya Krishna’s philosophy, which however does not explicitly address at 
length the topic of dialogue and even less of intercultural dialogues. In inquiring into the 
different forms of presuppositions and their constitutions, I derived further concepts concerning 
the dialogical constitutions of knowledge and creativity. In connection with his dialogues, these 
concepts raise questions for thinking intercultural dialogues, and more specifically, what 
intercultural dialogues ought to reach, namely the creativity of intercultural knowledge 
(chapters 4 to 7).  
While these lines roughly describe the logical progression of this work, I now want to proceed 
in reverse to conclude it. The larger concern of intercultural studies has framed my approach of 
Daya Krishna’s philosophy, and the dialogical experiments have contextualized how I 
developed my analysis of his philosophy. Beginning by the end, I now want to start by 
connecting his theoretical inputs to his practical dialogues in the larger fields of cross-cultural 
studies.  
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Another question that made the transition between the practical experiments and the philosophy 
of Daya Krishna was raised in section 3.5, namely: is there a theory of dialogue, or a philosophy 
of intercultural dialogue in Daya Krishna? And how can we interpret the gap between such an 
intensive dialogical practice in which he was engaged throughout his life, and such comparably 
less explicit writings on ‘dialogue’ itself? I suggested a first hypothesis by interpreting the 
experiments themselves, suggesting in particular that, being constantly engaged in concrete 
dialogues and often writing as if conversing with philosophers, he might not have felt the need 
to theorize ‘dialogue’ as such: he rather lived in dialogues. Let me now come back to this point 
from the perspective of his philosophy.  
There is little explicit and systematic theory of dialogue in Daya Krishna’s philosophy. 
However, much of his philosophy expresses what dialoguing across philosophical traditions 
means when connected to the practice he was developing. This connection is found in concrete 
experiments with others and in his own writings. As it has been earlier noticed by his friends 
and further described here, Daya Krishna writes as a pūrvapakṣin, as the one raising counter-
positions. Not hesitating to denounce any presupposition, in the sense of beliefs, postulates and 
axioms necessarily entailed in a study, a field of research or an intellectual tradition (see chapter 
5), he is very often in a position of questioning and counter-arguing. He is in so doing exposing 
the implicit ‘givenness’ of what is actually self-constructed, the commonness of received ideas 
that have been accepted as ‘true’ by those who are located within the same (conceptual) 
structure (see section 7.1). Not unaware that he himself must presuppose some concepts and 
ideas, he is also always fostering questions and hoping for counter-positions to his own counter-
positions, for the ‘dialogue to go on’. In this sense, as he often repeats, he did not consider his 
own answers to be final or himself to be the holder of absolute truth-claims. His argumentation 
does not belong to him, as he says of knowledge in general. Each of his monographs, articles 
and dialogical experiments takes its signification from the reading of others, i.e. the questions 
that can be raised from it, or the further applications that could be derived from it. In that sense, 
his writings and his experiments are depending on how others engage with and contribute to 
them, i.e. on their dialogical potentialities. 
This gesture of counter-position, as a contemporary reinterpretation of the resourcefulness of 
the classical Indian dialectic traditions to think today (see 2.1), presents several advantages. 
Firstly, it enables to question the very foundation of any given system, thereby challenging the 
sense of certainty and fixity of any frozen pictures (see 2.1.2 and 6.2). Secondly, it refreshes 
philosophical curiosity, reinforces critical imagination and a creative, sympathetic usage of 
concepts without jettisoning traditions, resources from the past and their rigorous studies. It 
thus enables to shift the methodological debate on ‘exegetic carefulness’ versus ‘creative 
(mis)understanding’ into careful exploration and mutual clarification (see 4.1 and 6.2). It thirdly 
emphasizes less-heard aspects of the dialogical realm: the relevance of listening (see 5.2.1 and 
3.3.1), of witnessing the origin of one’s thought (see 5.3), the self-luminous awareness of the 
other’s position from within oneself (see chapter 7), and a detachment-via-engagement in 
philosophical dialogues. In other words, it describes how to let alternative positions emerge 
from the dialogue and overcome these alternatives into a mutual transformation (see 5.3). This 
constitutes the epistemological endeavor of chapter 5, although already there it was made clear 
that such a conception requires concepts such as ‘significance’ and ‘meaning’, which 
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necessarily imply a valuational dimension (chapter 6). It also implies an ontological reflection 
on the activity of consciousness, which ‘demands’ from within an intersubjective essentiality 
with some others who participate in a meaningful dialogue to create ‘philosophical worlds’ 
(chapter 7). This way of doing philosophy has far-reaching implications that open up new 
dimensions of what dialogue means, besides the linguistic account of translations. However, it 
does not go without some difficulties. Most importantly, Daya Krishna tends to expose other 
philosophies without building a systematic overview of his own and without reconstructing the 
full historical context of what he is discussing (see 3.5). This has often prompted specialists 
(most of the time historians or philologists) to reproach him inaccurate or incomplete details of 
his studies.938
To add an exegetic ‘footnote’ on classical texts was never his objective. Although he carefully 
analyzed any topic he was writing about, I do agree that his studies are often ‘incomplete’. In 
my reading, however, they are like that because they are conceived as conscious responses to 
others, i.e. they presuppose dialogical partners to whom Daya Krishna is responding. Thus, they 
take their incentive in discussions and dialogues, which Daya Krishna continues even in 
monographs. This can explain why I also chose to connect these last chapters to other 
philosophers, in particular to K. C. and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, as well as N. V. Banerjee, whom 
I find helpful to reconstruct a ground on which counter-positions can be raised. It also justifies 
why I announced in the preface that there could be many other interlocutors, and thus, many 
other ways of reading Daya Krishna. The range of his dialogical partners is too wide to be 
encompassed in a single work. In any case, I do not think that it is possible to read Daya Krishna 
‘alone’ for he constantly invites his readers to look elsewhere and he himself writes with others 
in mind. In other words, he is constantly dialoguing while writing. Thus, for his reader, a more 
encompassing framework would be needed to understand or imagine positions he is counter-
arguing against. It also enables to ground his counter-positions, namely to understand more 
fully ‘what’ he is reacting against. In other words, I find it useful to draw a ‘position’ from his 
‘counter-attitude’ or contrary thinking, in need of a positively ground to engage ‘against.’ (see 
5.3.1 on negation in dialogue), even if these positions are to be momentary and questioned 
again. In addition, as also frequently mentioned, Daya Krishna never aimed at a conclusion. 
Being a specialist of open-ended writings that conclude in exploring further research, this 
incompleteness is a way to keep the dialogue going and an invitation to think further. His 
incompleteness thus reflects how he conceives of dialogue (see the openness in the different 
dialogical experiments in 3 and in connection to presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions 
from chapter 4 to 7).  
For the charge of ‘inaccuracy’ above mentioned, which I believe can be made, I think however 
that Daya Krishna was exploring another sense of accuracy, which should be seen in an 
interdisciplinary and intercultural perspective. For Daya Krishna, who viewed himself as a 
philosopher, the task was to show the ‘inaccuracy’ of some presuppositions of thinking, rather 
than the inaccuracy of the particular details within an already defined field of study. This is in 
                                                 
938 For instance with Karl Potter and Rajendra Prasad respectively on mokṣa and puruṣārtha. For Potter, see Potter, 
“Indian Philosophy’s Alleged Religious Orientation”; Potter, “Are All Indian Philosophers Indian Philosophers?” 
and Daya Krishna in Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006, 57. For Prasad, see 6.1 and Prasad, “Daya Krishna’s 
Therapy for Myths of Indian Philosophy.” 
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particular indicated by his description of the ‘myth’ of Indian philosophies. In general, his 
virulent critique of any fixed thought (see chapter 2 and 5) shows how he conceives of 
‘inaccuracy’. For him, accuracy is not limited to applying a sense of validity conceived from 
within a system, a discipline or a tradition. Thus, it cannot deductively follow the premises of 
a study, for a study is relying on its own presuppositions, which are left untouched by the 
validity that operates from within. In that sense, Daya Krishna was more concerned about 
questioning the field (including the context from which the field is constituted, namely its 
tradition, implying socio-political-cultural-historical aspects of it) in which one is located. This 
extends to the method that one uses, the perspectives that it brings, and the presuppositions and 
illusions of one’s thinking. If the conclusions that he reaches are sometimes too fast and 
provoking, they rather aim at producing this ‘shock’ of the confrontation with others (fields, 
scholars, concepts) and the wonder so crucial for philosophical thinking. While using him 
within a micro-study to contribute to one’s already-oriented knowledge might be insufficient, 
this insufficiency originates from the fact that he precisely questioned this very way of 
proceeding - thus, he might not be easily adaptable to such footnotes. It is therefore, in his own 
words, “as an outsider” (see the introducing quote of chapter 2) that he chose to approach a 
problem. In other words, he provokes us to question this sense of accuracy that we tend to 
consider as given from within our tradition, academic background, cultural identity and history, 
etc. It is in such a perspective that I made his philosophy a resource for intercultural theories, 
for it contributes to the difficulties that intercultural dialogues unveil, namely the lack of ‘one’ 
criterion upon which to evaluate other theories which are located ‘outside’ one’s philosophical 
tradition. This, in practice, constitutes one of the incentives for the saṃvāda experiments 
between disciplines and philosophical traditions. The cross-cultural approach practiced is not 
the one of comparatively juxtaposing parallel presentations, or a collection of different articles 
from various traditions on a common topic. It is conceived in terms of conceptually broad 
questions and specific answers, positions and counter-positions from different standpoints 
related by what he calls the ‘universality of knowledge’ (see 5.2.1). This universality implies 
the common seeking for knowledge of participants who engage together and mutually into an 
explorative thinking. Such a practice avoids again the problem of ‘understanding’ (see in 
particular chapter 7) the other as other, or how to understand the resources from within the 
tradition when we do not belong to this tradition. It rather contributes to a productive effectivity 
of what originates from ‘each-other’, i.e. from a ‘we’, which can highlight unforeseen questions 
and problems.  
Another apparent difficulty of his approach as a pūrvapakṣin is that Daya Krishna remains 
conditioned by the positions against which he is arguing, namely by seeing through the other. 
As I mentioned in section 5.2.2, by critically questioning Kant and the Advaitin inspiration of 
philosophers such as K. C. Bhattacharyya for instance, he unveils some presuppositions entailed 
in their philosophies, notably a critique of the transcendental unity and other forms of illusions 
contained in the transcendental conception. This occurs due to a certain shift of perspective. 
However, by refusing to construct any synthesis out of his counter-position, he does not leave 
behind the structure as such. Unveiling the presuppositions of a position does not necessarily 
enable us to traverse the framework through which the other was thinking, since this first 
requires to genuinely understand and defend his/her position to the best of one’s ability 
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(according to Daya Krishna’s interpretation of pūrvapakṣa). In so doing, outlining the others’ 
limits does not necessarily reach a third perspective or an alternative system. It is most likely 
that Daya Krishna was aware of this limitation, which would explain at a practical level why 
he constantly enlarged the dialogue with many different partners, curious to explore further 
standpoints (see chapter 3). It also, I think, led him to encourage other narratives (see 2.2.2, 3.1, 
6.2.2) and alternatives, and even more, to carefully suggest the limits of alternatives which are 
made of ‘A or B’ (as a critique of the Bhattacharyyas, see 5.3.2). Refusing the choice entailed 
in the ‘or’ while being at the same time aware that A and B are needed conceptual resources to 
think further, he proceeded in extending to C, D, etc. Finally, although by definition a counter-
position is not able to provide a synthesis or a conclusion, Daya Krishna’s device and practice 
of pūrvapakṣa makes it possible to leave room for underestimated aspects of creative 
knowledge in dialogue. Rather than focusing on the sublation (Aufhebung) to be reached, he 
outlines the movement from A to B (and so on), which brings attention for instance to the 
relevance of ignorance as a condition to seek to know (jijñāsa) (6.3). This implies that 
knowledge is not constituted by established positions, but by a tension between resources and 
the dissatisfying awareness that something more or different ought to be reached, i.e. a desire 
which implies the realization of ignorance as what moves us - and the dialogue - further.  
This already shows how such a simple ‘device’ of counter-position can unfold further 
dimensions of the dialogical, and how counter-position is not simply a rhetorical tool to win an 
argument, but an engagement with others for creative knowledge. One can also see that in Daya 
Krishna, practice and theory stand together, because his conception of counter-position 
corresponds to his own writings, and furthermore, to the organization of many saṃvādas. He 
concretely prepared series of questions ready to tackle the ‘givenness’ of certain concepts and 
positions, e.g. to consider the intellectual dimension of Bhakti, which apparently would deny 
it, and there, to stand ‘against’ any tradition, while at the same time, getting influenced by it 
(when speaking of bauddhika saṅkīrtana, for instance, see 3.3.2) Such an account of ‘creative 
knowledge’ in dialogue, described as a ‘positive’ ideal, seems to include what we usually 
consider as impediments, such as ignorance, inaccuracy or incompleteness.  
I further articulated the second part around three concepts: presuppositions (5), dissatisfactions 
(6) and illusions (7). Presuppositions can bring about prejudices, dissatisfactions rather connote 
a negative unfulfillment, and illusions can be associated with errors. Can they really be used as 
a foundation for thinking dialogues? Are these rather negatively connoted concepts really a 
theoretical ground that we can relate to Daya Krishna’s dialogical practise, the one that arouse 
enthusiasm among its participants for the sense of discoveries that it enabled (see 3)?  
I demonstrated in chapters 4 to 7 how each of these concepts, apparently being the cause of 
epistemological difficulties, could indeed be interpreted as the source of creativity of 
knowledge constituted in dialogue. If we accept dialogue across traditions to be a form of 
investigation on our own illusions, since they can unveil what is taken for granted in our 
approach to a philosophical problem, then the awareness of our own presuppositions, 
dissatisfactions and illusions constitutes a first step of the dialogical engagement. If we further 
grant others the capacity of questioning our presuppositions and illusions, and of making us feel 
the dissatisfaction of our apprehensions with regard to what we achieve or what remains to be 
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achieved together, we begin to see the unfolding of what dialogue means for Daya Krishna: an 
arduous path through my and others’ presuppositions and illusions, engaged together as seekers 
of knowledge. This orientation towards knowledge is itself to be corrected through the 
dissatisfactions between the theories conceived and their imperfect realizations (chapter 6). The 
knowledge that it strives for is also subjected to continuous revisions in a critical and creative 
intersubjective process from seekers grounded in different traditions. Accepting such a 
definition does not seem to be very ‘fulfilling’ in the first place, since it mostly exposes a 
number of obstacles. I used to describe dialogue in these lines the terms ‘arduous, 
presuppositions, illusions, corrected, dissatisfactions, imperfect, revisions’. Can such a list 
really account for the promise of a ‘critical and creative intersubjective process from seekers 
grounded in different traditions’? Does that mean that we reach such knowledge only when we 
overcome all these obstacles, and in particular when presuppositions, dissatisfactions and 
illusions are solved? 
Dialogues across traditions are not only a method to make us realize our parochiality, biases 
and prejudicial errors, even if they also enable this important perspective. They enable it 
furthermore by exploring what these prejudices entail rather than by simply erasing them in 
view of reaching a more inclusive sense of truth upon which all could agree. In this sense, the 
overarching objective is not to solve the problems related to these concepts, but to transform 
them into investigations that can lead to new formulations, insights and methodological 
revisions. Thus the source of this creativity of knowledge that is constituted in dialogues does 
not lie in the cumulation of different perspectives exposed parallelly to present the multifold 
dimension of a concept, but in the confrontation of different knowledges. In so doing, the 
creativity is not constituted by an addition of standpoints from different traditions which can 
mirror our own lacunae, but by the tension that originates by navigating through 
presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions.  
A few remarks can explain this point. The basic idea underlying this assumption is that the 
uncertainty that is implied in these three concepts creates the dynamic of knowledge, a dynamic 
which describes how dialogue proceeds. Presuppositions can cause fallacies and illusions 
blindness when they are not investigated. They can also generate new questions and 
perspectives when they are carefully unveiled by a confrontation from different standpoints. 
This process does not erase the possibility that new presuppositions and illusions originate, 
which can then again be questioned. This gives rise to the feeling of dissatisfaction. This feeling, 
combined with an inquiry into the generated presuppositions and illusions, describes how 
dialogue proceeds. For this to happen, however, I emphasized one illusion in particular, which 
seems to me to be the condition for the dialogical process to be unfolded: the illusion of I-
centricity, which is the illusion of seeing myself as an absolute subject around which others 
gravitate as objects (of my knowledge) (see 7.3). To this illusion corresponds also the tendency 
to consider that what I belong to is the center around which others gravitate in my periphery. 
The difference between the two is that the latter is influenced by political, social, historical and 
cultural forces, so that it is rather my identification to a larger world which is configured. For 
example, if I identify my ‘I’ as belonging to the cultural world ‘India’, I might not conceive of 
my ‘I’ as a centre in the philosophical realm (due to the persisting Eurocentrism examined at 
length in chapter 2). I might however associate my ‘I’ with a centre in the art. Thus, others will 
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be seen as objects of my consciousness gravitating around me, which I tend to further organize 
in different hierarchical peripheries. This creates a sense of absoluteness in the I further 
complexified in the different cultural realms with which I identify myself - the complexity of 
which, in a postcolonial world, creates such feelings as ‘cultural alienation’, ‘estrangement’, 
etc. as described by Indian philosophers in chapter 2. 
Overcoming this illusion demands an ontological analysis of the structure of consciousness 
which was done in chapter 7 in order to reveal the constitution of a ‘We’ through which the 
dialogue is possible. This constitution is the one of subjectivities based on the interactivity of 
which knowledge originates at first, in listening, correcting, counter-questioning. In other 
words, the creativity that is sought cannot originate from an artificial setting, the ethical 
framework of the discussion being enforced upon its participants. It also cannot lie in a purely 
linguistic account, a word-game or technical translation to render the same. It cannot rely on a 
consensual understanding that presupposes pre-determined rules within which validity cannot 
be deducted. On the contrary, it is connected to a form of life, which consists in an 
intersubjective world. In this sense, creativity originates within consciousness, ‘self-luminous’ 
in K. C. Bhattacharyya’s term, a consciousness which is however in interaction with others. In 
other words: creativity originates from the tension between their plurality and the unity of my 
consciousness, but also between my engagement in the world and my (momentary) withdrawal 
to witness the origin of my and other’s thoughts within me. This tension operates further 
between the ideal apprehension of something and the dissatisfaction of its concrete realizations, 
that the dialogue moves on (see chapters 6 and 7). There is thus no reconciliation possible as 
well as no sublation (Aufhebung), for clearing up this tension would bring the dialogue to an 
end. In that sense, the contradictory positions, seekings and valuational directions as well as the 
contradictions originating from the sense of absoluteness of my subjectivity in contrast with the 
other’s sense of absoluteness, are necessary. These, in return, imply to jettison any unitary 
concept of truth, finality and solution, for they cannot be articulated in such a contradictory 
plurality. In practice, it also implies to accept ‘failures’, i.e. dissatisfactions.  
Articulating dialogue around three rather negatively connoted concepts highlights the ‘risk’ of 
the knowledge that originates in this encounter: such a knowledge is perfectible, incomplete, 
uncertain, fallible. Considering this risk as a challenge however avoids idealizing dialogue. For 
Daya Krishna, dialogue does not occur out of grace and does not designate an ideal form of 
communication, something that was first hinted at by the apparent hierarchical form of the  
introductory presentation of the forms of communication (1.1). This hierarchy implicitly 
operating in discourses on philosophy of dialogue (see the ‘mismeeting’ with Friedman on this 
point in 6.2 and 6.3), as well as the idea of a harmony in intercultural dialogue, is not what Daya 
Krishna suggests. There is a regulative idea in the direction suggested by vāda even if the truth 
aimed at cannot be singular for Daya Krishna. This ideal remains present in the idea of 
dissatisfaction as the seeking that motivates us to enter in a dialogue. But the dialogues 
themselves are happening through experiments which entail silence, miscommunication and 
misunderstanding. This does not mean that dialogues have no limit otherwise. As Daya Krishna 
said and as it was demonstrated in the concrete limits of the experiments (3 and 6.3), there are 
periods of rest where a session stops. Similarly during a dialogue, not everything finds an 
answer, not every proposition is responded to, and not everything is creative. It is however in 
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the practice - tentative and imperfect - that one can evaluate its limits. It is furthermore from 
the apprehension of these limits afterwards, from new ideas for improvement, or other 
directions that the dialogues continue. These limits rather show the arduous task of dialogues 
between traditions, navigating between conceptual structures that are difficult to translate and 
to render usable in different contexts, between the different persons and the personal efforts to 
be made to create a welcome atmosphere, between the prejudices, the standards and norms that 
one must deconstruct to create alternatives. Conversely, a theory of dialogue cannot be detached 
from this process of correction, since the idea of dialogue is itself affected by the praxis. In 
Daya Krishna’s sense, dialogues can be only a path. The destination can be conceived ideally 
as a regulative direction, but precisely the arrival signifies the end of dialogue and, for Daya 
Krishna, the end of philosophy. This is in particular reflected in the manifoldness of the 
dialogical experiments, both in the ‘laboratory’ of ideas of the regular Jaipur experiments and 
the ‘blog’-type questions of the JICPR (chapter 3), as well as in the continuous self-reflection 
that prepares and further develop the saṃvāda experiments, and in the exposition of their 
conditions and contexts in chapter 2. 
Finally, a word should be added on what I chose not to do, and what could remain to be 
explored, or in Daya Krishna’s sense, an ‘agenda for further research’. First, it should be clearly 
stated that I used and described the saṃvāda experiments as a source of inputs for thinking 
dialogue rather than by focusing on their individual topics. Thus, I used their contents, in 
particular concerning the Bhakti dialogue, only to the extent that it was helpful to delineate 
components of what constitutes dialogue. In this case, I discussed the relevance of the location 
and the performative idea of investigating intellectually the non-intellectual dimension of 
Bhakti. I thus strongly limited the given philosophical contents to their more encompassing, 
and maybe more formal, contribution as dialogues across traditions. It would have been possible 
to explore the dialogical dimension via an intensive study of one philosophical theory in a 
dialogue, namely from the point of view of their content. This could be further explored, for 
instance in analyzing how the bilingual discussion of Russellian propositions influenced both 
Naiyāyikas and analytical philosophers. This definitely remains to be done in order to locate 
the precise enthusiasm and feeling of discovery that originated from it. However, such an 
account would have rendered an overview impossible, since it would have already constituted 
an independent study. I was rather concerned with unfolding the correlated dimension of the 
‘dialogical movement’: its development, preparation, organization, context and further 
applications, in order to illustrate the dynamic of dialogue in practice. It is for me this dynamic, 
from one experiment to the next, from one dialogical setting to the introduction of another 
column in the JICPR, which constitutes an impulse for Daya Krishna’s philosophy. I also do 
not imply that these were the only ones, and I tried to give an idea of their wide range by 
mentioning unpublished dialogues, and diverse forms, as far as I could have access to further 
materials. My aim was here thus not to fix them into historical examples, as an endeavor by 
now completed, which to any reader would appear contra-productive to Daya Krishna’s idea of 
dialogue. I rather wanted to introduce the reader to their diversity - of topics, participants, 
dialogical forms, locations and contexts. This was motivated first for reconstituting parts of a 
memory that might with the years slowly fade away, and even more to convey a sense of what 
the dialogues consisted of to non-participants. With regard to the larger academic context, I 
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wanted to insist on the necessity of connecting dialogical theory and practice with the 
intercultural context, which I regard as a current lacuna in the philosophical academic world. 
The latter seems globally more concerned with producing systematic theories rather than 
experimenting different intercultural dialogues, necessarily laborious and subjects to 
dissatisfactions. In return, with Daya Krishna’s philosophy, I argued that these experiments also 
influence the development of his concept of dialogue, which I emphasized above with the 
necessity of including the challenge of presupposition, illusion and dissatisfaction into a 
philosophy of dialogue.  
Secondly, the reader might wonder how it is possible, for an analysis on dialogue across 
traditions, to elaborate so little on linguistics and translations. In particular after emphasizing 
the feeling of subjection originating from the hegemony of the English language in the Indian 
academia, this question should be addressed (2.2.1). On the one hand, the postcolonial linguistic 
alienation strongly motivated the whole endeavor, the necessity of bilingual or trilingual 
communication, as well as further publishing in Hindi or Sanskrit. On the other hand, in spite 
of the occasional description in the saṃvādas of a situation where there was a linguistic 
miscommunication, there are very few traces of the specific difficulties that multilingual 
encounters could have arisen. It enabled more inclusion, diversity of participants, as well as in 
general to bring attention to the richness of Sanskrit philosophies. Thus, the difficulties concern 
rather the setting-up, in terms of invitation and location of different communities, than the actual 
philosophical encounter, where the communication does not seem to have been felt as a source 
of impediment. As I also discussed with participants, the specificities of languages matter in 
concrete conceptual cases (see 3.3.1) for applying a Sanskrit category to an English one, but it 
was successfully spoken by different participants not to be felt as an obstacle. Probably due to 
this, although Daya Krishna wrote on grammar and language, this aspect did not seem to me to 
highlight his more crucial contribution to think dialogue. I thus more strongly focused on the 
latter with an analysis of presuppositions of ‘thinking’. It is rather the problems of ‘truth-claim’, 
the authority of ‘values’, the ‘fixity’ of an idea or the sense of absoluteness of the ‘I’ that create 
challenges for dialogues. Further, in line with other philosophers of his time, like N. V. 
Banerjee, I on the contrary felt a certain reluctance to reduce philosophy, knowledge and 
dialogue to their linguistic aspects. I interpret this as a counter-position to the strong 
Anglophone analytical philosophy received in India, and possibly also to the analytical Indian 
philosophies done in England or America (following B. K. Matilal). K. C. and Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya insist on the necessity of plural expressions, however rather correlated to a 
certain idea of transcendental unity; Chubb, Barlingay, Pande, Banerjee, all rather insist on an 
‘anthropocentric’ view of knowledge including values in certain societies and cultures, 
combined with different ideas of freedom and constitution of the human condition. Thus, I 
refrained from restricting dialogue to the question of translation or bilingual expressions, and 
rather reflected on the ‘human’ idea of creative knowledge. Although in practice, such a 
knowledge is expressed in different conceptual structures in different languages, which is a 
source of creativity, it is not in the technical translation that it is are expressed, but rather in the 
wider worldviews that it entails. In so doing, knowledge is ‘moving’ through a plurality of 
languages that express different positions, merged in an intersubjective seeking. It is this ‘move’ 
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that I tried to articulate. Whether the ‘move’ itself is different if we consider solely Daya 
Krishna’s writings in Hindi in conversation with Hindi interlocutors, remains to be explored. 
Similarly, I made use of Daya Krishna’s reinterpretation of Sanskrit terms such as pūrvapakṣa 
and puruṣārtha as conceptual forms that enable the inclusion of other dialogical dimensions. 
The former has been described above, namely the epistemological implications of conceiving 
philosophy as counter-position, while the latter was used in particular to highlight the ideality 
of apprehending something to be realized (the significance of the ‘ought’) with regard to the 
deceptive realization of the ‘is’. Similarly, saṃvāda was related to the classical rhetoric, as an 
inspiration that however does not reduce any experiment to the classical format of rhetoric 
(2.1.1). I wanted to highlight the contemporariness of Daya Krishna’s thoughts and his ability 
to make use of resources in a creative way. This indeed is the core of the present work. There 
is, on the other hand, much more to be done: not only could one make philological uses of his 
research on classical Indian philosophies, but also locate the points of intermingling which give 
rise to creativity. This work argued in this sense, however from another direction. Instead of 
tracing back Daya Krishna’s reinterpretation to Sanskrit sources, I tried to think ‘dialogues 
across traditions’ from the contemporary reinterpretation of these concepts. I did not try in 
particular to historically trace the roots and the historical steps of these reinterpretations, but 
focused on what they can philosophically offer us today to think and practice dialogue. 
This has consequences for considering the ‘Indianness’ of this study. I do not consider Daya 
Krishna’s philosophy as uprooted from its philosophical context, neither do I see him as an 
authentic preserver of a particular tradition. There is something ‘Indian’ in the emphasis on the 
‘way’ towards ‘knowledge’, in the productive ‘negativity’ of dissatisfactions and ‘illusions’, in 
the ‘intellectual detachment’ and in the insistence on the ‘human’ conception of knowledge 
implying values and ontology. But stating this is as true as it is reductive and vague. For this 
reason, it is to no avail to classify his philosophy under a certain label, may it be Indian or 
Western, and to presuppose a radical postcolonial epistemological rupture from different 
classical traditions. Maybe it is precisely this what makes cosmopolitan or ‘hybrid’ philosophies 
so difficult to be globally received, for they escape the categorization that we tend to forcefully 
apply. They present a distinctiveness that is perceptible, but they are already dislocated enough 
so that characterizing them from the point of view of the classical traditions from which they 
are partially issued amounts to reducing these traditions. And yet, it is from this indecisiveness 
and, in a way, this freedom to navigate between traditions, that they offer creative insights made 
of different inspirations and flexible frameworks which can do justice to none of the traditions 
from where their inspiration originates if they are taken in isolation. It is the combination of 
different networks of concepts that provides their originality and creativity. In such a 
perspective, Daya Krishna is neither an Indian Philosopher who is not an Indian philosopher 
(to paraphrase Karl Potter’s designation939), nor a Western philosopher who is not a Western 
philosopher. He precisely belongs to those who, as uncomfortable as it can be for philosophers 
wishing to categorize evertyhing, are located in-between traditions, able to counter-question 
several of them.  
                                                 
939 Potter, “Are All Indian Philosophers Indian Philosophers?” 
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Finally, among these cosmopolitan philosophers and free thinkers beyond a single tradition, 
there would be much more to be explored between Daya Krishna’s dialogical approach and his 
own counter-positions, in particular the Advaitin oriented approach of K.C. and Kalidas 
Bhattacharyya, Ramchandra Gandhi and their followers. I located N. V. Banerjee in between, 
critical like Daya Krishna of a transcendental attraction of unity. He however himself poses the 
worldly ‘we’ as a metaphysical foundation of the human condition that does not escape all sides 
of such an attraction, in particular a sense of absoluteness. In so doing, I chose to relate Daya 
Krishna’s intersubjectivity to this ‘we’ and focused on the possibility of creativity to emerge 
from this ‘I with others’. I suggested in 7.3 further connections, in particular to the concept of 
‘addressing’ of Ramchandra Gandhi, which could be seen as an invitation to take part to this 
realm of the personal. I also connected in particular Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s concept of 
alternation to Daya Krishna’s plurality of standpoints along with the critiques addressed by the 
latter to the finality of a choice, which also implies a certain sense of absoluteness. The concepts 
of ‘address’, of ‘listening’, of ‘demand’ of consciousness as well as the self-luminous 
witnessing of the other’s thought, the awareness within me of the other, are resources that 
deserve further attention. They indicate alternative ways of relating to the other from within 
dialogue, and of inviting the other within me - however without negating the differences of 
these others ‘within’ me. They enable further possibilities for articulating differences and 
identities of others and myself, in relation with each other. While Daya Krishna is more 
confrontative in thinking a ‘counter’-position, I argued that the relatedness that emerges from 
the ‘counter’ is also a way to welcome other positions in a dialogue. This, however, operates in 
the mutual creation of a dialogue, i.e. from the point of view of its effectuation. Engaging further 
into a mutual dialogical transformation would require investigating a step forward into the 
‘within’, i.e. in the other within me rather than ‘I with others’. Finding a way to effectuate such 
a move without falling into a metaphysical, transcendental account denying differences (in 
Daya Krishna’s sense), and without loosing the dynamic of differences seeking together the 
universality of a knowledge which remains plural, remains a further investigation. In any case, 
such a dialogue between Daya Krishna and his peers would contribute to constructing identity 
in difference and differences in identity in dialogue, a crucial question for intercultural 
discourses.  
At a meta-philosophical level, the further directions to be explored point at the diversity and 
relevance of contemporary philosophers who refuse to have the last word on any philosophical 
or cultural subject matter. The advantage of Daya Krishna lies precisely in the possibility to 
confront his counter-positions with himself and with other interlocutors. This ensures that the 
dialogue can continue, and it shows how rich its forms can be. It moreover tells us how much 
resources can be used from those who are able to navigate between traditions. Immersed in 
different worlds, their philosophical contributions for intercultural discourses are truly 
invaluable. They never imply to ignore or radically break out of one or several traditions and 
their classical canons. Instead, these thinkers’ ingenuity and sensibility to reflect within and at 
the same time across different traditions, without an ‘allegiance’ to preserve any of them as they 
are historically conceived, is the source of much philosophical creativity and continuity. I hope 
that the emergence of different fields of inter-cultural and cross-cultural studies will not remain 
limited to the introduction and comparison of the immense classical traditions from which they 
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got inspired. I hope that these fields will also acknowledge the intellectual and creative richness 
of these free travelers in between cultures. Their original positions, methodological tools, 
counter-perspectives and alternative ways of thinking can provide the global community of 
philosophers with fresh insights. These insights, however, are only receivable in the ongoing 
activity of open dialoguing. 
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Appendix 1 – Report on the Workshop on “Texts and Their Interpretations” 
Held at Jaipur from 26th to 31th March, 1992 (unpublished)* 
 
* My acknowledgement to Daniel Raveh and Dor Miller who shared these documents in Daya 
Krishna’s correspondence with me. 
 
“The Workshop on “Texts and their Interpretations was held at Jaipur from 25th to 31st March, 
1992, both days inclusive. 
 
SUBJECTS:  
The subjects chosen for the workshop were the following: 
1. Philosophy. 
2. Sociology. 
3. History. 
4. Sanskrit. 
5. English. 
6. Linguistics. 
 
INSTITUTIONS: 
The letters of invitations informing about the workshop were sent to the Head of the 
Departments of the above subjects of the following Universities: (copy of the Invitation Letters 
enclosed as Annexure ‘A’: 
1. Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. 
2. Andhra University, Waltair. 
3. University of Bombay, Bombay. 
4. University of Delhi, Delhi. 
5. Gujarat University, Ahmedabad. 
6. University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad. 
7. Jadavpur University, Calcutta. 
8. Karnatak University, Dharwad. 
9. Lucknow University, Lucknow. 
10. University of Madras, Madras. 
11. University of Mysore, Mysore. 
12. Osmania University, Hyderabad. 
13. Panjab University, Chandigarh. 
14. University of Poona, Pune. 
15. Rajasthan University, Jaipur. 
16. Utkal University, Bhubaneswar. 
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17. Visvabharati, Santiniketan. 
18. I. I. T., Kanpur. 
19. M. L. Sukhadia University, Udaipur. 
20. J. N. Vyas University, Jodhpur. 
21. Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur. 
Replies were received from the following Departments: 
1. Philosophy: 
a) Utkal University, Bhubaneswar. 
b) University of Madras, Madras. 
c) University of Poona, Pune. 
d) University of Mysore, Mysore. 
e) I. I. T., Kanpur. 
f) University of Panjab, Chandigarh. 
g) University of Bombay, Bombay. 
h) University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad. 
i) Andhra University, Waltair. 
j) J. N. Vyas University, Jodhpur. 
k) Visvabharati, Santiniketan. 
2. English: 
a) University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad. 
b) University of Delhi, Delhi. 
c) Visvabharati, Santiniketan. 
3. Sociology: 
a) Osmania University, Hyderabad. 
b) Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur. 
4. History: 
a) Gujarat University, Ahmedabad. 
b) Visvabharati, Santiniketan. 
c) Panjab University, Chandigarh. 
5. Sanskrit: 
a) Panjab University, Chandigarh. 
b) Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. 
c) University of Delhi, Delhi. 
d) Jadavpur University, Calcutta. 
e) Osmania University, Hyderabad. 
f) University of Mysore, Mysore. 
g) Gujarat University, Ahmedabad. 
h) Utkal University, Bhubaneswar. 
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i) University of Poona, Pune. 
j) University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad. 
k) M. L. Sukhadia University, Udaipur. 
 
 
PARTICIPANTS: 
Thirty-five persons were selected (as per list enclosed – Annexure ‘B’) from the applications 
received. Out of these twenty-four candidates actually participated. The names of those who 
could not participate have been crossed out in the enclosed list.  
 
PURPOSE OF THE WORKSHOP: 
The main purpose in this workshop was to acquaint the participants with regard to the notion 
of a text and the problems of its interpretation.  
 
METHODOLOGY:  
As the workshop was an innovative experiments in changing the attitudes of the participants 
towards all that they read, it was tentative and experimental in character. A meeting of possible 
Resource persons was, therefore, held prior to the workshop to acquaint them with the purpose 
of the workshop and the possible methodologies that could be adopted keeping in mind the 
radical differences in the disciplines from which the participants were expected to come for the 
workshop. This preliminary meeting was useful in more ways than one, as it not only acquainted 
the possible Resource persons with the experiment we were proposing to conduct, but also 
resulted in various concrete suggestions regarding the ways in which the workshop could be 
organized. Some of these suggestions were tried during the workshop.  
As a result of this preliminary meeting it was felt that the possible participants could be 
informed beforehand not just [about] the purpose of the workshop, but also asked to engage in 
a prior exercise of this kind even before coming to the Workshop so that they may become 
acquainted with the new approach, at least to some extent before they arrive for the workshop. 
In pursuance of these objectives, the passages from Plato were selected and sent to the 
participants along with a letter asking them to perform the following exercise in respect of the 
texts which were sent to them: 
1) What were the questions or problems to which they (the texts) would be the possible 
answers or solutions? 
2) What are the questions that you can possibly raise with respect to the passages given to 
you? 
3) What are the deficiencies that you find in the contentions made in the paragraphs given 
to you? 
4) In what directions could you possibly develop the thought given in the passages? 
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5) How would you answer the question or solve the problem independently of the way it 
has been attempted or answered in the text given to you. 
They were also asked to send the results directly to us even before coming to the Workshop 
(Annexure ‘C’). Responses were received from many of the participants before the start of the 
workshop and it helped them to some extent in understanding the purpose of the workshop. 
However, as many of the participants wrote to us seeking further clarification regarding the 
nature of the workshop, a brief statement was prepared stating the nature of the experiment in 
which they were supposed to be involved and in which they were to actively participate during 
the workshop (‘Annexure ‘d). 
The Resource persons were requested to prepare the materials to be used as ‘texts’ for entire 
experimentation during the workshop. They were photocopied and given to the participants as 
soon as they arrived along with the instruction that they should go through the material and do 
the exercise before the actual sessions devoted to those subjects started in the workshop. A list 
of material prepared and given to the participants on the various subjects is enclosed herewith 
as Annexure ‘E’. 
The planning of the workshop was divided into two major parts one, the presentation of 
general introduction to the new approach to the texts which was to be experimentally 
demonstrated at the workshop and information regarding the diversity of the notion of the 
‘texts’ and ‘interpretation’ which has emerged in recent times, particularly in the field of 
Literature, Law, Medicine and History. Attempt was also made to divide the texts on which the 
participants were supposed to work in the sessions into two groups. The first type of ‘texts’ 
consisted of material which all the participants could reasonably be expected to understand and 
respond to. The other type of ‘texts’ were more specialized and only those who belonged to the 
subject concerned were expected to work upon them.  
We also tried to divide the groups according to subjects on the first day and found that it 
would be better if all the participants were present in each of the sessions rather than be 
segregated into different groups. 
The workshop benefitted immensely from the presence of Prof. T. N. Madan, a well-known 
Sociologist from the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi and Prof. Satish Chandra, the wekk-
known Historian of Medieval India from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The 
other outstanding personality who addressed the participants was Dr. P.K. Sethi, the 
internationally known Orthopedic Surgeon from Jaipur who gave the participants as well as 
others present, a new insight into the idea of treating the patient as a “text” whose symptoms 
were to be “interpreted” involving all the usual problem along with some specific ones 
belonging to the situation. Similarly we had a very interesting lecture from Prof. T. 
Bhattacharya, Professor of Law, at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, on the judicial 
interpretation of legal and non-legal texts in cases that come before the Court for decision.  
There was an interesting presentation from Dr. (Mrs.) Sharada Jain, Professor at the Institute 
of Development Studies, Jaipur regarding the problem of interpretation of social reality in the 
context of social action, particularly when it is concerned with its transformation.  
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They were a number of problems arising from the fact that the participants belonged to different 
disciplines and also because the problem of interpretation differed from subject to subject. But 
as is evident from many of the letters received from the participants, it seems that the inter-
disciplinary nature of the workshop added a dimension to it which, otherwise, it would have 
lacked. It enlarged the awareness of the participants in a way which a workshop devoted to one 
or two subjects alone would not have done.  
In case such workshops are to be held in future, the preparations should be done well in advance 
so that the “texts” are sent to the participants beforehand and they be asked to work on them 
before coming to the workshop. At the workshop the discussion could then be concentrated on 
the results of their different responses arising from the texts in the context of the new approach 
suggested to them. Also, the workshop should last perhaps for a week rather than just four days, 
as it was felt that the time was too short for real active work to be done during the time we had 
at our disposal. The material prepared for this workshop could be utilized with additions and 
alterations, where necessary.  
Daya Krishna 
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Appendix 2 - Discussion on the ‘Gauhati Meeting’ 
(Addressed to Shri Kireet Joshi, Chairman, Indian Council of Phil. Research, New Delhi) 
14th February, 05 
Dear Shri Kireet Joshi, 
It was nice meeting you and Prof. Vyas and discussing the possibility of organizing the Gauhati 
meeting in a way that would be different from the usual one which is adopted, as a matter of 
routine, by almost every institution that organizes such things. 
We may try some ‘new’ experiments, a few of which are mentioned below: 
We may divide the ‘experiment’ in two major divisions: 
1. Indian Philosophy and (2) Western Philosophy. 
In Indian Philosophy we may write to selected candidates in advance and ask them to write 
independently on the subjects assigned to them which they should bring when they come to the 
meetings: 
(a) Mīmāṁsā Sūtra 2. 4. 8. and the discussion on it in Śābara-bhāṣya (Gaṅgānāth Jhā’s 
translation). 
(b) The discussion in Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra 1. 3. 34 to 38 and its comparison 
with the discussion on the same issue on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra 6. 1. 4. onwards in Śābara-bhāṣya 
(op. cit.).  
(c) The whole of the discussion on Brahma Sūtra 3. 4. 1. in Śaṅkara Bhāṣya is to be analysed 
and commented upon. 
(d) The discussion in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad between Yājñavalkya and Janaka. In the fourth 
adhyāya in the first chapter and the discussion between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyi in Vth 
Brahmana of the IVth Adhyāya. 
(e) The following section from Chāndogya Upaniṣad: Fourth section of fourth chapters: the 
story of Satyakama Jabala and the story of Swetketu in the third part of the fifth chapter. 
(f) Taittiriya Upanisad, Siksawalli, Brahmawalli and Bhrghuwalli. 
Western Philosophy 
(a) Hegel’s refutation in his Science of Logic, Chapter 2 Section (C), para (b), Remark 2 of 
Kant’s arguments given in his Antinomy of Reason in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
(b) Kant’s arguments in the Transcendental Analytic in his Table of Judgement and the 
Categories of Understanding. 
(c) “Kant’s Doctrine of the Categories, Some Questions and problems’ Daya Krishna, JICPR. 
Vol. XVIII No. 4. P. 1-11. 
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(d) Interpreting Metaphysical Deduction: A Hermeneutic Response to Professor Daya 
Krishna’s Essay ‘Kant’s Doctrine of Categories: Some Questions and Problems” Binod Kumar 
Agarwala. JICPR Vol XIX No. 3. P/109-154. 
(e) “Binod Kumar Agarwala’s Response to Daya Krishna’s Essay on Kant’s Categories, R. S. 
Bhatnagar. JICPR Vol. XIX No.4 P/137-147. 
(f) A Reply to R. S. Bhatnagar’s Essay “On Binod Kumar Agarwala’s Response to Daya 
Krishna’s Essay on Kant’s Categories’ published JICPR Vol. XIX No.4. JICPR. XX. No.3 
P/194-213.  
(g) Reaction to Comments made by Binod Kumar Agarwla on my Essay (JICPR, Vol. XIX NO. 
4) on his Response to Daya Krishna’s Article on Kant’s Categories (JICPR XIX No. 3). R. S. 
Bhatnagar. JICPR Vol XX No. 4. P/176-179. 
(h) Aristotle’s Distinction between kinds of necessity. 
(i) The analysis of the statement “X is Good” by Moore and Stevenson.  
(j) Wittgenstein’s arguments against the Self-evidence of ostensive definitions.  
Photocopies of these have to be sent in advance to the person selected for commenting on them. 
Groups of five to ten may be choosen to comment on the basis of one or two of them. 
The list is only illustrative and the Council may choose others for this or other seminars and 
workshops that it may hold.  
As for the other idea that we discussed and which was earlier experimented upon at Jaipur we 
may do the following: 
The students may be divided in groups of five or more and given one or two pages or even a 
few paragraphs from original texts of outstanding philosophers and asked to answer the 
following: 
(a) What is the question or the problem which the author is trying to answer or solve here? 
(b) Do you consider the answer or the solution satisfactory? If not, why not? 
(c) How would you extend the thought expressed in these pages/paragraphs further? 
(d) What would be your own answer to the question or solution of the problem concerned? 
(e) What are your grounds for thinking your solution is more satisfactory than that of the author? 
In case you have any difficulty in getting photocopies of the material mentioned above, I can 
send them to you. 
With regards, 
Yours sincerely, 
Daya Krishna 
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Appendix 3 - Daya Krishna’s Bibliography 
 
Daya Krishna authored and/or edited more than 20 books, and published about 200 articles. 
Prolific and heteroclite writer, he touched upon any philosophical topic, but also wrote on 
literature, sociology and economics. At a time where online resources and open access were 
limited, many articles are not available online, and very rarely in libraries, in particular outside 
India. To tally this difficulty, some monographs have tried to compile some of Daya Krishna’s 
important contributions, including posthumously by his colleagues and students (articles 
republished in monographs are indicated with ‘*’; articles republished in monographs that could 
not be located in their original publications are not indicated independently).  
This bibliographical list has been conceived on the basis on my own research and thanks to the 
‘Bio-Data’ document initially prepared by D. D. Mathur and provided by Asha Mukherjee. I 
thank here Shaked Eshach and Daniel Raveh for their corrections. This bibliography has been 
published on the Daya Krishna Online Library: https://www.dayakrishna.org/bibliography 
 
I. Authorship of books 
 
1. The Nature of Philosophy, Prachi Prakashan, Calcutta, 1955.  
2. Planning, Power and Welfare, The Office for Asian Affairs, Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, Delhi, 1959. 
3. Considerations towards a Theory of Social Change, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1965. 
4. Social Philosophy: Past and Future, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 
1969. 
5. Political Development: A Critical Perspective, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1979. 
6. Gyāna Mīmāṃsā, Rajasthan Hindi Granth Academy, Jaipur, 1980. 
7. Paschimi Darshan Ka Itihas, Vol. I & II, Rajasthan Hindi Granth Academy, Jaipur, 
1987.  
8. with Fred W. Riggs, Development Debate, Printwell Publishers, Jaipur, 1987. 
9. The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze over Three Decades, 
Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Munshiram Manoharlal 
Publishers, Delhi, 1989.  
10. Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991, 
1996. Revised and enlarged edition published by Sri Satguru Publications, 2006.  
11. The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, 
Society and Polity, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1996.  
12. Indian Philosophy: A New Approach, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1997. 
13. Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, Munshiram 
Manoharlal Publishers, Delhi, 1997. 
14. New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, Rawat Publishers, Delhi and Jaipur, 2001.  
15. Developments in Indian Philosophy from the Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical 
and Western, Vol. X Part. 1 of History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian 
Civilization, General Editor D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Centre for studies in Civilizations, 
Delhi, 2002. 
16. Bhārtīya Darśana: Eka Nayī Dṛṣṭi, Rawat Publishers, Delhi and Jaipur, 2004.  
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17. The Nyāya Sūtras: A New Commentary on an Old Text, Sri Satguru Publications, 
Delhi, 2004.  
18. Bhāratīya Evaṃ Pāshcātya Dārshanik Paramparāṃ, UGC ASIHSS Program, 
Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University and Literary Circle, Jaipur, 2006.  
(Indian and Western Philosophical Traditions: Collected Essays by Daya Krishna in 
Hindi, edited by Yogesh Gupta.) 
19. Contrary Thinking, Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, Ed. By D. Raveh, N. Bhushan & 
J. L. Garfield, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011. 
20. Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia, SAGE, Delhi, 2012. 
21. Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, Centre for Studies in 
Civilizations & Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, Delhi, 2012. 
22. Agenda for Research in Indian & Western Philosophy, (Vol 1 & 2), edited by R.S. 
Bhatnagar and Yogesh Gupta, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan and 
Literary Circle, Jaipur, 2013. 
 
II. Edited Volumes 
 
1. Daya Krishna (Ed.), Modern Logic: Its Relevance to Philosophy, Impex India, Delhi, 
1969. 
2. -, Indian Education Today: Prospects and Perspectives, Rajasthan University Press, 
Jaipur, 1970. 
3. -, with A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastava, The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, 
Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, Poona, 1978/1977.  
4. -, with A. M. Ghose, Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian 
Perspectives, Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, Poona, 1978. 
5. -, with B. V. Kishan, What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy, Andhra 
University Press, Waltair, 1978. 
6. -, India's Intellectual Traditions, Attempts at Conceptual Reconstructions, Indian 
Council of Philosophical Research in association with Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 
1987. The book includes, besides other contributions, two essays by Daya Krishna, 
‘The Search for a Conceptual Structure of the Nāṭyaśāstra’ and ‘India’s Intellectual 
Tradition: An Overview’. 
7. -, with K. L. Sharma, The Philosophy of J. N. Mohanty, Indian Council of 
Philosophical Research, Delhi, 1987. 
8. -, with M.P. Rege, R. C. Dwivedi, and Mukund Lath, Saṃvāda, A Dialogue between 
Two Philosophical Traditions, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1991.  
9. -, with K. Satchidananda Murty, History, Culture and Truth: Essays presented to 
Professor D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Kalki Prakashan, Delhi, 1999.  
10. -, with Mukund Lath and Francine E. Krishna. Bhakti: A Contemporary Discussion—
Philosophical Explorations in the Indian Bhakti Tradition, Indian Council of 
Philosophical Research, Delhi, 2000.  
11. -, Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Vedānta, Mīmāmsā and Nyāya, Indian 
Council of Philosophical Research, Delhi, 2004. 
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III. Articles 
 
1. Daya Krishna, ‘The Experiential Standpoint in the Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo’, The 
Sri Aurobindo Annual, Pondicherry (1948). 
2. -* ‘An Attempted Analysis of the Concept of Freedom’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 12 (4) (June 1952), pp. 550-556. 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103615) 
3. -* ‘Some Considerations on F. S. C. Northrop’s Theory of Concepts’, The 
Philosophical Review Vol. 61, No. 3 (July 1952); pp. 392-399. 
4. -* ‘Assumptions in the Social Sciences’, Ethics Vol. 63, no. 2 (January 1953), pp. 
137-139. 
5. - ‘An Experiment in Democracy’, Quest (1954). 
6. -* ‘Mysticism and the Problem of Intelligibility’, The Journal of Religion, 34 (2) 
(April. 1954), pp. 101-105. 
7. - ‘Social Change - An Attempt at a Study in Conflicting Patterns of Social Action’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (4) (1954), pp. 567-573. 
8. - ‘Investment, Priorities and Planning’, The Eastern Economist (September 23, 1955). 
9. -* ‘Surplus Value, Profit and Exploitation’, The Review of Economic Studies Vol. 22 
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